Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in International Law
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Rickmers Genoa Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Cie KG (Rickmers) sought to enforce a Philippine arbitral award given to Lito Martinez Asignacion for maritime injuries. Asignacion sued Rickmers in Louisiana state court to recover for his injuries. Rickmers filed an exception seeking to enforce the arbitration clause of Asignacion’s contract. The state court granted the exception, stayed litigation, and ordered arbitration in the Philippines. The district court refused to enforce the award pursuant to the public-policy defense found in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the prospective-waiver doctrine. Rickmers appeals. Finding that the district court erred in reaching its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for the district court to enforce the award. View "Asignacion v. Rickmers Genoa Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Cie KG" on Justia Law

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From 1987 to 2001, Bengis and Noll engaged in a scheme to harvest large quantities of South Coast and West Coast rock lobsters from South African waters for export to the United States in violation of both South African and U.S. law. Defendants, through their company, Hout Bay, harvested rock lobsters in amounts that exceeded the South African Department of Marine and Coastal Management’s quotas. In 2001, South Africa seized a container of unlawfully harvested lobsters, declined to prosecute the individuals, but charged Hout Bay with overfishing. Bengis pleaded guilty on behalf of Hout Bay. South Africa cooperated with a parallel investigation conducted by the United States. The two pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit smuggling and violate the Lacey Act, which prohibits trade in illegally taken fish and wildlife, and to substantive violations of the Lacey Act. Bengis pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act. The district court entered a restitution order requiring the defendants to pay $22,446,720 to South Africa. The Second Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the extent of Bengis’s liability, rejecting an argument the restitution order violated their Sixth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Bengis" on Justia Law

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The government filed a civil complaint seeking forfeiture of funds held in a brokerage account. The clerk entered a default against Appellants and all other potential claimants. The district court granted the government’s motion for entry of default and, concluding that Appellants could not allege a meritorious defense, refused to grant their motion to set aside the default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). The court did not specifically articulate any “extreme circumstances” justifying entry of default and default judgment. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) courts reviewing a Rule 60(b) motion must apply the factors outlined in Falk v. Allen to ensure that the “extreme circumstances” policy is recognized, but nothing in Rule 60(b) nor the Court’s precedent requires a district court to articulate on the record particular “extreme circumstances” before it denies a motion to set aside a default judgment; and (2) after applying the Falk factors, it is clear that Appellants had no meritorious defense, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’ Rule 60(b)(1) motion. View "United States v. Aguilar" on Justia Law

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Air travelers sued Delta Airlines, seeking compensation for a nationwide class of persons who were inconvenienced when their flights from airports located in the European Union were delayed for more than three hours or cancelled on short notice. The suit was filed in the Northern District of Illinois and invoked the court’s diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 29 U.S.C. 1332(d). The claim cited a consumer-protection regulation promulgated by the European Parliament setting standardized compensation rates ranging from €250 to €600 (depending on flight distance) for cancellations and long delays of flights departing from airports located within EU Member States. The district court held that the regulation could not be enforced outside the European Union and dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The regulation is not incorporated into Delta’s contract of carriage, so the claim is not cognizable as a breach of contract. A direct claim for compensation under the regulation is actionable only as provided in the regulation itself, which requires that each European Union Member State designate an appropriate administrative body to handle enforcement responsibility and implicitly limits judicial redress to courts in Member States under the procedures of their own national law. View "Volodarskiy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

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The issues this appeal presented for the Eleventh Circuit's review stemmed from defendant-appellant Mark Alexander’s conviction for conspiring to sell cutting machines to companies in Iran, in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the federal conspiracy statute. Alexander was the chief executive officer and part-owner of Hyrdajet Technology, LLC, a company based in Dalton, Georgia, that manufactured waterjet cutting systems. In 2007, Hydrajet Technology shipped two waterjet cutting machines to Hydrajet Mena in Dubai, where the machines then were shipped companies in Tehran. The jury convicted Alexander on the sole count of the indictment. The district court sentenced Alexander to a term of imprisonment of 18 months, followed by a period of supervised release of three years. Alexander argued on appeal: (1) that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to permit a deposition of one of Alexander’s codefendants, a fugitive residing in Iran; (2) that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Alexander’s motion for a mistrial after a juror stated that her car had been impeded temporarily by unknown persons in the parking lot adjacent to the courthouse; and (3) that the district court erred when it addressed the jury on legal issues that arose during the trial. The Eleventh Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, three Iranian émigré siblings and the estate of their deceased brother, sought recovery for imprisonment, torture, and an extrajudicial killing that they allegedly suffered at the hands of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1999, as leaders in the Iranian pro-democracy movement.The three surviving siblings live in the United States. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, principally because of defendants’ foreign sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602. The court rejected plaintiffs’ reliance on the Act’s terrorism exception, for “torture” or “extrajudicial killing” where the victim was a “national of the United States” at the time of those acts. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. The Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, does not confer any waiver of foreign sovereign immunity. View "Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law

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Shabban, an Egyptian national, met Hernandez, a Mexican national, in Washington, D.C. They had a son in 2001. They entered into a consensual order giving Hernandez primary physical custody of the boy. Shabban had unsupervised visitation rights; their son was not to be removed from the country without the written consent of both parties. Three years later, Shabban sold his business and had his roommate to take over their apartment lease. Shabban and his son boarded a flight, with Shabban flying under the name “Khaled Rashad.” Days later, Shabban called and told Hernandez that they were in Egypt. Hernandez worked with the FBI for 22 months to convince Shabban to bring the child back to the U.S. During taped conversations, Shabban referred to their son’s difficulty learning to communicate and told Hernandez that he had taken the child to learn a single language, Arabic, rather than the three he was hearing at home, Arabic, Spanish, and English. Shabban admitted taking the child without permission. Charged with international parental kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1204(a), Shabban argued that he lacked the specific intent to obstruct Hernandez’s parental rights because his sole purpose was to place the child in an environment that would improve his speech. The trial judge sentenced him to 36 months’ imprisonment. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Regardless of his motive, Shabban was aware his actions would obstruct Hernandez’s parental rights. View "United States v. Shabban" on Justia Law

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Enacted after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), authorizes execution, in satisfaction of judgments against terrorists, on blocked assets that are seized or frozen by the United States. The plaintiffs, victims of terror, hold a judgment against al Qaeda for their $2.5 billion subrogation claims. The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Although plaintiffs have constitutional and statutory standing and TRIA is a remedial statute, under the statute the only assets subject to execution are blocked assets. Assets that are subject to a United States government license for final payment, transfer, or disposition, among other requirements, do not qualify as blocked assets. By the time plaintiffs filed their initial claims, the Office of Foreign Assets Control had already issued its license and the funds had already been arrested to preserve them for forfeiture; the funds were no longer blocked. View "United States v. Art Ins.Co." on Justia Law

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Following a prolonged period of civil unrest in the Republic of Colombia, plaintiffs-appellants filed suit in the United States on behalf of over one hundred Colombian citizens killed by violent paramilitaries in the ensuing armed conflict. Plaintiffs, the legal heirs of the decedents, filed suit against numerous defendants-appellees, including a supranational coal mining company based in Alabama, its subsidiary, and several of its high-ranking corporate officers. Averring that defendants engaged the paramilitaries, known as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), to eliminate suspected guerilla groups from around the company's mining operations in Colombia, plaintiffs contended their innocent decedents were incidental casualties of defendants' arrangement with the AUC. Claiming that Defendants aided and abetted, conspired with, and entered into an agency relationship with the AUC, plaintiffs brought suit under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA); and Colombia's wrongful death laws. The district court found that the Supreme Court's decision in "Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.," (133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013)), required dismissal of plaintiffs' ATS claims, and the court entered summary judgment in defendants' favor on those claims. In a series of opinions, the district court also dismissed plaintiffs' TVPA claims on summary judgment. Further, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' wrongful death claims under Colombian law and denied plaintiffs' motion to vacate the district court's grants of summary judgment, which plaintiffs sought in order to proceed with their Colombian wrongful death claims. Plaintiffs appealed each of the district court's opinions and the holdings therein. After careful consideration of the parties' briefs and those filed by the amici, the record on appeal, and the relevant legal authorities, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. View "Jane Doe, et al. v. Drummond Company, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

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Miranda and Carvajal, citizens of Colombia, participated in an operation that used high-speed boats to smuggle drugs from Colombia to Central American countries. Neither planned to, or did, leave Colombia in furtherance of the conspiracy. Carvajal was an organizer of the operations, and Miranda provided logistical support. In 2011, Colombian officials arrested them. They were extradited to the United States and pleaded guilty to drug conspiracy charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) 46 U.S.C. 70501. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting their arguments that the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied to their conduct, that the MDLEA fails to reach extraterritorially to encompass their conduct in Colombia, and that the facts failed to support acceptance of their guilty pleas. They waived all but one of the arguments when they entered pleas of guilty without reserving any right to appeal. Their remaining claim, whether vessels used by the drug conspiracy were “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” within the meaning of the MDLEA, implicates the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and could not be waived by appellants’ pleas. On the merits of the issue, the stipulated facts fully supported the conclusion that the vessels were subject to U.S. jurisdiction. View "United States v. Miranda" on Justia Law