Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Cubatabaco, a Cuban entity, and General, a Delaware company, manufacture and distribute cigars using the COHIBA mark. General owns trademark registrations issued in 1981 and 1995. Cubatabaco owns the mark in Cuba and uses it worldwide. Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), prohibit Cubatabaco from selling cigars in the U.S.; 31 C.F.R. 515.201(b) prohibits “transfer of property rights . . . to a Cuban entity,” but a general or specific license allows Cuban entities to engage in otherwise prohibited transactions. General licenses are available for transactions “related to the registration and renewal” of U.S. trademark. Specific licenses issue from the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Cubatabaco used a general license to attempt to register the COHIBA mark in 1997, relying on 15 U.S.C. 1126(e), which allows reliance on a foreign registration if the applicant has a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce. Cubatabaco also sought to cancel General’s registrations, which the PTO cited as a basis for likelihood of confusion. Cubatabaco obtained a special license to sue General. The district court held that General had abandoned its registration by non-use and enjoined General’s use of the COHIBA mark, finding that Cubatabaco had acquired ownership under the famous marks doctrine. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that injunctive relief would involve a prohibited transfer under CACR because Cubatabaco would acquire ownership of the mark and later affirmed denial of General’s motion concerning cancellation of its registrations. The Board then dismissed Cubatabaco’s petition, stating that it need not address preclusion because Cubatabaco lacked standing. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that Cubatabaco has a statutory cause of action to petition to cancel the registrations and that issue and claim preclusion do not bar that petition View "Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. General Cigar Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Stokes was a public school teacher for more than 10 years. In 2000, he pleaded no contest to a charge of misdemeanor battery for indecently touching two boys who were his students. Stokes was sentenced to probation, with a prohibition on unsupervised contact with minors. Less than a month after sentencing, Stokes obtained permission to complete his probation in Thailand. Within weeks of his arrival in Thailand, he began seeking boys for sex. This continued for several years until someone tipped off the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service, which, with the Royal Thai Police, searched Stokes’s home and recovered a camera, a computer, and compact discs containing thousands of images of Stokes’s sexual activity with Thai boys. Stokes was extradited and convicted of traveling in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in a sex act with a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2423(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims related to a procedural mistake in the extradition process and to the legality of the search. The Thai foreign ministry waived the “Rule of Specialty,” allowing the government to proceed on a substitute charge. The Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and the Warrant Clause have no extraterritorial application, but Stokes was protected by the Amendment’s touchstone requirement of reasonableness. The search was reasonable.View "United States v. Stokes" on Justia Law

Nooren owns patent 044, entitled “Use of a Preparation for Insulation/Sealing and Coating Purposes and Method for Sealing Manhole Covers,” which discloses a composition for insulating and protecting substrates, such as manhole covers, underground tanks, pipes, and cable sleeves, from corrosion, water ingress, and mechanical stresses. The patent is licensed exclusively to Stopaq, a Dutch company that designs and manufactures coatings and sealants that exhibit both viscous and elastic properties (visco-elasticity) and are designed for corrosion protection and waterproofing. Kleiss, a Dutch company, manufactures similar products that prevent corrosion and protect against leaks, which are distributed in the U.S. by Amcorr. Kleiss and Amcorr sought a declaratory judgment in the Netherlands that their products did not infringe the 044 patent. Nooren filed suit in the U.S., alleging infringement. The parties agreed to focus on the phrase “a filler comprising a plurality of fractions each comprising different size particles, and wherein said different fractions have different particle size distributions” in the only independent claim in the patent. The court granted summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of Amcorr. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that the district court erred in at least on claim construction. View "Frans Nooren Afdichtingssystem v. Stopaq Amcorr Inc." on Justia Law

OOIDA, a trade association, challenged the decision of the FMCSA to exempt commercial vehicle operators licensed in Canada or Mexico from certain statutory medical certification requirements applicable to drivers licensed in the United States. The FMCSA claimed that applying these requirements would violate existing executive agreements between those two countries and the United States. The court agreed with the government that absent some clear and overt indication from Congress, the court would not construe a statue to abrogate existing international agreements even when the statute's text was not itself ambiguous. The court presumed that the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (the "Act"), Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144, was not intended to abrogate the executive agreements with Mexico and Canada and held that the FMCSA's implementing rules appropriately understood the medical certificate requirement to apply only to drivers based in the United States. The court rejected OOIDA's secondary argument and denied the petition for review.View "Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., et al." on Justia Law

Mary, who has both U.S. and Irish citizenship, attended college in Ireland.She and Derek lived together in Ireland for 11 years, but never married. Their son was born in Illinois. The three returned to Ireland 11 days later. A few months later Mary and the baby moved to Illinois against Derek’s wishes. As an unmarried father, Derek had no standing under Irish law to resort to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, which requires return of children to their country of habitual residence if they are “wrongfully removed to or retained in” another country in breach of the custody rights of the left-behind parent. After 3-1/2 years, an Irish court granted Derek guardianship and joint custody. Mary was in Ireland with the baby for the final hearing. The court allowed her to temporarily return to Illinois. Eight months later Derek filed a Hague Convention petition in Illinois. The district court ordered the child returned to Ireland. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court incorrectly treated the parents’ last shared intent as a test for determining habitual residence. Under the Hague Convention, that determination is a practical, flexible, factual inquiry. When Mary moved with the baby to Illinois she was his sole legal custodian and removal was not wrongful under the Convention. By the time of the alleged wrongful “retention,” his life was too firmly rooted in Illinois to consider Ireland his home.View "Redmond v. Redmond" on Justia Law

The government appealed the district court's order which altered the terms of a bond the Coast Guard had fixed for the release of a detained ship that was under investigation and restricted the types of penalties the government could seek for the ship's potential violations of certain ocean pollution prevention statutes. The ship at issue, the Pappadakis, an ocean-going bulk cargo carrier carrying a shipment of coal to Brazil, was detained by the Coast Guard because the vessel had likely been discharging bilge water overboard. The court reversed and remanded for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) where the matter was not subject to review in the district court because the Coast Guard's actions were committed to agency discretion by law. Consequently, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition.View "Angelex Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

A number of suits have challenged the accuracy of the warning label on Pradaxa, a prescription blood-thinning drug manufactured by Boehringer. The litigation is in the discovery stage. The district judge presiding over the litigation imposed sanctions on Boehringer for discovery abuse. Boehringer sought a writ of mandamus quashing the sanctions, which included fines, totaling almost $1 million and also ordered that plaintiffs’ depositions of 13 Boehringer employees, all of whom work in Germany be conducted at “a place convenient to the [plaintiffs] and [to] the defendants’ [Boehringer’s] United States counsel,” presumably in the United States. The parties had previously agreed to Amsterdam as the location. The Seventh Circuit rescinded the order with respect to the depositions but otherwise denied mandamus. View "Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm. v. Herndon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendant and the Church in Japan, alleging that they had tortiously induced her to transfer nearly all of her assets to the Church. After the Japanese courts awarded plaintiff a tort judgment, the Church contended that the judgment imposed liability for its religious teachings in violation of its constitutional right to free exercise of religion. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of plaintiff, holding that the district court's recognition and enforcement of the judgment did not constitute "state action" triggering direct constitutional scrutiny. The court also held that neither the Japanese judgment nor the cause of action on which it was based rose to the level of repugnance to the public policy of California or of the United States that would justify a refusal to enforce the judgment under California's Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 1713-1724. View "Ohno v. Yasuma" on Justia Law

Triple A, a Michigan corporation, has offices in Dearborn, Michigan, the Congo (previously known as Zaire), and Sierra Leone. In 1993, Zaire ordered military equipment worth $14,070,000 from Triple A. A South Korean manufacturer shipped the equipment to Zaire at Triple A’s request. For 17 years, Triple A sought payment from Zaire and then the Congo without success. In 2010, Triple A sued the Congo for breach of contract. The district court dismissed the case, citing lack of jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the language of the Act, under which federal courts have jurisdiction “in any case in which the action is based upon” the following: [1] a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or [2] upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or [3] upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.View "Triple A Int'l, Inc. v. Democratic Republic of the Congo" on Justia Law

Appellees, the Rubins, requested that the district court issue a Writ of Garnishment against the assets of Hamas and HLF after obtaining a judgment against Hamas for damages resulting from a terrorist attack in an outdoor pedestrian mall in Jerusalem. The district court executed the writ but the Rubins could not execute against HLF's assets because those assets had been restrained under 21 U.S.C. 853 to preserve their availability for criminal forfeiture proceedings. The district court subsequently denied the government's motion to dismiss the Rubins' third-party petition under section 853(n) to assert their interests in the restrained assets and vacated the preliminary order of forfeiture. The district court held that the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), Pub. L. No. 107-297, title II, 201, 116 Stat. 2337, allowed the Rubins to execute against HLF's assets not withstanding the government's forfeiture proceedings. The court reversed, holding that section 853(n) did not provide the Rubins with a basis to prevail in the ancillary proceeding; TRIA did not provide the Rubins a basis to assert their interest in the forfeited property; TRIA did not trump the criminal forfeiture statute; and the in custodia legis doctrine did not preclude the district court's in personam jurisdiction over HLF.View "United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief, et al." on Justia Law