Justia International Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Meyer Corp., U.S. v. United States
Meyer Corporation, U.S. (Meyer) imported cookware manufactured in Thailand and China, which was sold to distributors in Macau and Hong Kong before being imported to the U.S. Meyer requested that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Customs) value the cookware based on the first-sale price paid by the distributors to the manufacturers. Customs rejected this request and assessed duties based on the second-sale price Meyer paid to the distributors. Meyer protested and appealed to the Court of International Trade.The Court of International Trade affirmed Customs' decision, holding that Meyer failed to prove the first-sale prices were free of market-distortive influences, particularly due to the lack of financial documents from Meyer’s parent company, Meyer International Holdings, Ltd. (Meyer Holdings). Meyer appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, instructing the trial court to reconsider without imposing requirements beyond the statute and regulations.On remand, the trial court again held that Meyer could not rely on the first-sale price, citing Meyer’s failure to produce Meyer Holdings' financial documents as dispositive. The trial court presumed that the absence of these documents indicated potential market-distortive influences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the trial court improperly applied an evidentiary presumption against Meyer and failed to address other record evidence. The appellate court vacated the trial court's decision and remanded the case for reconsideration of whether Meyer may rely on the first-sale price, instructing the trial court to evaluate the extensive record without relying on speculative adverse inferences. The appellate court did not address Meyer’s argument regarding the interpretation of "the firm" in the relevant regulation, as the trial court's decision did not hinge on this interpretation. View "Meyer Corp., U.S. v. United States" on Justia Law
Risen Energy Co., LTD. v. United States
Risen Energy Co., Ltd. (Risen), a Chinese exporter of solar cells, was subject to an antidumping order by the Department of Commerce (Commerce). In the Sixth Administrative Review, Commerce used surrogate values from Malaysia to calculate normal values for Risen's products. Risen challenged Commerce's surrogate value calculations for its backsheet and ethyl vinyl acetate (EVA) inputs, as well as the overhead ratio calculation.The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) initially found Commerce's surrogate value calculations for Risen's backsheet and EVA inputs unsupported by substantial evidence and remanded the matter for further explanation. Commerce then provided additional evidence from ASTM standards to support its choice of HTS categories for these inputs, which the Trade Court sustained. However, the Trade Court upheld Commerce's surrogate financial ratio calculation for overhead despite some reservations about Commerce's rationale.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Commerce's use of the HTS categories for "sheet" to value Risen's backsheet and EVA inputs, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence. However, the court found Commerce's surrogate overhead ratio calculation unsupported by substantial evidence. The court noted that Commerce's reliance on the Hanwha financial statement and the IFRS standard was unclear and speculative.The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court's decision regarding the surrogate value calculations for backsheet and EVA inputs but vacated the decision on the surrogate overhead ratio calculation. The case was remanded to Commerce for further proceedings to provide substantial evidence for its overhead calculation. View "Risen Energy Co., LTD. v. United States" on Justia Law
TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON v. LENOVO (UNITED STATES), INC.
The case involves a dispute between two companies over the enforcement of standard-essential patents (SEPs) related to the 5G wireless-communication standard. The plaintiff, a telecommunications company, had made a commitment to license its SEPs on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The defendant, another technology company, sought an antisuit injunction to prevent the plaintiff from enforcing injunctions it had obtained in Colombia and Brazil based on these SEPs.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied the defendant's request for an antisuit injunction. The district court applied a three-part framework to analyze the request, focusing on whether the domestic suit would be dispositive of the foreign actions. The court concluded that the domestic suit would not necessarily result in a global cross-license between the parties and therefore did not meet the threshold requirement for issuing an antisuit injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court vacated the district court's denial and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court concluded that the district court had erred in its interpretation of the "dispositive" requirement. Specifically, the appellate court held that the FRAND commitment precludes the plaintiff from pursuing SEP-based injunctive relief unless it has first complied with its obligation to negotiate in good faith over a license to those SEPs. Since whether the plaintiff had complied with this obligation was an issue before the district court, the appellate court determined that the "dispositive" requirement was met.The appellate court did not decide whether the defendant was ultimately entitled to the antisuit injunction, leaving that determination to the district court's discretion upon further analysis. The case was remanded for the district court to consider the remaining parts of the foreign-antisuit-injunction framework. View "TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON v. LENOVO (UNITED STATES), INC. " on Justia Law
SHAMROCK BUILDING MATERIALS, INC. v. US
Shamrock Building Materials, Inc. imported steel tubing from Mexico, which had a thin interior coating primarily composed of epoxy, melamine, and silicone additives. The United States Customs and Border Protection classified the tubing under heading 7306 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), which pertains to other tubes and pipes of iron or nonalloy steel. Shamrock contested this classification, arguing that the tubing should be classified under heading 8547 of the HTSUS, which covers electrical conduit tubing of base metal lined with insulating material. Customs rejected Shamrock's protests.The United States Court of International Trade reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the United States, upholding Customs' classification under heading 7306. The court found that the interior coating of the tubing did not provide significant electrical insulation, which is a requirement for classification under heading 8547. The court noted that the coating's primary function was to facilitate the installation of electrical wires by reducing friction, rather than providing electrical insulation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the decision of the Court of International Trade. The Federal Circuit agreed with the lower court's interpretation that heading 8547 requires a commercially significant level of electrical insulation. The court found that Shamrock did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the interior coating of the tubing provided such insulation. Consequently, the court held that the tubing was correctly classified under heading 7306 of the HTSUS. View "SHAMROCK BUILDING MATERIALS, INC. v. US " on Justia Law
J.D. IRVING, LTD. v. US
A Canadian company, J.D. Irving (JDI), challenged the U.S. Department of Commerce's assignment of an antidumping duty cash deposit rate of 11.59% on its softwood lumber products from Canada. This rate was determined in the final results of the second administrative review (AR 2) of an antidumping duty order. JDI argued that its cash deposit rate should remain at 1.57%, the rate assigned in the first administrative review (AR 1). JDI filed a complaint with the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), asserting that the CIT had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the court's residual jurisdiction.The CIT dismissed JDI's case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was not appropriate because jurisdiction could have been available under § 1581(c). The CIT noted that JDI's action was essentially a challenge to the final results of AR 2, which is reviewable under § 1581(c). Additionally, the CIT found that JDI had not demonstrated that the remedy provided by administrative review and binational panel review under the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) would be manifestly inadequate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT's dismissal. The court held that the true nature of JDI's suit was a challenge to the AR 2 final results, making § 1581(c) the proper jurisdiction. The court also determined that JDI had not met its burden to show that the alternative remedies of administrative review and binational panel review would be manifestly inadequate. The court emphasized that binational panels have the authority to review and remand final antidumping determinations, and Commerce must take action consistent with the panel's decision. Therefore, the CIT's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was affirmed. View "J.D. IRVING, LTD. v. US " on Justia Law
WORLDWIDE DOOR COMPONENTS, INC. v. US
The case involves the importation of door thresholds by Worldwide Door Components, Inc. and Columbia Aluminum Products, LLC. These companies sought a determination from the Department of Commerce that their imported door thresholds were not subject to existing antidumping and countervailing duty orders on aluminum extrusions from China. The door thresholds in question are assemblies containing both extruded aluminum and non-aluminum components, which the companies argued should be excluded from the orders under the finished merchandise exception.The United States Court of International Trade initially reviewed the case and remanded it to the Department of Commerce for further consideration. The court found that the Department had misinterpreted the scope of the orders and failed to properly consider whether the door thresholds qualified for the finished merchandise exception. On remand, the Department again found the thresholds to be within the scope of the orders, categorizing them as subassemblies. The Court of International Trade disagreed, remanding the case multiple times for further analysis and clarification.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Department of Commerce's determination that the door thresholds were subassemblies was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the Department had provided a thorough analysis of the scope language and relevant record evidence, including statements from the companies themselves. The court also clarified that subassemblies and finished merchandise are mutually exclusive categories under the orders, meaning that the Department was not required to consider the finished merchandise exception once it determined the thresholds were subassemblies.The Federal Circuit reversed the Court of International Trade's second remand order and reinstated the Department of Commerce's first remand redetermination, which found the door thresholds to be subassemblies and therefore within the scope of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders. The court vacated all subsequent opinions and orders by the Court of International Trade. View "WORLDWIDE DOOR COMPONENTS, INC. v. US " on Justia Law
CELANESE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION v. ITC
Celanese International Corporation, Celanese (Malta) Company 2 Limited, and Celanese Sales U.S. Ltd. (collectively, “Celanese”) filed a petition with the United States International Trade Commission (the “Commission”), alleging that Anhui Jinhe Industrial Co., Ltd., Jinhe USA LLC (collectively, “Jinhe”), and other entities violated 19 U.S.C. § 337 by importing Ace-K (an artificial sweetener) made using a process that infringed Celanese’s patents. The patents in question had an effective filing date of September 21, 2016. It was undisputed that Celanese had sold Ace-K made using the patented process in the United States before the critical date of September 21, 2015.The presiding Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted Jinhe’s motion for a summary determination of no violation of 19 U.S.C. § 337, concluding that Celanese’s prior sales triggered the on-sale bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). The ALJ found that the America Invents Act (AIA) did not overturn settled pre-AIA precedent, which held that sales of products made using a secret process could trigger the on-sale bar, precluding the patentability of that process. The Commission denied Celanese’s petition for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commission.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission’s decision. The court held that the AIA did not alter the pre-AIA rule that a patentee’s sale of an unpatented product made according to a secret method triggers the on-sale bar to patentability. The court concluded that Celanese’s pre-2015 sales of Ace-K made using its secret process triggered the on-sale bar, rendering the later-sought patent claims on that process invalid. View "CELANESE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION v. ITC " on Justia Law
PRIMESOURCE BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC. v. US
PrimeSource Building Products, Inc. and other appellants challenged the United States Department of Commerce's calculation of an all-others antidumping duty rate for non-selected respondents in the fourth administrative review of an antidumping duty order on certain steel nails from Taiwan. Commerce had assigned an adverse facts available (AFA) rate of 78.17% to the mandatory respondents, who failed to cooperate, and used this rate to calculate the all-others rate for non-selected respondents, including Liang Chyuan.The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) upheld Commerce's decision, finding that the use of the expected method to calculate the all-others rate was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law. The Trade Court determined that the burden of proof lay with the non-selected respondents to show that the expected method was not reasonable, which they failed to do. The court also rejected PrimeSource's argument that Liang Chyuan should receive an individual rate, noting that Liang Chyuan did not meet the statutory requirements to be considered a voluntary respondent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court's decision. The court held that Commerce's use of the expected method was appropriate and that the burden was on the appellants to demonstrate that the method was not feasible or did not reasonably reflect the potential dumping margins of the non-selected respondents. The court found that the appellants failed to provide substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of representativeness of the mandatory respondents. Additionally, the court agreed that Liang Chyuan was not entitled to an individual rate as it did not submit the necessary information in a timely manner to be considered a voluntary respondent. View "PRIMESOURCE BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC. v. US " on Justia Law
ADEE HONEY FARMS v. US
The case involves a dispute over the distribution of interest associated with antidumping and countervailing duties under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (CDSOA). Plaintiffs, who are affected domestic producers, argued that the United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs) unlawfully excluded delinquency interest from the distributions they were entitled to receive under the CDSOA. Customs had been distributing only interest charged on antidumping and countervailing duties at liquidation, as specified by 19 U.S.C. § 1677g, and not delinquency interest assessed under 19 U.S.C. § 1505(d).The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) initially dismissed claims related to distributions made more than two years before the complaints were filed, citing the statute of limitations. The CIT found that the Final Rule published by Customs in 2001 provided adequate notice of its decision to exclude delinquency interest. The CIT also denied plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration, maintaining that the Final Rule sufficiently informed the public of Customs' decision. Finally, the CIT denied plaintiffs' motions for judgment on the agency record, holding that the CDSOA did not require Customs to distribute delinquency interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT's decisions. The Federal Circuit held that the Final Rule provided adequate notice of Customs' decision to exclude delinquency interest, thus supporting the CIT's dismissal of claims outside the two-year statutory period. The court also concluded that the CDSOA unambiguously excludes delinquency interest from distributions to affected producers. Therefore, the court affirmed the CIT's judgment in favor of the government, upholding Customs' practice of excluding delinquency interest from CDSOA distributions. View "ADEE HONEY FARMS v. US " on Justia Law
GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US
The case involves an appeal by Marmen Inc., Marmen Énergie Inc., Marmen Energy Co., the Government of Québec, and the Government of Canada against a decision by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce had imposed countervailing duties on imports of certain utility scale wind towers from Canada, arguing that the Canadian government had provided illegal subsidies to the producers and exporters of these towers.The case was initially reviewed by the United States Court of International Trade, which upheld the Department of Commerce's decision. The appellants then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The appellants argued that the Department of Commerce had erred in its assessment of three government programs and its computation of the sales denominator used to calculate the subsidy rate. They contended that the subsidy rate should have been de minimis, meaning it was too trivial or minor to merit consideration.The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the U.S. Court of International Trade, ruling that the Department of Commerce's determination was supported by substantial evidence and was in accordance with the law. The court rejected the appellants' arguments, finding that the Department of Commerce had reasonably determined that the auditor's adjustment was unreliable, and that the three subsidy programs at issue did provide countervailable subsidies. View "GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US " on Justia Law