Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Turkish steel producers, including Kaptan Demir Celik Endustrisi ve Ticaret A.S., were subject to a countervailing duty (CVD) order after the U.S. Department of Commerce determined that the Turkish government subsidized steel rebar exports. During an administrative review, Commerce found that Kaptan sourced steel scrap, a key input for rebar, from several affiliates, including Nur, a shipbuilder. Commerce initially determined that Nur’s steel scrap was primarily dedicated to Kaptan’s rebar production, making Nur a cross-owned input supplier whose subsidies should be attributed to Kaptan, thereby increasing Kaptan’s CVD rate.The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) reviewed Commerce’s decision after Kaptan challenged the cross-attribution of Nur’s subsidies. The CIT found that Commerce had not adequately explained whether steel scrap was merely a link in the rebar production chain or addressed prior cases treating steel scrap as a byproduct. The CIT remanded the case for further explanation. On remand, Commerce developed a multi-factor analysis and ultimately reversed its position, finding that Nur’s steel scrap was a common, unprocessed input used in various products and industries, and that Nur’s primary business activity—shipbuilding—was not dedicated almost exclusively to producing rebar. As a result, Commerce concluded that Nur was not a cross-owned input supplier, and Kaptan’s CVD rate was reduced to a de minimis level. The CIT sustained Commerce’s remand decision.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s decision for abuse of discretion and Commerce’s remand findings for substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Commerce’s determination that Nur’s steel scrap was not primarily dedicated to Kaptan’s rebar production was adequately explained, supported by substantial evidence, and consistent with the applicable regulation. View "KAPTAN DEMIR CELIK ENDUSTRISI VE TICARET A.S. v. US " on Justia Law

Causam Enterprises, Inc. owns several patents related to “demand response” technology, which allows electrical utilities to reduce power demand in response to certain conditions. Causam filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (ITC), alleging that Resideo Smart Homes Technology (Tianjin) and its affiliate Ademco, Inc. were importing and selling internet-connected smart thermostats that infringed method claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 10,394,268, which Causam claimed to own. Causam sought to exclude these products from importation. During the ITC investigation, respondents argued that Causam did not own the patent and that Resideo’s products did not infringe the asserted claims.The assigned administrative law judge (ALJ) at the ITC found that Causam did not own the ’268 patent and that Resideo’s products did not infringe the claims. The full Commission, upon review, adopted only the noninfringement finding and did not address the ownership issue. Causam appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, challenging the noninfringement determination and seeking a ruling on ownership. Meanwhile, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) held, in a separate inter partes review, that claim 1 of the ’268 patent was unpatentable, and the Federal Circuit affirmed that decision in a companion case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Causam owns the ’268 patent, interpreting the relevant assignment agreements to exclude continuations-in-part from a prior assignment, thus leaving ownership with Causam. However, the court did not reach the noninfringement issue because its affirmance of the PTAB’s finding that claim 1 is unpatentable rendered the appeal moot. The court therefore dismissed the appeal as moot. View "CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC " on Justia Law

Gujarat Fluorochemicals Ltd., an Indian manufacturer, was subject to a countervailing duty investigation initiated by the U.S. Department of Commerce after Daikin America, Inc., a U.S. producer, filed petitions regarding imports of granular polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) resin from India and Russia. During the period of investigation, Gujarat purchased wind energy from Inox Wind Limited, a cross-owned Indian company that had received a subsidized land lease from the Indian government. Inox sold all its wind energy to Gujarat, which was used at Gujarat’s production facility to manufacture PTFE resin and other products. The wind energy from Inox represented a small fraction of the total energy consumed at the facility.Commerce determined that the subsidy received by Inox should be attributed to Gujarat under the cross-ownership regulation at 19 C.F.R. § 351.525(b)(6)(iv), resulting in a significant portion of the countervailing duty rate assessed against Gujarat. Commerce reasoned that because all of Inox’s wind energy was supplied to Gujarat, the input was “primarily dedicated” to Gujarat’s downstream production. Gujarat challenged this determination before the United States Court of International Trade, arguing that Commerce misapplied the “primarily dedicated” standard. The Trade Court agreed, finding that the regulation required more than mere consumption of the input by the downstream producer and that the facts did not support attributing the subsidy under the cross-ownership provision. The Trade Court ordered Commerce to remove the portion of the duty rate based on this attribution, and Commerce complied under protest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s judgment. The Federal Circuit held that the cross-ownership regulation does not apply solely because the downstream producer is the sole consumer of the input. Instead, the regulation requires a fact-specific inquiry into whether the input’s production is primarily dedicated to the downstream product, as reflected in the regulatory history and examples. The court affirmed the removal of the subsidy attribution and the adjusted duty rate. View "GUJARAT FLUOROCHEMICALS LTD. v. US " on Justia Law

A German telecommunications company invested nearly $100 million in an Indian company through a Singaporean subsidiary, acquiring a significant minority stake. The Indian government, through its wholly owned space company, later terminated a contract with the Indian company, prompting the German investor to initiate arbitration in Switzerland under a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between Germany and India. The arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of the German company, awarding it over $93 million, and courts in Switzerland, Germany, and Singapore confirmed the award.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia was then asked to confirm the arbitral award. India moved to dismiss, arguing sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), forum non conveniens, and that the dispute did not fall within the scope of the BIT’s arbitration clause. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the FSIA’s arbitration exception applied, that forum non conveniens was unavailable in such proceedings, and that the parties had delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrators, thus precluding judicial review of those issues. The court also found that India had forfeited other merits defenses by not raising them earlier.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the denial of dismissal on immunity and forum non conveniens grounds, but held that the district court erred in refusing to consider India’s substantive defenses to enforcement of the award. The appellate court found that the BIT did not clearly and unmistakably delegate exclusive authority over arbitrability to the arbitrators, so the district court must consider India’s merits defenses under the New York Convention. The judgment confirming the award was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Deutsche Telekom, A.G. v. Republic of India" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Venezuelan government expropriated assets belonging to a Venezuelan subsidiary of a U.S.-based energy company. The subsidiary had provided drilling services to a state-owned Venezuelan energy company, but after a breakdown in their business relationship and significant unpaid invoices, Venezuelan authorities blockaded the subsidiary’s operations, issued public statements about nationalization, and ultimately transferred the subsidiary’s assets to the state-owned company, which began operating them. The U.S. parent company claimed that this expropriation rendered its ownership interest in the subsidiary worthless and deprived it of its rights to control the subsidiary’s assets.The U.S. parent company and its Venezuelan subsidiary filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Venezuela and its state-owned energy company, alleging unlawful expropriation. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit initially affirmed. However, the Supreme Court vacated that decision, clarifying the standard for the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) expropriation exception. On remand, the D.C. Circuit found that only the U.S. parent company had a valid claim under international law, as the domestic-takings rule barred the subsidiary’s claim. The district court later dismissed Venezuela as a defendant, leaving the state-owned company as the sole defendant.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the state-owned company’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the FSIA’s expropriation exception applied because Venezuela indirectly expropriated the U.S. company’s property, the state-owned company owns and operates the expropriated assets, and it engages in commercial activity in the United States. The court also held that personal jurisdiction was proper and that the act-of-state doctrine, as limited by the Second Hickenlooper Amendment, did not bar the claim. View "Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. v. Petroleos De Venezuela, S.A." on Justia Law

An instrumentality of Iran attempted to wire nearly $10 million through an American bank, but the funds were blocked by the U.S. government under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) due to Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Two groups of plaintiffs, each holding substantial judgments against Iran for its support of terrorist acts, sought to attach these blocked funds to satisfy their judgments. The funds had been frozen by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and were the subject of a pending civil-forfeiture action initiated by the United States.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially quashed the plaintiffs’ writs of attachment. The court reasoned, first, that the funds were not “blocked assets” as defined by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) and thus were immune from attachment. Second, it held that the government’s earlier-filed civil-forfeiture action invoked the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, barring any subsequent in rem proceedings against the same property. The district court also noted that the existence of the Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund suggested Congress did not intend to encourage individual attachment actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The court held that the funds in question are “blocked assets” under TRIA, as they remain frozen by OFAC and are not subject to a license required by a statute other than IEEPA. The court further held that the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not bar multiple in rem proceedings filed in the same court. Accordingly, the court concluded that neither sovereign immunity nor the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine prevented the plaintiffs from seeking attachment of the funds and reversed the district court’s order quashing the writs of attachment. View "Estate of Levin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Several U.S. companies that import products from China challenged the imposition of tariffs on certain Chinese goods, known as List 3 and List 4A tariffs. These tariffs were implemented by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) after an investigation found that China engaged in unreasonable or discriminatory practices that burdened U.S. commerce. The initial tariffs, covering $50 billion in imports (Lists 1 and 2), were not contested. However, after China retaliated with its own tariffs, USTR expanded the tariffs to cover an additional $200 billion (List 3) and later $120 billion (List 4A) in Chinese imports. The plaintiffs argued that these expanded tariffs exceeded USTR’s statutory authority and violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by failing to properly consider public comments.The United States Court of International Trade reviewed the case first. It found that USTR acted within its authority under Section 307(a)(1)(B) of the Trade Act of 1974, which allows modification of trade actions when the burden on U.S. commerce increases or decreases. However, the court also determined that USTR had not adequately responded to significant public comments as required by the APA. The court ordered a limited remand for USTR to further explain its reasoning and how it considered public input. After USTR provided a more detailed explanation, the trial court sustained the List 3 and List 4A tariffs.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Section 307(a)(1)(C) independently authorized USTR’s modifications, allowing escalatory trade actions when the original action was no longer appropriate. The court also found that USTR’s remand redetermination satisfied the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed and sustained the challenged tariffs. View "HMTX Industries LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

A Swiss healthcare company entered into a contract with the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to modernize and operate a medical clinic. After the relationship deteriorated, with Equatorial Guinea refusing to allow the company to run the clinic, the company initiated arbitration in Switzerland and was awarded damages. The parties settled the first arbitration, but the company later sought further damages in a second arbitration. Equatorial Guinea challenged the arbitrators’ jurisdiction, arguing that the contract’s dispute-resolution clause required the company to first seek relief in Equatoguinean courts before pursuing international arbitration. The arbitral panel found the clause ambiguous but ultimately concluded that exhaustion of local remedies was not required and awarded the company over $9 million.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the company’s petition to confirm the arbitral award. The court found it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s arbitration exception. On the merits, the court deferred to the arbitrators’ interpretation of the dispute-resolution clause, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, and confirmed the award.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that the district court had jurisdiction but disagreed with its deferential approach to the arbitrators’ interpretation of the dispute-resolution clause. The appellate court held that, in this context, the question of whether exhaustion of local remedies was required is a substantive arbitrability issue for courts, not arbitrators, to decide. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve the proper interpretation of the dispute-resolution clause. View "Marseille-Kliniken AG v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea" on Justia Law

Several small businesses and a coalition of states challenged a series of executive orders issued by the President that imposed new tariffs of unlimited duration on nearly all goods imported from most countries. These tariffs, referred to as the Trafficking Tariffs and Reciprocal Tariffs, were imposed in response to declared national emergencies related to drug trafficking and trade imbalances. The executive orders directed changes to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, resulting in significant increases in import duties on products from Canada, Mexico, China, and other major trading partners.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT), arguing that the President exceeded his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by imposing these tariffs. The CIT granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that IEEPA did not authorize the President to impose the challenged tariffs and permanently enjoined their enforcement. The government appealed, and the Federal Circuit consolidated the cases, stayed the injunction pending appeal, and heard the matter en banc.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part, holding that IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate” importation does not include the power to impose tariffs of the type and scope at issue. The court found that IEEPA does not mention tariffs, duties, or taxes, and contrasted it with other statutes where Congress has explicitly delegated tariff authority to the President with clear limitations. The court also concluded that the government’s interpretation would raise serious constitutional concerns under the major questions and non-delegation doctrines. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s declaratory judgment that the executive orders were invalid, but vacated the universal injunction and remanded for the CIT to reconsider the scope of injunctive relief in light of recent Supreme Court guidance. View "V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump" on Justia Law

Several companies incorporated in Cyprus and the Isle of Man, who were shareholders of OAO Yukos Oil Company, alleged that the Russian Federation unlawfully expropriated Yukos’s assets between 2003 and 2004. The shareholders initiated arbitration proceedings under the Energy Charter Treaty, which Russia had signed but not ratified, claiming that Russia’s actions violated the Treaty’s protections against expropriation. The arbitral tribunal in The Hague found in favor of the shareholders, awarding them over $50 billion in damages. Russia contested the tribunal’s jurisdiction, arguing that it was not bound to arbitrate under the Treaty because provisional application of the arbitration clause was inconsistent with Russian law, and that the shareholders were not proper investors under the Treaty.After the tribunal’s decision, Russia sought to set aside the awards in Dutch courts. The Dutch Supreme Court ultimately upheld the tribunal’s jurisdiction and the awards, finding that Russia was provisionally bound by the Treaty’s arbitration clause and that the shareholders qualified as investors. Meanwhile, the shareholders sought to enforce the arbitral awards in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Russia moved to dismiss, asserting sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and arguing that the arbitration exception did not apply because there was no valid arbitration agreement. The district court denied Russia’s motion, holding that it had jurisdiction under the FSIA’s arbitration exception, and deferred to the arbitral tribunal’s determination that an arbitration agreement existed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the existence of an arbitration agreement is a jurisdictional fact under the FSIA that must be independently determined by the district court, rather than deferred to the arbitral tribunal. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for independent consideration of whether the FSIA’s arbitration exception applies, including whether the Dutch courts’ judgments should have preclusive effect. View "Hulley Enterprises Ltd. v. Russian Federation" on Justia Law