Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Dominican Republic and INDRHI for breach of contract and unjust enrichment related to an irrigation project in the Dominican Republic. After the district court entered a default judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendants moved to vacate the default judgment. The district court denied the motion and defendants appealed. While that appeal was pending, the Dominican Republic moved to vacate the default judgment for voidness under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). The district court denied the motion on the merits, finding that the Dominican Republic had waived its sovereign immunity. The Dominican Republic appealed. In these consolidated appeals, the court concluded that the district court erred by denying the Dominican Republic’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate for voidness the default judgment entered against the foreign nation because at least one statutory exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602-1611, applies; the district court abused its discretion by denying the Dominican Republic and INDRHI’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion to vacate for excusable neglect the default judgment entered against them because the factual findings underlying the district court's decision were unsupported by the record; and therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Architectural Ingenieria Siglo XXI v. Dominican Republic" on Justia Law

Zivotofsky was born to U.S. citizens living in Jerusalem. Under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2003, 116 Stat. 1350, his mother asked Embassy officials to list his place of birth as “Israel” on his passport. Section 214(d) of the Act states for “purposes of the registration of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon the request … record the place of birth as Israel.” Embassy officials refused to list Zivotofsky’s place of birth as “Israel,” citing the Executive Branch’s position that the U.S. does not recognize any country as having sovereignty over Jerusalem. The D. C. Circuit held the statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed. The President has the exclusive power to grant formal recognition to a foreign sovereign. The Court cited the Reception Clause, which directs that the President “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” and the President’s additional Article II powers, to negotiate treaties and to nominate the Nation’s ambassadors and dispatch other diplomatic agents. The Constitution assigns the President, not Congress, means to effect recognition on his own initiative. The Nation must “speak . . . with one voice” regarding which governments are legitimate in the eyes of the United States and which are not, and only the Executive has the characteristic of unity at all times. If Congress may not pass a law, speaking in its own voice, effecting formal recognition, then it may not force the President, through section 214(d), to contradict his prior recognition determination in an official document issued by the Secretary of State. View "Zivotofsky v. Kerry" on Justia Law

When Brandy and Jeremy Moore divorced in 2014, the superior court granted sole legal and primary physical custody of their ten-year-old daughter to Brandy, and awarded Jeremy unrestricted visitation, including visitation to foreign countries. Jeremy proposed taking the child to Micronesia during his visitation period because he became involved with a Micronesian woman he met while he was stationed there with the Army. Brandy asked the superior court to limit Jeremy’s international visitation to countries that have ratified the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The superior court denied Brandy’s motion, and she appealed, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion by allowing unrestricted international visitation. She worried that if Jeremy absconded with the child to a non-signatory country, the child will then be beyond the jurisdiction of the Alaska court to enforce the custody order. But because the superior court made an express finding that Jeremy’s conduct raised no concerns about the safety and return of the child, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moore v. Moore" on Justia Law

Iraq native al-Maliki became a United States citizen, but visited his children, ages 12 and three, in Syria. He was charged under 18 U.S.C. 2423(c) and (e), which at the time, punished any U.S. citizen who traveled in foreign commerce, and engaged in any illicit sexual conduct, which included noncommercial sexual acts with a minor, or any attempts to do the same. Al-Maliki denied all of the charges, and a trial began. A court-ordered psychological evaluation, deemed al-Maliki “manipulative and dishonest” and assessed his “risk for future sexual acting out” as “moderate to high.” He was convicted. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, characterizing his challenge to the statute as exceeding Congress’s authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause, a “close call.” The court applied plain error review and found the law not “obviously” unconstitutional. View "United States v. al-Maliki" on Justia Law

Petitioner, the former State director of United Public Workers, AFSCME Local 646, FL-CIO (UPW) and a former administrator of UPW’s Mutual Aid Fund trust (MAF), was held liable by a federal district court for negligently making loans under ERISA and thus breaching his fiduciary duties to the MAF. The court entered judgment against Petitioner in the amount of $850,000. Petitioner filed a complaint in the circuit court requesting that UPW indemnify him for the $850,000 on the grounds that his liability to the MAF arose from actions he took solely in his capacity as agent for UPW and/or that UPW ratified his actions. The circuit court granted summary judgment for UPW. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that because Petitioner was responsible for his own conduct, he was not entitled to be indemnified for his negligent acts as a matter of law. Petitioner requested certiorari, claiming that the ICA erred in concluding that his negligence claim defeated his indemnification claim as a matter of law. The Supreme Court denied certiorari without reaching this issue, holding that ERISA preemption, not Petitioner’s negligence, defeated Petitioner’s state indemnity claims against UPW as a matter of law. View "Rodrigues v. United Public Workers, AFSCME Local 646" on Justia Law

Omar was charged with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, 18 U.S.C. 2339A(a); providing material support to terrorists; conspiracy to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1); providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization; and conspiracy to murder, kidnap, and maim persons outside of the United States, 18 U.S.C. 956(a)(1). Omar moved to suppress any identification evidence. A magistrate judge held a hearing and recommended that Omar’s motion be granted, finding that the pre-trial identification technique used three witnesses was impermissibly suggestive because it amounted to a single-photograph identification and that repeated displays of Omar’s picture “served to dispel any hesitation the witnesses may have had in their original identification[s].” The district court rejected the recommendation and denied Omar’s motion, stating these witnesses “were sufficiently familiar with the Defendant to provide an accurate identification.” The court also denied a motion for disclosure or suppression of evidence obtained from electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.1801. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction, upholding admission of testimony by a government terrorism expert concerning global jihad and the court's evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Omar" on Justia Law

Validus, a foreign corporation, filed suit seeking a refund of excise taxes imposed under 26 U.S.C. 4371, which taxes certain types of "reinsurance." The government contends that “the best reading of the statute” establishes its applicability to reinsurance purchased by a reinsurer because such policies (known as “retrocessions”) are “a type of reinsurance,” and also that interpretation carries out Congress’s intent “to level the playing field” between domestic (U.S.) insurance companies subject to U.S. income taxes and foreign insurance companies that are not so burdened. Validus responds, however, that the plain text, considered in the context of reinsurance, and the statutory structure make clear that the excise tax does not apply to retrocessions, and further, the presumption against extraterritoriality resolves any doubt that the tax is inapplicable to Validus’s purchases of reinsurance from a foreign reinsurer. The court concluded that the text of the statute is ambiguous with respect to its application to wholly foreign retrocessions, and the ambiguity is resolved upon applying the presumption against extraterritoriality because there is no clear indication by Congress that it intended the excise tax to apply to premiums on wholly foreign retrocessions. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Validus's refund claims. View "Validus Reinsurance v. United States" on Justia Law

In "Hahn v. Diaz-Barba," (194 Cal.App.4th 1177 (2011)), the Court of Appeal affirmed an order, issued under the forum non conveniens doctrine, staying an action against residents of California for tortious interference with contract and related claims for the sale of an interest in a Mexican business. In this petition, the issue was whether the court erred by granting plaintiffs' motion to lift the stay on the ground Mexican courts dismissed two separate suits they filed in that country, making it an unavailable alternate forum. Defendants contended the ruling was erroneous because the evidence showed plaintiffs did not prosecute their action in Mexico in good faith. Among other things, defendants claimed they unreasonably delayed filing suit in Mexico and purposely drafted deficient complaints to ensure their rejection. Additionally, defendants argued the court prejudicially erred by denying their request to cross-examine the independent expert it appointed on Mexican law. After review, the California Court of Appeal concluded defendants' contentions lacked merit, and thus denied the petition. View "Diaz-Barba v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Nathan Stoliar was convicted and sentenced for crimes related to fraudulent schemes involving the false generation of renewable fuel credits under United States law, false representations regarding the type of fuel being sold, and the export of biodiesel without retiring or purchasing renewable energy credits adequate to cover the exported amount as required under United States law. Canada filed a petition for restitution from Soliar but the district court denied the order. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus filed pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3771. Because a petitioner seeking restitution under the CVRA must also rely on a substantive restitution statute, Canada sought restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1). The court concluded that Canada's claim for restitution is based on events that are insufficiently related to the schemes set forth in the indictment and the facts supporting Stoliar's guilty plea. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada v. U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her complaint for failure to effect service of process as required under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1608(a)(3). In view of the resulting prejudice to plaintiff and the absence of any relevant prejudice to the Embassy of Zambia of allowing a further effort at service, the court concluded that that dismissal was too extreme a remedy because plaintiff's attempts at service came so close to strict compliance with the FSIA as to demonstrate a good faith effort at timely compliance amidst the sometimes confusing directions from the district court. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Barot v. Embassy of Zambia" on Justia Law