Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Berezowsky and Rendon, both Mexican nationals, met in Mexico in 2008. Berezowsky learned that she was pregnant and the couple became engaged. Their relationship deteriorated. Berezowsky moved to her parents’ home in Texas, and cut off communication with Rendon. Rendon made repeated attempts to gain information about his unborn child, but received no response. Berezowsky gave birth to P in 2009 in Texas. A month later, Rendon learned his child’s name, sex, and date of birth through a private investigator. At least 12 different courts in the U.S. and Mexico have been involved in the ensuing custody dispute. Both parties have obtained orders by default, which the other party has subsequently appealed. Both parties continued to escalate their efforts. In 2012, Berezowsky filed a petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The district court held that P had been wrongfully removed from Mexico and ordered his immediate return. The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss. Berezowsky failed to meet her burden of establishing that Mexico was P’s place of habitual residence.View "Berezowsky v. Ojeda" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee William Sloan, a citizen of the United States, and plaintiff-appellant Elaine Murphy, a citizen of Ireland, were married in California in 2000. They lived together in Mill Valley, California, and had a daughter, E.S., in 2005. In October 2009, the couple separated, with Sloan moving to a different bedroom in their house. In 2010, Murphy and Sloan enrolled E.S. in a private California preschool for the next fall. But plans changed in the spring after Murphy proposed moving to Ireland so that she (Murphy) could go back to school. Murphy and Sloan discussed the move to Ireland as a "trial period," and Sloan wrote to both the private preschool and the public school district to inform them of E.S.'s move and the temporary nature of the plan. Visitation between the parents worked for several years until Murphy took E.S. with her on a trip to visit Murphy's boyfriend in Asia. Sloan lost contact with Murphy during that time. On a regularly scheduled visit to E.S. in Ireland, Sloan grew concerned about E.S.'s absences from school when Murphy announced she would again be going to Asia with Murphy's boyfriend. Sloan took E.S. with him to the United States when he left Ireland. Murphy and Sloan agreed that Sloan told Murphy that he did not intend to return E.S. to Ireland, to which Murphy responded that if E.S. was going to live in the United States, Murphy would return to Mill Valley. Murphy took no action to compel E.S.'s return to Ireland for nearly three months, until September 2013, when she filed the action that led to this appeal. E.S. began third grade in Mill Valley in August 2013. In October 2013, the Superior Court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage, but left pending the state court action for purposes of issuing further orders regarding child custody, child support and spousal support. Murphy brought suit under the Hague Convention to compel E.S.'s return to Ireland, contending that Ireland was E.S.'s "habitual residence." The district court denied Murphy's petition after considering Murphy and Sloan's sworn declarations, testimony and documents presented at an evidentiary hearing and depositions of Murphy's boyfriend and an expert witness. It determined that the spring of 2010 was the last time that Sloan and Murphy had a shared, settled intent, which was that E.S. reside in California. The court concluded that "E.S. was, at the time of the alleged wrongful retention, and now remains, a habitual resident of the United States." The issue this case presented for the Ninth Circuit's review explored the significance of a "trial period" of residence on a child's "habitual residence" under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Murphy sought the return of E.S. to Ireland. After review, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court that E.S. was a habitual resident of the United States; "E.S.'s attachments to Ireland 'did not shift the locus of [E.S.'s] development[,] and . . . any acclimatization did not overcome the absence of a shared settled intention by the parents to abandon the United States as a habitual residence.'" View "Murphy v. Sloan" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Italian citizen, sought the return of his two sons from the United States from their Italian citizen mother under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, T.A.S. No. 11, 670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, as implemented in the United States by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. 11601-10. The court affirmed the district court's holding that returning the children would pose a grave risk of harm under Article 13(b) to one of the sons, who has severe autism, and that separating the siblings would pose a grave risk of harm to both of them. The court held, however, that the district court's decision to deny the petition without prejudice to renewal was error and amended the judgment to deny the petition with prejudice. View "Ermini v. Vittori" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C. 11607(b)(3), against defendant for the return of their child. The parties settled and plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys' fees and necessary expenses. The court found that the settlement order was sufficient to create a duty on the district court to order an award of necessary fees and expenses under section 11607(b)(3)'s fee-shifting provision. The court concluded that the district court functioned within its broad discretionary powers in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing and deferred to the district court's determination that $39,079.13 was a reasonable award for the necessary expenses incurred by plaintiff in obtaining the return of her child. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Salazar v. Maimon" on Justia Law

Three children who are natives of Mexico appealed the district court's finding under the Hague Convention of the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-11, that they were being wrongfully retained in the United States and should be returned to their mother. While the appeal was pending, USCIS granted the children asylum. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the children, who are not parties, have standing to appeal where their well-being was at stake. On the merits, the court concluded that no jurisdictional defect arose from the fact that the director of child and family services was not the actual physical custodian of the children; the absence of ORR as a party was not a meaningful defect; and the Hague Convention was a proper mechanism for the recovery of the children. Accordingly, the district court did not lack jurisdiction to enter the order that the children be returned to their mother. Because the children's fundamental interests are at stake in the district court proceedings and no respondent is making an effort to represent those interests, the court remanded to the district court to appoint the children a guardian ad litem. The district court did not clearly err by failing to account for the mostly retrospective harm allegedly suffered by the children, or the conclusions of the psychologist, which were based on the children's belief that the same conditions would be present upon their return. Finally, the court concluded that an asylum grant did not remove from the district court authority to make controlling findings on the potential harm to the child. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Sanchez v. R.G.L." on Justia Law

Mary, who has both U.S. and Irish citizenship, attended college in Ireland.She and Derek lived together in Ireland for 11 years, but never married. Their son was born in Illinois. The three returned to Ireland 11 days later. A few months later Mary and the baby moved to Illinois against Derek’s wishes. As an unmarried father, Derek had no standing under Irish law to resort to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, which requires return of children to their country of habitual residence if they are “wrongfully removed to or retained in” another country in breach of the custody rights of the left-behind parent. After 3-1/2 years, an Irish court granted Derek guardianship and joint custody. Mary was in Ireland with the baby for the final hearing. The court allowed her to temporarily return to Illinois. Eight months later Derek filed a Hague Convention petition in Illinois. The district court ordered the child returned to Ireland. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court incorrectly treated the parents’ last shared intent as a test for determining habitual residence. Under the Hague Convention, that determination is a practical, flexible, factual inquiry. When Mary moved with the baby to Illinois she was his sole legal custodian and removal was not wrongful under the Convention. By the time of the alleged wrongful “retention,” his life was too firmly rooted in Illinois to consider Ireland his home.View "Redmond v. Redmond" on Justia Law

Respondent, the mother, appealed the district court's grant of petitioner's, the father, petition for the return of his daughter from New York to New Zealand under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 90, and its implementing legislation, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. 11601 et seq. The court held that New Zealand was the daughter's habitual residence immediately prior to her removal to New York; petitioner had some custody rights to the daughter and did not consent to the mother taking her to New York indefinitely; the daughter had not "acclimated" to life in New York such that it was the equivalent of a new habitual residence; and the district court should determine, in the first instance, whether to order respondent to pay petitioner the costs associated with bringing this action in the district court and on appeal. View "Hollis v. O'Driscoll" on Justia Law

Respondent appealed the district court's grant of her husband's petition for repatriation of their son from New York to Singapore. At issue was whether respondent's affirmative defenses to repatriation should have prevailed in the district court. The court concluded that, under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, T.I.A.S. No. 11, 670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, and its implementing statute, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. 11601-10, the evidence did not establish that the child faced a grave risk of physical or psychological harm upon repatriation (Article 13 defense). The court also held that it was not inclined to conclude that the presence of a Syariah Court in a foreign state whose accession to the Convention had been recognized by the United States was per se violative of all notions of due process; the court was also mindful of the need for comity; and, therefore, the district court did not err in rejecting respondent's Article 20 defense. Respondent's remaining arguments were without merit and the court affirmed the judgment.View "Souratgar v. Fair" on Justia Law

Mr. Chafin appealed the district court's grant of Ms. Chafin's petition for wrongful removal under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Abduction, T.I.A.S. No. 11670. The district court found that the child's country of habitual residence was Scotland and that Mr. Chafin failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that returning the child to Scotland would expose her to grave risk of harm. The court affirmed, concluding that Mr. Chafin had not demonstrated that the district court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous and that the district court correctly applied the law to the facts. View "Chafin v. Chafin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, the father, initiated this action under the Hague Convention and the International Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C. 11601 et seq., alleging that respondent, the mother, had wrongfully removed the child from Italy. The district court held that the father had not established that the child's habitual residence was Italy and denied the father's petition for return of the child. The court found no clear error in the district court's finding regarding the parents' shared intent that the child would reside in New York; the parents never shared an intent for their child to abandon his prior habitual residence in the United States; and the father waived any arguments with respect to "acclimation." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment dismissing the petition.View "Guzzo v. Cristofano" on Justia Law