Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved claims brought by cabin stewards against their employer, Celebrity Cruises, and against the Union (FIT) that represented them. Because the stewards were foreign employees involved in an internal wage dispute with a foreign ship, neither the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185, nor the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 159, applied to the stewards' challenges. Since their claims were dependent upon the protections of those acts, the district court properly dismissed their claims against Celebrity and FIT. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court in Appeal No. 10-13623. Because the stewards could have raised their Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313, claim in Lobo II but did not, the court affirmed the district court's order in Gomez as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court in Appeal No. 10-10406 View "Lobo, et al v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the Eleventh Circuit's authority to review an order remanding an action based on an antecedent and erroneous ruling that an agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable. Petitioner St. Hugh Williams filed in a Florida court a complaint that, while working onboard the M/V Norwegian Sky, he was injured as a result of the negligence and other tortious conduct of the owner of the ship, NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. NCL removed the action to the district court on the ground that Petitioner was contractually bound to arbitrate his complaint under the United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, but Petitioner moved to remand the action to state court. The district court ruled that the arbitration clause was unenforceable and granted Petitioner's motion to remand. NCL appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit later held in "Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.," (652 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2011)), that an agreement to arbitrate under the Convention is enforceable. Petitioner argued that the Eleventh Circuit lacked jurisdiction, but the Court found that it had jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion to compel under "City of Waco v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.," (293 U.S. 140 (1934)). The Court reversed the order denying the motion to compel of NCL, vacated the order remanding Petitioner's complaint to state court, and remanded the case with instructions to compel arbitration. View "Williams v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a jury verdict awarding damages to its former employee for breach of a stock options contract. Defendant argued that the jury instruction misstated the governing Korean law, that the jury's verdict relied on legally insupportable evidence, and that the district court applied the wrong law when determining attorney's fees. The court held that defendant failed to prove that the district court abused its discretion in excluding a requirement of coercion or intimidation from the jury instructions. Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial on damages. Finally, the award of attorney's fees would be permitted under either Texas or Korean law. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Garriott v. NCsoft Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's enforcement of the arbitration agreement in his employment contract with defendant. Plaintiff sued defendant on a single count of Jones Act negligence, pursuant to 46 U.S.C. 30104, claiming that defendant breached its duty to supply him with a safe place to work. The court held that, given the United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) and governing Supreme Court and Circuit Court precedent, the court must enforce the arbitration clause in plaintiff's employment contract, at least at this initial arbitration-enforcement stage. Therefore, after review and oral argument, the court affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration of plaintiff's Jones Act negligence claim. View "Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), LTD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, 23 Liberian children, charge defendant with using hazardous child labor on its rubber plantation in violation of customary international law. The Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, confers on the federal courts jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, despite disagreeing with the district court holding that a corporation cannot be held liable under the statute. The court also stated that the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust remedies in which alleged violations occurred. Plaintiffs did not establish an adequate basis for inferring a violation of customary international law; the company does not employ children, they work to help their parents meet quotas, and there was no evidence about work expectations for Liberian children living off the plantation. View "Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The children of three former union leaders murdered in Colombia in 2001 sued appellee alleging that it hired paramilitaries from the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia to assassinate their fathers in violation of the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C 1350, the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"), 28 U.S.C. 1350, and the wrongful death laws of Colombia. The children alleged that the murders of their fathers caused them damages including emotional harm, loss of companionship, and loss of financial support. At issue was whether the children possessed constitutional standing and a cause of action under these statutes. The court held that the children easily satisfied Article III standing requirements and clearly have a stake in the controversy that was real enough and concrete enough to entitle them to be heard in a federal district court concerning their TVPA and ATS claims. The court also held that the children have adequately pled a cause of action cognizable under the ATS and the TVPA. The court further held that it could not conclude that the children were also parties to the Drummond I suit and, as a result, reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of the children's TVPA claims to the extent that it concluded on a motion to dismiss where the doctrine of res judicata precluded the children from proceeding with the case.