Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 et seq., and the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 and of making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his conspiring with others in a scheme to illegally purchase SOCAR, a state-owned oil company, by bribing the Azerbaijani president and other officials. Defendant appealed his conviction. The court held that the district court did not err in instructing the jury regarding overt acts, conscious avoidance, insufficiency of the mens rea charge, and proposed bad faith instructions; the district court did not err in allowing his conviction on the false statements count to stand because it was supported by sufficient evidence; and the district court did not err in not permitting testimony by the vice president for investments at Columbia University, not permitting cross-examination of Thomas Farrell, and permitting a portion of a certain memorandum referencing a conversation as a prior consistent statement. The court examined the remainder of defendant's arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Bourke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, in his role as executor of the estate and personal representative of his wife, who perished in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as in his individual capacity, filed suit alleging claims that arose from the events of that day, of assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, wrongful death, and violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. 2333. Defendant subsequently appealed from an order denying without prejudice its motion to vacate entry of default and to dismiss the complaint. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's suit was properly considered under the noncommercial tort exception to foreign sovereign immunity provided by 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(5). Because factual issues persisted with respect to whether the Taliban's actions in allegedly agreeing to facilitate the September 11th attacks were properly considered to be the action of Afghanistan and as to whether any such actions were "discretionary" under section 1605(a)(5)(A), the court remanded the case for jurisdictional discovery as requested by Afghanistan in the district court. View "Doe v. Bin Laden, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment convicting him of (1) conspiracy to violate the Iranian Transaction Regulations (ITR) and operate an unlicensed money-transmitting business; (2) violating the ITR; (3) operating an unlicensed money-transmitting business; and (4) two counts of making false statements in response to government subpoenas. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in several respects when instructing the jury on the conspiracy, ITR, and money-transmitting counts; defendant was entitled to a new trial on the false statement counts because the government constructively amended the indictment; the government committed misconduct in its rebuttal summation, which he claimed necessitated a new trial on all counts; and defendant should be resentenced because the district court miscalculated the applicable offense level. The court reversed Count One to the extent it alleged a violation of the ITR as an overt act and vacated and remanded to the extent it was based on the money-transmission violation as an overt act; reversed Count Two; vacated and remanded Count Three; and affirmed Counts Four and Five. View "United States v. Banki" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for conspiring to kill U.S. officers, to acquire and export anti-aircraft missiles, and to provide material support to a known terrorist organization. Two defendants were additionally convicted of money laundering and conspiring to kill U.S. citizens. The court held that the United States had federal subject-matter jurisdiction to prosecute defendants; the district court did not err in denying defendants' motion for a hearing on certain issues; because the court concluded that defendants' proffered evidence was inadmissible under Rule 404 and that the district court did not commit manifest error by excluding it under Rule 403, defendants' evidentiary challenge to the exclusion was rejected; defendants' remaining challenges were rejected and their convictions were affirmed under 18 U.S.C. 2332(g); the district court's jury instruction was correct and that 18 U.S.C. 2339B did not violate the Fifth Amendment, notwithstanding that no proof was required that a defendant intended his aid to support the terrorist activity of a terrorist group; and one defendant's insufficiency challenge was rejected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. al Kassar, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Debbie and Max Walters appealed from a district court judgment that dismissed their petition for the issuance of a turnover order. In 1990, the Walters' thirteen-year-old son was killed on a hunting trip with his father when a Chinese-manufactured rifle the boy carried allegedly misfired. The Walters sued China and several entities allegedly controlled by China in the U.S. District Court on theories of products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty in connection with the manufacture of the rifle. The Walters eventually won a $10 million default judgment, and sought to enforce it by collecting China's assets in the possession of the respondent banks, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., Bank of China, Ltd. and China Construction Bank Corporation. Citing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), the district court dismissed the petition with prejudice. Without filing a new petition, the Walters argued on appeal that the Banks lacked standing to assert foreign sovereign immunity on behalf of China, and that China waived any immunity by its conduct underlying the default judgment and by its failure to appear. Upon review of the submitted briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Second Circuit found Plaintiffs' arguments were without merit, and affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss their case. View "Walters v. Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, Ltd." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from continuing disputes between Argentina and its various private creditors. Argentina and its Brady bondholders entered into a Continuation of Collateral Pledge Agreement that extended the security interest in the tendered bonds' collateral during its transfer and liquidation. Capital Ventures International (CVI) held certain non-Brady bonds on which Argentina also defaulted and chose to sue Argentina to collect on the defaulted bonds it held, seeking to attach Argentina's reversionary interest in the Brady collateral. At issue was whether the attachments blocked the proposed exchange and whether the district court properly modified the attachments to allow the exchange. The court held that CVI was entitled to maintain its attachments even though a quirk of the bonds' Collateral Pledge Agreement meant that the attachments would effectively block the proposed exchange between Argentina and the Brady bondholders. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's orders that modified the attachments to permit the exchange. View "Capital Ventures Int'l v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

The Republic of Argentina and interested non-party-appellant, Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA), appealed from orders of the district court to attach funds held in BCRA's account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) on the theory that, pursuant to First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), those funds were attachable interests of the Republic. At issue was whether sovereign immunity for central bank property "held for its own account" pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1611(b)(1), depended upon a presumption of the central bank's independence under Bancec, and the proper definition of central bank property "held for its own account" under section 1611(b)(1). The court held that because BCRA's sovereign immunity over the FRBNY funds had not been waived and the FRBNY funds were property of BCRA held for its own account under section 1611(b)(1), the FRBNY funds were immune from attachment and restraint. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred in concluding that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a suit for attachment and restraint for the FRBNY funds. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "NML Capital, Ltd. et al. v. The Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a successful forfeiture action brought by the United States government pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1595a, which denied appellant's subsequent motion for attorney's fees. The forfeiture action sought to recover the Pissaro work of art entitled "Le Marche" that was reported stolen from the Musee Faure in Aix-les-Bains, France in 1981. At issue was whether the district court erred by refusing to apply the protections afforded by 18 U.S.C. 983 to the government's section 1595a claim and by denying her motion for attorney's fees after two of the government's three forfeiture claims were dismissed at summary judgment. The court held that a forfeiture action brought pursuant to section 1595a was not governed by section 982 and therefore, appellant was not entitled to raise the innocent-owner defense provided by section 983(d) or to take advantage of the heightened proof requirement of section 983(c). Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of forfeiture and since appellant was not a prevailing party within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2465(b)(1), she was not entitled to attorney's fees under the statute. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law