Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Sumontinee Sridej, a Thai citizen, was accused of defrauding her employer in Thailand of approximately $4 million worth of electronics between 2013 and 2015. She left Thailand in January 2015 and moved to Las Vegas, Nevada. In 2022, Thailand requested her extradition under the extradition treaty between Thailand and the United States. The U.S. government filed a complaint seeking her arrest and extradition, and a magistrate judge certified her extradition in January 2023. Sridej then filed a habeas corpus petition challenging her extradition, which the district court denied, allowing her to renew her claim after the Secretary of State made a formal extradition determination.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied Sridej’s habeas corpus petition and her subsequent motion to reopen the case under Rule 60(b). The district court found that the Secretary of State had granted Thailand’s extradition request and that the Secretary had considered whether Sridej would face a risk of torture if extradited, as required by the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and its implementing regulations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s order. The Ninth Circuit held that the Secretary of State had properly considered the risk of torture in compliance with CAT’s regulations. The court found that a declaration by an Attorney Adviser at the Office of the Legal Adviser for the Department of State was sufficient to establish that the Secretary had fulfilled his obligations. The court also held that the declaration did not need to be signed by the Secretary or a senior official and did not require a case-specific explanation for the extradition decision due to the doctrines of separation of powers and non-inquiry. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Sridej’s Rule 60(b) motion. View "SRIDEJ V. BLINKEN" on Justia Law

Webuild S.P.A., an Italian investment company, formed a consortium with other companies to work on the Panama Canal expansion project. After the project's completion, Webuild initiated an arbitration against Panama under the ICSID, alleging that Panama breached its obligations under a bilateral investment treaty by providing incomplete information and making unfair financial demands. Webuild sought discovery from WSP USA, which had acquired the project's engineering consultant, Parsons Brinkerhoff.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York initially granted Webuild's ex parte application for discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. However, following the Supreme Court's decision in ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., which limited § 1782 to governmental or intergovernmental tribunals, the district court vacated its order and quashed the subpoena. The court concluded that the ICSID arbitration tribunal did not qualify as a governmental or intergovernmental entity under § 1782.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling, agreeing that the ICSID tribunal did not exercise governmental authority as required by § 1782. The court noted that the tribunal was formed specifically for the arbitration, funded by the parties, and its members had no official governmental affiliation. Thus, the ICSID tribunal did not meet the criteria established by the Supreme Court in ZF Automotive for a "foreign or international tribunal" under § 1782. View "Webuild v. WSP USA Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Saad Aljabri, a former Saudi Arabian government official, who alleges that a group led by the current Saudi Prime Minister and Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud, plotted to kill him after he relocated to Canada. The district court dismissed Aljabri's claims, finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over most of the defendants, and that Aljabri had failed to state a claim against two others.The district court found that due to the burden on bin Salman to litigate in the United States and Saudi Arabia’s greater procedural and substantive interest, the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over bin Salman would not meet “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” The court also determined that the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute did not provide “specific” personal jurisdiction over other defendants because Aljabri failed to sufficiently align their alleged business activities in D.C. with the plot against his life. The court denied Aljabri's request for jurisdictional discovery, finding that any information revealed in the discovery would not change the court’s conclusion that exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendants would be unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims against Saudi Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud, albeit for a different reason: his immunity from suit. However, the court held that the district court did abuse its discretion in denying Aljabri’s motion for jurisdictional discovery outright. The court therefore reversed the district court’s order denying jurisdictional discovery, vacated the judgment of dismissal with respect to two defendants, and remanded for jurisdictional discovery. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against two other defendants for the reasons given by the district court. View "Aljabri v. Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the ownership of a painting by Bernardo Bellotto, which was sold under duress by Max Emden during the Nazi persecution of Jews prior to World War II. The painting was later found in a salt mine in Austria by the Monuments Men, a group of U.S. military officers tasked with facilitating the restitution of art stolen by the Nazis. The painting was mistakenly sent to the Netherlands to fulfill a claim by a gallery in Amsterdam, but the painting was actually a replica painted by Bellotto himself, not the gallery's version. The painting was eventually sent to the United States and is currently housed in the Museum of Fine Arts in Houston. The heirs of Max Emden, the original owner, are seeking to recover the painting.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, which dismissed the claim due to the act of state doctrine. This doctrine prohibits U.S. courts from questioning the actions of a foreign government, in this case, the Dutch government's decision to send the painting to the United States.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that the act of state doctrine applies in this case. The court held that any evaluation of the painting's ownership would require questioning the Dutch government's actions, which is prohibited by the act of state doctrine. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the doctrine should not apply because the Dutch government's actions were not official, there would be no negative impact on foreign relations, and the act was not solely within the Netherlands. The court concluded that the act of state doctrine bars U.S. courts from questioning the validity of the Dutch government's actions. View "Emden v. Museum of Fine Arts" on Justia Law

The case involves a Ukrainian couple, Yasamin Karimi and Roman Tereshchenko, who divorced and disputed custody of their two children. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Tereshchenko agreed to Karimi removing the children from Ukraine for safety reasons, but requested that she bring them to him in Dubai. Instead, Karimi took the children to undisclosed locations, including the United States. Tereshchenko filed a petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction for the return of the children. The District Court granted Tereshchenko’s petition and ordered the children returned to him in France, where he was currently residing.Karimi appealed the decision, challenging the District Court's jurisdiction and arguing that Tereshchenko had consented to the children's removal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's jurisdiction and rejected Karimi's argument that Tereshchenko had consented to the children's removal. The Court of Appeals also found that the District Court had erred in determining that the children would not be exposed to a grave risk of harm if they were returned to western Ukraine. However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court was permitted to order the return of the children to Tereshchenko in a third country, France, as a temporary measure due to the grave risk of harm in Ukraine. The case was remanded to the District Court to modify the order to maintain the Ukrainian courts’ authority over an ultimate custody determination. View "Tereshchenko v. Karimi" on Justia Law

A German citizen, Asli Baz, filed a suit under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) to compel Anthony Patterson, a U.S. citizen, to return their six-year-old son, A.P., from Illinois to Germany. The couple had previously lived together in Chicago, but after their relationship ended, they continued to cohabit and share custody of their son. Baz later moved to Germany with A.P., with Patterson's consent. However, Patterson later took A.P. from his school in Germany and brought him back to the U.S., refusing to return him to Germany.The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that A.P.’s habitual residence at the time he was retained was in Germany, where he had lived with Baz for over a year, and that the retention in Illinois violated Baz’s rights of custody under German law. It thus granted Baz’s petition and ordered the child’s return. Patterson appealed, challenging both the jurisdiction of the district court and its rulings on the merits of the petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court rejected Patterson's argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction due to a provision in the Illinois Allocation Judgment, which stated that the Circuit Court of the State of Illinois had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The court also found that the district court did not err in determining that A.P.'s habitual residence was Germany, and that Baz was exercising her rights of custody at the time of the retention. The court emphasized that its decision did not touch on any matters of custody, which should be resolved by the courts of the child's habitual residence. View "Baz v. Patterson" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between GeLab Cosmetics LLC, a New Jersey-based online nail polish retailer, and Zhuhai Aobo Cosmetics, a China-based nail polish manufacturer. The founders of GeLab, Xingwang Chen and Shijian Li, are both Chinese citizens. The dispute centers around the ownership of GeLab and allegations of trade secret theft. According to Chen, he and Li founded GeLab with Chen owning 60% and Li 40%. They entered a joint venture with Zhuhai, which was supposed to invest in GeLab for an 80% ownership stake. However, Chen alleges that Zhuhai never sent the money and instead began using low-quality materials for GeLab's products, selling knock-off versions under its own brand, and fraudulently claiming majority ownership of GeLab. Zhuhai, on the other hand, asserts that Chen was its employee and that it owns 80% of GeLab.The dispute first began in China, where Li sued Chen for embezzlement. Chen then sued Li, Zhuhai, and Zhuhai's owners in New Jersey state court, alleging that he had a 60% controlling interest in GeLab and that Zhuhai had no ownership interest. The state defendants counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that Zhuhai owns 80% of GeLab. GeLab then filed a second action in New Jersey against Li alone. The state court consolidated the two cases.While the New Jersey proceedings were ongoing, GeLab filed a federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Zhuhai and its owners, alleging violations of the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Illinois Trade Secrets Act. The defendants responded that Zhuhai owns GeLab and that it cannot steal trade secrets from itself. The district court stayed the federal case, citing the doctrine of Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, reasoning that judicial economy favors waiting for the New Jersey court to determine who owns the company. GeLab appealed the stay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to stay the proceedings. The court found that the federal and state cases were parallel as they involved substantially the same parties litigating substantially the same issues. The court also found that exceptional circumstances warranted abstention, with at least seven factors supporting the district court's decision. These factors included the inconvenience of the federal forum, the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent fora, the source of governing law, the adequacy of state-court action to protect the federal plaintiff's rights, the relative progress of state and federal proceedings, and the availability of concurrent jurisdiction. View "GeLab Cosmetics LLC v. Zhuhai Aobo Cosmetics Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

The case involves 21 U.S. citizens and the family of a deceased U.S. citizen who were victims of rocket attacks by the Hizbollah terrorist organization in Israel in 2006. The plaintiffs allege that the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) provided financial services to Hizbollah, including facilitating millions of dollars in wire transfers through a New York-based correspondent bank. In 2011, LCB and Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL (SGBL), a private company incorporated in Lebanon, executed a purchase agreement where SGBL acquired all of LCB's assets and liabilities. In 2019, the plaintiffs brought similar claims against SGBL, as LCB's successor, in the Eastern District of New York for damages stemming from the 2006 attacks.The federal district court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over SGBL. The court interpreted several Appellate Division and federal decisions to allow imputation of jurisdictional status only in the event of a merger, not an acquisition of all assets and liabilities. On appeal, the Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals, asking whether an entity that acquires all of another entity's liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, inherits the acquired entity's status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction, and under what circumstances the acquiring entity would be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York.The New York Court of Appeals answered the first question affirmatively, stating that where an entity acquires all of another entity's liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, it inherits the acquired entity's status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction. The court declined to answer the second question as unnecessary. The court reasoned that allowing a successor to acquire all assets and liabilities, but escape jurisdiction in a forum where its predecessor would have been answerable for those liabilities, would allow those assets to be shielded from direct claims for those liabilities in that forum. View "Lelchook v Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL" on Justia Law

The case involves Rimco Inc., an importer and reseller of wheels, who appealed against the United States Court of International Trade's dismissal of its action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Rimco sought judicial review of a denied protest against the assessment of countervailing and antidumping duties by Customs and Border Protection. Rimco argued that the Court of International Trade had exclusive jurisdiction to review the denial of protests under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), or alternatively, residual jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).Previously, the Court of International Trade had dismissed Rimco's action, stating that it lacked jurisdiction under § 1581(a) because Customs' application of antidumping and countervailing duties was not a protestable decision. The court also found that it lacked jurisdiction under § 1581(i) because jurisdiction under § 1581(c) would have been available if Rimco had sought administrative review of Commerce’s antidumping and countervailing duties determinations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of International Trade's dismissal. The court held that Customs' ministerial assessment of antidumping and countervailing duties was not a protestable decision. Furthermore, the court found that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) would have been available and not manifestly inadequate if Rimco had not failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Therefore, the Court of International Trade correctly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Rimco Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals examined a case against Iran and Syria brought by Rotem and Yoav Golan, an Israeli couple injured in a terrorist attack. The plaintiffs and their relatives who suffered emotional trauma from the attack, accused Iran and Syria of supporting the terrorist group Hamas, which orchestrated the attack. The district court denied a default judgment to several plaintiffs, leading to this appeal.The appellate court ultimately held that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. The court explained that although Congress has permitted federal courts to hear personal-injury claims arising from "extrajudicial killings" committed by state sponsors of terrorism, the attack in this case did not kill anyone, thus, it cannot be classified as an "extrajudicial killing". The plaintiffs could not identify any other basis for jurisdiction against the foreign-government defendants.The court pointed out that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 generally exempts foreign sovereigns from the reach of U.S. courts. This case falls within a statutory exception to that immunity, which was created by Congress in 1996 to withdraw foreign sovereign immunity for lawsuits that seek damages for personal injury or death caused by a state sponsor of terrorism. However, the court concluded that the exception did not apply because the attacker did not kill anyone.The court vacated the judgment of the district court with respect to the plaintiffs before the court and remanded for dismissal of their claims. View "Borochov v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law