Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

JBLU does business as C’est Toi Jeans USA. In 2010, JBLU imported jeans manufactured in China, embroidered with “C’est Toi Jeans USA,” “CT Jeans USA,” or “C’est Toi Jeans Los Angeles” in various fonts. JBLU filed trademark applications for “C’est Toi Jeans USA” and “CT Jeans USA” on October 8, 2010, stating that the marks had been used in commerce since 2005. Customs inspected the jeans and found violation of the Tariff Act, which requires that imported articles be marked with their country of origin, 19 U.S.C. 1304(a); JBLU’s jeans were marked with “USA” and “Los Angeles,” but small-font “Made in China” labels were not in close proximity to and of at least the same size as “USA” and “Los Angeles.” Customs applied more lenient requirements to the jeans that were marked with “C’est Toi Jeans USA” or “CT Jeans USA” and were imported after JBLU filed its trademark applications. The Trade Court granted the government summary judgment. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the more-lenient requirements apply to unregistered, as well as registered, trademarks. Regulations in the same chapter as 19 C.F.R. 134.47 and regulations in a different chapter but the same title use the word “trademark” to include registered and unregistered trademarks. View "JBLU, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

VLM, a Montreal-based supplier, sold frozen potatoes to IT in Illinois. After nine successful transactions, IT encountered financial difficulty and failed to pay for the next nine shipments. Invoices sent after delivery included a provision purporting to make IT liable for collection-related attorney’s fees if it breached the contracts. VLM sued; the deadline for an answer passed. The court entered a default. On defendants' motion, the court vacated the default as to IT’s president only. All three defendants then filed answers, contesting liability for attorney’s fees. The judge applied the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code and found that the fee provision had been incorporated into the contract. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods applied. On remand, the judge applied the Convention and held that the fee provision was not part of the contracts and that IT could benefit from this ruling, despite the prior entry of default. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. IT never expressly assented to the attorney’s fees provision in VLM’s trailing invoices, so under the Convention that term did not become a part of the contracts. VLM waived its right to rely on the default by failing to raise the issue until its reply brief on remand. View "VLM Food Trading Int'l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co." on Justia Law

The Tariff Act of 1930 gives the International Trade Commission authority to remedy only those unfair acts that involve the importation of “articles” as described in 19 U.S.C. 1337(a). The Commission instituted an investigation based on a complaint filed by Align, concerning violation of 19 U.S.C. 1337 by reason of infringement of various claims of seven different patents concerning orthodontic devices. The accused “articles” were the transmission of the “digital models, digital data and treatment plans, expressed as digital data sets, which are virtual three-dimensional models of the desired positions of the patients’ teeth at various stages of orthodontic treatment” from Pakistan to the United States. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the Commission lacked jurisdiction. The Commission’s decision to expand the scope of its jurisdiction to include electronic transmissions of digital data runs counter to the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” View "ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

From 1987 to 2001, Bengis and Noll engaged in a scheme to harvest large quantities of South Coast and West Coast rock lobsters from South African waters for export to the United States in violation of both South African and U.S. law. Defendants, through their company, Hout Bay, harvested rock lobsters in amounts that exceeded the South African Department of Marine and Coastal Management’s quotas. In 2001, South Africa seized a container of unlawfully harvested lobsters, declined to prosecute the individuals, but charged Hout Bay with overfishing. Bengis pleaded guilty on behalf of Hout Bay. South Africa cooperated with a parallel investigation conducted by the United States. The two pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit smuggling and violate the Lacey Act, which prohibits trade in illegally taken fish and wildlife, and to substantive violations of the Lacey Act. Bengis pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act. The district court entered a restitution order requiring the defendants to pay $22,446,720 to South Africa. The Second Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the extent of Bengis’s liability, rejecting an argument the restitution order violated their Sixth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Bengis" on Justia Law

From 2004-2008, Georgiou and co-conspirators engaged in a stock fraud scheme resulting in more than $55 million in actual losses. The scheme centered on four stocks, all quoted on the OTC Bulletin Board or the Pink OTC Markets Inc. The conspirators opened brokerage accounts in Canada, the Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos, which they used to trade stocks, artificially inflating prices. They were able to sell their shares at inflated prices and used the shares as collateral to fraudulently borrow millions of dollars from Bahamas brokerage firms. In 2006, Waltzer, a co-conspirator, began cooperating in an FBI sting operation. A jury convicted Georgiou of conspiracy, securities fraud, and wire fraud. The district court sentenced him to 300 months’ imprisonment, ordered him to pay restitution of $55,823,398, ordered a special assessment of $900, and subjected Georgiou to forfeiture of $26,000,000. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the securities and wire fraud convictions were improperly based upon the extraterritorial application of United States law. The securities were issued by U.S. companies through U.S. market makers acting as intermediaries for foreign entities. The court also rejected claims of Brady and Jencks Act violations and of error on evidentiary and sentencing issues. View "United States v. Georgiou" on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiffs were driving a 2004 Jeep Cherokee in San Joaquin County, when the vehicle rolled over and the roof collapsed. Young sustained injuries, rendering her a permanent quadriplegic. Young’s daughter allegedly suffered physical and emotional harm. They filed suit, claiming that the roof and restraint systems were defectively designed. The vehicle at issue was designed, manufactured, and distributed by DaimlerChrysler Corporation (DCC), a former indirect subsidiary of Daimler. Among others, the complaint named Daimler and DCC as defendants. Daimler is a German public stock company that designs and manufactures Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany and has its principal place of business in Stuttgart. Before 1998, DCC was known as Chrysler Corporation. After a 1998 agreement, Chrysler Corporation became an indirect subsidiary of Daimler and changed its name to DCC. DCC was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. It ceased to be a subsidiary of Daimler in 2007, changing its name to Chrysler LLC. Daimler is not a successor-in-interest to DCC or Chrysler LLC. Plaintiffs served Daimler with the complaint in accordance with the Hague Convention. The trial court quashed service for lack of personal jurisdiction over Daimler AG. The court of appeal affirmed, relying on the 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman. View "Young v. Daimler AG" on Justia Law

Cubatabaco, a Cuban entity, and General, a Delaware company, manufacture and distribute cigars using the COHIBA mark. General owns trademark registrations issued in 1981 and 1995. Cubatabaco owns the mark in Cuba and uses it worldwide. Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), prohibit Cubatabaco from selling cigars in the U.S.; 31 C.F.R. 515.201(b) prohibits “transfer of property rights . . . to a Cuban entity,” but a general or specific license allows Cuban entities to engage in otherwise prohibited transactions. General licenses are available for transactions “related to the registration and renewal” of U.S. trademark. Specific licenses issue from the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Cubatabaco used a general license to attempt to register the COHIBA mark in 1997, relying on 15 U.S.C. 1126(e), which allows reliance on a foreign registration if the applicant has a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce. Cubatabaco also sought to cancel General’s registrations, which the PTO cited as a basis for likelihood of confusion. Cubatabaco obtained a special license to sue General. The district court held that General had abandoned its registration by non-use and enjoined General’s use of the COHIBA mark, finding that Cubatabaco had acquired ownership under the famous marks doctrine. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that injunctive relief would involve a prohibited transfer under CACR because Cubatabaco would acquire ownership of the mark and later affirmed denial of General’s motion concerning cancellation of its registrations. The Board then dismissed Cubatabaco’s petition, stating that it need not address preclusion because Cubatabaco lacked standing. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that Cubatabaco has a statutory cause of action to petition to cancel the registrations and that issue and claim preclusion do not bar that petition View "Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. General Cigar Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Stokes was a public school teacher for more than 10 years. In 2000, he pleaded no contest to a charge of misdemeanor battery for indecently touching two boys who were his students. Stokes was sentenced to probation, with a prohibition on unsupervised contact with minors. Less than a month after sentencing, Stokes obtained permission to complete his probation in Thailand. Within weeks of his arrival in Thailand, he began seeking boys for sex. This continued for several years until someone tipped off the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service, which, with the Royal Thai Police, searched Stokes’s home and recovered a camera, a computer, and compact discs containing thousands of images of Stokes’s sexual activity with Thai boys. Stokes was extradited and convicted of traveling in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in a sex act with a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2423(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims related to a procedural mistake in the extradition process and to the legality of the search. The Thai foreign ministry waived the “Rule of Specialty,” allowing the government to proceed on a substitute charge. The Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and the Warrant Clause have no extraterritorial application, but Stokes was protected by the Amendment’s touchstone requirement of reasonableness. The search was reasonable.View "United States v. Stokes" on Justia Law

Nooren owns patent 044, entitled “Use of a Preparation for Insulation/Sealing and Coating Purposes and Method for Sealing Manhole Covers,” which discloses a composition for insulating and protecting substrates, such as manhole covers, underground tanks, pipes, and cable sleeves, from corrosion, water ingress, and mechanical stresses. The patent is licensed exclusively to Stopaq, a Dutch company that designs and manufactures coatings and sealants that exhibit both viscous and elastic properties (visco-elasticity) and are designed for corrosion protection and waterproofing. Kleiss, a Dutch company, manufactures similar products that prevent corrosion and protect against leaks, which are distributed in the U.S. by Amcorr. Kleiss and Amcorr sought a declaratory judgment in the Netherlands that their products did not infringe the 044 patent. Nooren filed suit in the U.S., alleging infringement. The parties agreed to focus on the phrase “a filler comprising a plurality of fractions each comprising different size particles, and wherein said different fractions have different particle size distributions” in the only independent claim in the patent. The court granted summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of Amcorr. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that the district court erred in at least on claim construction. View "Frans Nooren Afdichtingssystem v. Stopaq Amcorr Inc." on Justia Law

OOIDA, a trade association, challenged the decision of the FMCSA to exempt commercial vehicle operators licensed in Canada or Mexico from certain statutory medical certification requirements applicable to drivers licensed in the United States. The FMCSA claimed that applying these requirements would violate existing executive agreements between those two countries and the United States. The court agreed with the government that absent some clear and overt indication from Congress, the court would not construe a statue to abrogate existing international agreements even when the statute's text was not itself ambiguous. The court presumed that the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (the "Act"), Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144, was not intended to abrogate the executive agreements with Mexico and Canada and held that the FMCSA's implementing rules appropriately understood the medical certificate requirement to apply only to drivers based in the United States. The court rejected OOIDA's secondary argument and denied the petition for review.View "Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., et al." on Justia Law