Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Several companies incorporated in Cyprus and the Isle of Man, who were shareholders of OAO Yukos Oil Company, alleged that the Russian Federation unlawfully expropriated Yukos’s assets between 2003 and 2004. The shareholders initiated arbitration proceedings under the Energy Charter Treaty, which Russia had signed but not ratified, claiming that Russia’s actions violated the Treaty’s protections against expropriation. The arbitral tribunal in The Hague found in favor of the shareholders, awarding them over $50 billion in damages. Russia contested the tribunal’s jurisdiction, arguing that it was not bound to arbitrate under the Treaty because provisional application of the arbitration clause was inconsistent with Russian law, and that the shareholders were not proper investors under the Treaty.After the tribunal’s decision, Russia sought to set aside the awards in Dutch courts. The Dutch Supreme Court ultimately upheld the tribunal’s jurisdiction and the awards, finding that Russia was provisionally bound by the Treaty’s arbitration clause and that the shareholders qualified as investors. Meanwhile, the shareholders sought to enforce the arbitral awards in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Russia moved to dismiss, asserting sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and arguing that the arbitration exception did not apply because there was no valid arbitration agreement. The district court denied Russia’s motion, holding that it had jurisdiction under the FSIA’s arbitration exception, and deferred to the arbitral tribunal’s determination that an arbitration agreement existed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the existence of an arbitration agreement is a jurisdictional fact under the FSIA that must be independently determined by the district court, rather than deferred to the arbitral tribunal. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for independent consideration of whether the FSIA’s arbitration exception applies, including whether the Dutch courts’ judgments should have preclusive effect. View "Hulley Enterprises Ltd. v. Russian Federation" on Justia Law

The case involves Tau-Ken Temir LLP, JSC NMC Tau-Ken Samruk, and the Ministry of Trade and Integration of the Republic of Kazakhstan (collectively, "Tau-Ken") appealing a decision by the U.S. Court of International Trade. The U.S. Department of Commerce had determined that the Republic of Kazakhstan subsidized Tau-Ken’s production of silicon metal, warranting a countervailable subsidy rate of 160%. This determination was based on Commerce rejecting a Tau-Ken submission that was filed 1 hour and 41 minutes past the deadline.The U.S. Court of International Trade sustained Commerce’s decision, finding that Commerce did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the late submission and applying an adverse inference when selecting from facts otherwise available. The Trade Court likened the case to Dongtai Peak Honey Industries Co. v. United States, where Commerce had similarly rejected untimely submissions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that Commerce abused its discretion in rejecting Tau-Ken’s submission. The court noted that the rejection significantly impeded the goal of determining an accurate countervailable subsidy rate and that accepting the late submission would not have burdened Commerce or implicated finality concerns. The court also found that Tau-Ken had made diligent efforts to comply with the deadlines and that the technical issues encountered were legitimate.The Federal Circuit vacated the Trade Court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions for Commerce to accept the September 16 submission and proceed with the countervailing duty investigation accordingly. The court emphasized the importance of determining subsidy rates as accurately as possible and found that Commerce’s rejection of the submission was a clear error of judgment. View "TAU-KEN TEMIR LLP v. US " on Justia Law

The appellants, Banoka S.à.r.l. and others, sought third-party discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 from Elliott Management Corp. and related entities for use in a contemplated fraud lawsuit in England. The dispute arose from a failed transaction involving the sale of a Paris hotel, where Westmont International Development Inc. was the potential buyer, and the Elliott entities were to provide funding. Banoka alleged that Westmont acted in bad faith during negotiations, leading to the collapse of the deal.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Banoka's petition for discovery from Elliott Management Corp. and its affiliates, but allowed limited discovery from the Elliott Funds. The court found that the forum-selection clause in the agreement between Banoka and Westmont, which designated English courts for dispute resolution, weighed against granting the petition. Additionally, the court determined that Banoka's discovery requests were overly broad and burdensome, particularly since the relevant documents and custodians were primarily located abroad.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the forum-selection clause as a factor against granting the discovery petition. The court also found no error in the district court's conclusion that the discovery requests were unduly burdensome, given their broad scope and the foreign location of the documents and custodians. The appellate court emphasized that the district court's careful and contextual analysis of the relevant factors was appropriate and within its discretion. View "Banoka S.à.r.l. v. Elliott Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves José Ramón López Regueiro, who filed a lawsuit against American Airlines, Inc. under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. Regueiro alleged that his father purchased Cuba’s main airport, which was later confiscated by Fidel Castro’s regime. Regueiro inherited his father’s interest in the airport and became a U.S. citizen in 2015. He claimed that American Airlines trafficked in the confiscated property by operating flights in and out of the airport.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the case. The court agreed with American Airlines that the Helms-Burton Act implicitly required the property owner to be a U.S. citizen when the property was confiscated and the plaintiff to be a U.S. citizen when they acquired an interest in the property. Since Regueiro’s father was not a U.S. citizen when the airport was confiscated and Regueiro became a U.S. citizen only after inheriting the property, the court ruled that Regueiro failed to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s interpretation. The appellate court concluded that the Helms-Burton Act does not impose the preconditions that American Airlines argued. The Act provides a cause of action to any U.S. national who owns a claim to confiscated property, regardless of the owner’s citizenship status at the time of confiscation or acquisition. The court also rejected American Airlines’s argument that Regueiro’s ownership of shares in the company that owned the airport did not constitute an ownership interest in the airport itself. The appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Regueiro v. American Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Jilin Forest Industry Jinqiao Flooring Group Co. ("Jilin") is an exporter of multilayered wood flooring in China. In November 2010, the Department of Commerce ("Commerce") initiated an antidumping investigation into the sale of this product from China, treating China as a non-market economy ("NME") country. Commerce applied a presumption that all companies in an NME country are subject to government control and should be assessed a single antidumping duty rate unless they can demonstrate independence. Jilin successfully demonstrated independence and received a separate rate of 3.31 percent.In the fifth administrative review initiated in February 2017, Commerce selected Jilin as a mandatory respondent. Despite Jilin's cooperation, Commerce found that Jilin failed to rebut the presumption of government control and assigned it the PRC-wide antidumping duty rate of 25.62 percent. Jilin challenged this decision at the Court of International Trade ("CIT"), which questioned the lawfulness of Commerce's NME policy and ordered Commerce to calculate an individual rate for Jilin. On remand, Commerce calculated a zero percent rate for Jilin under protest, and the CIT entered that rate in its final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Commerce's practice of applying the NME presumption and assigning a single NME-wide rate to exporters that fail to rebut the presumption is lawful. The court cited binding precedents, including Sigma Corp. v. United States and China Manufacturers Alliance, LLC v. United States, which upheld Commerce's authority to use the NME presumption and assign a single rate to the NME-wide entity. The court reversed the CIT's decision, reinstating the PRC-wide antidumping duty rate of 25.62 percent for Jilin. View "JILIN FOREST INDUSTRY JINQIAO FLOORING GROUP CO. v. US " on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, David Boniface, Nissandère Martyr, and Juders Ysemé, brought claims against Jean Morose Viliena under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) for events that occurred in Haiti in 2007-08. The claims included the extrajudicial killing of Boniface's brother, Eclesiaste Boniface, the attempted extrajudicial killings of Martyr and Ysemé, and the torture of Martyr and Ysemé. The jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts found Viliena liable and awarded compensatory and punitive damages.Viliena appealed, challenging the findings of liability and the damages awards. He argued that federal courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that Congress did not have the power to authorize causes of action under the TVPA for conduct occurring abroad between foreign nationals. He also contended that the TVPA does not provide for attempted extrajudicial killing and raised various specific challenges to the trial and damages awards.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the TVPA claims. However, it vacated the denial of the motion for reconsideration and remanded for the district court to address whether Congress had the power to provide any cause of action under the TVPA for conduct occurring outside the United States between foreign citizens. The court also agreed with Viliena that the TVPA does not provide a cause of action for attempted extrajudicial killing.The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings of liability for the extrajudicial killing and torture claims. However, it determined that a new trial on damages was necessary due to the erroneous inclusion of the attempted extrajudicial killing claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Boniface v. Viliena" on Justia Law

Two Mauritian mining companies, Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. and Amari Nickel Holdings Zimbabwe Ltd., filed a lawsuit against the Republic of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), and Zimbabwe’s Chief Mining Commissioner. The plaintiffs sought to recognize and enforce a judgment from the High Court of Zambia, which confirmed an arbitral award issued in Zambia. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants waived their immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) through the arbitration exception and the implied waiver exception.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled on the scope of the FSIA exceptions. The court determined that the arbitration exception did not apply because it covers actions to confirm arbitral awards, not actions to recognize and enforce foreign court judgments. However, the district court held that the implied waiver exception applied, reasoning that by signing the New York Convention and agreeing to arbitrate in Zambia, the defendants waived their immunity from the action to recognize a foreign court judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court that the arbitration exception did not apply, as the exception covers only actions to confirm arbitral awards, not actions to recognize foreign court judgments. The court also concluded that the implied waiver exception did not apply, as signing the New York Convention and agreeing to arbitrate in a signatory state did not demonstrate an intent to waive immunity from judgment recognition actions. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's determination of subject matter jurisdiction, vacated the remaining orders, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. v. Zimbabwe Mining Development Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioners-Appellants were on the losing end of an arbitration held in Geneva, Switzerland, which resulted in the award of a substantial monetary sum, declaratory relief, and costs and attorneys’ fees to Respondents-Appellees. In accordance with an agreement between the parties that New York courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters concerning the arbitration, Petitioners-Appellants filed a petition to vacate the arbitral awards in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.The district court denied the petition, concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to vacate the Swiss-made awards under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) because, in the district court’s view, the awards may only be vacated in the country where they were made, Switzerland.Petitioners-Appellants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the New York Convention does not mandate that all vacatur proceedings take place in the country that produced an award and that the parties were free to contract for a non-Swiss forum to adjudicate issues arising from the arbitration.The Second Circuit concluded that the district court correctly determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the petition to vacate. The court explained that Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act endows a district court with subject-matter jurisdiction over “[a]n action or proceeding falling under the [New York] Convention.” However, the New York Convention primarily concerns the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in countries other than that in which an award was made. It does not contemplate a petition to vacate a foreign-made arbitral award. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Molecular Dynamics, Ltd. v. Spectrum Dynamics Med. Ltd." on Justia Law

Approximately two years after Jessica Silveira da Silva brought her minor son, A.R., to the United States, A.R.'s father, Edervaldo Rodrigues da Silva, initiated proceedings in federal court to return A.R. to Brazil under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Rodrigues proved that A.R. had been wrongfully removed, and Silveira invoked the "now settled" defense, arguing that A.R.'s extensive ties to the community in Lowell, Massachusetts, weighed against returning him to Brazil.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held a three-day bench trial and ultimately concluded that A.R. was not settled in the United States. The court found that although A.R. had lived in Lowell for over two years, attended the same school, and had some family and community ties, these factors did not sufficiently demonstrate that A.R. was settled. The court ordered Silveira to return A.R. to Brazil.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's findings. The appellate court held that the district court erred in concluding that A.R. was not settled in the United States. The First Circuit found that the totality of the circumstances, including A.R.'s age, stable home environment, consistent school attendance, and community involvement, demonstrated that A.R. was indeed settled. The court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for the district court to decide whether to exercise its equitable discretion to order A.R.'s return to Brazil despite his settled status. View "Rodrigues da Silva v. Silveira da Silva" on Justia Law

Petitioners, including various agricultural and trade organizations, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) over a rule that set an equation for calculating vehicle fuel economy, specifically the "Ra factor." They argued that the Ra factor was set arbitrarily low, which effectively increased federal fuel economy standards and decreased demand for gasoline, harming their businesses.The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The petitioners contended that the EPA's rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by ignoring significant comments and data that flagged flaws in the determination of the Ra factor. They pointed out that the EPA's test program used too few and outdated vehicles, included data from a malfunctioning vehicle, and excluded data from a properly functioning one. Additionally, they argued that the EPA failed to consider alternative data sources, such as manufacturer certification data, which showed a higher Ra factor.The Fifth Circuit found that the EPA's rule was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the EPA did not adequately respond to significant comments that raised substantial issues with the test program's sample size, the representativeness of the vehicles tested, and the inclusion and exclusion of certain test data. The court also found that the EPA failed to justify its rejection of alternative data sources. As a result, the court held that the EPA did not demonstrate that its decision was the product of reasoned decision-making.The court granted the petition for review and vacated the portion of the EPA's rule that set and implemented the Ra factor of 0.81. The court concluded that there was no serious possibility that the EPA could substantiate its decision on remand, and thus, vacatur was the appropriate remedy. View "Texas Corn Producers v. EPA" on Justia Law