Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

This petition involves a paternity and support action filed in a Zurich court in 2008, alleging that petitioner, a resident of California, is the father of Jayden. Both Jayden and his mother live in Switzerland. The court held that when a foreign judgment establishing paternity and child support is registered in California for enforcement purposes under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, Fam. Code 4900 et seq., a California court order may not order genetic testing to challenge registration of that order. In the context of this case, genetic testing is not relevant to any matter that is properly before the trial court in this enforcement proceeding under the Act. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for writ of mandate. View "County of L.A. Child Supp. Serv. Dept. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), the Alien Tort Statute Act (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 1350, and federal common law, seeking judgments against Arab Bank for allegedly financing and facilitating the activities of organizations that committed the attacks that caused plaintiffsʹ injuries. The district court entered judgments on the pleadings as to the ATS claims. On appeal, plaintiffs argued principally that this Circuitʹs opinion in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel I), when analyzed in light of the Supreme Courtʹs decision in Kiobel II, which was affirmed on other grounds, is no longer ʺgood law,ʺ or at least, does not control this case. The court declined to conclude that Kiobel II overruled Kiobel I on the issue of corporate liability under the ATS. The court noted that Kiobel II appears to suggest that the ATS allows for some degree of corporate liability. The court went on to say that one panelʹs overruling of the holding of a case decided by a previous panel is perilous. The court affirmed on the basis of Kiobel I. Finally, the court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in declining to permit the plaintiffs to amend their complaints. View "Jesner v. Arab Bank" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the United Kingdom who resides in Northern Ireland, appealed from the denial of her petition filed under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 22 U.S.C. 9001 et seq. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot, claiming that a New York court's custody determination resolved the parties dispute. The court denied the motion to dismiss where holding that the petition is moot because respondents received a favorable custody determination in a potentially friendlier New York court could encourage the jurisdictional gerrymandering that the Hague Convention was designed to prevent. View "Tann v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Between 2001 and 2004, Nitek Electronics, Inc. entered thirty-six shipments of pipe fitting components used for gas meters into the United States from China. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) claimed that the merchandise was misclassified and issued Nitek a final penalty claim stating that the tentative culpability was gross negligence. Customs then referred the matter to the United States Department of Justice (“Government”) to bring a claim against Nitek in the Court of International Trade to enforce the penalty. The Government brought suit against Nitek to recover lost duties, antidumping duties, and a penalty based on negligence under 19 U.S.C. 1592. Nitek moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. The court denied dismissal of the claims to recover lost duties and antidumping duties but did dismiss the Government’s claim for a penalty based on negligence, concluding that the Government had failed to exhaust all administrative remedies under 19 U.S.C. 1592 by not having Customs demand a penalty based on negligence, instead of gross negligence. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the statutory framework of section 1592 does not allow the Government to bring a penalty claim based on negligence in court because such a claim did not exist at the administrative level. View "United States v. Nitek Elecs., Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent, a California resident, filed suit against OBB, an Austrian state-owned railway, after she suffered injuries from falling off the railroad tracks at the Innsbruck, Austria, train station. Respondent had purchased a Eurail pass over the Internet from a Massachusetts-based travel agent. The district court granted OBB's motion to dismiss pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Eurail pass sale by the travel agent could be attributed to OBB through common law principles of agency, and that respondent’s suit was “based upon” that Eurail pass sale. The Court held, however, that respondent's suit falls outside the commercial activity exception and is barred by sovereign immunity where the suit is not "based upon" the sale of the Eurail pass for purposes of section 1605(a)(2), and respondent's contention that her claims are "based upon" OBB's entire railway enterprise is forfeited. In this case, respondent's action is "based upon" the railway's conduct in Innsbruck. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. View "OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs" on Justia Law

The Department of Commerce determined that utility scale wind towers from the People’s Republic of China and utility scale wind towers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (together, the subject merchandise) were sold in the United States at less than fair value and that it received countervailable subsidies. The International Trade Commission made a final affirmative determination of material injury to the domestic industry. The determination was by divided vote of the six-member Commission. The Court of International Trade upheld the Commission’s affirmative injury determination. Siemens Energy, Inc., an importer of utility scale wind towers, challenged the determination. The issues on appeal concerned the interpretation and effect of the divided vote. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the Court of International Trade properly upheld the Commission’s affirmative injury determination. View "Simens Energy, Inc. v. United States, Wind Tower Trade Coalition" on Justia Law

The Tariff Act of 1930 gives the International Trade Commission authority to remedy only those unfair acts that involve the importation of “articles” as described in 19 U.S.C. 1337(a). The Commission instituted an investigation based on a complaint filed by Align, concerning violation of 19 U.S.C. 1337 by reason of infringement of various claims of seven different patents concerning orthodontic devices. The accused “articles” were the transmission of the “digital models, digital data and treatment plans, expressed as digital data sets, which are virtual three-dimensional models of the desired positions of the patients’ teeth at various stages of orthodontic treatment” from Pakistan to the United States. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the Commission lacked jurisdiction. The Commission’s decision to expand the scope of its jurisdiction to include electronic transmissions of digital data runs counter to the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” View "ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

Maghreb appealed the district court's grant of plaintiff's motion for non-recognition of a Moroccan judgment under Texas's Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgment Recognition Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 36.001–36.008. Under de novo review, the court held that the Texas Recognition Act’s due process standard requires only that the foreign proceedings be fundamentally fair and inoffensive to “basic fairness.” In this case, the Moroccan judicial system does not present an exceptional case of “serious injustice” that renders the entire system fundamentally unfair and incompatible with due process. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that non-recognition was justified under Section 36.005(a)(1) of the Texas Recognition Act. The court further concluded that plaintiff has not established, as required by the Texas Recognition Act, that Morocco would refuse to recognize an otherwise enforceable foreign judgment simply because it was rendered in Texas. The court rejected plaintiff's claims regarding service of process and his amenability to jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Exploration" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, injured sailors and their spouses, filed suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602 et seq., alleging that al Qaeda was responsible for the attack of the U.S.S. Cole and that the Republic of Sudan had provided material support to al Qaeda. Plaintiffs subsequently registered the default judgment and then sought to enforce it against funds held by New York banks. The district court issued three turnover orders. The court affirmed and held that (1) service of process on the Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs via the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., complied with the FSIAʹs requirement that service be sent to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs, and (2) the District Court did not err in issuing the turnover orders without first obtaining either a license from the Treasury Departmentʹs Office of Foreign Assets Control or a Statement of Interest from the Department. View "Harrison v. Republic of Sudan" on Justia Law

Philos Tech, an Illinois company, sent equipment to Korea for delivery to P&D in connection with an alleged joint venture between the companies. The nature and origins of the joint venture are disputed. Defendant Don-Hee Park visited Illinois twice and met with Philos. Philos Tech filed suit in Illinois in 2008, alleging that P&D, Don-Hee and Jae-Hee unlawfully converted that equipment by refusing to return it after failing to increase Philo’s shares in P&D. The parties presented the court with competing translations of the documents, all of which are in Korean. There were transfers of funds and equipment between Korea and Illinois, but the purpose and details are unclear. The district court granted Philos Tech default judgment and awarded damages. After Philos Tech attempted to enforce this judgment in Korea, Defendants moved to vacate the judgment under FRCP 60(b)(4), asserting that the Illinois court’s judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that the request was untimely, but the Seventh Circuit reversed. Following a remand, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants and denial of Philos Tech’s motion asking the court to vacate its judgment on account of the Parks’ alleged fraud. View "Philos Techs., Inc. v. Philos & D, Inc." on Justia Law