Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) makes it a crime for certain sex offenders to “knowingly fai[l] to register or update a registration,” 18 U.S.C. 2250(a)(3), and requires that offenders who move to a different state “shall, not later than 3 business days after each change of name, residence, employment, or student status,” inform, in person, at least one "jurisdiction involved" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 16913(a) of all changes to required information. Section 16913(a) refers to “each jurisdiction where the offender resides, . . . is an employee, and . . . is a student.” Nichols, a registered sex offender, moved from Kansas to the Philippines without updating his registration, was arrested, and returned to the U.S. The Tenth Circuit affirmed his SORNA conviction, holding that Kansas, remained a SORNA “jurisdiction involved.” The Supreme Court reversed. Section16913(a) uses the present tense. Nichols once resided in Kansas; after moving, he “resides” in the Philippines. The Philippines is not a SORNA “jurisdiction.” Nichols could not have appeared in person in Kansas “after” leaving the state. SORNA’s drafters could have required sex offenders to deregister in their departure jurisdiction before leaving the country had that been their intent. The Court noted that recent federal legislation, with existing registration requirements, offer reassurance that sex offenders will not be able to escape punishment for leaving the country without notifying their departure jurisdictions. View "Nichols v. United States" on Justia Law

The United States delivered a criminal summons to the office of Sinovel Wind (USA) in Texas in order to serve process on Sinovel Wind Group, a Chinese corporation and the owner of 100% of the shares of Sinovel (USA), which had been indicted for criminal copyright infringement, wire fraud and trade secret theft. The charges arose from Sinovel’s alleged scheme to steal computer source code from American Superconductor for use to assist in operating Sinovel’s wind turbines. Sinovel contested jurisdiction and moved to quash service. Concluding that Sinovel USA was the alter ego of Sinovel and that service on Sinovel USA was proper, the district court denied Sinovel’s motion. The Seventh Circuit concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear Sinovel’s appeal and that the case did not meet the high standards for issuance of a writ of mandamus. The court rejected arguments that U.S. criminal proceedings against Sinoval could interfere “with ongoing civil litigation in Chinese courts” over the same dispute and that this was an exceptional case in which the importance of the particular value at stake is sufficiently great that an immediate appeal must be allowed to protect that value. View "Sinovel Wind Grp. Co., Ltd v. Crabb" on Justia Law

Two men died in a 2005 shooting in Oaxaca, Mexico. Petitioner, a legal permanent resident of the U.S., where he had lived for more than 15 years was the shooter. Petitioner frequently traveled to Mexico, where his wife and children lived.The town clerk held a meeting. Petitioner’s family and a victim's family signed an agreement, drafted by the court, identifying Petitioner as the person “who committed the homicide” and providing that his family would pay 50,000 pesos to the victim's family. Petitioner’s wife understood “the agreement resolved the case," because the family of the other victim, “never claimed that Avelino committed any crime.” Unbeknownst to Petitioner, a cousin who was not a party to the agreement reported the homicide to the attorney general. Oaxacan authorities issued a warrant on charges of homicide with “unfair advantage." Meanwhile, Petitioner returned to the U.S., and lived openly under his own name. The Mexican government made no effort to locate him or to obtain extradition. In 2012, Mexico cited the “urgency” clause of the extradition treaty to request his arrest. Petitioner, who had obtained citizenship in 2010, was working to obtain permanent resident status for his family. He made several trips to Mexico to meet consular officials. Neither Mexican nor U.S. authorities detained him or informed him of the warrant. Petitioner was arrested in 2013, and certified as extraditable. He unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus, challenging certification of extraditability. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the treaty incorporates the Speedy Trial Clause. View "Martinez v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant, while in Venezuela, was convicted in absentia in Colombia of drug manufacturing and trafficking. Defendant was later extradited from Venezuela to Colombia and then the United States later transmitted a formal request to Colombia for the arrest and extradition of defendant to face the charge of conspiracy to manufacture and import five kilograms or more of cocaine into the United States. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to the conspiracy count and was sentenced to 648 months imprisonment, as well as fined $1 million. Defendant, currently 46 years old, challenged his sentence on the ground that it violates the United States government’s assurance that “a sentence of life imprisonment will not be sought or imposed” because the sentence exceeds defendant's life expectancy. The court concluded that any individual right that defendant may have under the terms of his extradition is only derivative through the state. Therefore, defendant would only have prudential standing to raise the claim that his sentence violated the terms of his extradition if Colombia first makes an official protest. Because defendant lacked prudential standing in this case, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Suarez" on Justia Law

Iraq native al-Maliki became a United States citizen, but visited his children, ages 12 and three, in Syria. He was charged under 18 U.S.C. 2423(c) and (e), which at the time, punished any U.S. citizen who traveled in foreign commerce, and engaged in any illicit sexual conduct, which included noncommercial sexual acts with a minor, or any attempts to do the same. Al-Maliki denied all of the charges, and a trial began. A court-ordered psychological evaluation, deemed al-Maliki “manipulative and dishonest” and assessed his “risk for future sexual acting out” as “moderate to high.” He was convicted. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, characterizing his challenge to the statute as exceeding Congress’s authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause, a “close call.” The court applied plain error review and found the law not “obviously” unconstitutional. View "United States v. al-Maliki" on Justia Law

Omar was charged with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, 18 U.S.C. 2339A(a); providing material support to terrorists; conspiracy to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1); providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization; and conspiracy to murder, kidnap, and maim persons outside of the United States, 18 U.S.C. 956(a)(1). Omar moved to suppress any identification evidence. A magistrate judge held a hearing and recommended that Omar’s motion be granted, finding that the pre-trial identification technique used three witnesses was impermissibly suggestive because it amounted to a single-photograph identification and that repeated displays of Omar’s picture “served to dispel any hesitation the witnesses may have had in their original identification[s].” The district court rejected the recommendation and denied Omar’s motion, stating these witnesses “were sufficiently familiar with the Defendant to provide an accurate identification.” The court also denied a motion for disclosure or suppression of evidence obtained from electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.1801. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction, upholding admission of testimony by a government terrorism expert concerning global jihad and the court's evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Omar" on Justia Law

Nathan Stoliar was convicted and sentenced for crimes related to fraudulent schemes involving the false generation of renewable fuel credits under United States law, false representations regarding the type of fuel being sold, and the export of biodiesel without retiring or purchasing renewable energy credits adequate to cover the exported amount as required under United States law. Canada filed a petition for restitution from Soliar but the district court denied the order. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus filed pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3771. Because a petitioner seeking restitution under the CVRA must also rely on a substantive restitution statute, Canada sought restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1). The court concluded that Canada's claim for restitution is based on events that are insufficiently related to the schemes set forth in the indictment and the facts supporting Stoliar's guilty plea. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada v. U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada" on Justia Law

The South Korean government seeks to prosecute petitioner for murder and requests that he be extradited from the United States. Petitioner had served a prison term in South Korea after being convicted of destroying evidence in connection with the murder. A magistrate judge certified the extradition and petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the certification order. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the petition where the lapse-of-time provision in the 1998 extradition treaty between the United States and South Korea did not impose a mandatory bar on petitioner's extradition. Further, the double-jeopardy provision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) governing American military personnel and their dependents in South Korea does not provide a basis for a court to bar petitioner's extradition where the individual rights established through the SOFA are not judicially enforceable. The court's decision does not foreclose petitioner from seeking relief from the Secretary of State. View "Patterson v. Wagner" on Justia Law

From 1987 to 2001, Bengis and Noll engaged in a scheme to harvest large quantities of South Coast and West Coast rock lobsters from South African waters for export to the United States in violation of both South African and U.S. law. Defendants, through their company, Hout Bay, harvested rock lobsters in amounts that exceeded the South African Department of Marine and Coastal Management’s quotas. In 2001, South Africa seized a container of unlawfully harvested lobsters, declined to prosecute the individuals, but charged Hout Bay with overfishing. Bengis pleaded guilty on behalf of Hout Bay. South Africa cooperated with a parallel investigation conducted by the United States. The two pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit smuggling and violate the Lacey Act, which prohibits trade in illegally taken fish and wildlife, and to substantive violations of the Lacey Act. Bengis pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act. The district court entered a restitution order requiring the defendants to pay $22,446,720 to South Africa. The Second Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the extent of Bengis’s liability, rejecting an argument the restitution order violated their Sixth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Bengis" on Justia Law

The issues this appeal presented for the Eleventh Circuit's review stemmed from defendant-appellant Mark Alexander’s conviction for conspiring to sell cutting machines to companies in Iran, in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the federal conspiracy statute. Alexander was the chief executive officer and part-owner of Hyrdajet Technology, LLC, a company based in Dalton, Georgia, that manufactured waterjet cutting systems. In 2007, Hydrajet Technology shipped two waterjet cutting machines to Hydrajet Mena in Dubai, where the machines then were shipped companies in Tehran. The jury convicted Alexander on the sole count of the indictment. The district court sentenced Alexander to a term of imprisonment of 18 months, followed by a period of supervised release of three years. Alexander argued on appeal: (1) that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to permit a deposition of one of Alexander’s codefendants, a fugitive residing in Iran; (2) that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Alexander’s motion for a mistrial after a juror stated that her car had been impeded temporarily by unknown persons in the parking lot adjacent to the courthouse; and (3) that the district court erred when it addressed the jury on legal issues that arose during the trial. The Eleventh Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law