Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

In November 2001, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued an anti-dumping duty order on certain hot-rolled carbon steel flat products from Thailand, found that the company was selling the subject merchandise at less than normal value and assigned a dumping margin of 3.86%. In 2006 the order was partially revoked, as to the company, but remained in effect with respect to other exporters and producers. Commerce received a complaint that dumping had resumed and initiated changed circumstances review (CCR), despite the company's assertion that it lacked authority to so. The Court of International Trade (CIT) dismissed the company's suit for an injunction in 2009. Commerce reinstated the order with respect to the company; CIT affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Commerce reasonably interpreted and acted on its revocation and CCR authority under 19 U.S.C. 1675(b, d) as permitting conditional revocation and reconsideration. View "Sahaviriya Steel Ind. Public Co.Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Illinois corporation, filed suit for conversion against a corporation based in South Korea and individuals. Although the defendants were served, there was no formal response. The individual defendants sent a letter asserting that they had no connection to the corporation and requesting dismissal. Several months later the court entered default judgment in the amount of $2,916,332. About a year later the defendants filed appearances and a motion to vacate for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. After noting that jurisdiction can be contested in the original proceeding or in a collateral action, the court concluded that the motion was not untimely. The letter did not constitute an appearance by the individuals and the corporation was not capable of making a pro se appearance. The defendants have submitted affidavits concerning whether they had "minimum contacts" with Illinois that must be considered by the court. View "Philos Technologies, Incorpora v. Philos & D, Incorporated, et al" on Justia Law

After first filing claims in a U.S. district court, inhabitants of eastern Ecuador filed suit in their country, alleging that the company contaminated the area and caused residents' health problems. The company, attempting to establish fraud and collusion in the proceedings, sought discovery from the plaintiffs' attorney for use in that litigation, in criminal proceedings in Ecuador, and in arbitration initiated against the Republic of Ecuador with the United Nations. The district court granted discovery under 28 U.S.C. 1782, which provides that the court of the district in which a person is found may order him to give testimony or to produce a document or thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign tribunal, unless the disclosure would violate a legal privilege. The court concluded that attorney-client privilege had been waived because documentary film-makers had been allowed intimate access to proceedings involving the environmental litigation. The Third Circuit reversed in part, holding that the public disclosure of certain communications did not lead to "subject matter waiver" of attorney-client privilege for communications that were covered by the privilege. The court remanded for consideration of whether certain communications are discoverable pursuant to the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.

The company filed a claim under the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1337, asserting infringement of its patents on microchip encapsulation innovations. The ITC found no violation. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Substantial evidence supported the finding of no infringement of one patent by 17 of 18 defendants. The court also affirmed the ITC's determination that the patent was not anticipated and its finding of patent exhaustion with respect to the eighteenth defendant. The claims with respect to other patents, which have expired, are moot.

The defendant, a dual-citizen of the U.S. and Iran and a chemical engineer, marketed a dynamic software program to Iranian actors and agreed to provide Iranian entities with technology for construction of chemical plants, with a goal of converting Iran into a chemical powerhouse. His efforts included contacting President Ahmadinejad to unveil his plan to help Iran, with respect to the United States' "cruel and tyrannical" treatment of the Iranian people. He was convicted on 10 chargesâfour counts stemming from violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), three counts of making false statements, and three counts of bank fraud and sentenced to a four years imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of the IEEPA and Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control regulations. The law meaningfully constrains the President's discretion and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The government proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's operation does not fall within the informational-materials exemption of the Act. The regulations are not unconstitutionally vague.

In 2003 the Department of Commerce, responding to a petition by the domestic wheat industry, found that Canadian wheat had been sold in the United States at less than fair value and issued an anti-dumping order. A North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) binational panel remanded and Commerce found that the dumping had not materially injured the domestic industry. The NAFTA panel affirmed. Revocation of the anti-dumping order stated ârevocation does not affect the liquidation of entries made prior to January 2, 2006â and instructed Customs to liquidate earlier entries at the rate in effect at the time of entry. The Trade Court granted an injunction against liquidation of those duties and held that the Canadian Wheat Board was entitled to return of deposited unliquidated anti-dumping duties. The Federal Circuit affirmed, first holding that the Trade Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581. The case did not involve unauthorized review of a NAFTA panel decision, but Commerce's implementation of the decision. Characterizing the decision to not return anti-dumping duties as "bizarre and unfair," the court stated that retaining the duties cannot be valid if the underlying order is invalid. Return of the duties does not constitute a retroactive remedy.