Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves 21 U.S. citizens and the family of a deceased U.S. citizen who were victims of rocket attacks by the Hizbollah terrorist organization in Israel in 2006. The plaintiffs allege that the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) provided financial services to Hizbollah, including facilitating millions of dollars in wire transfers through a New York-based correspondent bank. In 2011, LCB and Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL (SGBL), a private company incorporated in Lebanon, executed a purchase agreement where SGBL acquired all of LCB's assets and liabilities. In 2019, the plaintiffs brought similar claims against SGBL, as LCB's successor, in the Eastern District of New York for damages stemming from the 2006 attacks.The federal district court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over SGBL. The court interpreted several Appellate Division and federal decisions to allow imputation of jurisdictional status only in the event of a merger, not an acquisition of all assets and liabilities. On appeal, the Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals, asking whether an entity that acquires all of another entity's liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, inherits the acquired entity's status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction, and under what circumstances the acquiring entity would be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York.The New York Court of Appeals answered the first question affirmatively, stating that where an entity acquires all of another entity's liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, it inherits the acquired entity's status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction. The court declined to answer the second question as unnecessary. The court reasoned that allowing a successor to acquire all assets and liabilities, but escape jurisdiction in a forum where its predecessor would have been answerable for those liabilities, would allow those assets to be shielded from direct claims for those liabilities in that forum. View "Lelchook v Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL" on Justia Law

Sagarra, a Spanish corporation, was a minority shareholder of Uniland, also a Spanish corporation. Sagarra brought a Court of Chancery action to rescind the sale, by CPV, of Giant, to Uniland. CPV was the controlling stockholder of both Giant and Uniland. Sagarra purported to sue derivatively on behalf of a wholly-owned Delaware subsidiary of Uniland, UAC, which was specifically created as the vehicle to acquire Giant. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Sagarra lacked standing to enforce a claim on behalf of UAC. The Court of Chancery held that Sagarra's standing to sue was governed by Spanish law, because Uniland - the only entity in which Sagarra owned stock - was incorporated in Spain. The court upheld the Court of Chancery's reasoning and judgment because Sagarra failed to satisfy the demand requirements of Spanish law.View "Sagarra Inversiones, S.L., v. Cementos Portland Valderrivas, S.A., et al." on Justia Law

This action arose out of the sale of Giant Cement Holding, Inc. (Giant) by defendant Cementos Portland Valderrivas (CPV) to defendant Corporacion Uniland S.A. Sagarra Inversiones, S.L. (Sagarra) challenged the transaction on the basis of CPV's self-dealing because of its position as the majority shareholder on both sides of the transaction. Sagarra purported to bring this action individually and derivatively on behalf of nominal defendant Uniland Acquisition Corp. (Uniland Delaware). The court held that to the extent the Complaint asserted a multiple derivative action on behalf of Uniland Delaware, it must be dismissed because Sagarra did not have standing to raise those claims based on the court's review of Spanish law. The court held that for the same reasons, Counts I and II, which assert multiple derivative claims on behalf of Uniland Delaware, were dismissed. The court's determination with respect to Sagarra's lack of standing as to Counts I and II was equally applicable to Count III. The court finally held that because Count IV raised fiduciary duty claims under Spanish law, the better course of action was for the court to exercise its discretion and dismiss Count IV. Therefore, defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint was granted and an implementing order would be entered.View "Sagarra Inversiones, S.L. v. Cementos Portland Valderrivas, S.A., et al." on Justia Law