Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Zank, a U.S. citizen, and Moreno, an Ecuadorian citizen, divorced and had joint custody of BLZ, born in Michigan in 2006. The decree prohibited Moreno from taking BLZ to Ecuador without prior notice to Zank. In 2009, Moreno took BLZ to Ecuador. Zank obtained a Michigan state court temporary sole custody order, contacted the State Department, and filled out a Hague Convention petition with the Embassy in Ecuador. Zank did not complete the process by filing the petition with the Ecuadorian courts. The State Department labeled Ecuador as noncompliant with its Hague Convention obligations. In Ecuador, Moreno enrolled BLZ in school. BLZ flourished, participating in extracurricular activities and making many friends. In 2010, Moreno permitted Zank to visit BLZ in Ecuador. Zank did not take BLZ to the Embassy or pursue a Hague Convention petition. Moreno obtained an ex parte order from an Ecuadorian court prohibiting BLZ from leaving the country. The parents eventually filed an agreement in Ecuador: Moreno received full legal custody and an increase in child support; Zank waived issues concerning BLZ's arrival in Ecuador. The "no travel" order was lifted. BLZ visited Zank in 2014. Moreno and Zank reiterated their agreement, for filing in the U.S.; it was filed in the wrong court. In 2016, BLZ visited Zank. Zank claims that BLZ told him that Moreno had physically abused her and that she did not wish to return to Ecuador. BLZ voiced a preference for living permanently with Zank. The Michigan court granted Zank custody. Moreno filed this Hague Convention petition in federal court, which held that the original abduction meant that Ecuador could not be the child’s habitual residence. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The proper remedy for the initial kidnapping was a Hague Convention petition in Ecuador, subject to applicable defenses, not self-help. View "Moreno v. Zank" on Justia Law

Anwar, a U.S. citizen, was hired to work for MEG International in Dubai. Anwar alleges that, following her promotion, her supervisor, Ramachandran, began harassing her about working when she had young children; openly made comments about not needing highly-paid female employees; and expressed his disapproval of Anwar’s divorce, going so far as to meet with her husband. Anwar alleges that this culminated in her termination, one day after she initiated her divorce. Anwar sued in a Dubai court and obtained severance pay. She argues that Dubai’s courts could not provide a sufficient remedy for sex and marital status discrimination. Anwar filed a complaint in Michigan, alleging that she was impermissibly terminated because of her gender, religion, national origin, and marital status, citing Title VII; the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act; and breach contract. The district court dismissed claims against Ramachandran for lack of personal jurisdiction and opened discovery for limited purposes: Investigating Anwar’s allegations that MEG International does business as MEG America and that the MEGlobal subsidiaries act as a single entity and Anwar’s allegation that Ramachandran and other MEG managers are employed by Dow. Dow obtained a protective order to prohibit depositions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of all claims. Anwar did not allege facts, aside from those demonstrating possible macromanagement, that MEG International is the alter ego of MEG Americas. Under Michigan law, the separate entities will be respected unless “a contrary determination would be inequitable.” View "Anwar v. Dow Chemical Co." on Justia Law

Taglieri, a citizen of Italy, was studying in Chicago when he met Monasky, an American citizen. They married and together decided to move to Italy. Taglieri was licensed to practice medicine in Italy and would have had to meet onerous requirements to practice in the U.S.. Monasky had a fellowship in Milan. Monasky became pregnant. Monasky alleges that Taglieri was sexually abusive and frequently hit her. Taglieri acknowledges “smack[ing]” Monasky once. Taglieri’s work required frequent travel; Monasky encountered professional difficulties and did not speak much Italian. Monasky applied for jobs in the U.S., contacted divorce lawyers, and researched American childcare options. The couple also investigated Italian child-care. Monasky sought an Italian driver’s license; the two moved to a larger apartment under a lease in Monasky’s name. The couple disputes whether the ensuing weeks involved Monasky planning to stay or return to the U.S. After an argument, Monasky took baby A, sought refuge in a safe house, and left Italy with eight-week-old A. Taglieri obtained termination Monasky’s parental rights in Italy, and filed a petition in Ohio, seeking A's return. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that A’s habitual residence (the location that she should be returned to) was Italy, that Monasky had no definitive plans to return to the U.S. until the final altercation, and that the other Hague Convention requirements were satisfied: Taglieri had properly exercised his custody rights, A’s removal was wrongful, Monasky had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that Taglieri posed a grave risk of harm to A. If a child lives exclusively in one country, that country is presumed to be the child’s habitual residence. View "Taglieri v. Monasky" on Justia Law

Doe and her daughter flew aboard Etihad Airways from Abu Dhabi to Chicago. During the journey, Doe’s tray table remained open because a knob had fallen off. Doe’s daughter found the knob on the floor; Doe placed it in a seatback pocket. When a flight attendant reminded Doe to place her tray in the locked position for landing, Doe attempted to explain by reaching into the seatback pocket to retrieve the knob. She was pricked by a hypodermic needle that lay hidden within, which drew blood. Doe sought damages from Etihad for her physical injury and her “mental distress, shock, mortification, sickness and illness, outrage and embarrassment from natural sequela of possible exposure to” various diseases. Her husband claimed loss of consortium. The court granted Etihad partial summary judgment, citing the Montreal Convention of 1999, an international treaty, which imposes capped strict liability “for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft.” The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred in reading an additional “caused by” requirement into the treaty and concluding that Doe’s bodily injury did not cause her emotional and mental injuries. The Convention allows Doe to recover all her “damage sustained” from the incident. View "Doe v. Etihad Airways, P.J.S.C." on Justia Law

Fontana, in his 50s, posed as a 16-year-old to chat with a 15-year-old female living near Detroit. Fontana claimed that his computer’s camera was broken and convinced his victim to take off her shirt. He recorded this act, then used the threat of publishing this recording online to force her to perform sexual acts, which he recorded and used as additional leverage. He forced her to be in front of her web camera at certain times, to sleep in a certain position, to ask for permission to go out, and to convince a 14-year-old friend to perform sexual acts for him. The girl’s mother contacted the police. Following extradition from Canada on 12 child pornography-related charges, Fontana pleaded guilty to four charges. Applying 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the judge considered that, after Fontana’s arrest, investigators discovered images of up to 50 victims, including minors, none of whom were the basis for Fontana’s extradition. Fontana argued that consideration of the additional victims violated the U.S.-Canada extradition treaty’s “specialty” requirement that he only be detained, tried, or punished for the crimes for which he was extradited. The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument. The treaty does not preclude taking into account activity that is not the basis of the extradition in determining punishment for the crimes on which the extradition was based, at least as long as such consideration did not affect the statutory range of that punishment. View "United States v. Fontana" on Justia Law

Fontana, in his 50s, posed as a 16-year-old to chat with a 15-year-old female living near Detroit. Fontana claimed that his computer’s camera was broken and convinced his victim to take off her shirt. He recorded this act, then used the threat of publishing this recording online to force her to perform sexual acts, which he recorded and used as additional leverage. He forced her to be in front of her web camera at certain times, to sleep in a certain position, to ask for permission to go out, and to convince a 14-year-old friend to perform sexual acts for him. The girl’s mother contacted the police. Following extradition from Canada on 12 child pornography-related charges, Fontana pleaded guilty to four charges. Applying 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the judge considered that, after Fontana’s arrest, investigators discovered images of up to 50 victims, including minors, none of whom were the basis for Fontana’s extradition. Fontana argued that consideration of the additional victims violated the U.S.-Canada extradition treaty’s “specialty” requirement that he only be detained, tried, or punished for the crimes for which he was extradited. The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument. The treaty does not preclude taking into account activity that is not the basis of the extradition in determining punishment for the crimes on which the extradition was based, at least as long as such consideration did not affect the statutory range of that punishment. View "United States v. Fontana" on Justia Law

The government sought forfeiture (21 U.S.C. 881(a)(4),(6), (7); 18 U.S.C. 981) of bank accounts, real properties, vehicles, and $91,500 in U.S. currency, related to its investigation into Salouha and Sbeih. Salouha allegedly illegally sold prescription drugs through his Ohio pharmacies, 21 U.S.C. 841. Salouha and Sbeih allegedly laundered the receipts through their accounts, 18 U.S.C. 1956. Sbeih and his wife filed verified claims to seven of the personal bank accounts. Sbeih was indicted but failed to appear. The court issued an arrest warrant, lifted the stay on the civil forfeiture case and scheduled a status conference. Sbeih’s counsel sought permission for Sbeih not to attend, as he was in Israel. Sbeih alleged that he was in danger of losing his Jerusalem permanent residency permit if he left Israel. The court granted the motion. The government moved to strike Sbeih’s claim under the fugitive disentitlement statute, 28 U.S.C. 2466. The court waited to see whether the Salouhas, Sbeih’s codefendants, were able to reenter the country, but ultimately granted the government’s motion to strike Sbeih’s claim and ordered forfeiture. While section 2466 requires the government to prove that the claimants had a specific intent of avoiding criminal prosecution in deciding to remain outside the U.S., it does not require that that intent be the sole or principal intent. In this case, however, government did not meet its burden of proving that Sbeih was not returning to the U.S. to avoid prosecution View "United States v. $525,695.24" on Justia Law

Faisal is a citizen of the United Kingdom, residing in London. Mardia is a U.S. citizen. They married in Bangladesh in 2009, while Mardia was a student in Michigan. She remained in Michigan to complete her studies. In 2011, Mardia moved to London; in 2013 she applied for Indefinite Leave to Remain, In 2014, Mardia, then pregnant, traveled to Knoxville, where she had lived previously. The couple disputes whether she intended to return to the UK. Faisal traveled to Knoxville on a three-month visa. Mardia gave birth to twins in Knoxville and the family moved into an apartment. Faisal’s visa expired; he returned to London. Mardia insists she told him then that she intended to remain in the U.S. with the children. Faisal visited the U.S. in April 2015. The next month, the entire family traveled to the UK. The parties dispute their intentions. In July 2015, Mardia traveled with the children to Bangladesh. Their tickets indicated they were scheduled to return to London on August 5. Mardia claims she told her husband that she would not return. Faisal claims he did not learn her plans until August 4, when she flew to Knoxville with the children. He sought their return under the Hague Convention, as implemented by 22 U.S.C. 9001. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Faisal’s petition, finding that he failed to establish that the UK was the children’s habitual residence at the time Mardia retained them. View "Ahmed v. Ahmed" on Justia Law