Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

USAID entered a contract with a private consulting firm, DAI, to provide humanitarian support to groups within Cuba pursuant to the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. 6021 et seq. DAI contracted with Alan Gross to train the Jewish community in Cuba to use and maintain information and communication technologies. Gross was subsequently convicted in Cuba of participating in a subversive project of the U.S. government and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. Gross and his wife subsequently field suit against DAI and the United States, alleging, among other things, negligence, gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium in connection with Gross's work in Cuba. Gross settled with DAI and the district court granted the United States's motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The court concluded that the foreign country exception deprived the district court of jurisdiction to address Gross's Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(k), claims, all of which are based on or derivative of injuries suffered in Cuba. Further, the court rejected Gross's Equal Protection Clause argument under rational basis review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal. View "Gross v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, citizens and former residents of Colombia, filed suit in California against two corporations, both headquartered in the United States, for their alleged complicity in the 1998 bombing of a Colombian village by members of the Colombian Air Force (CAF). The district court dismissed all claims under the political question doctrine. The court held that plaintiffs lack a valid claim under either the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. 1350 Note., pursuant to Mohamad v. Palestinan Auth., or the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 1350, under Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.; the court affirmed the district court's judgment of dismissal with respect to plaintiffs' state-law claims, but did so on the ground of international comity; the district court abused its discretion by applying the incorrect legal standard in its comity analysis when it erroneously concluded that a "true conflict" between domestic and foreign law is required for the application of international comity in all circumstances; and, in light of Mujica IV, the court concluded that the state-law claims before the court are not justiciable under the doctrine of international comity. View "Mujica v. AirScan, Inc." on Justia Law

Pine Top, an insurer, sued Banco, an entity wholly owned by Uruguay, claiming that Banco owes $2,352,464.08 under reinsurance contracts. The complaint sought to compel arbitration but alternately proposed that the court enter judgment for breach of contract. Pine Top moved to strike Banco’s answer for failure to post security under Illinois insurance law. The district court denied the motion and later denied the motion to compel arbitration. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which prohibits attaching a foreign state’s property, thereby preventing application of the Illinois security requirement, 28 U.S.C. 1609. Banco did not waive its immunity in the manner allowed by that law and Pine Top forfeited contentions that the McCarran-Ferguson Act allows a state rule to govern. On the arbitration question, the court held that denials of motions to compel arbitration under the Panama Convention are immediately appealable under 9 U.S.C. 16(a)(1)(B), but that the contract language, reasonably read, does not transfer the right to demand arbitration. View "Pine Top Receivables of IL, LLC v. Banco de Seguros del Estado" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ismail Yaman, a Turkish citizen, and respondent Linda Yaman, a United States citizen, were married in Turkey in August 2000, and respondent became a Turkish citizen in October 2000. Their first child, K.Y., was born in March 2002, in the United States. In January 2003, the family moved to Turkey. The couple’s second child, E.Y., was born in Turkey in August 2003. In early to mid-2004, the respondent became suspicious that petitioner was sexually abusing their older child. In December 2004, the parties separated, and early the next year, petitioner initiated divorce proceedings in the Turkish Family Court. On March 13, 2006, after conducting six hearings in which the court considered evidence from both parties and from the independent experts, the Turkish court rejected respondent’s claim that petitioner had abused the children, and issued an order granting sole legal custody of the children to petitioner and granting respondent visitation. Respondent appealed the order to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Turkey on two occasions, and both times the appellate court affirmed the family court’s order. The family court finalized its order in 2007. Within weeks after the family court’s order became final, and without notice to petitioner, respondent fled Turkey with the children by engaging the services of a self-proclaimed “snatch back” specialist. After years of searching, petitioner, who remained in Turkey, was informed in December 2011 that respondent and the children were living in New Hampshire. Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to Article 2 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction2 and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) with the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Following a three-day evidentiary hearing, the court ruled that the return of the children to Turkey would not pose a grave risk of harm to them because respondent had not established that petitioner abused them. The court also found, however, that the respondent had established that the children were “settled” in New Hampshire within the meaning of Article 12 of the Hague Convention; in light of this finding, the court ruled that it lacked the authority to order the children’s return to Turkey. Alternatively, the court ruled that, given the facts of the case, even if it did have the authority to do so, it would not order the return of the children to Turkey. Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which determined that the district court erred in ruling that it lacked authority to order the return of “settled” children, but affirmed the trial court’s alternative ruling denying return of the children on equitable grounds as a sustainable exercise of discretion. After its review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err in granting enforcement of the Turkish custody order. View "In the Matter of Ismail Yaman and Linda Yaman" on Justia Law

A German court denied Father's petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98, and a German appellate court affirmed. Consequently, Mother did not have to return the children to North Carolina. On a one-month visit to North Carolina, Father decided to keep the children. The district court accorded comity to the German appellate court's decision and granted Mother's Hague petition. The children were ordered to return to Germany. Father appealed. The court rejected Father's arguments on appeal and concluded that the district court properly extended comity because the German court's decision neither clearly misinterpreted the Hague Convention nor failed to meet a minimum standard of reasonableness. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Smedley v. Smedley" on Justia Law

In 2009, Illinois State Police Officer Zeigler pulled over Mordi’s vehicle. A trained dog discovered drugs in the car. Zeigler arrested Mordi, took him to the station, and left him in an interrogation room. Other officers interviewed Mordi. Mordi is a Nigerian national. Nigeria and the U.S. are parties to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Convention. Mordi told Zeigler that his name was Nigerian, but Mordi does not recall mentioning that he was a Nigerian national. Zeigler listed Mordi’s place of birth as Nigeria, but asserts that he was unaware of Mordi’s citizenship. Mordi did tell the interviewing officers about his citizenship. Immigration and Customs Enforcement filed a detainer notice and federal authorities took over the prosecution. Mordi was represented by a federal public defender, who was aware of his nationality. Mordi pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance and is serving a sentence. At no point during criminal proceedings was he informed about his right under the Convention to have the Nigerian consulate notified about his status. He did not learn about the Convention until a year later, from another inmate. He wrote to the Nigerian consulate, but did not follow through. Mordi instituted, but dismissed, habeas proceedings, arguing ineffective assistance. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied summary judgment motions by Zeigler and the interviewing officers, based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the specific legal principle on which this case turns was not clearly established. View "Mordi v. Zeigler" on Justia Law

After victims of a terrorist kidnapping in Colombia (plaintiffs) received a nine-figure default judgment against their captor (FARC), they attempted to collect through a series of ex parte garnishments and executions against third parties with purported illicit ties to the captor. Third-party claimants appealed the various orders granting plaintiffs' motions seeking to collect on their judgment using claimants' assets and denying the motions filed by claimants seeking relief. The court concluded that plaintiffs should have provided formal notice of the garnishment and execution proceedings to the owners of the property, as Florida law provides; the district court incorrectly concluded that no process was due to the owners of the property here; ultimately, claimants bear their share of the blame for either sitting on their rights to challenge the allegations against them or simply failing to rebut the changes; and, therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court with the exception of the turnover judgment against Brunello Ltd.'s account. View "Stansell, et al. v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, (FARC), et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, family members or trustees of the estates of victims of state-sponsored terrorism, seek to enforce their 2009 Florida state court judgment obtained against Cuba by attaching the blocked assets of that state under section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), 28 U.S.C. 1610 note. Plaintiffs seek to satisfy the underlying judgment from electronic fund transfers (EFTs) blocked under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515. The court concluded that the EFTs are not attachable under section 201 because no terrorist party or agency or instrumentality thereof has a property interest in the EFTs. In this case, it is undisputed that no Cuban entity transmitted any of the blocked EFTs directly to the blocking bank. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hausler et al., v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al." on Justia Law

Halo is a supplier of electronic components and owns three patents directed to surface mount electronic packages containing transformers for mounting on a printed circuit board inside electronic devices such as computers and internet routers. Halo alleged that Pulse infringed its patents. The district court entered summary judgment that Pulse did not sell or offer to sell certain accused products within the U.S. and, therefore, did not directly infringe, and that that Pulse’s infringement with respect to accused products that Pulse sold and delivered outside the U.S. was not willful. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Pulse did not sell or offer to sell within the U.S. those accused products that Pulse manufactured, shipped, and delivered outside the U.S., so there was no direct infringement by those products. The court upheld the constructions of the claim limitations “electronic surface mount package” and “contour element,” found the patents not invalid for obviousness, and affirmed the judgment of direct infringement with respect to products that Pulse delivered in the U.S. and the judgment of inducement with respect to products that Pulse delivered outside the U.S. but were ultimately imported by others. View "Halo Elec., Inc. v. Pulse Elec., Inc." on Justia Law

The Bra Top, which is imported by Victoria’s Secret, and the Bodyshaper, imported by Lerner. Both are sleeveless garments, made of knit fabric, worn as tops. Both are designed for body coverage and bust support, without the need for a garment on top or a separate brassiere underneath. The Court of International Trade classified them under heading 6114 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), which covers “other garments, knitted or crocheted.” The importers contend that the garments should have been classified under heading 6212, which covers “brassieres, girdles, corsets, braces, suspenders, garters and similar articles and parts thereof.” The Federal Circuit affirmed the classification under heading 6212. The Bra Top and Bodyshaper are not “similar articles” under heading 6212 because they do not possess the unifying characteristics of the listed items in that heading. View "Victoria's Secret Direct, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law