Justia International Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in US Supreme Court
Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc.
Hetronic (a U.S. company) manufactures remote controls for construction equipment. Abitron Austria, once a licensed Hetronic distributor, claimed ownership of the rights to much of Hetronic’s intellectual property and began employing Hetronic’s marks on products it sold. Hetronic sued Abitron in the Western District of Oklahoma under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1). A jury awarded Hetronic approximately $96 million. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Lanham Act extended to “all of [Abitron’s] foreign infringing conduct.”The Supreme Court vacated. Applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, the relevant sections of the Lanham Act are not extraterritorial and extend only to claims where the infringing use in commerce is domestic. Neither provision provides an express statement of extraterritorial application or any other clear indication that it is one of the “rare” provisions that nonetheless applies abroad. Both simply prohibit the use “in commerce” of protected trademarks when that use “is likely to cause confusion.” Because sections 1114(1)(a) and 1125(a)(1) are not extraterritorial, the Court considered the location of the conduct relevant to the focus of the statutory provisions: the unauthorized “use in commerce” of a protected trademark under certain conditions. “Use in commerce” provides the dividing line between foreign and domestic applications of these provisions. View "Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc." on Justia Law
Yegiazaryan v. Smagin
Smagin won a multimillion-dollar arbitration award against Yegiazaryan stemming from the misappropriation of funds in Moscow. Because Yegiazaryan lives in California, Smagin, who lives in Russia, filed suit to enforce the award in California under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The district court froze Yegiazaryan’s California assets before entering judgment. While the action was ongoing, Yegiazaryan himself obtained an unrelated multimillion-dollar arbitration award and sought to avoid the asset freeze by concealing the funds.Smagin filed a civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964(c), alleging Yegiazaryan and others worked together to frustrate Smagin’s collection on the judgment through a pattern of RICO predicate racketeering acts, including wire fraud, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Smagin failed to plead a “domestic injury.”The Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court disagreed. The “domestic-injury” requirement for private civil RICO suits is context-specific and turns largely on the facts alleged; it does not mean that foreign plaintiffs may not sue under RICO. The circumstances surrounding Smagin’s injury indicate that the injury arose in the United States. Smagin’s alleged injury is his inability to collect his judgment. Much of the alleged racketeering activity that caused that injury occurred in the United States. While some of Yegiazaryan’s actions to avoid collection occurred abroad, the scheme was directed toward frustrating the California judgment. The injurious effects of the racketeering activity largely manifested in California and undercut the orders of the California court. The Court rejected arguments that fraud is typically deemed felt at the plaintiff’s residence and that intangible property is generally located at the owner’s domicile as not necessarily supporting the presumption against extraterritoriality, with its distinctive concerns for comity and discerning congressional meaning. View "Yegiazaryan v. Smagin" on Justia Law
Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh
A 2017 terrorist attack on an Istanbul nightclub, committed on behalf of ISIS, killed Alassaf and 38 others. Alassaf’s family sued Facebook, Twitter, and Google (which owns YouTube) under 18 U.S.C. 2333, which permits U.S. nationals who have been injured by an act of international terrorism to sue for damages. They alleged that the companies knowingly allowed ISIS and its supporters to use their platforms and “recommendation” algorithms for recruiting, fundraising, and spreading propaganda and have profited from the advertisements placed on ISIS content. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint.A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. The 2016 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, section 2333(d)(2), imposes secondary civil liability on anyone “who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism.” The Court concluded that it is not enough for a defendant to have given substantial assistance to a transcendent enterprise. A defendant must have knowingly provided substantial assistance in the commission of the actionable wrong—here, an act of international terrorism. The allegations do not show that the defendants gave ISIS such knowing and substantial assistance that they culpably participated in the attack. There are no allegations that the platforms were used to plan the attack; that the defendants gave ISIS special treatment; nor that the defendants carefully screened content before allowing users to upload it. The mere creation of media platforms is no more culpable than the creation of email, cell phones, or the internet generally.The allegations rest primarily on passive nonfeasance. The plaintiffs identify no duty that would require communication-providing services to terminate customers after discovering that the customers were using the service for illicit ends. The expansive scope of the claims would necessarily hold the defendants liable for aiding and abetting every ISIS terrorist act committed anywhere in the world. The Ninth Circuit improperly focused primarily on the value of the platforms to ISIS, rather than whether the defendants culpably associated themselves with the attack. View "Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh" on Justia Law
Gonzalez v. Google LLC
In 2015, ISIS terrorists unleashed coordinated attacks across Paris, killing 130 victims, including Gonzalez, a 23-year-old U.S. citizen. Gonzalez’s family sued Google under 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), (d)(2). They alleged that Google was directly and secondarily liable for the terrorist attack that killed Gonzalez, citing the use of YouTube, which Google owns and operates, by ISIS and ISIS supporters.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, finding most of the claims were barred by the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1). The sole exceptions were claims based on allegations that Google approved ISIS videos for advertisements and then shared proceeds with ISIS through YouTube’s revenue-sharing system. The court held that these potential claims were not barred by section 230, but that the allegations nonetheless failed to state a viable claim. The complaint neither plausibly alleged that “Google reached an agreement with ISIS,” as required for conspiracy liability, nor that Google’s acts were “intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, or to influence or affect a government,” as required for a direct-liability claim.The Supreme Court vacated. The complaint. independent of section 230, states little if any claim for relief. The Court noted its contemporaneously-issued “Twitter” decision and held that the complaint fails to state a claim for aiding and abetting. The Court remanded the case for consideration in light of the Twitter decision. View "Gonzalez v. Google LLC" on Justia Law
Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States
Halkbank is owned by the Republic of Turkey. The United States indicted Halkbank for conspiracy to evade economic sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran by laundering Iranian oil and gas proceeds and making false statements to the Treasury Department. Two individuals, including a former Halkbank executive, have been convicted for their roles in the conspiracy. The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of Halkbank’s motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court held that the district court has jurisdiction under the general federal criminal jurisdiction statute, 18 U.S.C. 3231; the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330 does not provide immunity.Section 3231’s text encompasses the charged offenses; the Court declined to limit the broad jurisdictional grant to exclude suits against foreign states and their instrumentalities “simply because" unrelated U.S. Code provisions "happen to expressly reference foreign states and instrumentalities.”FSIA's text exclusively addresses civil suits against foreign states and their instrumentalities. Although most litigation involving foreign states and their instrumentalities at the time of the FSIA’s 1976 enactment was civil, the Executive Branch occasionally attempted to subject foreign-government-owned entities to federal criminal investigations. Given that history, it is unlikely that Congress sought to codify foreign sovereign immunity from criminal proceedings without mentioning such proceedings. Congress housed FSIA within Title 28, which mostly concerns civil procedure, not in Title 18, which addresses crimes and criminal procedure. Under Halkbank’s view, a commercial business that is owned by a foreign state could engage in criminal conduct affecting U.S. citizens and threatening U.S. national security while facing no criminal accountability in U.S. courts. The Court rejected various arguments that U.S. criminal proceedings against instrumentalities of foreign states would negatively affect national security and foreign policy. The Court remanded for consideration of arguments regarding common-law immunity. View "Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States" on Justia Law
Golan v. Saada
Golan, a U.S. citizen, married Saada, an Italian citizen, in Italy, where, in 2016, they had a son, B. In 2018, Golan flew to the United States and moved into a domestic violence shelter with B. Saada sought an order returning B. to Italy under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, which requires that a child be returned to the child’s country of habitual residence upon a finding that the child has been wrongfully removed to or retained unless the authority finds that return would expose the child to a “grave risk” of “physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” The district court concluded that B. would face a grave risk of harm if returned to Italy, given evidence that Saada had abused Golan but ordered B. returned to Italy, applying Second Circuit precedent obligating it to “examine the full range of options that might make possible the safe return of a child” and concluding that ameliorative measures could reduce the risk to B. Following a remand, the Second Circuit affirmed.The Supreme Court vacated. A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for the return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm. The Second Circuit’s rule, imposing an atextual, categorical requirement that courts consider all possible ameliorative measures in exercising discretion under the Convention, improperly elevated return above the Convention’s other objectives. A court reasonably may decline to consider ameliorative measures that have not been raised by the parties, are unworkable, draw the court into determinations properly resolved in custodial proceedings, or risk overly prolonging return proceedings. View "Golan v. Saada" on Justia Law
ZF Automotive U. S., Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd.
Parties involved in arbitration proceedings abroad sought discovery in the U.S. under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a), which authorizes a district court to order the production of evidence “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.” One case, a contract dispute between private parties, was proceeding under the Arbitration Rules of the German Institution of Arbitration and involves a private dispute-resolution organization. The second case is proceeding against Lithuania before an ad hoc arbitration panel, in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law.The Supreme Court held that the parties are not entitled to discovery. Only a governmental or intergovernmental adjudicative body constitutes a “foreign or international tribunal” under 28 U.S.C. 1782; the bodies at issue do not qualify. While a “tribunal” need not be a formal “court,” attached to the modifiers “foreign or international,” the phrase is best understood to refer to an adjudicative body that exercises governmental authority. The animating purpose of section 1782 is comity: Permitting federal courts to assist foreign and international governmental bodies promotes respect for foreign governments and encourages reciprocal assistance. Extending section 1782 to include private bodies would be in significant tension with the Federal Arbitration Act, which governs domestic arbitration; section 1782 permits much broader discovery than the FAA.The Court acknowledged that the arbitration panel involving Lithuania presents a harder question. The option to arbitrate is contained in an international treaty rather than a private contract but the two nations involved did not intend that an ad hoc panel exercise governmental authority. View "ZF Automotive U. S., Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd." on Justia Law
Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation
Cassirer inherited a Pissaro Impressionist painting. After the Nazis came to power in Germany, she surrendered the painting to obtain an exit visa. She and her grandson, Claude, eventually settled in the United States. The family’s post-war search for the painting was unsuccessful. In the 1990s, the painting was purchased by the Foundation, an entity created and controlled by the Kingdom of Spain.Claude sued the Foundation, invoking the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602, to establish jurisdiction. FSIA provides foreign states and their instrumentalities with immunity from suit unless the claim falls within a specified exception. The court held that the Nazi confiscation of the painting brought Claude’s suit within the FSIA exception for expropriated property. To determine what property law governed the dispute, the court had to apply a choice-of-law rule. The plaintiffs urged the use of California’s choice-of-law rule; the Foundation advocated federal common law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the choice of the federal option, which commanded the use of the law of Spain, under which the Foundation was the rightful owner.The Supreme Court vacated. In an FSIA suit raising non-federal claims against a foreign state or instrumentality, a court should determine the substantive law by using the same choice-of-law rule applicable in a similar suit against a private party. When a foreign state is not immune from suit under FSIA, it is subject to the same rules of liability as a private party. Only the same choice-of-law rule can guarantee the use of the same substantive law and guarantee the same liability. Judicial creation of federal common law to displace state-created rules must be “necessary to protect uniquely federal interests.” Even the federal government disclaims any necessity for a federal choice-of-law rule in FSIA suits raising non-federal claims. View "Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation" on Justia Law
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe
Six individuals from Mali alleged that they were trafficked into Ivory Coast as child slaves to produce cocoa; they sued U.S.-based companies, Nestlé and Cargill, citing the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which provides federal courts jurisdiction to hear claims brought “by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. 1350. The companies do not own or operate cocoa farms in Ivory Coast, but they buy cocoa from farms located there and provide those farms with technical and financial resources. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit.The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The plaintiffs improperly sought extraterritorial application of the ATS. Where a statute, like the ATS, does not apply extraterritorially, plaintiffs must establish that “the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States . . . even if other conduct occurred abroad.” Nearly all the conduct that allegedly aided and abetted forced labor—providing training, equipment, and cash to overseas farmers—occurred in Ivory Coast. Pleading general corporate activity, like “mere corporate presence,” does not draw a sufficient connection between the cause of action and domestic conduct. To plead facts sufficient to support a domestic application of the ATS, plaintiffs must allege more domestic conduct than general corporate activity common to most corporations. View "Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe" on Justia Law
Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp
German Jewish art dealers owned a collection of medieval relics. Their heirs allege that the Nazi government unlawfully coerced the consortium into selling the collection to Prussia for a third of its value. The relics are currently maintained by an instrumentality of the Federal Republic of Germany and displayed at a Berlin museum. After unsuccessfully seeking compensation in Germany, the heirs brought claims in the U.S. Germany argued that the claims did not fall under an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for “property taken in violation of international law,” 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(3) because a sovereign’s taking of its own nationals’ property is not unlawful under the international law of expropriation. The heirs countered that the purchase was an act of genocide, a violation of international human rights law. The D. C. Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court vacated. Under the expropriation exception, a foreign sovereign’s taking of its own nationals’ property remains a domestic affair. Historically, a sovereign’s taking of a foreign national’s property implicated international law because it constituted an injury to the state of the alien’s nationality. A domestic taking did not interfere with relations among states. The FSIA’s expropriation exception emphasizes property and property-related rights, while human rights violations are not mentioned. Germany’s interpretation of the exception is more consistent with the FSIA’s goal of codifying the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, under which immunity extends to a sovereign’s public, but not private, acts. Other FSIA exceptions confirm Germany’s position; those exceptions would be of little consequence if human rights abuses could be packaged as violations of property rights and brought within the expropriation exception. View "Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp" on Justia Law