Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs, a group of American service members and their families affected by the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, sought to enforce multi-billion-dollar judgments against Iran. They aimed to obtain $1.68 billion held in an account with Clearstream Banking, a Luxembourg-based financial institution, representing bond investments made in New York on behalf of Bank Markazi, Iran’s central bank. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Clearstream and Bank Markazi to turn over the account contents. Clearstream and Bank Markazi appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ turnover claim against Bank Markazi. However, it determined that the district court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Clearstream. The court also found that Clearstream’s challenge to the constitutionality of 22 U.S.C. § 8772, which makes certain assets available to satisfy judgments against Iran, failed. Despite this, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs without applying state law to determine the ownership of the assets.The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's order and judgment. It remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to determine whether Bank Markazi is an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and to apply state law to ascertain the parties' interests in the assets before applying 22 U.S.C. § 8772. View "Peterson v. Bank Markazi" on Justia Law

In 2010, four individuals sued the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) under the Anti-Terrorism Act, resulting in a default judgment of $318 million against FARC. Unable to collect from FARC, the plaintiffs sought to garnish assets of Samark José López Bello and his companies, alleging they were agents or instrumentalities of FARC. The district court initially ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, mandating a jury trial to determine the agency status of López and his companies.On remand, the district court scheduled a jury trial and allowed discovery. The plaintiffs sought to depose López and requested documents. López and his companies filed motions for protective orders to avoid discovery, which the district court denied, warning of sanctions for non-compliance. López failed to appear for his deposition and did not comply with document requests. Consequently, the district court entered default judgments against López and his companies, citing willful disobedience and the inability to compel compliance due to López's fugitive status.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's entry of default judgments, finding no abuse of discretion. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court correctly interpreted its scheduling order to allow discovery and found that López's failure to comply with discovery orders was willful. The court also determined that less severe sanctions would not ensure compliance, given López's fugitive status. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction due to an appeal of the protective order denials, as those orders were not final or immediately appealable. View "Stansell v. Lopez Bello" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two companies over the enforcement of standard-essential patents (SEPs) related to the 5G wireless-communication standard. The plaintiff, a telecommunications company, had made a commitment to license its SEPs on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The defendant, another technology company, sought an antisuit injunction to prevent the plaintiff from enforcing injunctions it had obtained in Colombia and Brazil based on these SEPs.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied the defendant's request for an antisuit injunction. The district court applied a three-part framework to analyze the request, focusing on whether the domestic suit would be dispositive of the foreign actions. The court concluded that the domestic suit would not necessarily result in a global cross-license between the parties and therefore did not meet the threshold requirement for issuing an antisuit injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court vacated the district court's denial and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court concluded that the district court had erred in its interpretation of the "dispositive" requirement. Specifically, the appellate court held that the FRAND commitment precludes the plaintiff from pursuing SEP-based injunctive relief unless it has first complied with its obligation to negotiate in good faith over a license to those SEPs. Since whether the plaintiff had complied with this obligation was an issue before the district court, the appellate court determined that the "dispositive" requirement was met.The appellate court did not decide whether the defendant was ultimately entitled to the antisuit injunction, leaving that determination to the district court's discretion upon further analysis. The case was remanded for the district court to consider the remaining parts of the foreign-antisuit-injunction framework. View "TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON v. LENOVO (UNITED STATES), INC. " on Justia Law

A Canadian company, J.D. Irving (JDI), challenged the U.S. Department of Commerce's assignment of an antidumping duty cash deposit rate of 11.59% on its softwood lumber products from Canada. This rate was determined in the final results of the second administrative review (AR 2) of an antidumping duty order. JDI argued that its cash deposit rate should remain at 1.57%, the rate assigned in the first administrative review (AR 1). JDI filed a complaint with the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), asserting that the CIT had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the court's residual jurisdiction.The CIT dismissed JDI's case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was not appropriate because jurisdiction could have been available under § 1581(c). The CIT noted that JDI's action was essentially a challenge to the final results of AR 2, which is reviewable under § 1581(c). Additionally, the CIT found that JDI had not demonstrated that the remedy provided by administrative review and binational panel review under the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) would be manifestly inadequate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT's dismissal. The court held that the true nature of JDI's suit was a challenge to the AR 2 final results, making § 1581(c) the proper jurisdiction. The court also determined that JDI had not met its burden to show that the alternative remedies of administrative review and binational panel review would be manifestly inadequate. The court emphasized that binational panels have the authority to review and remand final antidumping determinations, and Commerce must take action consistent with the panel's decision. Therefore, the CIT's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was affirmed. View "J.D. IRVING, LTD. v. US " on Justia Law

Juan Jose Paramo, the defendant-appellant, is involved in a legal dispute with Banco Mercantil de Norte, S.A. and Arrendadora y Factor Banorte, S.A. de C.V. (the Banorte Parties). The Banorte Parties allege that Paramo committed large-scale fraud in Mexico and fled to the United States. They are pursuing a civil lawsuit in Mexico and sought discovery in the U.S. under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to locate and seize Paramo’s assets. The Banorte Parties filed an ex parte request for discovery assistance, which the district court granted, authorizing subpoenas for Paramo and two other individuals.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted the Banorte Parties' petition and authorized the subpoenas. Paramo filed a motion to quash the subpoenas, arguing that the discovery request was overly broad and that the Intel factors favored him. The district court denied Paramo’s motion in a brief order without waiting for his reply or holding a hearing. Paramo appealed the decision, arguing that the district court failed to provide reasoning for its denial and violated local rules by not allowing him to file a reply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide any reasoning for its decision to deny Paramo’s motion to quash. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that district courts must explain their decisions when granting or denying motions to quash § 1782 subpoenas to allow for effective appellate review. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to provide a reasoned decision. The court did not address the substantive arguments regarding the Intel factors or the scope of the discovery request. View "Banco Mercantil de Norte, S.A. v. Paramo" on Justia Law

In the early 1990s, the Republic of Argentina issued collateralized bonds as part of a sovereign-debt-relief plan. Argentina retained reversionary interests in the collateral, which would revert to Argentina if the bonds were fully paid. However, Argentina defaulted on the bonds in 2001. Two decades later, holders of other defaulted Argentine bonds sought to attach these reversionary interests to satisfy judgments from Argentina’s default. They argued that the reversionary interests were used for commercial activity in the U.S., thus falling under an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the attachment of the reversionary interests. During the appeal, the bonds matured, and the district court ordered the turnover of the reversionary interests to the bondholders. Argentina appealed both the attachment and turnover orders, leading to a consolidated appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. The court held that Argentina’s reversionary interests were not protected by the FSIA because Argentina used them in commercial activity in the U.S. The court also found Argentina’s arguments against the turnover under New York law to be meritless. Additionally, the court ordered the parties to resubmit their briefs and appendices with narrow redactions, as the reasons for sealing the case were no longer compelling. The court denied the motion to supplement the record and granted the motion to limit the scope of sealing. View "Attestor Master Value Fund LP v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

The case involves over 1,420 Peruvian citizens alleging environmental harm due to exposure to toxic substances from the La Oroya Metallurgical Complex (LOMC) in Peru. The plaintiffs claim that Doe Run Resources Corporation and related entities, which purchased LOMC in 1997, failed to reduce lead emissions, resulting in unsafe lead levels and subsequent health issues. The plaintiffs argue that Doe Run's decision-making in the United States led to their injuries.Initially, the plaintiffs filed common law tort lawsuits in Missouri state court, which were removed to federal court and consolidated. The district court dismissed several claims and defendants but allowed the substantive negligence-based claims to proceed under Missouri law. Doe Run filed motions to dismiss based on international comity and to apply Peruvian law, both of which were denied by the district court. The court also denied summary judgment on the safe harbor defense and certified its choice-of-law and comity rulings for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's decisions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying dismissal under the doctrine of international comity, as the harm occurred in Peru but the alleged conduct occurred in Missouri. The court also found that the Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) between the United States and Peru did not require dismissal, as the plaintiffs' claims were not explicitly addressed by the TPA. Additionally, the court determined that traditional comity factors did not necessitate dismissal, as neither the State Department nor the government of Peru had asserted their positions, and there was no adequate alternative forum in Peru. Lastly, the court concluded that extraterritoriality principles did not warrant abstention, as the plaintiffs' claims were based on conduct within the United States.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Reid v. Doe Run Resources Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between SPS Corp I, Fundo de Investimento em Direitos Creditórios Não Padronizados (SPS), and General Motors Co. (GM). GM Brazil, a subsidiary of GM, sued the Brazilian government to recover tax overpayments made by car dealerships. After winning the right to recover, GM Brazil filed a claim with Brazil’s tax agency, Receita Federal do Brasil (RFB), to determine the exact amount. Meanwhile, SPS, as the assignee of thirty-five dealerships, sought to recover the tax overpayments from GM Brazil in Brazilian courts but faced adverse decisions regarding standing and preliminary discovery.The District Court for the District of Delaware reviewed SPS’s application for discovery against GM under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which allows for discovery in aid of foreign litigation. The District Court denied the request, citing the factors from the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. The court found that the discovery sought was within the jurisdictional reach of Brazilian courts, which had already denied similar requests by SPS. The court also noted that allowing the discovery would undermine the decisions of the Brazilian courts and lead to inefficiency.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling, agreeing that the Intel factors weighed against granting SPS’s discovery request. The court emphasized that the Brazilian courts had jurisdiction over the requested documents and had already denied SPS’s requests. The Third Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision to respect the Brazilian courts’ rulings and to avoid circumventing foreign proof-gathering restrictions. View "SPS Corp I v. General Motors Co." on Justia Law

In a dispute between the Republic of Djibouti and Doraleh Container Terminal (Doraleh), Doraleh secured a $474 million arbitral award against Djibouti. Djibouti then nationalized a majority interest in Doraleh and appointed a provisional administrator, Chantal Tadoral, to manage the company. Quinn Emanuel, a law firm, sought to enforce the arbitral award in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming to represent Doraleh. However, Tadoral stated she did not authorize the filing, and Djibouti requested the case be dismissed.The District Court for the District of Columbia entered judgment for Doraleh, holding that Quinn Emanuel’s authority was irrelevant or, alternatively, that Djibouti had forfeited the issue by not raising it during arbitration. Djibouti appealed, arguing that the district court erred by not determining whether Quinn Emanuel had the authority to represent Doraleh.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court. The appellate court held that Quinn Emanuel’s authority is relevant and that the issue of a lawyer’s authority can be challenged at any point in litigation. The court found that Djibouti presented substantial evidence questioning Quinn Emanuel’s authority, which required the district court to determine whether the law firm had the authority to file the suit. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court to determine Quinn Emanuel’s authority to represent Doraleh. View "Doraleh Container Terminal SA v. Republic of Djibouti" on Justia Law

Sumontinee Sridej, a Thai citizen, was accused of defrauding her employer in Thailand of approximately $4 million worth of electronics between 2013 and 2015. She left Thailand in January 2015 and moved to Las Vegas, Nevada. In 2022, Thailand requested her extradition under the extradition treaty between Thailand and the United States. The U.S. government filed a complaint seeking her arrest and extradition, and a magistrate judge certified her extradition in January 2023. Sridej then filed a habeas corpus petition challenging her extradition, which the district court denied, allowing her to renew her claim after the Secretary of State made a formal extradition determination.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied Sridej’s habeas corpus petition and her subsequent motion to reopen the case under Rule 60(b). The district court found that the Secretary of State had granted Thailand’s extradition request and that the Secretary had considered whether Sridej would face a risk of torture if extradited, as required by the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and its implementing regulations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s order. The Ninth Circuit held that the Secretary of State had properly considered the risk of torture in compliance with CAT’s regulations. The court found that a declaration by an Attorney Adviser at the Office of the Legal Adviser for the Department of State was sufficient to establish that the Secretary had fulfilled his obligations. The court also held that the declaration did not need to be signed by the Secretary or a senior official and did not require a case-specific explanation for the extradition decision due to the doctrines of separation of powers and non-inquiry. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Sridej’s Rule 60(b) motion. View "SRIDEJ V. BLINKEN" on Justia Law