Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

A worker at a fish processing plant was injured while on the job. His employer asserted that it did not maintain workers' compensation and that it was immune from suit, so the worker filed a negligence action in state court seeking reimbursement for medical expenses, compensation for lost wages, and attorney's fees. The superior court granted the employer's motion to dismiss on immunity grounds. Because the employer, an international organization, enjoys absolute immunity from suit and it did not waived this immunity, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court.View "Price v. Unisea, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were several dozen national and international citizens who resided in Israel and were injured in rocket attacks allegedly launched by Hizballah during the Second Lebanon War. Plaintiffs brought suit against the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB), a defunct bank headquartered in Beirut, claiming that LCB assisted Hizballah in committing the illegal attacks. The lawsuit was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs asserted personal jurisdiction over LCB under New York's long-arm statute. The district court granted LCB's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals accepted questions of law from the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals and answered (1) a foreign bank's maintenance of a correspondent bank account at a financial institution in New York and use of that account to effect dozens of wire transfers on behalf of a foreign client constitutes a "transaction" of business in New York within the meaning of the long-arm statute; and (2) Plaintiffs' claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Alien Tort Statute, or for negligence or breach of statutory duty in violation of Israeli law arose from LCB's transaction of business in New York within the meaning of the long-arm statute.View "Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was a challenge to the failure of a district court to give preclusive effect to a California federal district court judgment during a proceeding to grant recognition of a subsequent German judgment. Plaintiff Ron Markin executed a promissory note in 1988 agreeing to pay Defendant Thomas Grohmann $551,292.00 with interest at ten percent per annum. The loan was for a business transaction between the parties. In September 1997, Plaintiff sued Defendant in the United States District Court in the Central District of California in order to collect the promissory note. At that time, Defendant resided in Scottsdale, Arizona. The parties entered into a written settlement agreement to resolve the lawsuit. The agreement provided the principal and interest owing; that the lawsuit would be dismissed if that sum plus interest was paid according to the terms of the agreement; that the court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement; that if the amount due under the agreement was not paid in full as provided in the agreement, Plaintiff could obtain a judgment as provided by California law; and that the agreement "shall be governed by and interpreted under the laws of the State of California." Defendant failed to pay according to the agreement, and Plaintiff obtained an ex parte judgment against Defendant. After learning that Defendant owned real property in Germany, Plaintiff commenced a civil action in Germany to enforce the California judgment. The German trial court dismissed the action on the ground that the judgment was not enforceable under German law. Plaintiff appealed and asserted that if the judgment was not enforceable, he could recover on the settlement agreement upon which that judgment was based. The appellate court agreed, and it issued an opinion ordering Defendant to pay Plaintiff. The court held that it could enter a judgment against Defendant based upon the settlement agreement because he had previously been a German citizen. Upon its review of matter, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the German judgment was a final judgment under German law. But because the German judgment did not recognize the effect of a final judgment under California law, it conflicted with the California judgment. The Idaho Court therefore reversed the judgment of the district court that recognized the German judgment.View "Markin v. Grohmann" on Justia Law

In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.View "In re J.L. Gordon, Minor" on Justia Law

In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.View "In re C.I. Morris, Minor" on Justia Law

Appellant is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States illegally in 2003. He married Jane Doe (Mother) in Payette, Idaho. After they were married, Appellant was arrested in when he attempted to open a bank account with a false social security number. He served three months in jail, and was then transferred to a to be held for deportation. He agreed to voluntarily leave the United States and did so, returning to his parents' home in Mexico. Mother also went to Mexico, but she returned to the United States after she became pregnant. Their child (Daughter) was born in the United States in November 2008. Mother also had a four-year-old son by another man. In March 2009, Father reentered the United States illegally in an attempt to be with his wife and Daughter, but he was caught in Arizona and returned to Mexico. In 2009, Mother and her boyfriend took the boyfriend's son to the hospital regarding severe bruising on his head. Because Mother and the boyfriend gave conflicting accounts of how the child was injured, medical personnel called law enforcement. The two were arrested, and the State initiated proceedings for care of the children in Mother's custody. The petition alleged the daughter's father was unknown, in Mexico, at an unknown address. Appellant spoke by telephone from Mexico with a State caseworker, expressing his wish to be reunited with Mother and his daughter. When informed that Mother was not adhering to the plan, Appellant attempted to have his daughter moved to Mexico so that he may care for her. For the next year, there was a breakdown in communications between Appellant and the state caseworker. The State decided to initiate termination proceedings against Appellant. A default judgment was entered against him and his parental rights to his daughter were terminated. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the magistrate's finding that Appellant "made no attempt to establish a relationship by the means that were available to him" was "absurd." The Court found the magistrate's decisions with regard to the child "clearly erroneous," and reversed the lower court's decision. The Court remanded the case with instructions for the State to make all reasonable steps to promptly place the daughter with Appellant in Mexico.View "RE: Termination of Parental Rights of John (2011-23) Doe" on Justia Law

In an original proceeding, the Supreme Court reviewed a trial court's order that quashed service on Defendant Paulo Rodriguez-Cera. Defendant resided in Mexico but was served by substituted service in Colorado. After previously granting substituted service, the trial court determined that C.R.C.P. 4(d) mandated that service on a defendant located in a foreign country be made according to international agreement, if any. Because Mexico and the United States are parties to the Convention on Service Arboad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters (20 U.S.T. 361), the trial court concluded that Plaintiff Rex Willhite must serve Defendant via the Convention. As a result, the trial court quashed the substituted service. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that C.R.C.P. 4(d) did not establish service according to international agreement as the exclusive means of serving a defendant in a foreign country. The Court held that substituted service under Colorado law provides a valid alternative to service abroad. The Court made the rule absolute and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Willhite v. Rodriguez-Cera" on Justia Law

Dean and Stacey Norcutt bought a home for cash and satisfied the existing first mortgage held by Zions National Bank. They later discovered the home was also subject to a judgment lien obtained by Sourcecorp, Inc. that far exceeded the property's value. Sourcecorp subsequently initiated a sheriff's sale to foreclose on its judgment lien, and the Norcutts sued to enjoin the sale. The trial court granted relief to the Norcutts, and the court of appeals reversed. On remand, the trial court entered summary judgment for Sourcecorp. The Court of appeals reversed, holding that the Norcutts were equitably subrogated to the position of Zions Bank in priority over Sourcecorp. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Norcutts were equitably subrogated to the mortgage lien's priority for the amount they paid to satisfy the mortgage. Remanded.View "Sourcecorp, Inc. v. Norcutt" on Justia Law

Sagarra, a Spanish corporation, was a minority shareholder of Uniland, also a Spanish corporation. Sagarra brought a Court of Chancery action to rescind the sale, by CPV, of Giant, to Uniland. CPV was the controlling stockholder of both Giant and Uniland. Sagarra purported to sue derivatively on behalf of a wholly-owned Delaware subsidiary of Uniland, UAC, which was specifically created as the vehicle to acquire Giant. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Sagarra lacked standing to enforce a claim on behalf of UAC. The Court of Chancery held that Sagarra's standing to sue was governed by Spanish law, because Uniland - the only entity in which Sagarra owned stock - was incorporated in Spain. The court upheld the Court of Chancery's reasoning and judgment because Sagarra failed to satisfy the demand requirements of Spanish law.View "Sagarra Inversiones, S.L., v. Cementos Portland Valderrivas, S.A., et al." on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights case, the Supreme Court considered two separate appeals pertaining to a mother’s and father’s respective rights to their two daughters, seventeen-year-old R.W. and thirteen-year-old N.W. The case presented novel jurisdictional questions because the parents and children are citizens of Sri Lanka and, although mother and the children have been residents of Vermont for a number of years, father resided in Sri Lanka and has never been to Vermont. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) petitioned to terminate both mother’s and father’s residual parental rights. The family division granted the request as to mother, but concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction over father. Mother appealed termination of her parental rights, arguing that the superior court applied the incorrect standard of proof with respect to changed circumstances and engaged in a faulty best-interests analysis. DCF filed a separate appeal as to father, arguing that even though father lacked minimum contacts with Vermont, the court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the status of his children, who were within the court’s jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the termination of parental rights was a determination of status and could be adjudicated when the forum state has a sufficient connection to the children, even absent minimum contact jurisdiction over a parent. Further, in this case, the Court held that exercise of jurisdiction was authorized by the UCCJA and was reasonable given the strong interests of the state and the children in resolution of father’s rights as well as the lack of any conflicting jurisdictional claims by another state or country. The Court affirmed the termination of the mother's parental rights.View "In re R.W. and N.W." on Justia Law