Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

The court-appointed receiver for a Ponzi scheme (the Stanford scheme) filed suit against LIA and LFICO, seeking to recover proceeds of certificates of deposits (CDs) previously transferred to LFICO by SIB. The district court ruled that LIA was immune from the district court's jurisdiction pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1291, but that LFICO was not. Both the receiver and LFICO timely appealed. The court held that the FSIA provides no basis for jurisdiction over LIA and affirmed the district court’s holding that it had no jurisdiction over the claims against LIA under the FSIA. However, the court vacated the district court's ruling that it had jurisdiction over the claims against LFICO under the FSIA and remanded for development of the factual record on this issue and for a determination whether LFICO is an organ, and thus an agent or instrumentality, of Libya under the FSIA. View "Janvey v. Libyan Investment Authority" on Justia Law

Cynthia C. and Gerardo L. appealed the termination of their parental rights to their daughter, R. L. Gerardo contended the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders, and all subsequent orders, had to be reversed because the juvenile court did not have home state jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. He also contended he did not receive notice of the proceedings pursuant to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters. Cynthia joined in Gerardo's arguments to the extent they inured to her benefit, but raised no other issues. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeals found Cynthia and Gerardo's arguments unavailing, and affirmed termination of their parental rights. View "In re R.L." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five entities incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, filed suit against the Republic of Ecuador and two of Ecuador's instrumentalities, CFN and Trust, claiming that an agency of the Republic of Ecuador unlawfully seized their property in Ecuador. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The court affirmed and concluded that the presumption of legal separateness established by the Supreme Court in First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, and respect for international comity compel the court to treat these legally separate entities as just that, unless plaintiffs can demonstrate that CFN and the Trust exercise “significant and repeated control over the [entities’] day‐to‐day operations.” Because plaintiffs have failed to clear this substantial bar, they fail to satisfy the requirements of Section 1605(a)(3) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(3). Therefore, defendants are protected by sovereign immunity and the court need not consider the alternative bases for dismissal relied on by the district court or presented by defendants. View "Arch Trading Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador" on Justia Law

This dispute stems from plaintiff's attempt to protect his copyright in photographs of Pablo Picasso's artworks after an American art editor (Wofsy) reproduced the photographic images. Plaintiff received a judgment in French court of two million euros in "astreinte" against Wofsy. Plaintiff then sought to enforce the judgment in federal court in California under the California Uniform Foreign-Court Monetary Judgment Recognition Act, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 1713 et seq. The court held that Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 authorizes district courts to consider foreign legal materials outside the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss because Rule 44.1 treats foreign law determinations as questions of law, not fact. In this case, the district court did not err in considering expert declarations on the content of French law in ruling on Wofsy’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that “the award of an astreinte in this case constitutes a penalty for purposes of the [Uniform Recognition Act].” The court held that the astreinte awarded by the French courts to plaintiff falls within the Uniform Recognition Act as a judgment that “[g]rants . . . a sum of money.” In this case, the astreinte was not a “fine or other penalty” for purposes of the Act, and accordingly the district court erred in concluding otherwise. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "De Fontbrune v. Wofsy" on Justia Law

Dominguez moved to Dutch Sint Maarten in 2007. Dominguez met Didon and moved into his Dutch Sint Maarten apartment in 2009. In 2010, A.D. was born; in 2011, Dominguez’s daughter from a previous relationship, J.D., joined them. Didon and Dominguez successfully petitioned the French consulate to change J.D.’s birth certificate to list Didon as her father. The family resided in Dutch Sint Maarten, Didon worked and the children attended school in French Saint Martin. In 2014, Dominguez took the children to New York for her sister’s wedding, showing Didon round-trip tickets. Dominguez did not return with the children. Didon pursued a custody action. A French court granted him full custody of both children in an ex parte order. Didon’s investigator located them in Pennsylvania. Didon filed a Hague Convention petition. Following an ex parte telephone hearing, the Pennsylvania district court ordered the U.S. Marshals Service to serve Dominguez, and to confiscate the passports of Dominguez, A.D., and J.D. After hearings at which both parties presented evidence, the court granted Didon’s petition. The Third Circuit vacated. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction allows a parent to petition for the return of a child when that child has been removed or retained from her “habitual residence” country in violation of the parent’s custody rights in that country. The Hague Convention is recognized by French Saint Martin but is not recognized by Dutch Sint Maarten. Rejecting an argument that a child could have two concurrent “habitual residence” countries, the court concluded that the children were habitual residents only of the country in which they “lived”—Dutch Sint Maarten. View "Didon v. Castillo" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenges the district court's denial of his petition for return of his children to Venezuela pursuant to the Hague Convention. The court concluded that the district court applied the correct legal standard in determining the children’s habitual residence, and its shared intent determination was not clearly erroneous. In this case, the record demonstrates that respondent, the children's mother, and petitioner's last shared intent was to abandon Venezuela permanently as the children’s habitual residence. There was a meeting of their minds to abandon Venezuela as the children’s habitual residence. The court also concluded that petitioner cannot meet his burden to show that the children were wrongfully removed from Venezuela or retained in the United States because Venezuela was abandoned as the children’s habitual residence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Delgado v. Osuna" on Justia Law

The 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701–07, authorizes the President to: [I]investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. In 2003-2005, President Bush invoked the IEEPA to issue Executive Orders “Blocking Property of Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Zimbabwe.” The Office of Foreign Asset Control enacted sanctions, under which property belonging to Zimbabwean Special Designated Nationals (SDNs), located within the United States, was “blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.” Turner was convicted of willfully conspiring, with Prince Ben Israel, to provide services for Zimbabwean SDNs by lobbying U.S. officials, arranging for Zimbabwean officials to meet U.S. officials, and assisting Zimbabwean officials in obtaining travel visas. They were promised payment of $3,405,000. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s admission into evidence a “Consulting Agreement” as an authenticated coconspirator statement, jury instructions regarding “willfulness” and unanimity, and interactions with the jury after deliberations began. After reviewing classified information, the court found no violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

Eleven American families filed suit against the PLO and the PA under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), for various terror attacks in Israel that killed or wounded plaintiffs or their families. A jury awarded plaintiffs damages of $218.5 million, an amount that was trebled automatically pursuant to the ATA, 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), bringing the total award to $655.5 million. Both parties appealed. The court concluded that the minimum contacts and fairness analysis is the same under the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment in civil cases. On the merits, the court concluded that, pursuant to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Daimler, the district court could not properly exercise general personal jurisdiction over defendants. The court also concluded that, because the terror attacks in Israel at issue here were not expressly aimed at the United States and because the deaths and injuries suffered by the American plaintiffs in these attacks were “random [and] fortuitous” and because lobbying activities regarding American policy toward Israel are insufficiently “suit-related conduct” to support specific jurisdiction, the court lacks specific jurisdiction over these defendants. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for the district court with instructions to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. The court did not consider defendants' other arguments on appeal or plaintiffs' cross-appeal, all of which are now moot. View "Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 1350, seeking to hold LCB, a Lebanese bank headquartered in Beirut, liable for providing international financial services to Hezbollah that they claim facilitated Hezbollah’s 2006 attacks that injured them or killed family members. The district court dismissed the ATS claims under Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., reasoning that plaintiffs failed to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS. The court concluded, however, that plaintiffs have surpassed the jurisdictional hurdle set forth in Kiobel II where the complaint alleges conduct by LCB that touched and concerned the United States, and that the same conduct, upon preliminary examination, states a claim for aiding and abetting Hezbollah’s violation of the law of nations, with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. Nevertheless, Kiobel I forecloses plaintiffs’ claims against LCB where corporations are immunized from liability under the ATS. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part the judgment of the district court. View "Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a United States citizen, worked as the lead trumpeter on a passenger Royal Caribbean cruise ship. The ship is a Bahamian flagged vessel with a home port in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Royal Caribbean, the operator of the vessel, is a Liberian corporation with its principal place of business in Florida. After plaintiff became ill while working for Royal Caribbean, he filed suit alleging unseaworthiness, negligence, negligence under the Jones Act, maintenance and cure, and seaman’s wages and penalties. Royal Caribbean moved to compel arbitration, and the district court granted the motion. This appeal presents an issue of first impression: whether a seaman’s work in international waters on a cruise ship that calls on foreign ports constitutes “performance . . . abroad” under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. 202. The Convention makes enforceable an arbitration agreement between United States citizens if their contractual relationship “envisages performance . . . abroad.” The court affirmed the order compelling arbitration of the dispute because a seaman works abroad when traveling in international waters to or from a foreign state. View "Alberts v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd." on Justia Law