Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

This was an appeal from the denial of the petition of a detainee at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay for a writ of habeas corpus. At issue was whether the district court erred in determining that the detainee was being lawfully detained on the record as it stood before that court and whether the district court's procedural errors deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to develop a record upon which he could challenge his detention. The court rejected the detainee's contention that the district court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous and because those findings were enough to establish that the detainee was "part of the Taliban or al Qaeda," the court rejected his contention that the record before the court was insufficient to establish the lawfulness of his detention. Given the time the detainee's attorneys had after their receipt of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal record, the district court's grant of leave to file an amended traverse, and the absence of any subsequent request for additional time or discovery, the court held that the detainee had failed to show that he was prejudiced by the denial of the thirty-day continuance. The court also held that, in light of the circumstances, there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to issue further discovery orders without a showing that there was a basis for believing that the requests satisfied the Case Management Order's predicate conditions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of the petition. View "Al Alwi, et al. v. Obama, et al." on Justia Law

The United States detained Nazul Gul and Adel Hamad for several years at the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay and during that time, each filed with the district court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Prior to any hearing on the merits of their petitions, the United States transferred the detainees to the custody of foreign sovereigns and did not then rescind their designation as "enemy combatants." Gul and Hamad wanted to continue litigating their habeas petitions but the district court dismissed their petitions as moot because they were no longer held by the United States. Gul and Hamad subsequently appealed, arguing among other things, that their petitions were not moot because they continued to be burdened by the collateral consequences of their prior detention and continuing designation. The court held that, having determined that Gul and Hamad identified no injury sufficient to bring their cases within the court's jurisdiction under Article III, the court affirmed the order of the district court. View "Gul v. Obama, et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from continuing disputes between Argentina and its various private creditors. Argentina and its Brady bondholders entered into a Continuation of Collateral Pledge Agreement that extended the security interest in the tendered bonds' collateral during its transfer and liquidation. Capital Ventures International (CVI) held certain non-Brady bonds on which Argentina also defaulted and chose to sue Argentina to collect on the defaulted bonds it held, seeking to attach Argentina's reversionary interest in the Brady collateral. At issue was whether the attachments blocked the proposed exchange and whether the district court properly modified the attachments to allow the exchange. The court held that CVI was entitled to maintain its attachments even though a quirk of the bonds' Collateral Pledge Agreement meant that the attachments would effectively block the proposed exchange between Argentina and the Brady bondholders. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's orders that modified the attachments to permit the exchange. View "Capital Ventures Int'l v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Americans taken hostage in Iran in November 1979, and their families brought a new complaint, five years after the dismissal of their suit, in the district court relying on Congress's 2008 amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891. At issue was whether the 2008 amendments to the FSIA reneged on the promise of the United States in the Algiers Accords to bar plaintiffs' suit. The court held that because the ambiguity in section 1083(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 28 U.S.C. 1605A(a), regarding whether plaintiffs, whose case was not pending at the time of enactment, could file under the new terrorism cause of action, the court was required again to conclude that Congress had not abrogated the Algiers Accords. The court also rejected plaintiffs' alternative argument that the reenactment and partially revised jurisdictional provisions of the FSIA abrogated the Algiers Accord where these provisions were not meaningfully different than they were when presented to the court in plaintiffs' original suit. Accordingly, the order of the district court was affirmed. View "Roeder, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican national, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a Texas court. Petitioner sought a stay of execution on the ground that his conviction was obtained in violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention), and relied on Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Avena). The Court held that petitioner's argument was foreclosed by Medellin v. Texas, in which the Court held that neither the Avena decision nor the President's Memorandum purporting to implement that decision constituted directly enforceable federal law. The Court declined to stay the execution so that Congress could consider whether to enact legislation implementing the Avena decision where the Due Process Clause did not prevent a State from carrying out a lawful judgment in light of unenacted legislation that might someday authorize a collateral attack on that judgment. The Court also declined the United State's request that the Court stay the execution until January 2012 in support of "future jurisdiction to review the judgment in a proceeding." Accordingly, the applications for stay of execution was denied and petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "Leal Garcia v. Texas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, 23 Liberian children, charge defendant with using hazardous child labor on its rubber plantation in violation of customary international law. The Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, confers on the federal courts jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, despite disagreeing with the district court holding that a corporation cannot be held liable under the statute. The court also stated that the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust remedies in which alleged violations occurred. Plaintiffs did not establish an adequate basis for inferring a violation of customary international law; the company does not employ children, they work to help their parents meet quotas, and there was no evidence about work expectations for Liberian children living off the plantation. View "Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., LLC" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a contract between the Indonesian government and the Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon), a United States corporation, and several of its wholly owned subsidiaries where Exxon operated a large natural gas extraction and processing facility in the Aceh province. Plaintiffs were fifteen Indonesian villagers. Eleven villagers filed a complaint in 2001 alleging that Exxon's security forces committed murder, torture, sexual assault, battery, and false imprisonment in violation of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. 1350, and various common law torts. Four villagers alleged that in 2007, Exxon committed various common law torts. All plaintiffs alleged that Exxon took actions both in the United States and at its facility in the Aceh province that resulted in their injuries. Plaintiffs challenged the subsequent dismissal of their claims and Exxon filed a cross-appeal, inter alia, raising corporate immunity for the first time. The court concluded that aiding and abetting liability was well established under the ATS. The court further concluded that neither the text, history, nor purpose of the ATS supported corporate immunity for torts based on heinous conduct allegedly committed by its agents in violation of the law of nations. The court affirmed the dismissal of the TVPA claims in view of recent precedent of the court. The court concluded, however, that Exxon's objections to justiciability were unpersuasive and that the district court erred in ruling that plaintiffs lacked prudential standing to bring their non-federal tort claims and in the choice of law determination. The court finally concluded that Exxon's challenge to the diversity of parties in the complaint at issue was to be resolved initially by the district court. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' TVPA claims, reversed the dismissal of the ATS claims at issue, along with plaintiffs' non-federal tort claims, and remanded the cases to the district court. View "John Doe VIII, et al. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., et al." on Justia Law

A 2007 patent litigation settlement agreement included a covenant not to sue that stated that it applied to customers of the defendants, who were intended beneficiaries, and a governing law/venue provision specifying New Mexico. In September 2010, plaintiff filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission alleging infringement by defendant and its U.S. distributors and filed a complaint in the Northern District of California alleging infringement of the same two patents, which issued after the settlement agreement but are continuations depending from the applications that were at issue in the settlement. The New Mexico district court entered a preliminary injunction, enforcing the forum selection clause. Plaintiff dismissed its ITC and California claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed the entry of the injunction; the issues relate to and arise out of the settlement agreement district court correctly applied the factors of irreparable harm, balance of hardships, and public interest. View "Gen. Protecht Grp., Inc. v. Leviton Mfg. Co." on Justia Law

The Republic of Argentina and interested non-party-appellant, Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA), appealed from orders of the district court to attach funds held in BCRA's account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) on the theory that, pursuant to First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), those funds were attachable interests of the Republic. At issue was whether sovereign immunity for central bank property "held for its own account" pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1611(b)(1), depended upon a presumption of the central bank's independence under Bancec, and the proper definition of central bank property "held for its own account" under section 1611(b)(1). The court held that because BCRA's sovereign immunity over the FRBNY funds had not been waived and the FRBNY funds were property of BCRA held for its own account under section 1611(b)(1), the FRBNY funds were immune from attachment and restraint. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred in concluding that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a suit for attachment and restraint for the FRBNY funds. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "NML Capital, Ltd. et al. v. The Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four Afghan and five Iraqi citizens captured and subsequently held in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, by the United States military sued defendants, seeking damages and declaratory relief as the result of their treatment while in U.S. custody. Each plaintiff asserted two Bivens claims, namely, defendants tortured him in violation of his due process right under the Fifth Amendment and defendants' conduct constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs also brought claims under the ATS based on defendants' alleged infliction of "prolonged arbitrary detention," "torture," and "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their constitutional claims and ATS claims. The court held that defendants were protected from plaintiffs' constitutional claims by qualified immunity. The court also held that, even if defendants were not shielded by qualified immunity and plaintiffs could claim the protections of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, the court would decline to sanction a Bivens cause of action because special factors counseled against doing so. The court further held that plaintiffs' claim under the ATS alleged a violation of the law of nations, not of the ATS, and therefore, did not violate a statute of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(2)(B). The court finally held that because plaintiffs have not alleged a cognizable cause of action, they have no basis upon which to seek declaratory relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of dismissal. View "Ali v. Rumsfeld" on Justia Law