Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

An instrumentality of Iran attempted to wire nearly $10 million through an American bank, but the funds were blocked by the U.S. government under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) due to Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Two groups of plaintiffs, each holding substantial judgments against Iran for its support of terrorist acts, sought to attach these blocked funds to satisfy their judgments. The funds had been frozen by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and were the subject of a pending civil-forfeiture action initiated by the United States.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially quashed the plaintiffs’ writs of attachment. The court reasoned, first, that the funds were not “blocked assets” as defined by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) and thus were immune from attachment. Second, it held that the government’s earlier-filed civil-forfeiture action invoked the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, barring any subsequent in rem proceedings against the same property. The district court also noted that the existence of the Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund suggested Congress did not intend to encourage individual attachment actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The court held that the funds in question are “blocked assets” under TRIA, as they remain frozen by OFAC and are not subject to a license required by a statute other than IEEPA. The court further held that the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not bar multiple in rem proceedings filed in the same court. Accordingly, the court concluded that neither sovereign immunity nor the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine prevented the plaintiffs from seeking attachment of the funds and reversed the district court’s order quashing the writs of attachment. View "Estate of Levin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Several small businesses and a coalition of states challenged a series of executive orders issued by the President that imposed new tariffs of unlimited duration on nearly all goods imported from most countries. These tariffs, referred to as the Trafficking Tariffs and Reciprocal Tariffs, were imposed in response to declared national emergencies related to drug trafficking and trade imbalances. The executive orders directed changes to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, resulting in significant increases in import duties on products from Canada, Mexico, China, and other major trading partners.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT), arguing that the President exceeded his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by imposing these tariffs. The CIT granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that IEEPA did not authorize the President to impose the challenged tariffs and permanently enjoined their enforcement. The government appealed, and the Federal Circuit consolidated the cases, stayed the injunction pending appeal, and heard the matter en banc.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part, holding that IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate” importation does not include the power to impose tariffs of the type and scope at issue. The court found that IEEPA does not mention tariffs, duties, or taxes, and contrasted it with other statutes where Congress has explicitly delegated tariff authority to the President with clear limitations. The court also concluded that the government’s interpretation would raise serious constitutional concerns under the major questions and non-delegation doctrines. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s declaratory judgment that the executive orders were invalid, but vacated the universal injunction and remanded for the CIT to reconsider the scope of injunctive relief in light of recent Supreme Court guidance. View "V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump" on Justia Law

The case involves two separate lawsuits filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA). The plaintiffs, American citizens injured or killed in terror attacks, sued the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA). The plaintiffs alleged that the PLO and PA engaged in conduct that triggered jurisdiction under the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA), which deems these entities to have consented to personal jurisdiction in ATA cases under certain conditions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found evidence that the PLO and PA engaged in conduct sufficient to satisfy the PSJVTA's jurisdictional predicates. However, the court ruled that exercising jurisdiction under the PSJVTA was unconstitutional. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that the PSJVTA could not establish personal jurisdiction over the PLO or PA consistent with constitutional due process requirements.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the PSJVTA's personal jurisdiction provision does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court reasoned that the statute reasonably ties the assertion of jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct involving the United States and implicating sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches. The Court reversed the Second Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization" on Justia Law

Aldrick Scott was convicted of first-degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and tampering with physical evidence after he shot and killed his former girlfriend, Cari Allen, in her home, buried her body, and disposed of other evidence. Scott claimed self-defense, stating that Allen had pulled a gun on him during an argument. However, evidence showed Scott had driven from Topeka to Omaha, where Allen lived, and waited outside her house before the incident. Scott's actions after the shooting, including disposing of Allen's body and other evidence, and fleeing to Belize, were also presented at trial.The District Court for Douglas County denied Scott's motion to suppress evidence obtained from his arrest and search by Belizean police, which included his cell phone. Scott argued that his arrest and search violated Belizean law and the extradition treaty between the United States and Belize, and that the evidence should be excluded under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that U.S. law enforcement did not substantially participate in Scott's arrest and search, and thus, the exclusionary rule did not apply.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the involvement of U.S. law enforcement did not amount to a joint venture with Belizean police, and thus, the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule did not apply. The court also found that any error in admitting the cell phone evidence was harmless, as it was cumulative of Scott's own testimony. Additionally, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find Scott guilty of all charges beyond a reasonable doubt. The court affirmed Scott's convictions and sentences. View "State v. Scott" on Justia Law

Corrigan Clay, an American citizen, pleaded guilty to sexually abusing his minor adopted daughter while living in Haiti, violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c). Clay argued that Congress lacked the power to enact § 2423(c), which criminalizes illicit sexual conduct by U.S. citizens abroad. He contended that his non-commercial conduct did not fall under Congress's authority to regulate foreign commerce or its treaty power.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied Clay's motion to dismiss the indictment, ruling that § 2423(c) was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate the channels of foreign commerce. The court did not address the treaty power arguments. Clay then pleaded guilty without a plea agreement and was sentenced to 235 months' imprisonment, the bottom of the Sentencing Guidelines range. He appealed, challenging the constitutionality of § 2423(c) and the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit held that § 2423(c) is a permissible exercise of congressional power under both the Foreign Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The court reasoned that Congress has broader authority to regulate foreign commerce than interstate commerce, and § 2423(c) fits within this power as it regulates the channels of foreign commerce and activities that substantially affect foreign commerce. Additionally, the court found that § 2423(c) is rationally related to implementing the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography, thus falling under the Necessary and Proper Clause.The Third Circuit also found no procedural or substantive errors in Clay's sentencing, affirming the District Court's judgment. The court concluded that the sentence was reasonable and appropriately reflected the seriousness of the offense, the need for just punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation. View "USA v. Clay" on Justia Law

The case involves the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, which was signed into law on April 24, 2024. The Act identifies certain countries, including China, as foreign adversaries and prohibits the distribution or maintenance of applications controlled by these adversaries, specifically targeting the TikTok platform. TikTok Inc. and ByteDance Ltd., along with other petitioners, challenged the constitutionality of the Act, arguing that it violates the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's equal protection and takings clauses, and the Bill of Attainder Clause.The lower courts had not previously reviewed this case, as it was brought directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The petitioners sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prevent the Attorney General from enforcing the Act. The court had to determine whether the petitioners had standing and whether their claims were ripe for judicial review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that TikTok had standing to challenge the Act and that its claims were ripe. The court assumed without deciding that strict scrutiny applied to the First Amendment claims and upheld the Act, finding that it served compelling governmental interests in national security and was narrowly tailored to achieve those interests. The court also rejected the equal protection, bill of attainder, and takings clause claims, concluding that the Act did not constitute a punishment, was not overinclusive or underinclusive, and did not result in a complete deprivation of economic value. The petitions were denied. View "TikTok Inc. v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves six plaintiffs who are users of Tornado Cash, a cryptocurrency mixing service that uses immutable smart contracts to anonymize transactions. Tornado Cash was sanctioned by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) for allegedly facilitating money laundering for malicious actors, including North Korea. The plaintiffs argued that OFAC exceeded its statutory authority by designating Tornado Cash as a Specially Designated National (SDN) and blocking its smart contracts.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the Department of the Treasury, finding that Tornado Cash is an entity that can be sanctioned, that its smart contracts constitute property, and that the Tornado Cash DAO has an interest in these smart contracts. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether the immutable smart contracts could be considered "property" under IEEPA. The court concluded that these smart contracts are not property because they are not capable of being owned, controlled, or altered by anyone, including their creators. The court emphasized that property, by definition, must be ownable, and the immutable smart contracts do not meet this criterion. Consequently, the court held that OFAC exceeded its statutory authority by sanctioning Tornado Cash's immutable smart contracts.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to grant the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment based on the Administrative Procedure Act. The court did not address whether Tornado Cash qualifies as an entity or whether it has an interest in the smart contracts, as the determination that the smart contracts are not property was dispositive. View "Van Loon v. Department of the Treasury" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a group of American service members and their families affected by the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, sought to enforce multi-billion-dollar judgments against Iran. They aimed to obtain $1.68 billion held in an account with Clearstream Banking, a Luxembourg-based financial institution, representing bond investments made in New York on behalf of Bank Markazi, Iran’s central bank. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Clearstream and Bank Markazi to turn over the account contents. Clearstream and Bank Markazi appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ turnover claim against Bank Markazi. However, it determined that the district court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Clearstream. The court also found that Clearstream’s challenge to the constitutionality of 22 U.S.C. § 8772, which makes certain assets available to satisfy judgments against Iran, failed. Despite this, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs without applying state law to determine the ownership of the assets.The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's order and judgment. It remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to determine whether Bank Markazi is an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and to apply state law to ascertain the parties' interests in the assets before applying 22 U.S.C. § 8772. View "Peterson v. Bank Markazi" on Justia Law

In 2010, four individuals sued the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) under the Anti-Terrorism Act, resulting in a default judgment of $318 million against FARC. Unable to collect from FARC, the plaintiffs sought to garnish assets of Samark José López Bello and his companies, alleging they were agents or instrumentalities of FARC. The district court initially ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, mandating a jury trial to determine the agency status of López and his companies.On remand, the district court scheduled a jury trial and allowed discovery. The plaintiffs sought to depose López and requested documents. López and his companies filed motions for protective orders to avoid discovery, which the district court denied, warning of sanctions for non-compliance. López failed to appear for his deposition and did not comply with document requests. Consequently, the district court entered default judgments against López and his companies, citing willful disobedience and the inability to compel compliance due to López's fugitive status.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's entry of default judgments, finding no abuse of discretion. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court correctly interpreted its scheduling order to allow discovery and found that López's failure to comply with discovery orders was willful. The court also determined that less severe sanctions would not ensure compliance, given López's fugitive status. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction due to an appeal of the protective order denials, as those orders were not final or immediately appealable. View "Stansell v. Lopez Bello" on Justia Law

Exxon Mobil Corporation owned subsidiaries in Cuba that had various oil and gas assets. In 1960, the Cuban government expropriated these assets without compensating Exxon. In 1996, Congress enacted the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which allows U.S. nationals to sue those who traffic in property confiscated by the Cuban government. Exxon sued three state-owned defendants, alleging they trafficked in the confiscated property by participating in the oil industry and operating service stations.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied one defendant's motion to dismiss based on foreign sovereign immunity. The court held that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act does not override the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), and jurisdiction depends on an FSIA exception. The court found that the FSIA’s expropriation exception did not apply but that the commercial-activity exception did. The court allowed limited jurisdictional discovery for the other two defendants and later denied their motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act does not confer jurisdiction and that the FSIA’s expropriation exception is inapplicable. However, the court concluded that the district court needed to undertake additional analysis before determining that jurisdiction exists under the FSIA’s commercial-activity exception. The court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further analysis on the applicability of the FSIA’s commercial-activity exception. View "Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba)" on Justia Law