Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), makes it a crime to invest income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity in an enterprise “which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,” 18 U.S.C. 1962(a); to acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, 1962(b); to conduct an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, 1962(c); and to conspire to violate any of the other three prohibitions, 1962(d). Section 1964(c) creates a private right of action. The European Community and 26 member states filed a RICO civil suit, alleging that RJR participated in a global money-laundering scheme in association with organized crime groups, under which drug traffickers smuggled narcotics into Europe and sold them for euros that—through black-market money brokers, cigarette importers, and wholesalers—were used to pay for large shipments of RJR cigarettes into Europe. The Second Circuit reversed dismissal of the claims, concluding that RICO permits recovery for a foreign injury caused by the violation of a predicate statute that applies extraterritorially. The Supreme Court reversed, first noting the presumption against extraterritoriality. While allegations under Sections 1962 (b) and (c) do not involve an impermissibly extraterritorial application of RICO, Section 1964(c), creating private remedies, does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. Allowing recovery for foreign injuries in a civil RICO action could create a danger of international friction that militates against recognizing foreign-injury claims without clear direction from Congress that is not present in Section 1964(c). View "RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, heirs to eight civilians killed in 2003 by Bolivian troops, filed suit under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. 1350, seeking damages and fees. In this case, plaintiffs have exhausted all of their available Bolivian remedies. They received some compensation through those remedies but not nearly as much as they claim is necessary to fully compensate them for their losses. Defendants sought certification for an interlocutory appeal on two issues: (1) whether the exhaustion requirement in section 2(b) of the TVPA bars plaintiffs’ claims, and (2) whether plaintiffs have failed to state claims for relief under the TVPA. The court answered the first certified question in the negative and affirmed the part of the district court’s order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the TVPA claims on exhaustion grounds. The court concluded that section 2(b)’s exhaustion requirement does not bar a TVPA suit by a claimant who has successfully exhausted her remedies in the foreign state. The court exercised its discretion not to decide the second certified issue, which is actually a cluster of multiple issues involving the claims of multiple plaintiffs against the two defendants. View "Mamani v. Sanchez Berzain" on Justia Law

Father petitioned for the return of his children to Mexico pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 19 I.L.M. 1501. The district court declined to order the children returned, and Father appealed. Reviewing the record facts as a whole, the court agreed with the district court that a preponderance of the facts establishes that Son has significant connections demonstrating a secure, stable, and permanent life in his new environment. Son is therefore “settled” within the meaning of the Convention. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s determination that Son is “settled” within the meaning of the Hague Convention and affirmed its decision not to exercise its discretion to order Son returned. View "Alcala v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for the murder of Special Agent James Terry Watson. Agent Watson - as an Assistant Attaché for the United States Mission in Colombia - was an internationally protected person (an IPP). Defendant, a citizen of Colombia, pleaded guilty to offenses of kidnapping conspiracy and murder of an IPP. Defendant argued that his prosecution in this country for offenses committed in Colombia contravened the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Applying the arbitrary-or-unfair framework, the court concluded that defendant's prosecution in this country was not fundamentally unfair where kidnapping and murder are "self-evidently criminal." Furthermore, the IPP convention alone gave defendant notice sufficient to satisfy due process. The court rejected defendant's contention that because the United States Code provisions implementing the IPP Convention require knowledge of the victim’s IPP status that Bello did not possess, those provisions cannot have put him on notice that he was subject to prosecution in this country. Accordingly, there is no merit to defendant’s mens rea contention - nor his broader claim that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause precluded his prosecution in this country - and the court must uphold his kidnapping conspiracy and murder convictions. View "United States v. Bello Murillo" on Justia Law

Pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. 252(1)(A), a referee held hearings and issued a report, finding: The parties were married in France, in 2006. Their child was born in 2008. A protection order had issued, based on findings that Karamanoglu had abused Gourlaouen and the child. The child’s therapist and the guardian ad litem agreed that it was in the child’s best interest to have unsupervised visitation with Karamanoglu, who had entered counseling. The report recommended shared parental rights and responsibilities, including shared primary residence and care. The parties jointly own properties in Primelin, France; Freeport; and Yarmouth. The parties had entered into a standard French marriage contract, which is valid and enforceable, and had supplemented that contract. The referee recommended: Karamanoglu’s and Gourlaouen’s shares of the equity in the Yarmouth property to be $3.1 million and $1.4 million respectively; that the Yarmouth and Freeport properties be set aside to Karamanoglu; that Gourlaouen be awarded the Primelin property; that Karamanoglu pay $1 million to Gourlaouen; and that Karamanoglu pay Gourlaouen spousal support of $3,800 per month for five years. The court adopted the reports. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated with respect to co-parenting counseling, the child's medical and mental health treatment, and mandatory pre-filing mediation, and found error in the analysis of the parties’ interests in the Primelin property. View "Karamanoglu v. Gourlaouen" on Justia Law

Diag Human appealed the district court's dismissal, sua sponte, of its claim for enforcement of a foreign arbitral award for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found for Diag Human on both of the contested Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(6), issues here: Diag Human and the Czech Republic shared a legal relationship, and their arbitration “may” be governed by the New York Convention. Therefore, the Czech Republic is not entitled to sovereign immunity in this matter under the FSIA’s arbitration exception. Here, Diag Human’s relationship with the Czech Republic qualifies as a commercial legal relationship, and the arbitration at issue here arises out of that commercial legal relationship. Because a legal basis exists for federal courts to enforce this arbitration award, the court concluded that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Whether the arbitration award is final will be a question going to the merits of the case, as it could determine whether the arbitration award can be enforced or not. The court expresses no view on the matter. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Diag Human S.E. v. Czech Republic - Ministry of Health" on Justia Law

GSS appealed the district court’s dismissal of its second attempt to confirm a $44 million arbitral award entered against the Port Authority for breach of a construction contract. GSS first tried to confirm the award, but the district court found that it had no personal jurisdiction over the Port Authority. Then GSS filed its second petition, also naming the Republic of Liberia, which owns the Port Authority, as respondents. The district court again dismissed GSS’s petition, finding that issue preclusion barred relitigating its personal jurisdiction over the Port Authority and that GSS failed to demonstrate that Liberia was liable for the Port Authority’s alleged breach. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims against Liberia for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330 et seq.; affirmed the district court's dismissal of GSS's petition against the Port Authority on sovereign immunities grounds; and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing GSS's petition before allowing jurisdictional discovery. View "GSS Group Ltd. v. Republic of Liberia" on Justia Law

Two brothers were awarded a $2.79 billion judgment against the Republic of Cuba and other Cuban parties. The brothers subsequently sought to satisfy the federal judgment. The district court concluded that certain assets the brothers sought to attach to satisfy the judgment were not the property of the Cuban government and thus were not subject to attachment in satisfaction of their judgment. The brothers appealed. The trustee who controlled the assets at issue cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred by denying its motion for attorneys’ fees incurred in proceedings addressing whether it had to turn over the assets to the brothers. The First Circuit affirmed in all respects, holding that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing the case, as the assets at issue were not the property of the Cuban government; and (2) did not err in denying the trustee’s motion for attorneys’ fees as untimely. View "Villoldo v. Castro Ruz" on Justia Law

The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 21 U.S.T. 2517, requires signatory states to recognize written arbitration agreements “concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.” In this appeal, the court addressed an issue of first impression for the Circuit: whether a cruise ship employee who is injured on the job, and whose employment contract contains an arbitration agreement governed by the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 201, can bar arbitration by showing that high costs may prevent him from effectively vindicating his federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum. The court concluded that it need not definitely answer this question because, even if the court were to assume that plaintiff could raise a cost-based (public policy) defense in response to NCL's motion to compel arbitration, on this record he has plainly failed to establish that the costs of arbitration would preclude him from arbitrating his federal statutory claims. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s order compelling the parties to arbitrate. However, the court denied defendant's motion for sanctions. View "Suazo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd." on Justia Law

Six-year-old D.A.P.G. was abducted from his home in Honduras and brought illegally into the United States by defendant, his mother. Plaintiff filed a petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, seeking the return of his only child. Plaintiff filed his return petition two months outside of the one-year period of the child's wrongful removal, allowing the district court to consider the Convention’s defense that the child is well-settled in his new environment and therefore should not be returned. The district court denied plaintiff's petition, concluding that D.A.P.G. was well-settled in his current community even though defendant’s removal of D.A.P.G. from Honduras was wrongful. The court concluded that the district court erred in its legal analysis and application of the Convention’s well-settled defense. The court joined its sister circuits and held that the following factors should be considered: (1) the child’s age; (2) the stability and duration of the child’s residence in the new environment; (3) whether the child attends school or day care consistently; (4) whether the child has friends and relatives in the new area; (5) the child’s participation in community or extracurricular activities; (6) the respondent’s employment and financial stability; and (7) the immigration status of the respondent and child. The court joined the Second and Ninth Circuits in concluding that immigration status is neither dispositive nor subject to categorical rules, but instead is one relevant factor in a multifactor test. Here, the district court did not clearly err in its factual findings but erred in its legal interpretation and application of the well-settled defense. Giving due consideration to immigration status and the other relevant factors listed above, the thin evidence in the record does not demonstrate that D.A.P.G. has formed significant connections to his new environment. Accordingly, the court vacated and rendered judgment in plaintiff's favor. View "Hernandez v. Pena" on Justia Law