Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Taxpayer filed a tax refund action against the United States, seeking a refund collected from him by the IRS pursuant to a treaty between the United States and Canada, for income taxes that he owed to Canada in 2006. After both countries executed the Convention Between the United States of America and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, the Senate ratified it. Under Article 26A, which was later added to the treaty and ratified by the Senate, the United States and Canada agreed to assist each other with the collection of unpaid taxes.The court affirmed the district court's judgment and held that Article 26A merely facilitates collection of an already existing debt and thus did not violate the Origination Clause; Article 26A did not infringe on the Taxing Clause where the Taxing Clause is not an exclusive grant of power to Congress; and thus Article 26A did not require House-originating implementation legislation. The court also held that the IRS can use its domestic assessment authority in pursuit of the collection of a liability owed by a taxpayer to Canada. View "Retfalvi v. United States" on Justia Law

After a hearing under 18 U.S.C. 3184, a magistrate certified Venckiene as extraditable to Lithuania for the prosecution of alleged offenses arising from a custody battle over Venckiene’s niece. The Secretary of State granted the extradition. Venckiene obtained a temporary stay and sought habeas corpus relief, claiming that the magistrate failed to apply the political offense exception in the extradition treaty and erred in finding probable cause that she was guilty of the offenses. Venckiene and others alleged political and judicial corruption in connection with her niece’s allegations of sexual abuse and claimed that the allegations evolved into protests that culminated in the formation of a new political party and the suspicious deaths of four people, including Venckiene's brother. Venckiene claimed that extradition violated her due process rights and that she might be subject to “particularly atrocious procedures or punishments” in Lithuania. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While there is a political dimension to Venckiene's actions, they do not qualify as relative political offenses, which require a finding of “violent political disturbance or uprising.” Venckiene’s actions were not objectively those of someone furthering a political agenda; a video and transcript support the charges that Venckiene attempted to prevent law enforcement from entering her home and seizing her niece to execute a court order. Without specific evidence of atrocious conditions that Venckiene is likely to experience if extradited, blocking this extradition after the executive has approved it would go beyond the role of the court in the extradition process. View "Venckiene v. United States" on Justia Law

While in prison pending his surrender to Colombia, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to block his extradition. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief, holding that, in accordance to the Department of State, both the United States and Colombia continue to recognize a previously nullified extradition treaty between the two countries as valid and in force. The court explained that, under the separation of powers established in and demanded by our Constitution, the Judicial Branch cannot second-guess that political judgment call or indulge whatever the court's own views on the matter may be. The court held that nothing in this case possibly requires the court to declare invalid Colombia's official acts, and thus the factual predicate for application of the act of state doctrine did not exist. View "Arias Leiva v. Warden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an international businessman who resides in Missouri, filed this suit against defendant, the investment and wealth fund of one of the United Arab Emirates, Ras Al Khaimah (RAK), alleging that defendant violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and committed the common law torts of conversion and unfair competition when it hacked plaintiff's computers. Plaintiff and defendants previously entered into a broad settlement agreement where they agreed to litigate all future, related claims in England.The DC Circuit held that the forum selection clause was mandatory and applied to plaintiff's claims, and the parties did not dispute that the clause was valid and enforceable. The court also held that the public interest factors that plaintiff raised to support his claim that transferring the case to England was unwarranted, did not defeat the forum selection clause. The court explained that the public did not have an interest in keeping U.S.-based disputes that turn on U.S. law in our courts. In this case, the Settlement Agreement provides that English Law will govern all disputes subject to the forum selection clause. Furthermore, judicial economy and administrative convenience point towards resolving the parties' claims in the same forum. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision to the contrary. View "Azima v. Rak Investment Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that defendants, while located in foreign nations, used the mail or wires to order fraudulent asset transfers from plaintiffs' New York bank accounts to defendants' own accounts. The district court held that all but one of the schemes were impermissibly extraterritorial under either civil RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1964(c), or the mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes plaintiffs cited as predicates to the civil RICO cause of action. The district court found the remaining scheme, standing alone, did not constitute a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO. At issue was whether the conduct violating the predicate statutes was extraterritorial, the application of civil RICO to plaintiff's alleged injuries was extraterritorial, and whether the surviving schemes amounted to a pattern of racketeering activity.The Second Circuit held that each of the schemes to defraud, except for the Sham Management Fees Scheme, calls for domestic applications of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), 1962(d), 1341, 1343, and 1344(2). The court also held that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the state law claims for lack of supplemental jurisdiction. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bascuñán v. Elsaca" on Justia Law

Four Colombian Departments filed an ex parte joint application under 28 U.S.C. 1782 to obtain discovery in aid of a foreign proceeding. Diageo intervened and appealed the district court's grant of the section 1782 application as to two of the departments. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the ex parte joint application and held that the district court correctly decided the so-called "receptivity" factor by looking to evidence introduced by both sides and by granting the application of two of the departments. View "Department of Caldas v. Diageo PLC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas corpus relief where petitioner challenged an order certifying him as extraditable to the Czech Republic in order for him to serve a sentence for a Czech conviction for attempted extortion.The panel agreed with the Sixth Circuit and nearly every district court that has considered the applicability of 18 U.S.C. 3196 that, in the absence of a treaty authorization or prohibition, the statute confers discretion on the U.S. Department of State to seek extradition of U.S. citizens. The panel also agreed with the district court that petitioner's Czech conviction for attempted extortion qualifies as an extraditable offense and thus the district court properly denied habeas relief. View "United States v. Knotek" on Justia Law

After Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA), plaintiffs moved the DC Circuit to recall the mandate issued after the court's decision holding that the federal courts lacked personal jurisdiction over the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority (defendants). The court denied plaintiffs' motion and held that plaintiffs failed to show circumstances that warrant the extraordinary remedy of recalling the mandate. The court considered all of the arguments and, to the extent not specifically addressed, they were either moot or without merit. View "Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Organization" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under New York tort law, alleging that defendants conspired with and aided and abetted the Sudanese regime in its commission of widespread atrocities. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint under Civil Rule of Procedure 12 (b)(6), holding that the district court misapplied the act of state doctrine and erroneously determined that the adult plaintiffs' claims were untimely.In this case, considering the lack of evidence introduced by defendants that genocide is the official policy of Sudan, and the countervailing evidence that genocide blatantly violates Sudan's own laws, the court held that there was simply no "official act" that a court would be required to "declare invalid" in order to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims. Furthermore, the court held that the atrocities to which defendant asked the court to defer can never be the basis of a rule of decision capable of triggering the act of state doctrine, because circuit precedent prohibits the court from deeming valid violations of non-derogable jus cogens norms irrespective of the consent or practice of a given state. The court also held that plaintiffs' claims under the act of state doctrine were timely. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A." on Justia Law

After originally hearing this appeal, the DC Circuit certified to the DC Court of Appeals the following question regarding plaintiffs' intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims: "Must a claimant alleging emotional distress arising from a terrorist attack that killed or injured a family member have been present at the scene of the attack in order to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress?" The DC Court of Appeals answered the question in the negative.The court rejected Sudan's arguments and affirmed the default judgments with respect to plaintiffs' IIED claims. In this case, Sudan's objections to the DC court's exception to the presence requirement all presume that DC law treats state actors differently from non-state actors. The court rejected Sudan's interpretation of the DC court's holding and did not reach the substantive question whether it would be impermissible for the DC court to single out certain foreign sovereigns for IIED liability in terrorism cases. View "Owens v. Republic of Sudan" on Justia Law