Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, descendants of the Herzog Collection's owner, claimed that following World War II the Hungarian government entered into bailment agreements with them to retain possession of the Collection and later breached those agreements by refusing to return the artwork. Hungary appealed the district court's partial denial of its motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs cross-appealed the dismissal of their claims to eleven pieces of artwork on international comity grounds. The court found Hungary's arguments unpersuasive and affirmed the district court's partial denial of its motion to dismiss. However, because the court agreed with plaintiffs that the district court prematurely dismissed several of their claims on international comity grounds, the court reversed that portion of the decision.View "De Csepel, et al. v. Republic of Hungary, et al." on Justia Law

In 2003, Russell, the sole occupant and pilot of an Agusta 109C helicopter, died after his helicopter crashed in Illinois. Russell, a resident of Georgia, was living in Illinois and working for an Illinois air ambulance service operating in the Chicago area. The helicopter was manufactured in Italy in 1989. The trial court dismissed claims against SNFA, a French company that manufactured a custom tail-rotor bearing for the helicopter, for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that Agusta and its American subsidiary, AAC, effectively operated as an American distributor for the tail-rotor bearings in the U.S. market and that SNFA custom manufactured the bearings at issue specifically for Agusta. By engaging a business entity located in Illinois, SNFA undoubtedly benefitted from Illinois’ system of laws, infrastructure, and business climate and has the requisite minimum contacts with Illinois for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction. The exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable; Illinois has an indisputable interest in resolving litigation stemming from a fatal Illinois helicopter accident.View "Russell v. SNFA" on Justia Law

Morning Mist appealed from the judgment of the district court affirming the order of the bankruptcy court, which determined that the debtor had its "center of main interests" (COMI) in the British Virgin Islands (BVI), and therefore recognized debtor's liquidation in the BVI as a "foreign main proceeding" under 11 U.S.C. 1517. To determine the proper COMI, the court considered the relevant time period for weighing the interests, and the principles and factors for determining which jurisdiction predominated. The court concluded that the relevant time period was the time of the Chapter 15 petition, subject to an inquiry into whether the process had been manipulated. The relevant principle was that the COMI lies where the debtor conducts its regular business, so that the place was ascertainable by third parties. The statute included a presumption that the COMI was where the debtor's registered office was found. Among other factors that could be considered were the location of headquarters, decision-makers, assets, creditors, and the law applicable to most disputes. Applying these principles, the court affirmed the decision of the district court recognizing the BVI liquidation as a foreign main proceeding.View "Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys" on Justia Law

After the Republic of Argentina defaulted on its external debt, NML, one of its bondholders, prevailed in 11 debt-collection actions filed against Argentina in New York. To execute its judgments, NML sought discovery of Argentina’s property, serving subpoenas on nonparty banks for records relating to global financial transactions. The district court granted motions to compel compliance. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting Argentina’s argument that the order transgressed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602. The Supreme Court affirmed; the FSIA does not immunize a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor from post-judgment discovery of information concerning its extraterritorial assets. The FSIA replaced factor-intensive loosely-common-law-based immunity with “a comprehensive framework for resolving any claim of sovereign immunity” so that any sort of immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in a U.S. court must stand or fall on its text. The FSIA established jurisdictional immunity, section 1604, which was waived here. FSIA execution immunity under sections 1609, 1610, 1611, generally shields “property in the United States of a foreign state” from attachment, arrest, and execution. Nothing forbids or limits discovery in aid of execution of a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor’s assets. Even if Argentina is correct that section 1609 execution immunity implies coextensive discovery-¬in-aid-of-execution immunity, there would be no protection from discovery a foreign sovereign’s extraterritorial assets. Section 1609 immunizes only foreign-state property “in the United States.” The prospect that NML’s general request for information about Argentina’s worldwide assets may turn up information about property that Argentina regards as immune does not mean that NML cannot pursue its discovery. View "Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd." on Justia Law

Residents of Argentina sued Daimler, a German company, in a California federal district court, alleging that Mercedes-Benz Argentina, a Daimler subsidiary, collaborated with state security forces during Argentina’s 1976–1983 “Dirty War” to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill MB Argentina workers, related to the plaintiffs. They asserted claims under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, and under California and Argentina law. Personal jurisdiction was predicated on the California contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA), another Daimler subsidiary, incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in New Jersey. MBUSA distributes Daimler-manufactured vehicles to independent U.S. dealerships, including some in California. The district court dismissed. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that MBUSA, which it assumed to fall within the California courts’ all-purpose jurisdiction, was Daimler’s “agent” for jurisdictional purposes. The Supreme Court reversed. Daimler is not amenable to suit in California for injuries allegedly caused by MB Argentina outside the U.S. California’s long-arm statute allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent permissible under the U. S. Constitution. Even if California is home to MBUSA, Daimler’s affiliations with California are not sufficient to subject it to the general jurisdiction of that State’s courts. The proper inquiry is whether a foreign corporation’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Neither Daimler nor MBUSA is incorporated in California; neither has its principal place of business there. If Daimler’s California activities sufficed to allow adjudication of this case in California, the same global reach would presumably be available in every other state in which MBUSA’s sales are sizable. View "Daimler AG v. Bauman" on Justia Law

Wiley, an academic publisher, often assigns to its foreign subsidiary (WileyAsia) rights to publish, print, and sell Wiley’s English language textbooks abroad. WileyAsia’s books state that they are not to be taken (without permission) into the U.S. When Kirtsaeng moved to the U.S., he asked friends to buy foreign edition English-language textbooks in Thai book shops, where they sold at low prices, and mail them to him. He sold the books at a profit. Wiley claimed that Kirtsaeng’s unauthorized importation and resale was an infringement of Wiley’s 17 U.S.C. 106(3) exclusive rights to distribute its copyrighted work and section 602’s import prohibition. Kirtsaeng cited section 109(a)’s “first sale” doctrine, which provides that “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title ... is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.” The district court held that the defense did not apply to goods manufactured abroad. The jury found that Kirtsaeng had willfully infringed Wiley’s American copyrights and assessed damages. The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that section 109(a)’s “lawfully made under this title” language indicated that the “first sale” doctrine does not apply to copies of American copyrighted works manufactured abroad. The Supreme Court reversed; the “first sale” doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully made abroad. Section 109(a) says nothing about geography. A geographical interpretation of the first-sale doctrine could re¬quire libraries to obtain permission before circulating the many books in their collections that were printed overseas; potential practical problems are too serious, extensive, and likely to come about to be dismissed as insignificant—particularly in light of the ever-growing importance of foreign trade to America. View "Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

After the Republic of Argentina defaulted on its external debt, NML, one of its bondholders, prevailed in 11 debt-collection actions filed against Argentina in New York. To execute its judgments, NML sought discovery of Argentina’s property, serving subpoenas on nonparty banks for records relating to global financial transactions. The district court granted motions to compel compliance. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting Argentina’s argument that the order transgressed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602. The Supreme Court affirmed; the FSIA does not immunize a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor from post-judgment discovery of information concerning its extraterritorial assets. The FSIA replaced factor-intensive loosely-common-law-based immunity with “a comprehensive framework for resolving any claim of sovereign immunity” so that any sort of immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in a U.S. court must stand or fall on its text. The FSIA established jurisdictional immunity, section 1604, which was waived here. FSIA execution immunity under sections 1609, 1610, 1611, generally shields “property in the United States of a foreign state” from attachment, arrest, and execution. Nothing forbids or limits discovery in aid of execution of a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor’s assets. Even if Argentina is correct that section 1609 execution immunity implies coextensive discovery-¬in-aid-of-execution immunity, there would be no protection from discovery a foreign sovereign’s extraterritorial assets. Section 1609 immunizes only foreign-state property “in the United States.” The prospect that NML’s general request for information about Argentina’s worldwide assets may turn up information about property that Argentina regards as immune does not mean that NML cannot pursue its discovery. View "Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd." on Justia Law

Residents of Argentina sued Daimler, a German company, in a California federal district court, alleging that Mercedes-Benz Argentina, a Daimler subsidiary, collaborated with state security forces during Argentina’s 1976–1983 “Dirty War” to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill MB Argentina workers, related to the plaintiffs. They asserted claims under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, and under California and Argentina law. Personal jurisdiction was predicated on the California contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA), another Daimler subsidiary, incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in New Jersey. MBUSA distributes Daimler-manufactured vehicles to independent U.S. dealerships, including some in California. The district court dismissed. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that MBUSA, which it assumed to fall within the California courts’ all-purpose jurisdiction, was Daimler’s “agent” for jurisdictional purposes. The Supreme Court reversed. Daimler is not amenable to suit in California for injuries allegedly caused by MB Argentina outside the U.S. California’s long-arm statute allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent permissible under the U. S. Constitution. Even if California is home to MBUSA, Daimler’s affiliations with California are not sufficient to subject it to the general jurisdiction of that State’s courts. The proper inquiry is whether a foreign corporation’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Neither Daimler nor MBUSA is incorporated in California; neither has its principal place of business there. If Daimler’s California activities sufficed to allow adjudication of this case in California, the same global reach would presumably be available in every other state in which MBUSA’s sales are sizable. View "Daimler AG v. Bauman" on Justia Law

Wiley, an academic publisher, often assigns to its foreign subsidiary (WileyAsia) rights to publish, print, and sell Wiley’s English language textbooks abroad. WileyAsia’s books state that they are not to be taken (without permission) into the U.S. When Kirtsaeng moved to the U.S., he asked friends to buy foreign edition English-language textbooks in Thai book shops, where they sold at low prices, and mail them to him. He sold the books at a profit. Wiley claimed that Kirtsaeng’s unauthorized importation and resale was an infringement of Wiley’s 17 U.S.C. 106(3) exclusive rights to distribute its copyrighted work and section 602’s import prohibition. Kirtsaeng cited section 109(a)’s “first sale” doctrine, which provides that “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title ... is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.” The district court held that the defense did not apply to goods manufactured abroad. The jury found that Kirtsaeng had willfully infringed Wiley’s American copyrights and assessed damages. The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that section 109(a)’s “lawfully made under this title” language indicated that the “first sale” doctrine does not apply to copies of American copyrighted works manufactured abroad. The Supreme Court reversed; the “first sale” doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully made abroad. Section 109(a) says nothing about geography. A geographical interpretation of the first-sale doctrine could re¬quire libraries to obtain permission before circulating the many books in their collections that were printed overseas; potential practical problems are too serious, extensive, and likely to come about to be dismissed as insignificant—particularly in light of the ever-growing importance of foreign trade to America. View "Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Johnson Controls, a Wisconsin manufacturer of building management systems and HVAC equipment, and Edman Controls entered into an agreement giving Edman exclusive rights to distribute Johnson’s products in Panama. In 2009, Johnson breached the agreement by attempting to sell its products directly to Panamanian developers, circumventing Edman. Edman invoked the agreement’s arbitration clause. The arbitrator concluded that Johnson had breached the agreement and that Edman was entitled to damages. Johnson sought to vacate or modify the arbitral award, challenging the way in which the award took account of injuries to Edman’s subsidiaries and the arbitrator’s alleged refusal to follow Wisconsin law. The district court ruled in Edman’s favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and upheld the district court’s award of attorney fees. View "Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Edman Controls, Inc." on Justia Law