Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Air Century, SA relied on diversity jurisdiction when it sued Defendant-Appellee Atlantque Air Assitance and Insured Aircraft Title Services, Inc. (IATS) for breach of contract in district court. Unfortunately, the legal authority Plaintiff used did not provide jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the parties stiputated to the existence of diversity jurisdiction. Instead of challenging diversity, Atlantique sought and was awarded dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Air Century stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of its claims against IATS and then appealed the dismissal of its claims against Atlantique. "Belatedly noticing the diversity issue early in the appeal," Atlantique moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In response, Air Century conceded that the district court had never had subject-matter jurisdiction. It requested that the Tenth Circuit: (1) vacate the district court’s order dismissing Atlantique for lack of personal jurisdiction and (2) dismiss this appeal. Under the circumstances, the district court had no power to rule on any substantive motions or to enter judgment in the case. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit denied the motion to dismiss the appeal, and vacated the district court's orders. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions for the court to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Air Century SA v. Atlantique Air, et al" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit consolidated two cases involving transfer to courts in another country. One is an appeal from an order to transfer cases involving vehicular accidents allegedly caused by tires installed on vehicles in Latin America, from the Southern District of Indiana to the courts of Mexico. Its i a suit by Mexican citizens arising from the death of another Mexican citizen in an accident in Mexico. The second involves transfer, to Israel, of suits against manufacturers of blood products used by hemophiliacs, which turned out to be contaminated by HIV; it was brought by Israeli citizens infected by the products in Israel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the transfers. Noting the existence of apparently dispositive precedent, the court referred to "ostrich-like tactic of pretending that potentially dispositive authority against a litigant's contention does not exist." View "Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner Gong Geng Chen petitioned the Tenth Circuit to review a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that denied his motion to reopen as untimely. Petitioner n is a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China. He illegally entered the United States in April 1993. In August of that same year he filed an asylum application in which he asserted that he had been persecuted because of his religious beliefs. Removal proceedings were initiated. After conceding removability, he filed for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. On appeal, Petitioner asked the BIA to remand his case to the IJ to consider the impact of worsening conditions for members of unofficial churches in China. In January 2010, more than ninety days following the BIA’s order dismissing his appeal and denying his motion to remand, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen. He acknowledged the untimeliness of the motion, but argued that the time restriction did not apply because of changes in his personal circumstances and in country conditions. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that reports and other evidence proffered did not support Petitioner's contention that material changes in country conditions warranted asylum. Accordingly, the Court determined the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to reopen as untimely, and denied his petition. View "Chen v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, in his role as executor of the estate and personal representative of his wife, who perished in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as in his individual capacity, filed suit alleging claims that arose from the events of that day, of assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, wrongful death, and violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. 2333. Defendant subsequently appealed from an order denying without prejudice its motion to vacate entry of default and to dismiss the complaint. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's suit was properly considered under the noncommercial tort exception to foreign sovereign immunity provided by 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(5). Because factual issues persisted with respect to whether the Taliban's actions in allegedly agreeing to facilitate the September 11th attacks were properly considered to be the action of Afghanistan and as to whether any such actions were "discretionary" under section 1605(a)(5)(A), the court remanded the case for jurisdictional discovery as requested by Afghanistan in the district court. View "Doe v. Bin Laden, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ferdinand De Leon appealed a district court’s judgment entered in favor of Defendant Denman Investment Corporation, Inc. Plaintiff represents a class of over 9500 people who brought human rights claims against the former president of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos. In 1995, the class obtained a $2 billion judgment in the federal district court of Hawai'i. Several years later, the class registered the judgment in the federal district court in Illinois in an attempt to enforce it. The judgment was revived in 2008 and remains in effect until 2017 under Illinois law. Plaintiff then registered the Illinois revival in federal district court in Colorado. While ancillary lawsuits proceeded, Plaintiff filed a putative class action in 2009, seeking to enforce the Illinois judgment in Colorado against property that Defendant owned nominally for the benefit of the Marcos estate. Defendant moved to dismiss the Colorado suit, contending that, among other things, the Illinois judgement was unenforceable in Colorado. The Colorado court denied Defendant's motion, denied a motion to certify the class, and dismissed the sole claim against the Marcoses. But while that motion to dismiss was pending, Plaintiff filed an "advice of settlement" indicating that the parties reached a settlement-in-principle in this suit and the ancillary suit. Later that year, the district court entered its orders. Of import here was the court's finding that the Illinois judgment could not be re-registered in Colorado, and therefore, Plaintiff lacked standing to enforce the judgment. Plaintiff moved to vacate or modify the court's decision in light of the advice of settlement. Defendant responded by filing a notice of its intent not to participate in the appeal, stating that it had settled all claims with the class members. Upon careful consideration of the legal authority and the lengthy court record of this case, the Tenth Circuit concluded that language in the settlement stipulating that once the settlement agreement was executed the parties would dismiss their pending lawsuit controlled in this case. The Court concluded that the district court should have "treated the stipulation as a self-executing dismissal;" Accordingly, the district court's granting of Defendant's motion to dismiss on the merits was void because it was issued after the stipulation was filed and therefore in the absence of jurisdiction." The Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to the lower court to dismiss the entire action with prejudice. View "De Leon v. Marcos, et al" on Justia Law

This Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 1350, case arose out of the operations of Rio Tinto mining group on the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the uprising against Rio Tinto in the late 1980's that resulted in the use of military force and many deaths. The only claims before the court on appeal were plaintiffs' claims for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and racial discrimination. As a preliminary matter, the court addressed claims regarding more sweeping legal principles that Rio Tinto and the dissent argued which called for the dismissal of the entire action. The court held that only plaintiffs' claims of genocide and war crimes fell within the limited federal jurisdiction created by the ATS and that the crimes against humanity arising from a blockade and the racial discrimination claims did not. Accordingly, the district court's order on prudential exhaustion was affirmed; the district court's dismissal of the claims for racial discrimination and crimes against humanity was affirmed; the dismissal of the claims for genocide and war crimes was reversed; and the case remanded for further proceedings on the claims of genocide and war crimes. View "Sarei, et al. v. Rio Tinto, PLC, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment convicting him of (1) conspiracy to violate the Iranian Transaction Regulations (ITR) and operate an unlicensed money-transmitting business; (2) violating the ITR; (3) operating an unlicensed money-transmitting business; and (4) two counts of making false statements in response to government subpoenas. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in several respects when instructing the jury on the conspiracy, ITR, and money-transmitting counts; defendant was entitled to a new trial on the false statement counts because the government constructively amended the indictment; the government committed misconduct in its rebuttal summation, which he claimed necessitated a new trial on all counts; and defendant should be resentenced because the district court miscalculated the applicable offense level. The court reversed Count One to the extent it alleged a violation of the ITR as an overt act and vacated and remanded to the extent it was based on the money-transmission violation as an overt act; reversed Count Two; vacated and remanded Count Three; and affirmed Counts Four and Five. View "United States v. Banki" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a jury verdict awarding damages to its former employee for breach of a stock options contract. Defendant argued that the jury instruction misstated the governing Korean law, that the jury's verdict relied on legally insupportable evidence, and that the district court applied the wrong law when determining attorney's fees. The court held that defendant failed to prove that the district court abused its discretion in excluding a requirement of coercion or intimidation from the jury instructions. Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial on damages. Finally, the award of attorney's fees would be permitted under either Texas or Korean law. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Garriott v. NCsoft Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner Sushma KC sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of her motion to reopen or reconsider its previous decision denying her asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). After arriving in this country, KC filed timely applications for asylum, but on June 23, 2008, an immigration judge (IJ) denied her applications, and ordered her to voluntarily depart or be removed to her native Nepal. In his oral decision, the IJ noted the threats she received: "the most recent and graphic of them was that her head would be cut off [by Maoist insurgents] unless she paid 300,000 rupees." The IJ concluded, however, that KC failed to satisfy the "one central reason" test (see 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)) which required showing that one of the central reasons the Maoists targeted her was because of her political beliefs. KC appealed to the BIA, which upheld the IJ’s decision. The BIA concluded that "[t]he Immigration Judge reasonably determined based on the record as a whole that the Maoists’ demands for money were acts of extortion not related to the respondent’s political opinion." In addition, the BIA denied KC’s motion to remand her case to the IJ so that he could consider additional evidence concerning her husband’s disappearance. Because the BIA adopted the IJ’s analysis without further explanation, both to dismiss KC’s appeal and to deny reconsideration, the Tenth Circuit held that the BIA’s decision lacked "rational explanation." Accordingly, the Court held that the BIA abused its discretion, and remanded the case for further consideration. The Court affirmed the BIA in all other respects. View "KC v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for conspiring to kill U.S. officers, to acquire and export anti-aircraft missiles, and to provide material support to a known terrorist organization. Two defendants were additionally convicted of money laundering and conspiring to kill U.S. citizens. The court held that the United States had federal subject-matter jurisdiction to prosecute defendants; the district court did not err in denying defendants' motion for a hearing on certain issues; because the court concluded that defendants' proffered evidence was inadmissible under Rule 404 and that the district court did not commit manifest error by excluding it under Rule 403, defendants' evidentiary challenge to the exclusion was rejected; defendants' remaining challenges were rejected and their convictions were affirmed under 18 U.S.C. 2332(g); the district court's jury instruction was correct and that 18 U.S.C. 2339B did not violate the Fifth Amendment, notwithstanding that no proof was required that a defendant intended his aid to support the terrorist activity of a terrorist group; and one defendant's insufficiency challenge was rejected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. al Kassar, et al." on Justia Law