Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

FG Hemisphere Associates, LLC ("FG Hemisphere") brought a suit against the Democratic Republic of Congo ("DRC") under the provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. 1604, permitting a plaintiff to confirm an arbitration award secured against a foreign sovereign. At issue was whether the district court could sanction DRC for failing to respond to a court-ordered discovery under the FSIA. The court held that the FSIA did not abrogate a court's inherit power to impose contempt sanctions on a foreign sovereign and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it sanctioned the DRC. View "FG Hemisphere Associates, LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Ecuadorian members of a fishing boat, sued the United States for damages that resulted from the United States Coast Guard's ("Coast Guard") stop of plaintiffs' boat in international waters near the Galapagos Islands under suspicion of plaintiffs' involvement with smuggling drugs. The Coast Guard performed tests on plaintiffs' boat that yielded inconclusive results and the Ecuadorian government conducted further tests which resulted in no contraband and no charges filed against plaintiffs. At issue was whether the United States waived its sovereign immunity under numerous sources. The court held that non-congressional sources were not acts of Congress and did not effect a waiver of sovereign immunity. The court also held that the Military Claims Act, Alien Tort Statute, and a bilateral treaty concerning the Air Force base at Manta, Ecuador did not waive sovereign immunity. The court further held that the Public Vessels Act ("PVA"), Suits in Admiralty Act, and Federal Tort Claims Act provided waivers of sovereign immunity. The court finally held that if a suit falls within the scope of the PVA, 46 U.S.C. 31102, plaintiffs must meet the reciprocity requirement of the PVA regardless of the type of claim they assert. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded to give the parties and the district court additional opportunity to determine whether reciprocity exists under Ecuadorian Law.

In 2003 the Department of Commerce, responding to a petition by the domestic wheat industry, found that Canadian wheat had been sold in the United States at less than fair value and issued an anti-dumping order. A North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) binational panel remanded and Commerce found that the dumping had not materially injured the domestic industry. The NAFTA panel affirmed. Revocation of the anti-dumping order stated ârevocation does not affect the liquidation of entries made prior to January 2, 2006â and instructed Customs to liquidate earlier entries at the rate in effect at the time of entry. The Trade Court granted an injunction against liquidation of those duties and held that the Canadian Wheat Board was entitled to return of deposited unliquidated anti-dumping duties. The Federal Circuit affirmed, first holding that the Trade Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581. The case did not involve unauthorized review of a NAFTA panel decision, but Commerce's implementation of the decision. Characterizing the decision to not return anti-dumping duties as "bizarre and unfair," the court stated that retaining the duties cannot be valid if the underlying order is invalid. Return of the duties does not constitute a retroactive remedy.

The Department of Commerce has employed a technique known as "zeroing" when it investigates a claim that a foreign producer is "dumping" products in the United States at a price below the price in the country of origin. Using zeroing, margins for sales of merchandise sold by a particular exporter at dumped prices are aggregated and margins for sales at non-dumped prices are given a value of zero; the alternative, known as "offsetting," involves aggregating both dumped and non-dumped prices. The statute, 19 U.S.C. 1677(35)(A), refers to calculation of a "dumping margin" equal to "the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price." Domestic producers read the word "exceeds" as requiring zeroing. The Federal Circuit has previously upheld use of zeroing in both investigation and administrative review. Following a World Trade Organization decision disapproving the practice, the Department began using offsetting for investigations and zeroing in administrative review. The Court of International Trade upheld the practice. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the Department had not adequately justified use of two different interpretations of an ambiguous statute.

The company imports components for home storage and organization systems. The U.S. Customs Service liquidated wall panels and locator tabs as "other articles of plastic" rather than as furniture. The company filed protests and requested that the parts be reclassified under duty free provisions. Customs denied the protests. The Court of International Trade ruled in favor of Customs. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. While the lower court examined appropriate authority in defining "unit furniture," it incorrectly determined that a storage panel with hooks was like a wall rack rather than furniture. Noting the various accessories and configurations available with the system, the court stated that the product's versatility is the "very essence of unit furniture."

Plaintiffs, injured in a 1997 Jerusalem suicide bombing, obtained a $71 million default judgment against the Republic of Iran for its role in the attack. They registered the judgment in Illinois in order to attach antiquities on loan to a university and property owned by museums. The court held that Iran was required to appear to assert a defense under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1330(a). When Iran appeared, plaintiffs served discovery requests for the locations of all Iranian assets in the United States. The district court allowed the discovery. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The orders were subject to immediate appeal because of possible intrusion on sovereign immunity. The Act provides that property of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment unless an enumerated exception applies. The district court did not address the exceptions, but issued a blanket order that was contrary to the presumption of immunity. That there has been a determination of liability does not nullify the protections of the Act with respect to execution. Based on the presumption of immunity, Iran was not required to appear to assert the defense in the first place. The court noted provisions of the Act, under which federal agencies may assist plaintiffs in collecting judgments against foreign states.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, Dow Chemical Company ("Dow") and Dole Food Company, Inc. ("Dole"), for physical and psychological injuries they sustained from exposure to a pesticide, dibromocholoropropane, Dow supplied to Dole to use on its banana plantations. At issue is whether the over $97 million judgment a Nicaraguan court awarded plaintiffs is enforceable under the Florida Uniform Out-of-country Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act ("Act"). The court affirmed the district court's holding that the Nicaraguan judgment is not due recognition and enforcement under the Act where the Nicaraguan court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and/or personal jurisdiction over the defendants, where the judgment was "rendered under a system which does not provide... procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law" under the Act, and where recognizing the Nicaraguan judgment would be repugnant to Florida public policy.

Plaintiff, a Cuban corporation, sued the United States Department of Treasury when plaintiff's renewal of its trademark, which had previously been permitted as an exception under the Trading with the Enemy Act ("Act"), was barred by the 1998 law that modified the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and subsequently barred renewals of certain trademarks. At issue was whether plaintiffs had invoked the presumption against retroactivity and the 1998 law should be interpreted to bar only new trademark registrations, not renewals of previously registered trademarks, and if the 1998 law did bar the renewal of previously registered trademarks, then would it violate the substantive due process doctrine. The court held that the presumption against retroactivity did not apply to plaintiff where plaintiff did not possess a vested right to renewal of its trademark. The court also held that the 1998 law did not violate the substantive due process doctrine where it was rationally related to the legitimate government goals of isolating Cuba's Communist government and hastening a transition to democracy in Cuba.