Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

In 2001, China and Nigeria signed a bilateral investment treaty to encourage investment between the two countries, agreeing to treat each other's investors fairly and protect their investments. Zhongshan Fucheng Industrial Investment, a Chinese company, invested in Nigeria by participating in a joint venture with Ogun State to develop a free-trade zone. After years of development and significant investment, Ogun State abruptly terminated its relationship with Zhongshan, and Nigerian federal authorities expelled the company's executives. Zhongshan initiated arbitration proceedings, and an arbitrator found that Nigeria had breached its obligations under the treaty, awarding Zhongshan over $55 million in damages.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that it had jurisdiction over the case, finding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s (FSIA) arbitration exception applied because the award was governed by the New York Convention, an international arbitration treaty. Nigeria appealed, arguing that it was immune from suit under the FSIA.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the FSIA’s arbitration exception applied because the arbitration award arose from a legal relationship considered commercial, governed by the New York Convention. The court found that Nigeria had an arbitration agreement with Zhongshan, an arbitration award was issued, and the award was governed by the New York Convention. The court rejected Nigeria's argument that the New York Convention only applies to private acts, holding that the treaty covers arbitral awards arising from sovereign acts when a state consents to arbitration. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's jurisdiction and the enforceability of the arbitration award. View "Zhongshan Fucheng Industrial Investment Co. Ltd v. Federal Republic of Nigeria" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Commodities & Minerals Enterprise, Ltd. (CME) and CVG Ferrominera Orinoco, C.A. (FMO). CME sought to confirm a New York Convention arbitration award of $187.9 million against FMO. FMO opposed the confirmation, alleging that CME procured the underlying contract through fraud, bribery, and corruption, arguing that enforcing the award would violate U.S. public policy. The district court confirmed the award, ruling that FMO was barred from challenging the confirmation on public policy grounds because it failed to seek vacatur within the three-month time limit prescribed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially reviewed the case. CME moved to confirm the arbitration award in December 2019. FMO opposed the confirmation nearly two years later, citing public policy concerns. The district court granted CME’s motion, explaining that FMO was barred from opposing confirmation on public policy grounds due to its failure to seek vacatur within the FAA’s three-month time limit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, based on its recent en banc decision in Corporación AIC, SA v. Hidroélectrica Santa Rita S.A., FMO should have been allowed to assert its public policy defense in opposition to confirmation. The court clarified that the grounds for vacating a New York Convention arbitration award are those set forth in U.S. domestic law, specifically Chapter 1 of the FAA, which does not recognize public policy as a ground for vacatur. However, the court affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the award, concluding that FMO’s public policy defense failed on the merits because it attacked the underlying contract, not the award itself. View "Commodities & Minerals Enterprise, Ltd. v. CVG Ferrominera Orinoco C.A." on Justia Law

Yanjun Xu, a Chinese citizen and member of China’s Ministry of State Security, was convicted of conspiracy to commit economic espionage and conspiracy to steal trade secrets from multiple aviation companies over a five-year period. Xu was also convicted of attempted economic espionage by theft or fraud and attempted theft of composite fan-blade technology from GE Aviation. He was sentenced to a combined 240 months’ imprisonment. Xu appealed, seeking to vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial, arguing that the district court erred in failing to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 as duplicitous and abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). Alternatively, Xu sought to have his sentence vacated, arguing it was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied Xu’s motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that the conspiracy counts were not duplicitous as they alleged a single overarching conspiracy. The court also admitted expert testimony from James Olson, a retired CIA officer, who testified about espionage techniques and tradecraft, which Xu argued violated Rule 704(b). The court overruled Xu’s objections, finding that Olson’s testimony did not directly opine on Xu’s intent but rather described common practices in espionage.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the indictment was not duplicitous as it charged a single conspiracy with multiple overt acts. The court also found that Olson’s testimony did not violate Rule 704(b) and that any potential error was cured by the district court’s limiting instructions to the jury. Additionally, the appellate court found Xu’s sentence to be procedurally and substantively reasonable, noting that the district court properly calculated the intended loss and considered the § 3553(a) factors. The court concluded that Xu’s sentence was within the Guidelines range and not disparate compared to similarly situated defendants. View "United States v. Yanjun Xu" on Justia Law

PrimeSource Building Products, Inc. and other appellants challenged the United States Department of Commerce's calculation of an all-others antidumping duty rate for non-selected respondents in the fourth administrative review of an antidumping duty order on certain steel nails from Taiwan. Commerce had assigned an adverse facts available (AFA) rate of 78.17% to the mandatory respondents, who failed to cooperate, and used this rate to calculate the all-others rate for non-selected respondents, including Liang Chyuan.The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) upheld Commerce's decision, finding that the use of the expected method to calculate the all-others rate was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law. The Trade Court determined that the burden of proof lay with the non-selected respondents to show that the expected method was not reasonable, which they failed to do. The court also rejected PrimeSource's argument that Liang Chyuan should receive an individual rate, noting that Liang Chyuan did not meet the statutory requirements to be considered a voluntary respondent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court's decision. The court held that Commerce's use of the expected method was appropriate and that the burden was on the appellants to demonstrate that the method was not feasible or did not reasonably reflect the potential dumping margins of the non-selected respondents. The court found that the appellants failed to provide substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of representativeness of the mandatory respondents. Additionally, the court agreed that Liang Chyuan was not entitled to an individual rate as it did not submit the necessary information in a timely manner to be considered a voluntary respondent. View "PRIMESOURCE BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States (Chabad) sought to reclaim religious property expropriated by the Russian Federation. Chabad obtained a default judgment against the Russian Federation and its agencies, which ignored the order to return the property. Consequently, the district court imposed monetary sanctions, accruing to over $175 million. Chabad attempted to collect these sanctions by attaching the property of three companies it claimed were controlled by the Russian Federation.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially granted Chabad’s motion to dismiss the Russian Federation’s claim of immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court held that it had jurisdiction under the FSIA’s expropriation exception. However, the court later denied Chabad’s motion to attach the property of Tenex-USA, Tenex JSC, and VEB without prejudice, citing a lack of proper notice of the sanctions judgments to the Russian Federation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Chabad’s claims against the Russian Federation under the FSIA’s expropriation exception. The court determined that the expropriated property was not present in the United States, a requirement for jurisdiction under the FSIA. Consequently, the default judgment and sanctions judgments against the Russian Federation were void. The court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, effectively dismissing the Russian Federation from the case. View "Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Federation" on Justia Law

The case involves over 1,420 Peruvian citizens alleging environmental harm due to exposure to toxic substances from the La Oroya Metallurgical Complex (LOMC) in Peru. The plaintiffs claim that Doe Run Resources Corporation and related entities, which purchased LOMC in 1997, failed to reduce lead emissions, resulting in unsafe lead levels and subsequent health issues. The plaintiffs argue that Doe Run's decision-making in the United States led to their injuries.Initially, the plaintiffs filed common law tort lawsuits in Missouri state court, which were removed to federal court and consolidated. The district court dismissed several claims and defendants but allowed the substantive negligence-based claims to proceed under Missouri law. Doe Run filed motions to dismiss based on international comity and to apply Peruvian law, both of which were denied by the district court. The court also denied summary judgment on the safe harbor defense and certified its choice-of-law and comity rulings for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's decisions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying dismissal under the doctrine of international comity, as the harm occurred in Peru but the alleged conduct occurred in Missouri. The court also found that the Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) between the United States and Peru did not require dismissal, as the plaintiffs' claims were not explicitly addressed by the TPA. Additionally, the court determined that traditional comity factors did not necessitate dismissal, as neither the State Department nor the government of Peru had asserted their positions, and there was no adequate alternative forum in Peru. Lastly, the court concluded that extraterritoriality principles did not warrant abstention, as the plaintiffs' claims were based on conduct within the United States.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Reid v. Doe Run Resources Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between SPS Corp I, Fundo de Investimento em Direitos Creditórios Não Padronizados (SPS), and General Motors Co. (GM). GM Brazil, a subsidiary of GM, sued the Brazilian government to recover tax overpayments made by car dealerships. After winning the right to recover, GM Brazil filed a claim with Brazil’s tax agency, Receita Federal do Brasil (RFB), to determine the exact amount. Meanwhile, SPS, as the assignee of thirty-five dealerships, sought to recover the tax overpayments from GM Brazil in Brazilian courts but faced adverse decisions regarding standing and preliminary discovery.The District Court for the District of Delaware reviewed SPS’s application for discovery against GM under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which allows for discovery in aid of foreign litigation. The District Court denied the request, citing the factors from the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. The court found that the discovery sought was within the jurisdictional reach of Brazilian courts, which had already denied similar requests by SPS. The court also noted that allowing the discovery would undermine the decisions of the Brazilian courts and lead to inefficiency.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling, agreeing that the Intel factors weighed against granting SPS’s discovery request. The court emphasized that the Brazilian courts had jurisdiction over the requested documents and had already denied SPS’s requests. The Third Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision to respect the Brazilian courts’ rulings and to avoid circumventing foreign proof-gathering restrictions. View "SPS Corp I v. General Motors Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Cambodian villagers, alleged they were victims of human trafficking while working at seafood processing factories in Thailand. They claimed the factories, owned by Thai corporations Phatthana Seafood Co., Ltd. and S.S. Frozen Food Co., Ltd., subjected them to abusive conditions. Rubicon Resources, LLC, a U.S. company, was accused of knowingly benefiting from these violations by attempting to sell shrimp processed at these factories.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Rubicon, holding that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that Rubicon knowingly benefited from the trafficking venture. The court also found no evidence that Rubicon knew or should have known about the violations. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, interpreting the statute to exclude liability for attempts to benefit from trafficking violations.Subsequently, Congress amended the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) through the Abolish Trafficking Reauthorization Act (ATRA), which expanded liability to include those who "attempt or conspire to benefit" from trafficking violations. The plaintiffs filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) to reopen the judgment based on this legislative change, arguing that the amendment clarified the original intent of the TVPRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The Ninth Circuit held that ATRA did not apply retroactively to events that occurred before its enactment. The court reasoned that the lack of an express statutory command for retroactive application and the forward-looking nature of the amendment indicated that ATRA was not intended to clarify the original statute but to change it. Therefore, the district court did not err in declining to reopen the final judgment. View "RATHA V. RUBICON RESOURCES, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, a private insurance company, TIG Insurance Company, sought to enforce two judgments against the Republic of Argentina. The dispute centers on whether Argentina, as the successor to a state-owned Argentine company, Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro, is liable under reinsurance contracts that Caja entered into with TIG in 1979. TIG alleged that Caja failed to pay as promised under these contracts, leading to arbitral awards and subsequent judgments in TIG's favor.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially ruled in favor of Argentina, finding that Argentina's property was immune from execution under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) because it was not used for commercial activity at the time the writ would issue. The court also held that the Illinois district court lacked jurisdiction over Argentina for the 2018 judgment and that TIG needed to amend the 2001 judgment in Illinois to name Argentina before seeking enforcement in D.C. TIG appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that two FSIA exceptions—the arbitration and waiver exceptions—might apply. The court held that an agreement could be "made by" a sovereign if it legally binds that sovereign to arbitrate, even if the sovereign was not an original signatory. The court also found that implied waiver does not require evidence of subjective intent but can be based on objective actions, such as agreeing to arbitration or a choice-of-law clause. The court vacated the district court's decisions and remanded for further analysis and factfinding on these issues.The appellate court affirmed the denial of TIG's request for jurisdictional discovery and precluded TIG from advancing an alter ego theory or arguing that Argentina failed to raise its immunity in a responsive pleading. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's instructions. View "TIG Insurance Company v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

In a dispute between the Republic of Djibouti and Doraleh Container Terminal (Doraleh), Doraleh secured a $474 million arbitral award against Djibouti. Djibouti then nationalized a majority interest in Doraleh and appointed a provisional administrator, Chantal Tadoral, to manage the company. Quinn Emanuel, a law firm, sought to enforce the arbitral award in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming to represent Doraleh. However, Tadoral stated she did not authorize the filing, and Djibouti requested the case be dismissed.The District Court for the District of Columbia entered judgment for Doraleh, holding that Quinn Emanuel’s authority was irrelevant or, alternatively, that Djibouti had forfeited the issue by not raising it during arbitration. Djibouti appealed, arguing that the district court erred by not determining whether Quinn Emanuel had the authority to represent Doraleh.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court. The appellate court held that Quinn Emanuel’s authority is relevant and that the issue of a lawyer’s authority can be challenged at any point in litigation. The court found that Djibouti presented substantial evidence questioning Quinn Emanuel’s authority, which required the district court to determine whether the law firm had the authority to file the suit. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court to determine Quinn Emanuel’s authority to represent Doraleh. View "Doraleh Container Terminal SA v. Republic of Djibouti" on Justia Law