Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Air travelers sued Delta Airlines, seeking compensation for a nationwide class of persons who were inconvenienced when their flights from airports located in the European Union were delayed for more than three hours or cancelled on short notice. The suit was filed in the Northern District of Illinois and invoked the court’s diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 29 U.S.C. 1332(d). The claim cited a consumer-protection regulation promulgated by the European Parliament setting standardized compensation rates ranging from €250 to €600 (depending on flight distance) for cancellations and long delays of flights departing from airports located within EU Member States. The district court held that the regulation could not be enforced outside the European Union and dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The regulation is not incorporated into Delta’s contract of carriage, so the claim is not cognizable as a breach of contract. A direct claim for compensation under the regulation is actionable only as provided in the regulation itself, which requires that each European Union Member State designate an appropriate administrative body to handle enforcement responsibility and implicitly limits judicial redress to courts in Member States under the procedures of their own national law. View "Volodarskiy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

The issues this appeal presented for the Eleventh Circuit's review stemmed from defendant-appellant Mark Alexander’s conviction for conspiring to sell cutting machines to companies in Iran, in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the federal conspiracy statute. Alexander was the chief executive officer and part-owner of Hyrdajet Technology, LLC, a company based in Dalton, Georgia, that manufactured waterjet cutting systems. In 2007, Hydrajet Technology shipped two waterjet cutting machines to Hydrajet Mena in Dubai, where the machines then were shipped companies in Tehran. The jury convicted Alexander on the sole count of the indictment. The district court sentenced Alexander to a term of imprisonment of 18 months, followed by a period of supervised release of three years. Alexander argued on appeal: (1) that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to permit a deposition of one of Alexander’s codefendants, a fugitive residing in Iran; (2) that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Alexander’s motion for a mistrial after a juror stated that her car had been impeded temporarily by unknown persons in the parking lot adjacent to the courthouse; and (3) that the district court erred when it addressed the jury on legal issues that arose during the trial. The Eleventh Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three Iranian émigré siblings and the estate of their deceased brother, sought recovery for imprisonment, torture, and an extrajudicial killing that they allegedly suffered at the hands of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1999, as leaders in the Iranian pro-democracy movement.The three surviving siblings live in the United States. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, principally because of defendants’ foreign sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602. The court rejected plaintiffs’ reliance on the Act’s terrorism exception, for “torture” or “extrajudicial killing” where the victim was a “national of the United States” at the time of those acts. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. The Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, does not confer any waiver of foreign sovereign immunity. View "Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law

Shabban, an Egyptian national, met Hernandez, a Mexican national, in Washington, D.C. They had a son in 2001. They entered into a consensual order giving Hernandez primary physical custody of the boy. Shabban had unsupervised visitation rights; their son was not to be removed from the country without the written consent of both parties. Three years later, Shabban sold his business and had his roommate to take over their apartment lease. Shabban and his son boarded a flight, with Shabban flying under the name “Khaled Rashad.” Days later, Shabban called and told Hernandez that they were in Egypt. Hernandez worked with the FBI for 22 months to convince Shabban to bring the child back to the U.S. During taped conversations, Shabban referred to their son’s difficulty learning to communicate and told Hernandez that he had taken the child to learn a single language, Arabic, rather than the three he was hearing at home, Arabic, Spanish, and English. Shabban admitted taking the child without permission. Charged with international parental kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1204(a), Shabban argued that he lacked the specific intent to obstruct Hernandez’s parental rights because his sole purpose was to place the child in an environment that would improve his speech. The trial judge sentenced him to 36 months’ imprisonment. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Regardless of his motive, Shabban was aware his actions would obstruct Hernandez’s parental rights. View "United States v. Shabban" on Justia Law

Enacted after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), authorizes execution, in satisfaction of judgments against terrorists, on blocked assets that are seized or frozen by the United States. The plaintiffs, victims of terror, hold a judgment against al Qaeda for their $2.5 billion subrogation claims. The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Although plaintiffs have constitutional and statutory standing and TRIA is a remedial statute, under the statute the only assets subject to execution are blocked assets. Assets that are subject to a United States government license for final payment, transfer, or disposition, among other requirements, do not qualify as blocked assets. By the time plaintiffs filed their initial claims, the Office of Foreign Assets Control had already issued its license and the funds had already been arrested to preserve them for forfeiture; the funds were no longer blocked. View "United States v. Art Ins.Co." on Justia Law

Following a prolonged period of civil unrest in the Republic of Colombia, plaintiffs-appellants filed suit in the United States on behalf of over one hundred Colombian citizens killed by violent paramilitaries in the ensuing armed conflict. Plaintiffs, the legal heirs of the decedents, filed suit against numerous defendants-appellees, including a supranational coal mining company based in Alabama, its subsidiary, and several of its high-ranking corporate officers. Averring that defendants engaged the paramilitaries, known as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), to eliminate suspected guerilla groups from around the company's mining operations in Colombia, plaintiffs contended their innocent decedents were incidental casualties of defendants' arrangement with the AUC. Claiming that Defendants aided and abetted, conspired with, and entered into an agency relationship with the AUC, plaintiffs brought suit under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA); and Colombia's wrongful death laws. The district court found that the Supreme Court's decision in "Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.," (133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013)), required dismissal of plaintiffs' ATS claims, and the court entered summary judgment in defendants' favor on those claims. In a series of opinions, the district court also dismissed plaintiffs' TVPA claims on summary judgment. Further, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' wrongful death claims under Colombian law and denied plaintiffs' motion to vacate the district court's grants of summary judgment, which plaintiffs sought in order to proceed with their Colombian wrongful death claims. Plaintiffs appealed each of the district court's opinions and the holdings therein. After careful consideration of the parties' briefs and those filed by the amici, the record on appeal, and the relevant legal authorities, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. View "Jane Doe, et al. v. Drummond Company, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Miranda and Carvajal, citizens of Colombia, participated in an operation that used high-speed boats to smuggle drugs from Colombia to Central American countries. Neither planned to, or did, leave Colombia in furtherance of the conspiracy. Carvajal was an organizer of the operations, and Miranda provided logistical support. In 2011, Colombian officials arrested them. They were extradited to the United States and pleaded guilty to drug conspiracy charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) 46 U.S.C. 70501. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting their arguments that the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied to their conduct, that the MDLEA fails to reach extraterritorially to encompass their conduct in Colombia, and that the facts failed to support acceptance of their guilty pleas. They waived all but one of the arguments when they entered pleas of guilty without reserving any right to appeal. Their remaining claim, whether vessels used by the drug conspiracy were “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” within the meaning of the MDLEA, implicates the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and could not be waived by appellants’ pleas. On the merits of the issue, the stipulated facts fully supported the conclusion that the vessels were subject to U.S. jurisdiction. View "United States v. Miranda" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, appealed the denial of his petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 challenging a magistrate judge's certification of extraditability. The magistrate judge found that petitioner was subject to extradition under a treaty between the United States and Bosnia and Herzegovina based on war crimes he allegedly committed during the conflict in former Yugoslavia. The court applied the indefinite limitations period from the United States Torture Act, 18 U.S.C. 2340A, that was in place at the time of the extradition request and concluded that the request for petitioner's extradition is not time-barred under Article VII of the treaty. Further, the acts of torture allegedly perpetrated by petitioner against civilians preclude application of the political offense exception. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that petitioner's extradition is neither time-barred nor precluded by the political offense exception in the treaty. View "Nezirovic v. Holt" on Justia Law

CCC, an investment fund incorporated in Guernsey, a British Crown dependency in the English Channel, invested in residential mortgage-backed securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Moonmouth purchased CCC shares for $60 million under a 2006 Subscription Agreement, which contained a forum selection clause giving Delaware state courts exclusive jurisdiction over any action and specifying that Delaware law was to govern. In 2008, CCC entered liquidation. A Guernsey court appointed liquidators, who sued Carlyle and others (plaintiffs in this action) in Guernsey for breach of fiduciary duties owed to CCC. Subsequent Transfer Agreements involving the parties released then-existing claims against Carlyle. In 2012, a Dutch law firm representing Moonmouth sent letters alleging that plaintiffs took unacceptable risks in connection with CCC-managed investments and that they would hold plaintiffs liable for damages sustained by investors in connection with CCC. Plaintiffs sought to enforce the Subscription Agreement’s forum selection clause and the Transfer Agreements’ releases. After removal to federal court, the district court remanded to state court. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Subscription Agreement’s forum selection clause pertains to the case, may be enforced against defendants, and may be invoked by plaintiffs; the Transfer Agreement provides an alternative ground supporting remand. View "Carlyle Inv, Mgmt., LLC v. Moonmouth Co., SA" on Justia Law

The Galstians abandoned their properties in Iran in 1978, when the family fled to Los Angeles after the overthrow of the Shah. In 1996, the Iranian government allowed the Galstians to enter Iran and begin reclaiming and selling the properties. By 2003, Minassian and Izadi held powers of attorney for the remaining properties. In 2008, Minassian and Izadi executed a general quitclaim deed transferring all remaining properties to themselves for little or no consideration. Galstian discovered the transfers in 2010, demanded that title be returned, and hired an Iranian attorney, who pressed criminal charges in Iran. The Galstians died in 2012. Their children sued Minassian and Izadi in 2013, asserting breach of fiduciary duty, accounting, and conversion. Minassian argued the Iranian civil court provides a suitable forum for an action brought by Iranian citizens against Iranian citizens and that the California court lacked power to enforce an order directing the transfer of real property in Iran. The trial court stayed the action under Code of Civil Procedure 410.30(a), finding that the interest of substantial justice would be served by having the action heard in another forum. The court of appeal reversed, finding insufficient evidence to show Iran is a suitable alternative forum. View "Aghaian v. Minassian" on Justia Law