Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, an American citizen and national, was convicted of homicide and injuries in Mexico. Pursuant to the Treaty on Execution of Penal Sentences, petitioner was transferred from Mexico to the United States. At issue is the USPC's contest of the court's jurisdiction and petitioner's assertion that the USPC’s determination of his release date was substantively unreasonable, in light of his claim that it failed to account for the abuse he suffered while imprisoned in Mexico. Because petitioner challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence based on the USPC’s refusal to vary downward, the court concluded that it has jurisdiction to review his claim. On the merits, the court concluded that petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of reasonableness for his within-Guidelines sentence of 204 months in prison. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Gomez v. USPC" on Justia Law

Cruz was to host a party in his village in Oaxaca, Mexico on New Year’s Day 2006. He went to the municipal hall to deliver invitations, where a man approached and shot him and a bystander. Both men died. The murderer fled the scene. Cruz’s family accused Martinez, then a U.S. permanent resident (a citizen since 2010) whose family lived in the village. Cruz’s widow and parents met with Martinez’s wife and brother before a town clerk and signed an agreement stating that Martinez had “committed the homicide” and that “the family of the perpetrator” would pay 50,000 pesos for “the expenses incurred,” so that “the matter shall be closed.” Days later, two eyewitnesses made sworn statements identifying Martinez as the murderer. An Oaxacan judge issued an arrest warrant. Martinez returned to Tennessee. In 2009, an American consular official asked about the status of Martinez’s arrest warrant. The Oaxacan court responded that it was “still pending and executable.” In 2012, the Mexican government filed a diplomatic note with the State Department, requesting his “provisional arrest” pursuant to the extradition treaty between the two nations. U.S. authorities arrested Martinez about a year later; Mexican officials filed a formal extradition request in 2013. Complying with the procedures identified in 18 U.S.C. 3184-3186, the Secretary of State filed the request with a federal magistrate judge, who certified that Martinez could be extradited. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of Martinez’s habeas corpus action. The extradition will not violate the statute of limitations or his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. View "Cruz-Martinez v. United States" on Justia Law

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), makes it a crime to invest income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity in an enterprise “which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,” 18 U.S.C. 1962(a); to acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, 1962(b); to conduct an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, 1962(c); and to conspire to violate any of the other three prohibitions, 1962(d). Section 1964(c) creates a private right of action. The European Community and 26 member states filed a RICO civil suit, alleging that RJR participated in a global money-laundering scheme in association with organized crime groups, under which drug traffickers smuggled narcotics into Europe and sold them for euros that—through black-market money brokers, cigarette importers, and wholesalers—were used to pay for large shipments of RJR cigarettes into Europe. The Second Circuit reversed dismissal of the claims, concluding that RICO permits recovery for a foreign injury caused by the violation of a predicate statute that applies extraterritorially. The Supreme Court reversed, first noting the presumption against extraterritoriality. While allegations under Sections 1962 (b) and (c) do not involve an impermissibly extraterritorial application of RICO, Section 1964(c), creating private remedies, does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. Allowing recovery for foreign injuries in a civil RICO action could create a danger of international friction that militates against recognizing foreign-injury claims without clear direction from Congress that is not present in Section 1964(c). View "RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for the murder of Special Agent James Terry Watson. Agent Watson - as an Assistant Attaché for the United States Mission in Colombia - was an internationally protected person (an IPP). Defendant, a citizen of Colombia, pleaded guilty to offenses of kidnapping conspiracy and murder of an IPP. Defendant argued that his prosecution in this country for offenses committed in Colombia contravened the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Applying the arbitrary-or-unfair framework, the court concluded that defendant's prosecution in this country was not fundamentally unfair where kidnapping and murder are "self-evidently criminal." Furthermore, the IPP convention alone gave defendant notice sufficient to satisfy due process. The court rejected defendant's contention that because the United States Code provisions implementing the IPP Convention require knowledge of the victim’s IPP status that Bello did not possess, those provisions cannot have put him on notice that he was subject to prosecution in this country. Accordingly, there is no merit to defendant’s mens rea contention - nor his broader claim that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause precluded his prosecution in this country - and the court must uphold his kidnapping conspiracy and murder convictions. View "United States v. Bello Murillo" on Justia Law

Bašić, a Balkan native, came to the U.S. in 1994 as a refugee to escape the civil war that was tearing Yugoslavia apart. She settled in Kentucky and became a naturalized citizen. She is now accused in Bosnia, one of Yugoslavia’s successor states, of crimes committed against ethnic Serbs during the war while Bašić was a member of the Croatian army. Bosnia asked the U.S. to extradite Bašić for trial. The Department of State filed a Complaint for Extradition in 2011. A Magistrate Judge certified the complaint, concluding that Bašić was extraditable under a 1902 treaty between the U.S. and the Kingdom of Serbia, 32 Stat. 1890. Direct appeal is not available in extradition proceedings, so Bašić filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial, rejecting arguments that the Treaty prohibits extradition of U.S. citizens to Bosnia and that the Bosnian government failed to produce a warrant for Bašić’s arrest as required by the Treaty. View "Bašic v. Steck" on Justia Law

The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) makes it a crime for certain sex offenders to “knowingly fai[l] to register or update a registration,” 18 U.S.C. 2250(a)(3), and requires that offenders who move to a different state “shall, not later than 3 business days after each change of name, residence, employment, or student status,” inform, in person, at least one "jurisdiction involved" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 16913(a) of all changes to required information. Section 16913(a) refers to “each jurisdiction where the offender resides, . . . is an employee, and . . . is a student.” Nichols, a registered sex offender, moved from Kansas to the Philippines without updating his registration, was arrested, and returned to the U.S. The Tenth Circuit affirmed his SORNA conviction, holding that Kansas, remained a SORNA “jurisdiction involved.” The Supreme Court reversed. Section16913(a) uses the present tense. Nichols once resided in Kansas; after moving, he “resides” in the Philippines. The Philippines is not a SORNA “jurisdiction.” Nichols could not have appeared in person in Kansas “after” leaving the state. SORNA’s drafters could have required sex offenders to deregister in their departure jurisdiction before leaving the country had that been their intent. The Court noted that recent federal legislation, with existing registration requirements, offer reassurance that sex offenders will not be able to escape punishment for leaving the country without notifying their departure jurisdictions. View "Nichols v. United States" on Justia Law

The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) makes it a crime for certain sex offenders to “knowingly fai[l] to register or update a registration,” 18 U.S.C. 2250(a)(3), and requires that offenders who move to a different state “shall, not later than 3 business days after each change of name, residence, employment, or student status,” inform, in person, at least one "jurisdiction involved" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 16913(a) of all changes to required information. Section 16913(a) refers to “each jurisdiction where the offender resides, . . . is an employee, and . . . is a student.” Nichols, a registered sex offender, moved from Kansas to the Philippines without updating his registration, was arrested, and returned to the U.S. The Tenth Circuit affirmed his SORNA conviction, holding that Kansas, remained a SORNA “jurisdiction involved.” The Supreme Court reversed. Section16913(a) uses the present tense. Nichols once resided in Kansas; after moving, he “resides” in the Philippines. The Philippines is not a SORNA “jurisdiction.” Nichols could not have appeared in person in Kansas “after” leaving the state. SORNA’s drafters could have required sex offenders to deregister in their departure jurisdiction before leaving the country had that been their intent. The Court noted that recent federal legislation, with existing registration requirements, offer reassurance that sex offenders will not be able to escape punishment for leaving the country without notifying their departure jurisdictions. View "Nichols v. United States" on Justia Law

The United States delivered a criminal summons to the office of Sinovel Wind (USA) in Texas in order to serve process on Sinovel Wind Group, a Chinese corporation and the owner of 100% of the shares of Sinovel (USA), which had been indicted for criminal copyright infringement, wire fraud and trade secret theft. The charges arose from Sinovel’s alleged scheme to steal computer source code from American Superconductor for use to assist in operating Sinovel’s wind turbines. Sinovel contested jurisdiction and moved to quash service. Concluding that Sinovel USA was the alter ego of Sinovel and that service on Sinovel USA was proper, the district court denied Sinovel’s motion. The Seventh Circuit concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear Sinovel’s appeal and that the case did not meet the high standards for issuance of a writ of mandamus. The court rejected arguments that U.S. criminal proceedings against Sinoval could interfere “with ongoing civil litigation in Chinese courts” over the same dispute and that this was an exceptional case in which the importance of the particular value at stake is sufficiently great that an immediate appeal must be allowed to protect that value. View "Sinovel Wind Grp. Co., Ltd v. Crabb" on Justia Law

Two men died in a 2005 shooting in Oaxaca, Mexico. Petitioner, a legal permanent resident of the U.S., where he had lived for more than 15 years was the shooter. Petitioner frequently traveled to Mexico, where his wife and children lived.The town clerk held a meeting. Petitioner’s family and a victim's family signed an agreement, drafted by the court, identifying Petitioner as the person “who committed the homicide” and providing that his family would pay 50,000 pesos to the victim's family. Petitioner’s wife understood “the agreement resolved the case," because the family of the other victim, “never claimed that Avelino committed any crime.” Unbeknownst to Petitioner, a cousin who was not a party to the agreement reported the homicide to the attorney general. Oaxacan authorities issued a warrant on charges of homicide with “unfair advantage." Meanwhile, Petitioner returned to the U.S., and lived openly under his own name. The Mexican government made no effort to locate him or to obtain extradition. In 2012, Mexico cited the “urgency” clause of the extradition treaty to request his arrest. Petitioner, who had obtained citizenship in 2010, was working to obtain permanent resident status for his family. He made several trips to Mexico to meet consular officials. Neither Mexican nor U.S. authorities detained him or informed him of the warrant. Petitioner was arrested in 2013, and certified as extraditable. He unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus, challenging certification of extraditability. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the treaty incorporates the Speedy Trial Clause. View "Martinez v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant, while in Venezuela, was convicted in absentia in Colombia of drug manufacturing and trafficking. Defendant was later extradited from Venezuela to Colombia and then the United States later transmitted a formal request to Colombia for the arrest and extradition of defendant to face the charge of conspiracy to manufacture and import five kilograms or more of cocaine into the United States. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to the conspiracy count and was sentenced to 648 months imprisonment, as well as fined $1 million. Defendant, currently 46 years old, challenged his sentence on the ground that it violates the United States government’s assurance that “a sentence of life imprisonment will not be sought or imposed” because the sentence exceeds defendant's life expectancy. The court concluded that any individual right that defendant may have under the terms of his extradition is only derivative through the state. Therefore, defendant would only have prudential standing to raise the claim that his sentence violated the terms of his extradition if Colombia first makes an official protest. Because defendant lacked prudential standing in this case, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Suarez" on Justia Law