Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

The company filed a claim under the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1337, asserting infringement of its patents on microchip encapsulation innovations. The ITC found no violation. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Substantial evidence supported the finding of no infringement of one patent by 17 of 18 defendants. The court also affirmed the ITC's determination that the patent was not anticipated and its finding of patent exhaustion with respect to the eighteenth defendant. The claims with respect to other patents, which have expired, are moot.

The families of two American contractors beheaded by terrorists in Iraq sued the Syrian Arab Republic ("Syria") in federal court and when Syria did not respond, the district court eventually entered a default judgment in favor of the families. At issue was whether the district court's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) order was in error and its default judgment void. Also at issue was whether remand was appropriate to give the district court opportunity to grant further relief of Syria. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the families adequately effected service of process against Syria when they first filed suit under former section 1605(a)(7) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. 1602, et seq., where, before the district court entered judgment, the families removed to convert their action and proceeded under the new section 1605A in accordance with section 1083 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ("NDAA"), Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3. The court also held that under section 1083 of the NDAA, the families did not have to serve Syria anew because the statutory text did not treat converted claims as new claims for relief. The court further held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a)(2) did not apply in this case given the FSIA's specific statutory service of process provision. Accordingly, there was no need to remand the case to grant Syria other relief.

The children of three former union leaders murdered in Colombia in 2001 sued appellee alleging that it hired paramilitaries from the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia to assassinate their fathers in violation of the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C 1350, the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"), 28 U.S.C. 1350, and the wrongful death laws of Colombia. The children alleged that the murders of their fathers caused them damages including emotional harm, loss of companionship, and loss of financial support. At issue was whether the children possessed constitutional standing and a cause of action under these statutes. The court held that the children easily satisfied Article III standing requirements and clearly have a stake in the controversy that was real enough and concrete enough to entitle them to be heard in a federal district court concerning their TVPA and ATS claims. The court also held that the children have adequately pled a cause of action cognizable under the ATS and the TVPA. The court further held that it could not conclude that the children were also parties to the Drummond I suit and, as a result, reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of the children's TVPA claims to the extent that it concluded on a motion to dismiss where the doctrine of res judicata precluded the children from proceeding with the case.

The defendant, a dual-citizen of the U.S. and Iran and a chemical engineer, marketed a dynamic software program to Iranian actors and agreed to provide Iranian entities with technology for construction of chemical plants, with a goal of converting Iran into a chemical powerhouse. His efforts included contacting President Ahmadinejad to unveil his plan to help Iran, with respect to the United States' "cruel and tyrannical" treatment of the Iranian people. He was convicted on 10 chargesâfour counts stemming from violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), three counts of making false statements, and three counts of bank fraud and sentenced to a four years imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of the IEEPA and Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control regulations. The law meaningfully constrains the President's discretion and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The government proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's operation does not fall within the informational-materials exemption of the Act. The regulations are not unconstitutionally vague.

Defendants, based in Romania and Chicago, operated an internet scam using E-bay. The Seventh Circuit addressed appeals by defendants convicted of wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343). The court upheld a sentence of 63 months imprisonment, at the high end of the guidelines, that did not include credit for time served on related state charges or in custody of immigration officials. The court properly allowed the defendant's attorney to withdraw and declined to appoint new counsel. Another defendant's appeal was barred by his plea agreement. The court properly considered the foreseeability of losses caused by co-schemers in sentencing a third defendant, who also pled guilty to receipt of stolen funds in interstate commerce (18 U.S.C. 2315). With respect to the only defendant to go to trial, the court vacated a conviction for aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. 1028A), finding the evidence insufficient to show that he knew that the passport he used belonged to a real person and was not a purely fictitious document; affirmed his conviction for money laundering (18 U.S.C. 1956(h)),stating that the court did not commit plain error in not limiting jury consideration of âproceedsâ to the net profits of the internet fraud scheme; and vacated his 324-month sentence.

Appellant petitioned for his son's transfer to Israel for custody adjudication alleging that his son had been wrongfully detained in Iowa by the child's mother. At issue was whether the district court erred in finding that the parties' intention was to make Iowa the habitual residence where the district court emphasized the son's perspective that the settled purpose of his relocation to Iowa was to reside there habitually. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that the parties' intent at the time of the move was to make Iowa the son's habitual residence whether the district court emphasized the son's perspective or the parents' perspectives; that the parties maintained no home in Israel after coming to Iowa and appellant spent two months closing down his business before rejoining his family in the United States; that it appeared that the family did intend to "abandon" Israel; and any agreement of the pair to return to Israel would have involved staying in the United States for the indefinite amount of time it would take the mother to finish her doctorate.

Defendants, in consolidated appeals, appealed their convictions for violations of 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(1) for attempting to travel by boat from Saipan in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands ("CNMI") to the Territory of Guam by boat. At issue was whether defendants violated section 1325(a)(1) for being aliens who knowingly and willingly attempted to enter the United States at a time and place other than as designated by immigration officers on or about January 5, 2010, a date within Title VII of the Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008's ("CNRA"), 48 U.S.C. 1806-1808, transition period. The court held that defendants did not violate section 1325(a)(1) by attempting to travel by boat from the CNMI to Guam where the CNMI and Guam were parts of the United States and an alien did not enter or attempt to enter the United States for purposes of section 1325(a)(1) when traveling from one part of the United States to another, even if when doing so they passed through international waters.

Appellee filed an action against appellants, sisters who were traveling together aboard Pan Am Airways Flight 73 when Libyan terrorists hijacked the plane and held it for sixteen hours on the tarmac in Pakistan, seeking to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitrarion Act ("Arbitration Act"), 9 U.S.C. 4. While the suit was pending, the United States and Libya reached a diplomatic settlement where Libya agreed to deposit $1.5 billion into a settlement fund and Congress provided for the implementation of the settlement fund for all terrorism-related litigation against Libya in American courts. At issue was whether the district court properly granted a motion to compel arbitration under section 4 of the Arbitration Act. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the motion to compel and held that the Libyan Claims Resolution Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605A, did not prevent the district court from ordering arbitration of the underlying dispute.

Argentina appealed the district court's dismissal of its motion to extend where Argentina had violated a Bilateral Investment Treaty when it implemented several emergency measures in response to the nation's financial crisis. An arbitration panel determined that Argentina was liable to National Grid PLC, ("National Grid") which had been operating in Argentina under the auspices of the treaty. At issue was whether National Grid forfeited its timeliness defense, whether the district court erred in treating Argentina's motion to extend as moot, and whether the district court erred in ultimately finding service to be untimely. Also at issue was whether the district court erred in granting a confirmation motion without first giving Argentina the opportunity to raise defenses available under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. 201-208. The court rejected Argentina's argument that National Grid had forfeited its timeliness defense where it had expressly preserved this defense in the joint stipulation and then raised it in its first responsive pleading. The court also held that the district court had no authority to grant Argentina's motion to extend time to serve notice and therefore acted within its discretion in treating the motion as moot. Absent any evidence of timely service of notice, the court affirmed the dismissal of Argentina's motion to vacate the arbitral awards. The court further affirmed National Grid's cross-motion for recognition of the arbitral award where Argentina had ample time to raise defenses but made no attempt to raise such defects in the district court.View "Argentine Republic v. National Grid PLC." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the son and widow of an individual who was allegedly tortured and killed by the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization ("defendants"), sued defendants for violation of the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"), 28 U.S.C. 1350, and federal common law. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in vacating the entry of default and if not, whether plaintiffs had a cause of action under the TVPA or federal common law. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court and held that the TVPA did not permit a suit against defendants where the term "individual" comprised only natural persons and also held that plaintiffs did not have a cause of action under 28 U.S.C. 1331 for an alleged violation of federal common law. View "Asid Mohamad, et al v. Jibril Rajoub, et al" on Justia Law