Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, including various agricultural and trade organizations, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) over a rule that set an equation for calculating vehicle fuel economy, specifically the "Ra factor." They argued that the Ra factor was set arbitrarily low, which effectively increased federal fuel economy standards and decreased demand for gasoline, harming their businesses.The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The petitioners contended that the EPA's rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by ignoring significant comments and data that flagged flaws in the determination of the Ra factor. They pointed out that the EPA's test program used too few and outdated vehicles, included data from a malfunctioning vehicle, and excluded data from a properly functioning one. Additionally, they argued that the EPA failed to consider alternative data sources, such as manufacturer certification data, which showed a higher Ra factor.The Fifth Circuit found that the EPA's rule was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the EPA did not adequately respond to significant comments that raised substantial issues with the test program's sample size, the representativeness of the vehicles tested, and the inclusion and exclusion of certain test data. The court also found that the EPA failed to justify its rejection of alternative data sources. As a result, the court held that the EPA did not demonstrate that its decision was the product of reasoned decision-making.The court granted the petition for review and vacated the portion of the EPA's rule that set and implemented the Ra factor of 0.81. The court concluded that there was no serious possibility that the EPA could substantiate its decision on remand, and thus, vacatur was the appropriate remedy. View "Texas Corn Producers v. EPA" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima (Lima) and Rutas de Lima S.A.C. (Rutas) entered into a Concession Contract for the construction and operation of urban roads in Lima, Peru. Rutas agreed to finance and manage the project in exchange for toll revenue, while Lima was responsible for preliminary infrastructure activities. Subsequent agreements transferred these preliminary responsibilities to Rutas in exchange for toll rate increases. Social protests erupted in response to these increases, leading Lima to close a toll unit and refuse further rate hikes. Rutas initiated two international arbitrations, claiming Lima breached the contract. Lima argued the contract was void due to bribery by Rutas’s parent company, Odebrecht S.A.The District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case after two arbitration tribunals ruled in favor of Rutas, finding insufficient evidence of corruption linked to the Concession Contract. Lima sought to vacate the arbitration awards, citing violations of U.S. public policy against corruption, fraud by Rutas in discovery, and misconduct by the second tribunal in excluding evidence. The District Court denied Lima’s petitions and confirmed the awards, concluding that Lima failed to prove the contract was obtained through bribery and that any alleged discovery misconduct did not prejudice Lima’s case.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The court held that the arbitration tribunals’ findings were supported by the record and that there was no sufficient evidence linking Odebrecht’s bribes to the Concession Contract. The court also found no merit in Lima’s claims of discovery fraud and tribunal misconduct, noting that Lima suffered no prejudice from the exclusion of evidence. The court concluded that enforcing the arbitration awards did not violate U.S. public policy. View "Metropolitan Municipality of Lima v. Rutas De Lima S.A.C." on Justia Law

Island Industries, Inc. filed a lawsuit under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Sigma Corporation, alleging that Sigma made false statements on customs forms to avoid paying antidumping duties on welded outlets imported from China. Island claimed that Sigma falsely declared that the products were not subject to antidumping duties and misrepresented the products as steel couplings instead of welded outlets. The jury found in favor of Island, concluding that Sigma was liable under the FCA.The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over the case. Sigma requested a scope ruling from the Department of Commerce, which determined that Sigma’s welded outlets fell within the scope of the antidumping duty order on certain carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings from China. The Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit affirmed this ruling. Sigma’s appeal was stayed pending the Federal Circuit’s decision, which ultimately affirmed the scope ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the case and that the action did not need to be initiated in the Court of International Trade. The court also held that 19 U.S.C. § 1592, which provides a mechanism for the United States to recover fraudulently avoided customs duties, does not displace the FCA. The court rejected Sigma’s argument that it lacked an “obligation to pay” antidumping duties under the FCA and concluded that Island’s theory that Sigma violated the FCA by knowingly falsely declaring that no antidumping duties were owed was legally valid and supported by sufficient evidence. The court also found that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict under either of Island’s theories of liability. View "ISLAND INDUSTRIES, INC. V. SIGMA CORPORATION" on Justia Law

The case involves two separate lawsuits filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA). The plaintiffs, American citizens injured or killed in terror attacks, sued the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA). The plaintiffs alleged that the PLO and PA engaged in conduct that triggered jurisdiction under the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA), which deems these entities to have consented to personal jurisdiction in ATA cases under certain conditions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found evidence that the PLO and PA engaged in conduct sufficient to satisfy the PSJVTA's jurisdictional predicates. However, the court ruled that exercising jurisdiction under the PSJVTA was unconstitutional. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that the PSJVTA could not establish personal jurisdiction over the PLO or PA consistent with constitutional due process requirements.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the PSJVTA's personal jurisdiction provision does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court reasoned that the statute reasonably ties the assertion of jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct involving the United States and implicating sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches. The Court reversed the Second Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellants, a group of German steel companies, challenged the U.S. Department of Commerce's determination of a 22.9 percent antidumping duty on their steel plate products. Commerce applied an adverse inference based on the appellants' failure to provide complete manufacturer information for certain sales by their affiliated reseller, which Commerce deemed necessary for calculating the dumping margin.The U.S. Court of International Trade (Trade Court) sustained Commerce's decision, finding that the appellants did not cooperate to the best of their ability. The Trade Court noted that the appellants failed to provide reasonable alternative forms of the missing information, which could have mitigated the burden of manually retrieving the data. The court suggested that a statistical analysis or randomized sampling could have been a reasonable alternative.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and held that Commerce's request for the missing manufacturer information imposed an unreasonable burden on the appellants. However, the court also found that the appellants did not propose reasonable alternative forms of the missing data as required by statute. Consequently, Commerce's application of adverse facts available was deemed permissible.The Federal Circuit affirmed Commerce's use of the highest non-aberrational net price among the disputed sales to fill the information gap, concluding that this approach was reasonable given the size of the information gap and the need to deter non-cooperation. The court found that Commerce's choice of adverse inference was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law. View "AG DER DILLINGER HUTTENWERKE v. US " on Justia Law

Mady Marieluise Schubarth pursued compensation for land allegedly seized from her family in Soviet-occupied Germany after World War II. She sued BVVG Bodenverwertungs-und-Verwaltungs GmbH (BVVG), an agent of Germany, under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). BVVG argued that U.S. courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the taking was a domestic matter, not subject to the expropriation exception. The district court disagreed and denied BVVG’s motion to dismiss.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed Schubarth’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Germany but reversed and remanded as to BVVG, allowing the case to proceed. On remand, the district court directed jurisdictional discovery, and BVVG again moved to dismiss, claiming the expropriation was a domestic taking. The district court denied this motion, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of BVVG’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the 1945 expropriation of the Estate was not a domestic taking because it implicated both Germany and the Soviet Union, thus interfering with relations among states. The court concluded that the expropriation could not be considered a domestic taking and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the expropriation constituted a taking in violation of international law. View "Schubarth v. BVVG Bodenverwertungs- Und -Verwaltungs GMBH" on Justia Law

Aldrick Scott was convicted of first-degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and tampering with physical evidence after he shot and killed his former girlfriend, Cari Allen, in her home, buried her body, and disposed of other evidence. Scott claimed self-defense, stating that Allen had pulled a gun on him during an argument. However, evidence showed Scott had driven from Topeka to Omaha, where Allen lived, and waited outside her house before the incident. Scott's actions after the shooting, including disposing of Allen's body and other evidence, and fleeing to Belize, were also presented at trial.The District Court for Douglas County denied Scott's motion to suppress evidence obtained from his arrest and search by Belizean police, which included his cell phone. Scott argued that his arrest and search violated Belizean law and the extradition treaty between the United States and Belize, and that the evidence should be excluded under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that U.S. law enforcement did not substantially participate in Scott's arrest and search, and thus, the exclusionary rule did not apply.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the involvement of U.S. law enforcement did not amount to a joint venture with Belizean police, and thus, the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule did not apply. The court also found that any error in admitting the cell phone evidence was harmless, as it was cumulative of Scott's own testimony. Additionally, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find Scott guilty of all charges beyond a reasonable doubt. The court affirmed Scott's convictions and sentences. View "State v. Scott" on Justia Law

The case involves multiple plaintiffs who sued Khalifa Hifter under the federal Torture Victim Protection Act for his actions as the commander of the Libyan National Army. The plaintiffs sought to hold Hifter liable for alleged torture and extrajudicial killings of their family members in Libya. The lawsuits were filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia over a 15-month period.In the district court, Hifter moved to dismiss the first two cases, and the court granted those motions in part and denied them in part. Hifter later moved to dismiss the third case, and the court again granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The district court eventually consolidated all three cases for discovery and pretrial matters. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court dismissed all three suits with prejudice, citing lack of personal jurisdiction over Hifter.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Hifter’s cross appeals in Nos. 24-1425, 24-1427, and 24-1429, as they merely sought affirmance of the district court’s judgments on alternative grounds. In Nos. 24-1422 and 24-1426, the court reversed the district court’s judgment, finding that Hifter waived his personal jurisdiction defense by failing to timely assert it in his pre-answer motions. The cases were remanded for further proceedings.In No. 24-1423, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Hifter properly raised a personal jurisdiction defense and that the district court correctly granted summary judgment due to the plaintiffs' failure to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. However, the court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to modify the judgment to state that the dismissal is without prejudice. View "al-Suyid v. Hifter" on Justia Law

Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. entered into a satellite-leasing agreement with Antrix Corporation Ltd., a company owned by the Republic of India. The agreement was terminated by Antrix under a force majeure clause when the Indian Government decided it needed more satellite capacity for itself. Devas initiated arbitration, and the arbitral panel awarded Devas $562.5 million in damages plus interest. Devas sought to confirm the award in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, which confirmed the award and entered a $1.29 billion judgment against Antrix.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, finding that personal jurisdiction was lacking. The Ninth Circuit held that under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), personal jurisdiction over a foreign state requires not only an immunity exception and proper service but also a traditional minimum contacts analysis as set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. The court concluded that Antrix did not have sufficient suit-related contacts with the United States to establish personal jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that personal jurisdiction under the FSIA exists when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. The Court determined that the FSIA does not require proof of minimum contacts beyond the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp." on Justia Law

The Government of Mexico filed a lawsuit against seven American gun manufacturers, alleging that the companies aided and abetted unlawful gun sales that routed firearms to Mexican drug cartels. Mexico claimed that the manufacturers failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent trafficking of their guns into Mexico, resulting in harm from the weapons' misuse. The complaint included allegations that the manufacturers knowingly supplied firearms to retail dealers who sold them illegally to Mexican traffickers, failed to impose controls on their distribution networks, and made design and marketing decisions to stimulate demand among cartel members.The U.S. District Court dismissed the complaint, but the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the decision. The First Circuit found that Mexico had plausibly alleged that the defendants aided and abetted illegal firearms sales, thus satisfying the predicate exception under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA).The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Mexico's complaint did not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers' unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers. The Court concluded that the allegations did not meet the requirements for aiding and abetting liability, as they did not show that the manufacturers took affirmative acts to facilitate the illegal sales or intended to promote the criminal activities. Consequently, PLCAA barred the lawsuit, and the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos" on Justia Law