Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were United States citizens injured in a 1997 terrorist attack in Jerusalem that Hamas orchestrated. Plaintiffs sued the Islamic Republic of Iran, alleging that Iran had provided material support to Hamas and was therefore liable for the attack. Plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against Iran in 2003. Seeking to collect on that judgment, Plaintiffs moved to attach, by trustee process action in the District of Massachusetts, certain antiquities they claimed were the property of Iran but that were in the possession of Defendants, the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston (MFA) and Harvard University. The district court granted Defendants' motions to dissolve the attachments, concluding that Defendants could invoke the objects' immunity from attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), and that although the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) provided a potential way around that immunity, Plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proving that the antiquities were attachable under that statute. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed but on narrower grounds, holding that TRIA in this case did not nullify the antiquities' immunity from execution under the FSIA. View "Rubin v. Harvard Univ." on Justia Law

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,50 U.S.C. 1881a,2008 amendments, permit the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to acquire foreign intelligence information by jointly authorizing surveillance of individuals who are not "United States persons" and are reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S. They normally must first obtain Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court approval; 1881a surveillance is subject to statutory conditions, congressional supervision, and compliance with the Fourth Amendment. United States persons who claim to engage in sensitive international communications with individuals who they believe are likely targets of surveillance sought a declaration that 1881a is facially unconstitutional and a permanent injunction. The district court found that they lacked standing, but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that they showed an "objectively reasonable likelihood" that their communications will be intercepted in the future and that they suffer present injuries from costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of their communications. The Supreme Court reversed. The plaintiffs do not have Article III standing, which require an injury that is "concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling." Allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient. Plaintiffs’ standing theory rests on a speculative chain of possibilities. The Court stated that it is "reluctant to endorse standing theories that require guesswork as to how independent decision-makers will exercise their judgment." Plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending. View "Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA" on Justia Law

In 1996 Beloit agreed to build high-speed paper-making machines for Indonesian paper companies. Two of the companies executed promissory notes in favor of Beloit reflecting a principal indebtedness of $43.8 million. The paper companies guaranteed the notes; Beloit assigned them to JPMorgan in exchange for construction financing. The machines were delivered in 1998 but did not run as specified. In 2000 the parties settled claims pertaining to the machines but preserved obligations under the notes. JPMorgan sued for nonpayment. The district court held that warranty-based claims were foreclosed by the settlement and that other defenses lacked merit; it awarded JPMorgan $53 million. After the appeal was filed, JPMorgan issued citations to discover assets. Although the companies raised an international conflict-of-law question, the district court ordered compliance with the citations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The settlement waived implied warranty defenses and counterclaims. The fraud defense is also mostly barred; to the extent it is not, the evidence was insufficient to survive summary judgment. The court also rejected defenses that the notes lacked consideration; that the notes were issued for a “special purpose” and were not intended to be repaid; and that JPMorgan is not a holder in due course. The discovery order was not appealable. View "JPMorgan Chase & Co., N.A. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction requires contracting states to order a child returned to her country of habitual residence upon finding that the child has been wrongfully removed to or retained in the contracting state. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U. S. C. 11601, implements the Convention. Chafin, a U.S. citizen, married a United Kingdom citizen (mother), in Germany, where they had a daughter, E. C. When Chafin was deployed with the military to Afghanistan, mother took E. C. to Scotland. When Chafin was transferred to Alabama, mother traveled there with E. C. Chafin filed for divorce and custody. Mother filed a petition under the Convention and ICARA. The district court concluded that E. C.’s country of habitual residence was Scotland. In Scotland, mother was granted interim custody and a preliminary injunction prohibiting Chafin from removing E. C. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Chafin’s appeal as moot. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Return of a child to a foreign country does not render appeal of a return order moot. The Chafins continue to contest where their daughter will be raised. Chafin’s claim for re-return cannot be dismissed as so implausible that it is insufficient to preserve jurisdiction; his prospects of success are not pertinent to mootness. Even if Scotland were to ignore a re-return order, U. S. courts would continue to have personal jurisdiction over mother and could command her to take action under threat of sanctions. Enforcement of the order may be uncertain, but that does not typically render cases moot. If cases were to become moot upon return of a child, courts would be more likely to routinely grant stays, to prevent loss of any right to appeal, conflicting with the Convention’s mandate of prompt return. View "Chafin v. Chafin" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Chevron's involvement in litigation over the alleged environmental contamination of oil fields in Ecuador. Ecuador sought discovery from John Connor and GSI Environmental, his company, for use in a foreign arbitration against Chevron. During the course of extended litigation with Ecuador, Chevron, an intervenor in the district court, benefited repeatedly by arguing against Ecuador and others that the arbitration was a "foreign or international tribunal." Because Chevron's previous positions were inconsistent with its current argument, judicial estoppel was appropriate to make discovery under 28 U.S.C. 1782 available for Ecuador. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for determination of the scope of discovery. View "Republic of Ecuador, et al v. Connor, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their action brought under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. 2331 et seq., against UBS, alleging that plaintiffs were direct or indirect victims of terrorist attacks in Israel facilitated by UBS's furnishing of United States currency to Iran, which the U.S. Department of State had listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (FAC) for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. On appeal, plaintiffs contended principally that the FAC alleged a chain of causation between transfers of funds to Iran by UBS and plaintiffs' injuries at the hands of various terrorist groups sponsored by Iran, sufficient to establish traceability for purposes both of standing and of stating a claim under the ATA. The court concluded that the FAC was sufficient to show Article III standing but insufficient to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rothstein v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

Petitioner (Father) brought this suit under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C. 11603(b), seeking the return of his two minor children to Turkey, as well as an order enforcing his rights under Turkish law to visit the children as long as they stayed in the United States with their mother. The court held that the Father had demonstrated that he retained custody rights under Turkish law and that the Mother's removal of the children from Turkey in 2011 interfered with the exercise of his custody rights. With regard to visitation claims, the court held that section 11603(b) created a federal right of action to enforce "access" rights protected under the Hague Convention. With regard to costs, however, the court concluded that in light of the particular circumstances of this case, an award of full costs would be "clearly inappropriate." Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's return order and vacated the costs award. View "Ozaltin v. Ozaltin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, American citizens, had bank accounts in UBS, Switzerland’s largest bank, in 2008 when the UBS tax-evasion scandal broke. The accounts were large and the plaintiffs had not disclosed the existence of the accounts or the interest earned on the accounts on their federal income tax returns, as required. Pursuant to an IRS amnesty program, they disclosed the interest and paid a penalty. They brought a class action to recover from UBS the penalties, interest, and other costs, plus profits they claim UBS made from the class as a result of the fraud and other wrongful acts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting that the “plaintiffs are tax cheats,” and rejecting an argument that UBS was obligated to give them accurate tax advice and failed to do so. Plaintiffs did not argue that they asked UBS to advise them on U.S. tax law or that the bank volunteered advice. The court stated that: “This is like suing one’s parents to recover tax penalties one has paid, on the ground that the parents had failed to bring one up to be an honest person who would not evade taxes.” The court noted, but did not decide, choice of law issues. View "Thomas v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

In 2009, Lumbard was arrested by Michigan authorities on warrants charging breaking and entering, destruction of a building, and larceny. He was released on a $100,000 bond. Other outstanding warrants charged aggravated battery, obstruction of justice, receiving stolen property, and more. Eluding capture on the other warrants, Lumbard paid Cheesebrew $500 for his birth date, social security number, and information about his place of birth and his parents. Lumbard used the information to obtain a driver’s license, a copy of Cheesebrew’s birth certificate, and a passport. He traveled to Tokyo, Thailand, and Burma after attempting to stage a “suicide.” Lumbard was eventually located and, during transport, attempted to stab a Burmese officer in order to be charged in Burma, which would have prevented extradition. He entered a conditional guilty plea to falsely representing information in an application for a passport and knowingly providing false identifying documents, 18 U.S.C. 1542 and using the name, social security number, date of birth, and driver’s license of another person to obtain a passport, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) and (c)(7), (aggravated identity theft). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that a purchase of identification can constitute aggravated identity theft. View "United States v. Lumbard" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, victims and families of victims of terrorist attacks committed in Israel between 1995-2004, brought claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. 2333, and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1350, seeking monetary damages from Arab Bank. Plaintiffs alleged that Arab Bank provided financial services and support to terrorists during this period, facilitating the attacks. On appeal, Arab Bank challenged the district court's orders imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(b) for its failure to comply with several of that court's discovery-related orders, and petitioned the court under 28 U.S.C. 1651 for a writ of mandamus directing vacatur of the district court's sanctions order. The court concluded that the sanctions order was not a reviewable collateral order, and therefore dismissed Arab Bank's appeal for want of jurisdiction. The court also concluded that this was not an appropriate case for issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus, since the court agreed with plaintiffs that Arab Bank had not established that it had a clear and indisputable right to such drastic relief or that review after final judgment would not provide adequate relief. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal and denied the petition for mandamus. View "Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC" on Justia Law