Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants appealed their conviction for conspiracy to possess illicit substances aboard an aircraft with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. 963. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their participation in a plan to transport cocaine from South America to the United Kingdom on board commercial airplanes. The court concluded that Congress intended that the substantive crime underlying the conspiracy charge - possession with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. 959(b) - applied extraterritorially; section 963 could be applied extraterritorially; under Blackmer v. United States, application of section 959(b) to Defendant Parker, a U.S. citizen, did not violate the Due Process Clause; extraterritorial application of section 959(b)(2) in this case was permissible as implementing Congress' treaty-making power under the Necessary and Proper Clause; and the recital of facts and the elements of conspiracy to commit the relevant offense was sufficient to enable defendants to prepare their defenses. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Lawrence, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an order of the district court denying Argentina's motion to dismiss a petition to confirm an arbitration award filed by Blue Ridge on foreign immunity grounds. The court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the district court's rejection of Argentina's assertion of foreign immunity under the collateral order doctrine; the court declined to exercise appellate jurisdiction to consider whether the district court erred in concluding that Blue Ridge, as an assignee, could state a claim to confirm the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes award because that issue was not "inextricably intertwined" with the district court's foreign sovereign immunity decision; the district court correctly concluded that Argentina waived its foreign sovereign immunity pursuant to two separate and independent exceptions to the immunity from suit provided by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: the implied waiver exception and the arbitral award exception, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(1), (2), and (a)(6). Accordingly, the court affirmed insofar as the district court concluded that Argentina waived its foreign sovereign immunity and remanded for further proceedings. View "Blue Ridge Investments, L.L.C. v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

Xena, a Cayman Islands corporation, filed suit against defendants claiming that defendants improperly and impermissibly secured loans made by MFM, incorporated in the Bahamas with its principal place of business in the Bahamas, to a commercial real estate hedge fund managed by MFM in the British Virgin Islands (BVI), giving them priority over Xena's shares in the funds. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, finding that it had no jurisdiction or authority to determine the priority of foreign parties entitled to, or payments made from, a foreign hedge fund. View "XENA Investments Ltd. v. Magnum Fund Mgmt. Ltd., et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, the father, sought the return of his children to Peru under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, and its implementing legislation, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C. 11601 et seq. The district court found that petitioner's violent temper and inability to cope with the prospect of losing custody of the children would expose them to a grave risk of harm were they returned to Peru. On appeal, petitioner challenged the district court's determination and respondent, the mother, cross-appealed. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting an expert's testimony that several factors indicated that returning the children to Peru would expose them to a high risk of harm where the factual basis for the expert's testimony was sufficient. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to return the children to Peru where petitioner did not make a specific proposal for appropriate undertakings before the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "Acosta v. Acosta, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., against defendants, alleging trademark infringement based on a theory that defendants misappropriated and have unauthorized commercial use in the United States of certain United States-registered trademarks related to "Stolichnaya" - brand vodka (the "Marks"). At issue on appeal was whether plaintiffs have sufficient claim to the Marks to sue for infringement under the Act. The court concluded that FTE was neither (1) the Russian Federation's "assign" of the marks nor (2) its "legal representative." The court also concluded that Cristall could not sue, since its rights as a plaintiff were purely derivative of those held by FTE, and FTE could not grant rights greater than its own; the court rejected plaintiffs' joint argument that they were entitled to proceed because the Russian Federation had "ratified" their suit; and, therefore, neither plaintiff was entitled to sue for infringement under section 1114(1). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Third Amended Complaint with prejudice. View "Fed. Treasury Enter. v. SPI Spirits Ltd." on Justia Law

A worker at a fish processing plant was injured while on the job. His employer asserted that it did not maintain workers' compensation and that it was immune from suit, so the worker filed a negligence action in state court seeking reimbursement for medical expenses, compensation for lost wages, and attorney's fees. The superior court granted the employer's motion to dismiss on immunity grounds. Because the employer, an international organization, enjoys absolute immunity from suit and it did not waived this immunity, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court.View "Price v. Unisea, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were several dozen national and international citizens who resided in Israel and were injured in rocket attacks allegedly launched by Hizballah during the Second Lebanon War. Plaintiffs brought suit against the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB), a defunct bank headquartered in Beirut, claiming that LCB assisted Hizballah in committing the illegal attacks. The lawsuit was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs asserted personal jurisdiction over LCB under New York's long-arm statute. The district court granted LCB's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals accepted questions of law from the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals and answered (1) a foreign bank's maintenance of a correspondent bank account at a financial institution in New York and use of that account to effect dozens of wire transfers on behalf of a foreign client constitutes a "transaction" of business in New York within the meaning of the long-arm statute; and (2) Plaintiffs' claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Alien Tort Statute, or for negligence or breach of statutory duty in violation of Israeli law arose from LCB's transaction of business in New York within the meaning of the long-arm statute.View "Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was a challenge to the failure of a district court to give preclusive effect to a California federal district court judgment during a proceeding to grant recognition of a subsequent German judgment. Plaintiff Ron Markin executed a promissory note in 1988 agreeing to pay Defendant Thomas Grohmann $551,292.00 with interest at ten percent per annum. The loan was for a business transaction between the parties. In September 1997, Plaintiff sued Defendant in the United States District Court in the Central District of California in order to collect the promissory note. At that time, Defendant resided in Scottsdale, Arizona. The parties entered into a written settlement agreement to resolve the lawsuit. The agreement provided the principal and interest owing; that the lawsuit would be dismissed if that sum plus interest was paid according to the terms of the agreement; that the court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement; that if the amount due under the agreement was not paid in full as provided in the agreement, Plaintiff could obtain a judgment as provided by California law; and that the agreement "shall be governed by and interpreted under the laws of the State of California." Defendant failed to pay according to the agreement, and Plaintiff obtained an ex parte judgment against Defendant. After learning that Defendant owned real property in Germany, Plaintiff commenced a civil action in Germany to enforce the California judgment. The German trial court dismissed the action on the ground that the judgment was not enforceable under German law. Plaintiff appealed and asserted that if the judgment was not enforceable, he could recover on the settlement agreement upon which that judgment was based. The appellate court agreed, and it issued an opinion ordering Defendant to pay Plaintiff. The court held that it could enter a judgment against Defendant based upon the settlement agreement because he had previously been a German citizen. Upon its review of matter, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the German judgment was a final judgment under German law. But because the German judgment did not recognize the effect of a final judgment under California law, it conflicted with the California judgment. The Idaho Court therefore reversed the judgment of the district court that recognized the German judgment.View "Markin v. Grohmann" on Justia Law

In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.View "In re J.L. Gordon, Minor" on Justia Law

In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.View "In re C.I. Morris, Minor" on Justia Law