Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Sacks is a law firm with a 20-year history of working with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 2011, IMF hired Sacks to negotiate disputed claims of various contractors that worked on the renovation of its headquarters. The parties’ contract asserts IMF’s immunity from suit and provides that any disputes not settled by mutual agreement shall be resolved by arbitration. In a subsequent fee dispute between Sacks and IMF, Sacks filed a demand for arbitration with the AAA. The arbitration panel awarded Sacks $39,918.82 plus interest but denied Sacks’ claim of underpayment in connection with earlier work.Sacks sued the Fund, claiming that the award should be vacated pursuant to the D.C. Code as “the result of misconduct by the arbitrators.” IMF removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss it on immunity grounds pursuant to its Articles of Agreement, given effect in the U.S. by the Bretton Woods Act, 22 U.S.C. 286h. Sacks asserted the contract waived immunity by expressly providing for arbitration pursuant to the AAA Rules, which contemplate courts’ entry of judgment on arbitral awards. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The AAA Rules and D.C. law contemplate judicial involvement in the enforcement of arbitral awards, so arguably the contract also does so but an international organization's waiver of the immunity must be explicit. The parties' contract expressly retains the IMF’s immunity, reiterating it even within the arbitration clause. View "Leonard A. Sacks & Associates P.C. v. International Monetary Fund" on Justia Law

Ali sought to pursue 42 U.S.C. 1983 proceedings challenging as unconstitutional an executive order of Maryland’s Governor that prohibits boycotts of Israel by business entities that bid on the state’s procurement contracts. According to the Initial Complaint, “Ali is a computer software engineer who wishes to submit bids for government software project contracts but is barred from doing so due to the presence of mandatory ‘No Boycott of Israel’ clauses.”The district court dismissed with prejudice Ali’s lawsuit for want of Article III standing to sue. The Fourth Circuit affirmed but modified the judgment to provide that the dismissal is without prejudice. The court first disagreed with Ali’s interpretation of the Order. The Order indicates that if a business entity has engaged in anti-Israel national origin discrimination in the process of preparing a bid for a state procurement contract, the entity is barred from being awarded the contract; if the entity has engaged in a boycott of Israel entirely unrelated to the bid formation process, the Order is of no relevance. The court rejected Ali’s argument that the certification requirement constitutes an unconstitutionally vague loyalty oath. The Order does not require the entity to pledge any loyalty to Israel or profess any other beliefs. View "Ali v. Hogan" on Justia Law

Wye sued Iraq. The district court denied Iraq’s motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds and entered judgment in Wye’s favor years later. An intervening Fourth Circuit ruling rejected Iraq’s contention that none of the exceptions in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602, applied to Wye’s breach of contract claims; because Wye alleged that it had engaged in acts inside the U.S. under the contract, the lawsuit could proceed under the second clause of the FSIA’s commercial activities exception, which abrogates foreign sovereign immunity with respect to claims that are “based upon . . . an act performed in the United States in connection with commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere.”The D.C. Circuit vacated. Iraq’s participation in the trial did not implicitly waive its sovereign immunity. The law of the case doctrine does not require adherence to the Fourth Circuit’s conclusions. The D.C. Circuit concluded that section 1605(a)(2) does not apply to this case. A plausible basis for sustaining the district court’s jurisdictional ruling can be found in the commercial activity exception’s third clause, abrogating immunity if the action is “based upon . . . an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.” The district court is best positioned to determine whether Iraq’s breach of contract caused “direct effects” in the U.S. View "Wye Oak Technology, Inc. v. Republic of Iraq" on Justia Law

Berg, a resident of South Carolina, sought recovery of art taken by the Nazis following the German invasion of the Netherlands. Berg’s grandfather was a partner in Firma D. Katz, which owned art galleries specializing in the sale of paintings by Dutch Old Masters. Following World War II, much of the stolen art was returned to the Netherlands by the U.S. military under Collection Point Agreements; the Netherlands agreed to hold the art as “custodians pending the determination of the lawful owners thereof.” Firma D. Katz was liquidated in 1974. The artworks have not been returned to the heirs of its partners. In the District of South Carolina, Berg sued the Kingdom of the Netherlands; its Ministry of Education, Culture & Science, its Cultural Heritage Agency (RCE), and municipal museums in the Netherlands holding the artworks.The Fourth Circuit affirmed that the Ministry and RCE, are political subdivisions of the Netherlands and do not lose Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602 immunity for artworks located outside of the U.S. which were expropriated in violation of international law. As to the museums, venue was improper in South Carolina under U.S.C. 1391(f). View "Berg v. Kingdom of the Netherlands" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's order vacating its earlier grant of Nigeria's application for discovery from VR under 28 U.S.C. 1782, holding that the district court's decision was based on an error of law, and thus amounted to an abuse of discretion as it effectively erected an impermissible extra-statutory barrier to discovery under section 1782. The court explained that the Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Nigeria on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters by its plain terms does not restrict Nigeria's use of other lawful means to access evidence in the United States for use in criminal matters. Rather, it expands such access, supplementing rather than replacing other evidence-gathering tools such as section 1782. Therefore, Nigeria does not circumvent the Treaty by applying directly to the district court for discovery under section 1782.The court also concluded that the district court erred by concluding that Nigeria's potential use of the discovery materials sought in a related proceeding challenging an arbitration award before an English court would be "improper" and by considering such potential use as a negative factor in addressing Nigeria's section 1782 application. Accordingly, the court remanded for further consideration. View "Federal Republic of Nigeria v. VR Advisory Services, Ltd." on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen and resident of France charged with violating the Commodity Exchange Act, appealed the district court's memorandum order applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and denying her motions to dismiss the indictment on grounds of extraterritoriality and due process.After determining that it has jurisdiction to review the order disentitling defendant, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings to consider or reconsider the merits of her motions to dismiss. The court agreed with defendant that it has jurisdiction to review the fugitive disentitlement ruling pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. The court held that defendant is not a fugitive, and that, even if she were, the district court abused its discretion in concluding that disentitlement was justified. The court explained that fugitivity implies some action by defendant to distance herself from the United States or frustrate arrest, but she took no such action. The court concluded, however, that it lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of the extraterritoriality and due process challenges and dismissed the appeal to that extent. View "United States v. Sindzingre" on Justia Law

Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Europe sought compensation for the expropriation of its interests in a company in Venezuela. The district court granted Saint-Gobain summary judgment after determining it had properly served the Republic of Venezuela with court process pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters.The D.C. Circuit reversed. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1608, identifies four methods for serving a foreign state. The method at issue is “by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial documents”; the Hague Convention is such an international agreement. Articles 2-6 of the Hague Convention require that a plaintiff request service from a Central Authority designated by the receiving state and receive a certificate of service from the Central Authority stating it has served the defendant by a method consistent with the state’s internal law. Venezuelan law requires lawsuits against the Republic to be served on the Attorney General, and the Attorney General was never served. View "Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Europe v. Bolivarian Rep. of Venezuela" on Justia Law

Venezuela expropriated mining rights owned by Crystallex, a Canadian mining company. After prevailing in an arbitration proceeding, Crystallex obtained a $1.4 billion judgment. In an execution action, Crystallex seeks to auction shares owned by Venezuela’s state-owned energy company, PDVS, to satisfy its judgment against Venezuel, including PDVSA’s shares in PDVH, a Delaware holding company that owns CITGO, a U.S. petroleum refiner (one of PDVSA’s most important U.S. assets). The district court held that it had jurisdiction to enforce the judgment against Venezuela and that PDVSA could not assert sovereign immunity as a defense and ordered PDVH’s registered agent to retain the stock until further order. In an earlier appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed.Political conditions changed in Venezuela. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which administers U.S. economic sanctions, prohibited the transfer of assets without OFAC approval. On remand, PDVSA, PDVH as the garnishee, and CITGO asked the district court to quash the writ of attachment. The United States filed a statement of interest urging the court not to authorize a contingent sale of the shares.The district court refused to quash the attachment and decided “to set up the sales procedures and then to follow them to the maximum extent that can be accomplished without a specific license from OFAC,” including appointing a special master. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court has not reached a final decision. 28 U.S.C. 1291. View "Crystallex International Corp v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezue" on Justia Law

Respondent-father Nedim Suljevic appealed a circuit court order denying his motion for the court to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction over the parties’ custody dispute pursuant to New Hampshire’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), and granting petitioner-mother Senay Akin's petition to enforce the parties’ Turkish child custody order. The parties, who both have or previously had Turkish citizenship, were married in December 2010 and had a daughter the following year. According to Mother, the parties married in New Hampshire, and when she was pregnant with their daughter, she moved to Turkey while Father continued to reside in the United States. The parties’ daughter was born in Turkey in December 2011 and, until the events giving rise to this proceeding occurred in 2019, lived in Turkey continuously, attending school and receiving medical care there. The parties were divorced by a Turkish court in January 2015; the decree granted Mother sole custody of the child and allowed Father to have visitation with her. In 2019, Mother agreed that the daughter could spend July and August in the United States to visit Father. However, at the end of this two-month visit, Father refused to return the daughter to Mother. Mother made repeated overtures to Father for the daughter’s return, but he refused her entreaties. Mother accepted employment in Massachusetts during the 2020-2021 timeframe so that she could visit the daughter. During this time, Father continually rejected Mother’s requests for the daughter’s return to her custody. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic and difficulty finding a suitable attorney, Mother did not bring a court action for the daughter’s return until filing the underlying petition for expedited enforcement of a foreign child custody order in April 2021. Father was served with Mother’s petition, and then filed his own motion at issue here. As grounds for his motion, Father argued Mother physically abused the daughter while in the Mother's custody. Mother objected to Father’s motion, asserting that he had “refused repeatedly to return [her] daughter” and had issued threats. Mother asserted that Father “should not be allowed to litigate in New Hampshire when the Turkish order controls custody.” After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the circuit court's decision to deny Father's request, and to grant Mother's petition to enforce the parties' Turkish child custody order. View "In the Matter of Akin & Suljevic" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, victims of Jaysh al-Mahdi terrorist attacks and the victims' family members, filed suit alleging that defendants, large medical supply and manufacturing companies, knowingly gave substantial support to the attacks against them in violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), and state law. Plaintiffs claim that defendants, aware of Jaysh al-Mahdi's command of the Ministry, secured lucrative medical-supply contracts with the Ministry by giving corrupt payments and valuable gifts to Jaysh al-Mahdi. The district court held that the complaint failed to state claims for either direct or secondary (aiding-and-abetting) liability under the ATA, and that it lacked personal jurisdiction over six foreign defendants.The DC Circuit reversed on three issues and remanded the balance of the issues to be addressed by the district court consistent with the court's opinion. First, the court concluded that plaintiffs plead facts that suffice to support their aiding-and-abetting claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Second, with respect to the direct liability claim, the court concluded that plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that defendants' payments to Jaysh al Mahdi proximately caused plaintiffs' injuries. Third, the court concluded that the district court's personal jurisdiction analysis was unduly restrictive. View "Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Limited" on Justia Law