Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

A Greek and Australian citizen and a U.S. citizen, who married in Australia, had a child together and lived in Australia before relocating to Greece. In late 2022, the family traveled to Maine for a planned vacation. On the day before their scheduled return to Greece, the mother informed the father that she and the child would not return with him. The father returned to Greece alone, while the mother and child remained in Maine, where the child began receiving developmental services and became integrated into the local community. The child was later diagnosed with autism and enrolled in a therapeutic program. The mother filed for divorce in Maine, and the father subsequently sought the child’s return to Greece under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.The Maine District Court found that the mother wrongfully retained the child in Maine as of January 4, 2023, but that the father did not file a petition for the child’s return in a Maine court until April 19, 2024—more than one year later. The court also found that the child was well settled in Maine, with significant family support, stable living arrangements, and access to specialized services. Exercising its discretion, the court denied the father’s petition to return the child to Greece. The father appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court determined that the order was reviewable under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. The court held that the District Court did not err in finding the date of wrongful retention, nor in concluding that the father’s petition was untimely under the Hague Convention. The court also affirmed the finding that the child was well settled in Maine and held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for return. The judgment was affirmed. View "Xamplas v. Xamplas" on Justia Law

An instrumentality of Iran attempted to wire nearly $10 million through an American bank, but the funds were blocked by the U.S. government under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) due to Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Two groups of plaintiffs, each holding substantial judgments against Iran for its support of terrorist acts, sought to attach these blocked funds to satisfy their judgments. The funds had been frozen by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and were the subject of a pending civil-forfeiture action initiated by the United States.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially quashed the plaintiffs’ writs of attachment. The court reasoned, first, that the funds were not “blocked assets” as defined by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) and thus were immune from attachment. Second, it held that the government’s earlier-filed civil-forfeiture action invoked the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, barring any subsequent in rem proceedings against the same property. The district court also noted that the existence of the Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund suggested Congress did not intend to encourage individual attachment actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The court held that the funds in question are “blocked assets” under TRIA, as they remain frozen by OFAC and are not subject to a license required by a statute other than IEEPA. The court further held that the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not bar multiple in rem proceedings filed in the same court. Accordingly, the court concluded that neither sovereign immunity nor the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine prevented the plaintiffs from seeking attachment of the funds and reversed the district court’s order quashing the writs of attachment. View "Estate of Levin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The appellants, Banoka S.à.r.l. and others, sought third-party discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 from Elliott Management Corp. and related entities for use in a contemplated fraud lawsuit in England. The dispute arose from a failed transaction involving the sale of a Paris hotel, where Westmont International Development Inc. was the potential buyer, and the Elliott entities were to provide funding. Banoka alleged that Westmont acted in bad faith during negotiations, leading to the collapse of the deal.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Banoka's petition for discovery from Elliott Management Corp. and its affiliates, but allowed limited discovery from the Elliott Funds. The court found that the forum-selection clause in the agreement between Banoka and Westmont, which designated English courts for dispute resolution, weighed against granting the petition. Additionally, the court determined that Banoka's discovery requests were overly broad and burdensome, particularly since the relevant documents and custodians were primarily located abroad.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the forum-selection clause as a factor against granting the discovery petition. The court also found no error in the district court's conclusion that the discovery requests were unduly burdensome, given their broad scope and the foreign location of the documents and custodians. The appellate court emphasized that the district court's careful and contextual analysis of the relevant factors was appropriate and within its discretion. View "Banoka S.à.r.l. v. Elliott Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, David Boniface, Nissandère Martyr, and Juders Ysemé, brought claims against Jean Morose Viliena under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) for events that occurred in Haiti in 2007-08. The claims included the extrajudicial killing of Boniface's brother, Eclesiaste Boniface, the attempted extrajudicial killings of Martyr and Ysemé, and the torture of Martyr and Ysemé. The jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts found Viliena liable and awarded compensatory and punitive damages.Viliena appealed, challenging the findings of liability and the damages awards. He argued that federal courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that Congress did not have the power to authorize causes of action under the TVPA for conduct occurring abroad between foreign nationals. He also contended that the TVPA does not provide for attempted extrajudicial killing and raised various specific challenges to the trial and damages awards.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the TVPA claims. However, it vacated the denial of the motion for reconsideration and remanded for the district court to address whether Congress had the power to provide any cause of action under the TVPA for conduct occurring outside the United States between foreign citizens. The court also agreed with Viliena that the TVPA does not provide a cause of action for attempted extrajudicial killing.The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings of liability for the extrajudicial killing and torture claims. However, it determined that a new trial on damages was necessary due to the erroneous inclusion of the attempted extrajudicial killing claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Boniface v. Viliena" on Justia Law

The case involves multiple plaintiffs who sued Khalifa Hifter under the federal Torture Victim Protection Act for his actions as the commander of the Libyan National Army. The plaintiffs sought to hold Hifter liable for alleged torture and extrajudicial killings of their family members in Libya. The lawsuits were filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia over a 15-month period.In the district court, Hifter moved to dismiss the first two cases, and the court granted those motions in part and denied them in part. Hifter later moved to dismiss the third case, and the court again granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The district court eventually consolidated all three cases for discovery and pretrial matters. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court dismissed all three suits with prejudice, citing lack of personal jurisdiction over Hifter.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Hifter’s cross appeals in Nos. 24-1425, 24-1427, and 24-1429, as they merely sought affirmance of the district court’s judgments on alternative grounds. In Nos. 24-1422 and 24-1426, the court reversed the district court’s judgment, finding that Hifter waived his personal jurisdiction defense by failing to timely assert it in his pre-answer motions. The cases were remanded for further proceedings.In No. 24-1423, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Hifter properly raised a personal jurisdiction defense and that the district court correctly granted summary judgment due to the plaintiffs' failure to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. However, the court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to modify the judgment to state that the dismissal is without prejudice. View "al-Suyid v. Hifter" on Justia Law

Amgen Inc., a biotechnology company, holds patents in the U.S. and South Korea for denosumab, a drug used in treating certain bone cancers. Amgen filed patent infringement suits against Celltrion Inc. (Celltrion Korea) in both countries. To support its case, Amgen sought discovery from Celltrion Korea’s subsidiary, Celltrion USA, located in New Jersey. Amgen filed an application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in the District of New Jersey to subpoena Celltrion USA for documents and testimony related to Celltrion Korea’s denosumab products.The Magistrate Judge granted Amgen’s § 1782 application, rejecting Celltrion USA’s argument that § 1782 cannot compel it to produce information held by its foreign parent company. The Judge also found the request not unduly burdensome and ordered the parties to meet and confer to agree on a confidentiality agreement. The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s order, leading Celltrion USA to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case to determine if the order under § 1782 was final and thus appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Court concluded that the order was not final because the scope of permissible discovery had not been conclusively defined. The Court emphasized that without a definite scope of discovery, it could not properly review whether the District Court had abused its discretion. Consequently, the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that an order granting discovery under § 1782 but leaving the scope of discovery unresolved is not a final order under § 1291. View "Amgen Inc v. Celltrion USA Inc" on Justia Law

A former president of Panama, while residing in the United States, was extradited to Panama under a bilateral treaty. Panama initially charged him with specific crimes, but after his extradition, he was prosecuted for additional money laundering crimes not included in the original extradition request. He claimed these prosecutions violated the treaty's rule of specialty, which restricts prosecution to the crimes listed in the extradition request unless the extradited individual has had the opportunity to return to the extraditing country.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed his lawsuit for lack of standing. The court concluded that he failed to show that his injury was traceable to the defendants' actions or that a favorable ruling would redress his injuries. The court also determined that he lacked standing under the treaty's rule of specialty provision because the United States had waived its right to object to the additional prosecutions, and his rights under the treaty were derivative of the United States' rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to establish Article III standing because his injury was not fairly traceable to the defendants' actions, as the decision to prosecute him was made independently by Panamanian officials. Additionally, the court found that a favorable declaratory judgment would not redress his injury, as it would not bind the Panamanian officials to drop the prosecutions. The court also concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing under the rule of specialty because the United States had consented to the prosecutions, extinguishing his derivative rights under the treaty. View "Berrocal v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

Dr. Ahmed Diaa Eldin Ali Hussein, a dual citizen of Egypt and the United States, sought to enforce an Egyptian administrative court ruling and a related ministerial decree in the United States. These rulings purportedly entitled him to compensation for the expropriation of his shares in the SIMO Middle East Paper Company by the Egyptian government in the 1990s. Hussein filed an enforcement action in New York State court against Dr. Mohamed Ahmed Maait, the Egyptian Minister of Finance, in his official capacity.The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by Maait, albeit after the 30-day deadline for removal. The District Court found that Egypt was the real party in interest and allowed the late removal under Section 1441(d) of the U.S. Code, which permits enlargement of the removal period for cause. The court then dismissed the suit under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Egypt was immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and that no exceptions to this immunity applied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Egypt was the real party in interest, as Hussein's claims were fundamentally against the Egyptian government and sought compensation from the public treasury. The court also upheld the District Court's finding of cause to extend the removal period, noting the lack of prejudice to Hussein and the procedural challenges faced by Maait in securing U.S. counsel. Finally, the appellate court determined that Hussein had waived any argument regarding exceptions to FSIA immunity by not raising them on appeal. Thus, the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed. View "Hussein v. Maait" on Justia Law

In 1960, the Cuban government seized Banco Nuñez and Banco Pujol, two privately held Cuban banks, and absorbed their assets into Banco Nacional de Cuba (BNC). Decades later, in 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act, which allows U.S. nationals to sue any person trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban regime. The plaintiffs, successors-in-interest to the assets of Banco Nuñez and Banco Pujol, brought a Helms-Burton action against Société Générale and BNP Paribas, alleging that the banks trafficked in their confiscated property by providing financial services to BNC.The plaintiffs initially filed their suits in the Southern District of Florida and the Southern District of New York. The district courts dismissed the complaints, holding that most of the allegations were time-barred under 22 U.S.C. § 6084, which they construed as a statute of repose. The courts also found that the remaining allegations failed to plausibly allege trafficking as defined by the Helms-Burton Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring their claims. However, it affirmed the district courts' rulings that 22 U.S.C. § 6084 is a statute of repose, not subject to equitable tolling, and that the presidential suspensions of the right to bring an action under the Act did not toll the time bar. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations of conduct after 2010 were insufficient to state a plausible claim of trafficking under the Helms-Burton Act. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district courts, dismissing the plaintiffs' actions. View "Moreira v. Société Générale,S.A." on Justia Law

North American Sugar Industries, Inc. ("North American Sugar") filed a lawsuit against five defendants under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, alleging that the defendants unlawfully trafficked its property, which was confiscated by the Cuban government. The defendants include three East Asian corporations (Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd., Goldwind International Holdings (HK) Ltd., and BBC Chartering Singapore Pte Ltd.), and two U.S. corporations (DSV Air & Sea, Inc. and BBC Chartering USA, LLC). North American Sugar claimed that the defendants participated in a conspiracy involving trafficking from China, through Miami, Florida, and then to Puerto Carupano, Cuba.The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, adopting a magistrate judge's recommendation. The magistrate judge found that the alleged trafficking occurred in Cuba, not Florida, and that none of the defendants engaged in any activity in Florida related to the shipments. North American Sugar objected, but the district court upheld the recommendation, concluding that the Helms-Burton Act violations occurred only in Cuba.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its narrow interpretation of the Helms-Burton Act. The Act broadly defines "traffics" to include various activities, and the court noted that trafficking can occur outside of Cuba. The appellate court also found that the district court improperly weighed conflicting evidence without holding an evidentiary hearing, as required under the prima facie standard.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to reconsider personal jurisdiction in light of the correct interpretation of the Helms-Burton Act and to address whether any defendants committed trafficking activities in Florida. The court also directed the district court to consider the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction if it finds jurisdiction over any defendant. View "North American Sugar Industries, Inc. v. Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd." on Justia Law