Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal involved claims by families and the estates of the victims of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. This opinion addressed only the claims against the 37 defendants dismissed by the district court for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court agreed with the district court that it lacked personal jurisdiction over most of these defendants pursuant to the court's decision in In re Terrorist Attacks III, because plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to show that most of these defendants expressly aimed their allegedly tortious conduct at the United States. The court concluded, however, that jurisdictional discovery was warranted with regard to 12 defendants. View "In Re: Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought civil claims against the sitting president of Sri Lanka under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. 1350. On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the president was not immune from civil suit under the TVPA. Because, as a consequence of the State Department's suggestion of immunity, the president was entitled to head of state immunity under the common law while he remained in office, and because the TVPA did not abrogate that common law immunity, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint. View "Manoharan, et al v. Rajapaksa" on Justia Law

Peter Knowland sued Syria, Libya, and a number of Syrian and Libyan individuals and organizations for sponsoring and supporting the terrorist attacks on international flight terminals in Rome and Vienna on December 27, 1985. Knowland was injured in the Vienna attack. The district court dismissed the case as untimely, and Knowland's legal representative appealed. Because Knowland filed suit after the statute of limitations had run pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1605A, his only hope of obtaining judicial relief depended on his ability to invoke the "related action" provision. Knowland argued that his suit was related to Estate of Buonocore v. Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, a suit against many of the same defendants for their alleged support of the Rome attack. The court concluded that the Vienna and Rome attacks constituted the same incident and thus Buonocore put defendants on notice that they could be liable for the Vienna attack. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Beneden v. Al-Sanusi, et al" on Justia Law

Wiley, an academic publisher, often assigns to its foreign subsidiary (WileyAsia) rights to publish, print, and sell Wiley’s English language textbooks abroad. WileyAsia’s books state that they are not to be taken (without permission) into the U.S. When Kirtsaeng moved to the U.S., he asked friends to buy foreign edition English-language textbooks in Thai book shops, where they sold at low prices, and mail them to him. He sold the books at a profit. Wiley claimed that Kirtsaeng’s unauthorized importation and resale was an infringement of Wiley’s 17 U.S.C. 106(3) exclusive rights to distribute its copyrighted work and section 602’s import prohibition. Kirtsaeng cited section 109(a)’s “first sale” doctrine, which provides that “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title ... is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.” The district court held that the defense did not apply to goods manufactured abroad. The jury found that Kirtsaeng had willfully infringed Wiley’s American copyrights and assessed damages. The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that section 109(a)’s “lawfully made under this title” language indicated that the “first sale” doctrine does not apply to copies of American copyrighted works manufactured abroad. The Supreme Court reversed; the “first sale” doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully made abroad. Section 109(a) says nothing about geography. A geographical interpretation of the first-sale doctrine could re¬quire libraries to obtain permission before circulating the many books in their collections that were printed overseas; potential practical problems are too serious, extensive, and likely to come about to be dismissed as insignificant—particularly in light of the ever-growing importance of foreign trade to America. View "Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Johnson Controls, a Wisconsin manufacturer of building management systems and HVAC equipment, and Edman Controls entered into an agreement giving Edman exclusive rights to distribute Johnson’s products in Panama. In 2009, Johnson breached the agreement by attempting to sell its products directly to Panamanian developers, circumventing Edman. Edman invoked the agreement’s arbitration clause. The arbitrator concluded that Johnson had breached the agreement and that Edman was entitled to damages. Johnson sought to vacate or modify the arbitral award, challenging the way in which the award took account of injuries to Edman’s subsidiaries and the arbitrator’s alleged refusal to follow Wisconsin law. The district court ruled in Edman’s favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and upheld the district court’s award of attorney fees. View "Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Edman Controls, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were United States citizens injured in a 1997 terrorist attack in Jerusalem that Hamas orchestrated. Plaintiffs sued the Islamic Republic of Iran, alleging that Iran had provided material support to Hamas and was therefore liable for the attack. Plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against Iran in 2003. Seeking to collect on that judgment, Plaintiffs moved to attach, by trustee process action in the District of Massachusetts, certain antiquities they claimed were the property of Iran but that were in the possession of Defendants, the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston (MFA) and Harvard University. The district court granted Defendants' motions to dissolve the attachments, concluding that Defendants could invoke the objects' immunity from attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), and that although the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) provided a potential way around that immunity, Plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proving that the antiquities were attachable under that statute. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed but on narrower grounds, holding that TRIA in this case did not nullify the antiquities' immunity from execution under the FSIA. View "Rubin v. Harvard Univ." on Justia Law

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,50 U.S.C. 1881a,2008 amendments, permit the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to acquire foreign intelligence information by jointly authorizing surveillance of individuals who are not "United States persons" and are reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S. They normally must first obtain Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court approval; 1881a surveillance is subject to statutory conditions, congressional supervision, and compliance with the Fourth Amendment. United States persons who claim to engage in sensitive international communications with individuals who they believe are likely targets of surveillance sought a declaration that 1881a is facially unconstitutional and a permanent injunction. The district court found that they lacked standing, but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that they showed an "objectively reasonable likelihood" that their communications will be intercepted in the future and that they suffer present injuries from costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of their communications. The Supreme Court reversed. The plaintiffs do not have Article III standing, which require an injury that is "concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling." Allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient. Plaintiffs’ standing theory rests on a speculative chain of possibilities. The Court stated that it is "reluctant to endorse standing theories that require guesswork as to how independent decision-makers will exercise their judgment." Plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending. View "Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA" on Justia Law

In 1996 Beloit agreed to build high-speed paper-making machines for Indonesian paper companies. Two of the companies executed promissory notes in favor of Beloit reflecting a principal indebtedness of $43.8 million. The paper companies guaranteed the notes; Beloit assigned them to JPMorgan in exchange for construction financing. The machines were delivered in 1998 but did not run as specified. In 2000 the parties settled claims pertaining to the machines but preserved obligations under the notes. JPMorgan sued for nonpayment. The district court held that warranty-based claims were foreclosed by the settlement and that other defenses lacked merit; it awarded JPMorgan $53 million. After the appeal was filed, JPMorgan issued citations to discover assets. Although the companies raised an international conflict-of-law question, the district court ordered compliance with the citations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The settlement waived implied warranty defenses and counterclaims. The fraud defense is also mostly barred; to the extent it is not, the evidence was insufficient to survive summary judgment. The court also rejected defenses that the notes lacked consideration; that the notes were issued for a “special purpose” and were not intended to be repaid; and that JPMorgan is not a holder in due course. The discovery order was not appealable. View "JPMorgan Chase & Co., N.A. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction requires contracting states to order a child returned to her country of habitual residence upon finding that the child has been wrongfully removed to or retained in the contracting state. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U. S. C. 11601, implements the Convention. Chafin, a U.S. citizen, married a United Kingdom citizen (mother), in Germany, where they had a daughter, E. C. When Chafin was deployed with the military to Afghanistan, mother took E. C. to Scotland. When Chafin was transferred to Alabama, mother traveled there with E. C. Chafin filed for divorce and custody. Mother filed a petition under the Convention and ICARA. The district court concluded that E. C.’s country of habitual residence was Scotland. In Scotland, mother was granted interim custody and a preliminary injunction prohibiting Chafin from removing E. C. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Chafin’s appeal as moot. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Return of a child to a foreign country does not render appeal of a return order moot. The Chafins continue to contest where their daughter will be raised. Chafin’s claim for re-return cannot be dismissed as so implausible that it is insufficient to preserve jurisdiction; his prospects of success are not pertinent to mootness. Even if Scotland were to ignore a re-return order, U. S. courts would continue to have personal jurisdiction over mother and could command her to take action under threat of sanctions. Enforcement of the order may be uncertain, but that does not typically render cases moot. If cases were to become moot upon return of a child, courts would be more likely to routinely grant stays, to prevent loss of any right to appeal, conflicting with the Convention’s mandate of prompt return. View "Chafin v. Chafin" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Chevron's involvement in litigation over the alleged environmental contamination of oil fields in Ecuador. Ecuador sought discovery from John Connor and GSI Environmental, his company, for use in a foreign arbitration against Chevron. During the course of extended litigation with Ecuador, Chevron, an intervenor in the district court, benefited repeatedly by arguing against Ecuador and others that the arbitration was a "foreign or international tribunal." Because Chevron's previous positions were inconsistent with its current argument, judicial estoppel was appropriate to make discovery under 28 U.S.C. 1782 available for Ecuador. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for determination of the scope of discovery. View "Republic of Ecuador, et al v. Connor, et al" on Justia Law