Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

In 1944, German troops entered Hungary. The Hungarian government and Nazi collaborators confiscated the Herzog Collection, “one of Europe’s great private collections of art, and the largest in Hungary.” Some pieces were transported to Germany, others were taken by the Hungarian government. The Herzogs fled Hungary and later attempted to reclaim the Collection, including through the Hungarian courts. In the U.S., they sued Hungary and three art museums, arguing that failure to return the artworks breached bailment contracts and constituted conversion and unjust enrichment.In 2013, the D.C. Circuit held the suit was not barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1604–05, and found that jurisdiction was not inconsistent with international agreements. After discovery, the D.C. Circuit affirmed that the action could proceed under FSIA’s expropriation exception; remanded for consideration whether that exception applies to 19 artworks that were temporarily returned to the Herzogs; ordered the dismissal of Hungary (citing FSIA); and ordered that the Herzogs be allowed to amend their complaint under the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016. The district court complied and added a new defendant, Hungarian National Asset Management (MNV).The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that MNV is shielded by Hungary’s sovereign immunity, that the district court violated the remand mandate by allowing the addition of MNV, that failure to join an indispensable party precluded action against the remaining defendants, and that the principle of prudential exhaustion required dismissal. View "De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary" on Justia Law

Sacks is a law firm with a 20-year history of working with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 2011, IMF hired Sacks to negotiate disputed claims of various contractors that worked on the renovation of its headquarters. The parties’ contract asserts IMF’s immunity from suit and provides that any disputes not settled by mutual agreement shall be resolved by arbitration. In a subsequent fee dispute between Sacks and IMF, Sacks filed a demand for arbitration with the AAA. The arbitration panel awarded Sacks $39,918.82 plus interest but denied Sacks’ claim of underpayment in connection with earlier work.Sacks sued the Fund, claiming that the award should be vacated pursuant to the D.C. Code as “the result of misconduct by the arbitrators.” IMF removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss it on immunity grounds pursuant to its Articles of Agreement, given effect in the U.S. by the Bretton Woods Act, 22 U.S.C. 286h. Sacks asserted the contract waived immunity by expressly providing for arbitration pursuant to the AAA Rules, which contemplate courts’ entry of judgment on arbitral awards. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The AAA Rules and D.C. law contemplate judicial involvement in the enforcement of arbitral awards, so arguably the contract also does so but an international organization's waiver of the immunity must be explicit. The parties' contract expressly retains the IMF’s immunity, reiterating it even within the arbitration clause. View "Leonard A. Sacks & Associates P.C. v. International Monetary Fund" on Justia Law

Wye sued Iraq. The district court denied Iraq’s motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds and entered judgment in Wye’s favor years later. An intervening Fourth Circuit ruling rejected Iraq’s contention that none of the exceptions in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602, applied to Wye’s breach of contract claims; because Wye alleged that it had engaged in acts inside the U.S. under the contract, the lawsuit could proceed under the second clause of the FSIA’s commercial activities exception, which abrogates foreign sovereign immunity with respect to claims that are “based upon . . . an act performed in the United States in connection with commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere.”The D.C. Circuit vacated. Iraq’s participation in the trial did not implicitly waive its sovereign immunity. The law of the case doctrine does not require adherence to the Fourth Circuit’s conclusions. The D.C. Circuit concluded that section 1605(a)(2) does not apply to this case. A plausible basis for sustaining the district court’s jurisdictional ruling can be found in the commercial activity exception’s third clause, abrogating immunity if the action is “based upon . . . an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.” The district court is best positioned to determine whether Iraq’s breach of contract caused “direct effects” in the U.S. View "Wye Oak Technology, Inc. v. Republic of Iraq" on Justia Law

Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Europe sought compensation for the expropriation of its interests in a company in Venezuela. The district court granted Saint-Gobain summary judgment after determining it had properly served the Republic of Venezuela with court process pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters.The D.C. Circuit reversed. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1608, identifies four methods for serving a foreign state. The method at issue is “by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial documents”; the Hague Convention is such an international agreement. Articles 2-6 of the Hague Convention require that a plaintiff request service from a Central Authority designated by the receiving state and receive a certificate of service from the Central Authority stating it has served the defendant by a method consistent with the state’s internal law. Venezuelan law requires lawsuits against the Republic to be served on the Attorney General, and the Attorney General was never served. View "Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Europe v. Bolivarian Rep. of Venezuela" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, victims of Jaysh al-Mahdi terrorist attacks and the victims' family members, filed suit alleging that defendants, large medical supply and manufacturing companies, knowingly gave substantial support to the attacks against them in violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), and state law. Plaintiffs claim that defendants, aware of Jaysh al-Mahdi's command of the Ministry, secured lucrative medical-supply contracts with the Ministry by giving corrupt payments and valuable gifts to Jaysh al-Mahdi. The district court held that the complaint failed to state claims for either direct or secondary (aiding-and-abetting) liability under the ATA, and that it lacked personal jurisdiction over six foreign defendants.The DC Circuit reversed on three issues and remanded the balance of the issues to be addressed by the district court consistent with the court's opinion. First, the court concluded that plaintiffs plead facts that suffice to support their aiding-and-abetting claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Second, with respect to the direct liability claim, the court concluded that plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that defendants' payments to Jaysh al Mahdi proximately caused plaintiffs' injuries. Third, the court concluded that the district court's personal jurisdiction analysis was unduly restrictive. View "Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Limited" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Tatneft's petition to confirm and enforce its arbitral award against Ukraine. The court agreed with the district court's decision rejecting Ukraine's arguments that the court should have declined to enforce the award under The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), and should have dismissed the petition on the basis of forum non conveniens. In this case, the enforcement of the arbitral award should not have been denied under the New York Convention arti. (V)(1)(C) where the district court neither exceeded its discretion nor made legal error when it denied Ukraine's motion for supplemental briefing, made years after the parties had initially briefed the merits; Ukraine can pay the $173 million judgment without risking a collapse; the district court did not exceed its authority under the New York Convention; and the court rejected Ukraine's contention that the district court mistakenly enforced the award in spite of the public policy and improper composition exceptions. Furthermore, the court has squarely held that forum non conveniens is not available in proceedings to confirm a foreign arbitral award because only U.S. courts can attach foreign commercial assets found within the United States. View "Tatneft v. Ukraine" on Justia Law

Twentieth Century geopolitical events — World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russian Civil War, and World War II — forced leaders of Chabad Chasidism, a religious movement, to flee Russia, first to Latvia, then to Poland, and ultimately to the United States. In 1940, Chabad of the United States was incorporated under New York law and began attempting to recover 17th Century religious materials taken from its religious community.In 2004, Chabad sued Russia. In 2006, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia entered a partial judgment for Russia, which eventually withdrew from the case. The district court entered a default judgment against Russia in 2010, ordering it to return the materials. When Russia failed to comply, Chabad served subpoenas seeking to identify assets that could be attached for the fines imposed by the district court. Both appellants moved to quash the subpoenas. Neither, however, appealed the district court denials of their motions. Each then attempted to appeal the district court denials of their efforts to present immunity defenses. The D.C. Circuit dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The court denied mandamus review because there was an alternative avenue for review (the collateral order appeal that was filed too late). View "Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Federation" on Justia Law

Broidy, an activist businessman, urged the government to oppose Qatar’s alleged funding and harboring of terrorists and to support the efforts of Qatar’s neighbors to isolate it economically. Broidy alleges that Qatar engaged in “a multi-million dollar dark money effort to recruit lobbyists and influencers to polish Qatar’s public image.” Qatar allegedly paid the defendants, U.S.-citizen public relations contractors, millions in hopes of rehabilitating its image with “the Republican, American Jewish community and other conservative supporters of Israel.” They allegedly retained a cybersecurity firm “to coordinate an offensive cyber and information operation against” Broidy and his company.Broidy sued, alleging violations of RICO, Stored Communications Act, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Defend Trade Secrets Act, and California law. Without acknowledging involvement in the alleged scheme, the defendants claimed immunity based on Broidy’s allegations regarding their relationship to Qatar, a foreign sovereign. The court dismissed certain claims as legally inadequate and rejected the immunity defense.The D.C. Circuit affirmed. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act by its terms does not apply. Qatar has not said that the challenged conduct was at its behest nor has it urged the United States to recognize the defendants’ immunity. The State Department has never suggested that the defendants are immune as agents of Qatar. Without any such acknowledgment or suggestion, a private party claiming foreign sovereign immunity bears a heavy burden. The defendants here are U.S. citizens sued in their private capacities by U.S. plaintiffs for violations of U.S. and California law within the U.S. View "Broidy Capital Management LLC v. Muzin" on Justia Law

Radmanesh, a U.S. citizen born in 1969, lived in Iran, 1978-1986. In 1979, armed members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a military arm of the Iranian government, stormed into the family home and accused Radmanesh’s father of treason. The family was threatened with execution unless the father trained Iranians as engineers. Radmanesh was forced to attend an Iranian-run school, where his classmates physically abused him while chanting “Death to Americans.” Members of a youth paramilitary organization beat Radmanesh. One beating sent Radmanesh to the hospital with broken ribs, lacerations, and a concussion. In 1986, Radmanesh was conscripted to fight in the Iran-Iraq War. Radmanesh’s commander told him that he was being sent to die as a martyr for Islam and forced Radmanesh at gunpoint to shoot and kill a sleeping Iraqi soldier. Radmanesh was diagnosed with PTSD and, while on leave, escaped to the United States.Radmanesh sued Iran and the IRGC, alleging hostage-taking, torture, assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint against Iran, finding that Radmanesh failed to establish that this case falls within the terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1604. What Radmanesh endured during the Iran-Iraq War was no different from the hardships that soldiers routinely suffer during wartime. The events that occurred before the war were not severe enough to amount to torture. View "Radmanesh v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law

On May 16, 2017, Turkish security forces clashed with protesters outside the Turkish ambassador’s Washington, D.C. residence. Injured protesters sued the Republic of Turkey, claiming that President Erdogan ordered the attack. They asserted various tort claims, violation of D.C. Code 22-3704, which creates a civil action for injuries that demonstrate an accused’s prejudice based on the victim’s race or national origin, and civil claims under the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act and under the Alien Tort Statute.After reviewing the videotape of the incident, the district court stated: [T]he protesters remained standing on the designated sidewalk. Turkish security forces ... crossed a police line to attack the protesters. The protesters ... either fell to the ground, where Turkish security forces continued to kick and hit them or ran away."The D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial of Turkey's motion to dismiss. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602, a foreign state is “presumptively immune" from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts but a “tortious acts exception,” strips immunity if money damages are sought for personal injury or death, or damage to property, occurring in the U.S. and caused by the tortious act of a foreign state. The court rejected Turkey's argument that the “discretionary function” exception preserved its sovereign immunity. Although the Turkish security detail had a right to protect President Erdogan, Turkey did not have the discretion to commit criminal assaults. The decisions giving rise to the lawsuit were not “‘fraught with’ economic, political, or social judgments.” View "Usoyan v. Republic of Turkey" on Justia Law