Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sought damages for terrorist acts committed while they were held hostage in the jungles of Columbia. Plaintiffs suffered repeated acts of international terrorism at the hands of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC). In an effort to collect their default judgment against FARC, plaintiffs filed a motion for a Writ of Garnishment in the district court against Mercurio's frozen assets. At issue was whether assets frozen pursuant only to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, 21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., qualified as "blocked assets" under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (Terrorism Act), Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322. Under the plain language of the statute, the court held that such assets were not "blocked assets" and thus, the district court's judgment in favor of plaintiffs relied on an erroneous interpretation of the Terrorism Act. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Stansell, et al v. Mercurio International S.A., et al" on Justia Law

In its tax return for the year 1997, ConEd claimed multiple deductions pertaining to a lease-in/lease-out (LILO) tax shelter transaction under which a Dutch utility, EZH, a tax-indifferent entity because it is not subject to U.S. taxation, conveyed to ConEd a gas-fired cogeneration plant that delivers power to customers in the Netherlands, then leased it back, followed by a reconveyance to EZH and a sublease. The stated purpose of the arrangement was tax avoidance. LILO transactions accelerate losses to the taxpayer and defer gains. The transaction provided several upfront deductions that allowed ConEd to pay lower taxes in 1997 (and in later years) than it otherwise would have. The IRS disallowed these claimed deductions and assessed a deficiency of $328,066. ConEd paid the deficiency and filed a refund claim; when this claim was denied, ConEd filed suit. The Claims Court awarded ConEd a full refund. The Federal Circuit reversed, applying the substance-over-form doctrine to conclude that ConEd’s claimed deductions must be disallowed. There was a reasonable likelihood that EZH would exercise its purchase option at the conclusion of the ConEd sublease, thus rendering the master lease illusory. View "Consol. Edison Co. of NY v. United States" on Justia Law

This case involved claims brought by cabin stewards against their employer, Celebrity Cruises, and against the Union (FIT) that represented them. Because the stewards were foreign employees involved in an internal wage dispute with a foreign ship, neither the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185, nor the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 159, applied to the stewards' challenges. Since their claims were dependent upon the protections of those acts, the district court properly dismissed their claims against Celebrity and FIT. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court in Appeal No. 10-13623. Because the stewards could have raised their Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313, claim in Lobo II but did not, the court affirmed the district court's order in Gomez as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court in Appeal No. 10-10406 View "Lobo, et al v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Defendant was an attorney who litigated a case against the nations believed to be behind a 1972 terrorist attack on Puerto Ricans at an Israeli airport. Defendant and the American Center for Civil Justice (the Center) originally had an agreement on how to handle the litigation. However, Defendant misrepresented to clients that the Center had paid him for his work and convinced clients to revoke the Center's attorney's power of attorney. Thereafter, the Center filed suit against Defendant. In the meantime, Plaintiffs, the heirs of two individuals killed in the terrorist attack who signed retainer agreements with Defendant, filed this action against Defendant, alleging that the retainer agreements were void because Defendant secured their consent by deceit. After a jury trial, judgment was entered against Defendant. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) the non-testifying heirs proved deceit without testifying about their reliance on Defendant's misrepresentations; and (3) the district court did not err in its instructions to the jury. View "Estate of Berganzo-Colon v. Ambush" on Justia Law

Defendants, four Chinese nationals, appealed their convictions and sentences for federal crimes that they committed as part of a scheme to steal funds from the Bank of China, where two of the defendants were high-level employees. Defendants also appealed their convictions related to their efforts to escape prosecution and to retain the proceeds by illegal transfers of funds and by immigration fraud. The court held that defendants' count one convictions were not the result of an improper extraterritorial application of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), conspiracy statute because defendants' criminal enterprise involved both bank fraud and immigration fraud centered on stealing money from the Bank of China and traveling freely with that stolen money in the United States. The evidence was sufficient to support convictions on money laundering conspiracy and conspiracy to transport stolen money. The court remanded for resentencing because the district court improperly relied on defendants' foreign conduct to meet the requirements of U.S.S.G. 2S1(a)(1)(A) resulting in procedural error, improperly applied a one-level enhancement based on foreign conduct, and failed to provide an adequate legal and factual basis for the restitution order. View "United States v. Xu" on Justia Law

Appellant alleged that the District of Columbia violated rights conferred upon him by Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 101, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. Appellant is a national of Jamaica and currently incarcerated in a federal penitentiary. Assuming without deciding that Article 36(1)(b) conferred individually enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court concluded that appellant's suit was untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the District of Columbia. View "Earle v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

This case arose when First Investment entered into a series of shipbuilding contracts with FSIGC and Mawei (collectively, the "Fujian Entities"). First Investment alleged that the Fujian Entities breached the contracts by refusing to honor an option agreement. On appeal, First Investment appealed the district court's decision to deny confirmation of a foreign arbitral award against the Fujian Entities and the People's Republic of China. At issue was whether a court could dismiss a petition to confirm a foreign arbitration award for lack of personal jurisdiction under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The court concluded that the district court's dismissal of the petition on personal jurisdiction grounds was appropriate. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed the People's Republic of China for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "First Invst Corp. of the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are 250 purchasers of timeshare interests in a resort in San José del Cabo, Mexico. They bought the interests between 2004 and 2006 from a Mexican company, DTR, which no longer exists. Each contract stated that “in case of controversy … the parties hereby agree to submit themselves to the applicable laws and competent courts of the City of Mexico, Federal District, expressly waiving any other forum that may correspond to them by reason of their present or future domiciles.” Plaintiffs allege that Raintree and Starwood defrauded them by “pretend[ing] to have a Mexican subsidiary (DTR) take in money for [villas] that would never be built.” The district court dismissed for improper venue. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that, even if the contracts of sale are fraudulent, it doesn’t follow that the clause is. The clause is not "unclear, in illegible print, in Sanskrit or hieroglyphics, or otherwise suggestive of fraudulent intent." There is no evidence that the defendants tried to mislead the plaintiffs concerning the meaning of the clause, or selected a foreign forum to make it difficult for the plaintiffs to enforce their rights under the contracts. Mexico was where the contracts were to be performed. View "Adams v. Raintree Vacation Exch., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his action against the Museum for its acquisition, possession, display, and retention of a painting that had been confiscated by the Russian Bolshevik regime from plaintiff's great-grandfather in 1918. On appeal, plaintiff contended principally that the district court erred in holding that the painting was taken pursuant to a valid act of state despite factual allegations in his Amended Complaint to the contrary. The court found that it was clear that the Amended Complaint, on its face, showed that plaintiff's action was barred by the act of state doctrine. The court considered all of plaintiff's arguments and concluded that they were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Konowaloff v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art" on Justia Law

Servicios, a Venezuela corporation, filed suit in district court against John Deere, a Louisiana corporation, for breach of contract providing for Servicios' exclusive distributorship of John Deere products in Venezuela. Servicios appealed the district court's judgment dismissing the complaint. The court concluded that there was no per se rule against standing for non-resident aliens in federal courts, as John Deere contended, and that the principles of prudential standing did not call for the dismissal of Servicios' suit. The court also concluded that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Servicios' complaint to the extent that it did so as a penalty for its perceived failure to properly brief its opposition to John Deere's motion. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Servicios Azucareros de Venezuela, C.A., et al v. John Deere Thibodeaux, Inc." on Justia Law