Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, owner of Fiscal Agency Agreement (FAA) bonds that were not restructured, filed suit against BCRA seeking to recover their unpaid principal and interest. The district court held that the FAA's express waiver of sovereign immunity, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(1), also waived BCRA's immunity because BCRA is Argentina’s “alter ego.” The district court further held that BCRA’s use of its account with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) constituted “commercial activity” in the United States, which waived BCRA’s sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2). The court concluded that it has jurisdiction over the appeal under the collateral-order doctrine; Argentina’s sovereign‐immunity waiver in the FAA may not be imputed to also waive BCRA’s independent sovereign immunity; and BCRA’s use of its FRBNY account is too incidental to the gravamen of plaintiffs’ claim to serve as the basis for waiving BCRA’s sovereign immunity under the commercial‐activity exception to the FSIA. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. View "EM Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Republica Argentina" on Justia Law

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) removes sovereign immunity in actions involving personal injury or death resulting from an act of state-sponsored terrorism, 28 U.S.C. 1605A. Subsection 1610(g) allows plaintiffs with a judgment against a state sponsor of terrorism to attach and execute the judgment against property of the foreign state itself and any agency and instrumentality of the state. The plaintiffs, relatives of men who were kidnapped and murdered in 2004 by al-Qaeda, while working as U.S. military contractors in Iraq, obtained a default judgment under FSIA for $413 million. A month later, the court clerk sent a copy of the default judgment to the Syrian Foreign Ministry via a private delivery service; the delivery was rejected. The next day, Syria filed an appeal challenging the district court’s personal jurisdiction. The court stayed enforcement pending appeal. The District of Columbia Circuit found personal jurisdiction proper and affirmed the default judgment; found that a “reasonable time” had passed after entry of judgment and notice to Syria; and authorized attachment and execution of the judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed registration of the judgment in Illinois and the lower court’s issuance of a “turn over” order, rejecting the objections of other claimants of the Syrian assets View "Wyatt v. Gates" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four groups of individuals, hold separate judgments obtained in U.S. courts against the Republic of Iran, based on various terrorist attacks that occurred between 1990 and 2002. The state-sponsored exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, abrogated a foreign sovereign's immunity from judgment, but not its immunity from collection. Thus, terrorism victims had a right without a meaningful remedy. Section 201(a) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), Pub L. No. 107-297, 201(a), and 28 U.S.C. 1610(g) addressed this loophole. Section 201 allowed victims to satisfy such judgments through attachment of blocked assets of terrorist parties and Section 1610(g) extended the TRIA’s abrogation of asset immunity to funds that were not blocked. The court agreed with the Second Circuit that it is “clear beyond cavil that Section 201(a) of the TRIA provides courts with subject matter jurisdiction over post-judgment execution and attachment proceedings against property held in the hands of an instrumentality of the judgment-debtor, even if the instrumentality is not itself named in the judgment.” Further, section 1610(g) makes unmistakably clear that whether or not an instrumentality is an alter ego is irrelevant to determining whether its assets are attachable. Therefore, section 201 of the TRIA and section 1610(g) permit victims of terrorism to collect money they’re owed from instrumentalities of the state that sponsored the attacks. Nothing in the text of the FSIA, Rule 19 or the Supreme Court’s retroactivity cases compels a different result. The district court correctly denied Bank Melli’s motion to dismiss and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bennett v. Bank Melli" on Justia Law

In 2009, on Highway 101 in Monterey County, a bus driver lost control of the vehicle, which collided with bridge rails. The bus, carrying 34 French tourists, rolled; 18 occupants were ejected. Several were thrown over the bridge onto railroad tracks. The driver and four passengers were killed; 21 were severely injured. Capitales Tours and other defendants moved to dismiss or stay California lawsuits, asserting that France was the suitable forum. Plaintiffs argued that most of the documents and witnesses were in California, and that medical personnel and hospitals would likely receive nothing if the cases were transferred. There were more than $5 million in outstanding medical bills. The court found that public and private interest factors favored France because plaintiffs sought application of the French Tourism Code and would require translation. The court stayed the actions for one year. If France accepted jurisdiction, the actions would be dismissed. Capitales initiated proceedings in Paris, but the pretrial judge invoked lis pendens, because the Monterey court had not completely declined jurisdiction. While appeal was pending in France, the California court of appeal affirmed the stay. On remittitur, Capitales moved to dismiss, citing plaintiffs’ failure to initiate proceedings in France and resistance to their jurisdiction. The court dismissed. The court of appeal reversed, holding that further proceedings are necessary before dismissal. View "Auffert v. Capitales Tours" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence action against CAL, an international airline based in Trinidad and Tobago. CAL is Trinidad and Tobago’s national carrier and it is majority-owned by the Minister of Finance of Trinidad and Tobago (Minister). At issue was whether CAL qualifies for jury immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1330. Because the court concluded that the district court correctly held that the Minister is a political subdivision of Trinidad and Tobago, CAL qualifies as an agency or instrumentality of Trinidad and Tobago, and the district court’s strike of plaintiff’s jury demand was not erroneous. Therefore, the court affirmed the order and the final judgment. View "Singh v. Caribbean Airlines Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, investment funds, filed suit seeking, by ex parte application, to discover certain documents from the defendant American and international accounting firms relating to audits conducted by their Middle Eastern affiliates. 28 U.S.C. 1782 provides assistance to litigants in proceedings before foreign and international tribunals. The statute authorizes a district court, “upon the application of any interested person,” to order a party “found” in the judicial district in which the court sits to produce discovery “for use” in a foreign proceeding. The court concluded that (1) assuming arguendo that the funds were “interested person[s]” in ongoing foreign proceedings, the funds did not establish that the evidence they sought was “for use” in those proceedings; and (2) the district court did not err in finding that additional proceedings that the funds asserted they intended to initiate were not “within reasonable contemplation” at the time the application was made. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the application. View "Certain Funds v. KPMG LLP" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute between Ecuador and Chevron involving a series of lawsuits related to an investment and development agreement. On appeal, Ecuador challenged the district court's confirmation of an international arbitral award to Chevron. In this case, the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) includes a standing offer to all potential U.S. investors to arbitrate investment disputes, which Chevron accepted in the manner required by the treaty. Therefore, the court concluded that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1604, allows federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over Ecuador in order to consider an action to confirm or enforce the award. The dispute over whether the lawsuits were “investments” for purposes of the treaty is properly considered as part of review under the Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), 9 U.S.C. 201-208. The court further concluded that, even if it were to conclude that the FSIA required a de novo determination of arbitrability, the court still would find that the district court had jurisdiction where Ecuador failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Chevron's suits were not "investments" within the meaning of the BIT. Likewise, the court rejected Ecuador's arguments against confirmation of the award under the New York Convention as meritless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chevron Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 1350, against various corporations for allegedly aiding and abetting crimes committed during apartheid by the South African government against South Africans within South Africa's sovereign territory. The court held that knowledge of or complicity in the perpetration of a crime under the law of nations (customary international law) - absent evidence that a defendant purposefully facilitated the commission of that crime - is insufficient to establish a claim of aiding and abetting liability under the ATS; it is not a violation of the law of nations to bid on, and lose, a contract that arguably would help a sovereign government perpetrate an asserted violation of the law of nations; allegations of general corporate supervision are insufficient to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality and establish aiding and abetting liability under the ATS; and, in this case, plaintiffs’ amended pleadings do not establish federal jurisdiction under the ATS because they do not plausibly allege that defendants themselves engaged in any “relevant conduct” within the United States to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 1350, against various corporations for allegedly aiding and abetting crimes committed during apartheid by the South African government against South Africans within South Africa's sovereign territory. The court held that knowledge of or complicity in the perpetration of a crime under the law of nations (customary international law) - absent evidence that a defendant purposefully facilitated the commission of that crime - is insufficient to establish a claim of aiding and abetting liability under the ATS; it is not a violation of the law of nations to bid on, and lose, a contract that arguably would help a sovereign government perpetrate an asserted violation of the law of nations; allegations of general corporate supervision are insufficient to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality and establish aiding and abetting liability under the ATS; and, in this case, plaintiffs’ amended pleadings do not establish federal jurisdiction under the ATS because they do not plausibly allege that defendants themselves engaged in any “relevant conduct” within the United States to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

The United States delivered a criminal summons to the office of Sinovel Wind (USA) in Texas in order to serve process on Sinovel Wind Group, a Chinese corporation and the owner of 100% of the shares of Sinovel (USA), which had been indicted for criminal copyright infringement, wire fraud and trade secret theft. The charges arose from Sinovel’s alleged scheme to steal computer source code from American Superconductor for use to assist in operating Sinovel’s wind turbines. Sinovel contested jurisdiction and moved to quash service. Concluding that Sinovel USA was the alter ego of Sinovel and that service on Sinovel USA was proper, the district court denied Sinovel’s motion. The Seventh Circuit concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear Sinovel’s appeal and that the case did not meet the high standards for issuance of a writ of mandamus. The court rejected arguments that U.S. criminal proceedings against Sinoval could interfere “with ongoing civil litigation in Chinese courts” over the same dispute and that this was an exceptional case in which the importance of the particular value at stake is sufficiently great that an immediate appeal must be allowed to protect that value. View "Sinovel Wind Grp. Co., Ltd v. Crabb" on Justia Law