Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

You, a U.S. citizen of Chinese origin, worked as a chemist, testing the chemical coatings used in Coca-Cola’s beverage cans. You was one of only a few Coca-Cola employees with access to secret BPA-free formulas. You secretly planned to start a company in China to manufacture the BPA-free chemical and received business grants from the Chinese government, claiming that she had developed the world’s “most advanced” BPA-free coating technology. On her last night as a Coca-Cola employee, You transferred the formula files to her Google Drive account and then to a USB drive. You certified that she had not kept any confidential information. You then joined Eastman, where she copied company files to the same account and USB drive. Eastman fired You and became aware of her actions. Eastman retrieved the USB drive and reported You to the FBI.You was convicted of conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets, 18 U.S.C. 1832(a)(5), possessing stolen trade secrets, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit economic espionage, and economic espionage. The Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing after rejecting You’s claims that the district court admitted racist testimony and gave jury instructions that mischaracterized the government’s burden of proof as to You’s knowledge of the trade secrets and their value to China. In calculating the intended loss, the court clearly erred by relying on market estimates that it deemed speculative and by confusing anticipated sales of You’s planned business with its anticipated profits. View "United States v. You" on Justia Law

Smagin won a multimillion-dollar arbitration award against Yegiazaryan stemming from the misappropriation of funds in Moscow. Because Yegiazaryan lives in California, Smagin, who lives in Russia, filed suit to enforce the award in California under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The district court froze Yegiazaryan’s California assets before entering judgment. While the action was ongoing, Yegiazaryan himself obtained an unrelated multimillion-dollar arbitration award and sought to avoid the asset freeze by concealing the funds.Smagin filed a civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964(c), alleging Yegiazaryan and others worked together to frustrate Smagin’s collection on the judgment through a pattern of RICO predicate racketeering acts, including wire fraud, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Smagin failed to plead a “domestic injury.”The Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court disagreed. The “domestic-injury” requirement for private civil RICO suits is context-specific and turns largely on the facts alleged; it does not mean that foreign plaintiffs may not sue under RICO. The circumstances surrounding Smagin’s injury indicate that the injury arose in the United States. Smagin’s alleged injury is his inability to collect his judgment. Much of the alleged racketeering activity that caused that injury occurred in the United States. While some of Yegiazaryan’s actions to avoid collection occurred abroad, the scheme was directed toward frustrating the California judgment. The injurious effects of the racketeering activity largely manifested in California and undercut the orders of the California court. The Court rejected arguments that fraud is typically deemed felt at the plaintiff’s residence and that intangible property is generally located at the owner’s domicile as not necessarily supporting the presumption against extraterritoriality, with its distinctive concerns for comity and discerning congressional meaning. View "Yegiazaryan v. Smagin" on Justia Law

While living in Japan, Defendant sexually abused a young girl. The government brought charges under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. The government’s theory was that Defendant was employed by the Armed Forces because he worked for a Department of Veterans Affairs subcontractor. Or, the government argued, he was accompanying a member of the Armed Forces because he lived with his wife, who worked at the Kadena Air Base in Japan. Defendant pleaded guilty to two charges in exchange for the government’s dropping the rest. As part of the deal, he also agreed to waive any right to appeal. The district court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Defendant to 420 months imprisonment. But, despite his waiver, Defendant appealed.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court explained that Defendant attempted to get around his appeal waiver by arguing that jurisdiction cannot be waived, and thus he has every right to proceed. The court reasoned that Defendant confuses a crime’s jurisdictional element with federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction. Here, Defendant is not challenging the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. He’s challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on his crimes’ jurisdictional element. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge falls under his appeal waiver, and thus the court dismissed his appeal. View "US v. Emilio Moran" on Justia Law

Defendant a citizen and resident of New Zealand, carried on an online relationship with a thirteen-year-old girl in Virginia that involved several sexually explicit video calls. A federal grand jury charged him with nine counts of producing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a). He entered a conditional guilty plea to one of the counts and was sentenced to twenty-one years in prison. Defendant challenged both his conviction and sentence on appeal. He first argued that his conviction involves an impermissible extraterritorial application of Section 2251(a) because he was in New Zealand when the unlawful images and videos were produced. Second, he contends that his conviction violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause because he lacked adequate notice that the victim was underage. Third, and finally, he challenges his sentence on the grounds that the district court improperly applied a two-level enhancement for offenses involving “sexual contact.”   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Defendant’s conviction stands as a permissible domestic application of Section 2251(a) because the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in Virginia, where the visual depiction that forms the basis of Defendant’s conviction was produced and transmitted. Further, the court held that although Defendant argued otherwise, the fact that a violation of Section 2251(a) carries a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence does not give him a due process right to a reasonable-mistake-of-age defense. Finally, the court held that because Defendant admitted to masturbating during the video calls,it was appropriate for the sentencing court to apply the two-level enhancement. View "US v. Troy Skinner" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a former Guantanamo Bay detainee. He asked the DC Circuit to vacate his convictions for war crimes—including providing material support to terrorism and murder of a United States soldier in violation of the law of war—based on the alleged constitutional and statutory infirmities of those convictions.   The DC Circuit dismissed the petition because Petitioner waived his right to appellate review by the DC Circuit. The court explained that a defendant cannot challenge a plea based on an alleged error of law that was raised, rejected and then waived pursuant to the plea. Here, Petitioner, aware that the military judge had rejected his theories, nonetheless chose to plead guilty and expressly waive his right to appeal those erroneous (in his view) rulings. He cannot now have the merits of his waived claims reviewed on appeal by arguing his waiver was invalid because those claims were wrongly decided. Indeed, the basic principle behind an appeal waiver is that the defendant gives up his right to have an appellate court review the merits of his arguments in exchange for valuable consideration. View "Omar Khadr v. United States" on Justia Law

Halkbank is owned by the Republic of Turkey. The United States indicted Halkbank for conspiracy to evade economic sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran by laundering Iranian oil and gas proceeds and making false statements to the Treasury Department. Two individuals, including a former Halkbank executive, have been convicted for their roles in the conspiracy. The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of Halkbank’s motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court held that the district court has jurisdiction under the general federal criminal jurisdiction statute, 18 U.S.C. 3231; the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330 does not provide immunity.Section 3231’s text encompasses the charged offenses; the Court declined to limit the broad jurisdictional grant to exclude suits against foreign states and their instrumentalities “simply because" unrelated U.S. Code provisions "happen to expressly reference foreign states and instrumentalities.”FSIA's text exclusively addresses civil suits against foreign states and their instrumentalities. Although most litigation involving foreign states and their instrumentalities at the time of the FSIA’s 1976 enactment was civil, the Executive Branch occasionally attempted to subject foreign-government-owned entities to federal criminal investigations. Given that history, it is unlikely that Congress sought to codify foreign sovereign immunity from criminal proceedings without mentioning such proceedings. Congress housed FSIA within Title 28, which mostly concerns civil procedure, not in Title 18, which addresses crimes and criminal procedure. Under Halkbank’s view, a commercial business that is owned by a foreign state could engage in criminal conduct affecting U.S. citizens and threatening U.S. national security while facing no criminal accountability in U.S. courts. The Court rejected various arguments that U.S. criminal proceedings against instrumentalities of foreign states would negatively affect national security and foreign policy. The Court remanded for consideration of arguments regarding common-law immunity. View "Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant challenged the basis of his detention at U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay. Detained in 2004, Mr. al-Hela filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 2005 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2241. The district court denied Appellant’s petition. On appeal, he argued that the length of his detention without trial violated the Due Process Clause. He also argued that the District Court’s procedural decisions and evidentiary rulings deprived him of his right under the Suspension Clause to meaningful review of, and a meaningful opportunity to challenge, the basis for his detention, as well as his rights under the Due Process Clause.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it rejects Appellant’s claim that his procedural due process rights were violated. The court held that it need not decide whether due process protections apply to Guantanamo detainees because even assuming the Due Process Clause applies, the court found that the procedures employed by the district court to adjudicate Appellant’s habeas petition satisfy procedural due process. The court further rejected Appellant’s claims that his detention violates substantive due process because there is insufficient evidence that he was an enemy combatant or solely because of the lengthy duration of the military conflict. The court concluded that even assuming the Due Process Clause applies to Appellant, these claims fail on the merits. The court remanded as to Appellant’s claim that his continued detention violates substantive due process because he no longer poses a significant threat to the United States. View "Abdulsalam Ali Al-Hela v. Joseph Biden (REISSUED)" on Justia Law

Peru sought to extradite former Peruvian president Alejandro Toledo Manrique (“Toledo”) to face criminal charges for allegedly accepting millions of dollars in bribes during his presidency. Peruvian prosecutors accused Toledo of money laundering and collusion in two Prosecutor’s Decisions, documents that summarize the ongoing investigation, and in an Acusación Fiscal, a document produced at the end of an investigation that lays out the crimes allegedly committed and supporting evidence. The Peruvian government presented initial and supplemental extradition requests to the United States, and following the usual procedures for extradition, a federal prosecutor filed a criminal complaint against Toledo. A United States magistrate judge certified the extradition to the State Department. Toledo petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus petition, which the district court denied, and Toledo appealed.   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s motion to stay his extradition proceeding. The panel weighed the four factors that guide consideration of whether to issue a stay. First, irreparable injury is obvious. Once extradited, Toledo’s appeal will be moot. Second, Toledo has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits on any of his three arguments. The panel wrote that the third and fourth factors— whether the issuance of a stay would substantially injure the other parties and the public interest—merge when the Government is the opposing party. The panel reaffirmed that the public interest will be served by the United States complying with a valid extradition application because proper compliance promotes relations between the two countries and enhances efforts to establish an international rule of law and order. View "ALEJANDRO MANRIQUE V. MARK KOLC" on Justia Law

According to the indictment, Defendant, a citizen of Switzerland and a partner in a Swiss wealth-management firm, and co-Defendant, a citizen of Portugal and Switzerland and an employee of a different Swiss wealth-management firm (together, “Defendants”), engaged in an international bribery scheme wherein U.S.-based businesses paid bribes to Venezuelan officials for priority payment of invoices and other favorable treatment from Venezuela’s state-owned energy company. A grand jury returned a nineteen-count indictment charging Defendants with various offenses stemming from their alleged international bribery scheme. The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that the district court’s grant of Defendants’ motions to dismiss was improper because the indictment adequately conforms to minimal constitutional standards. Further, the indictment did not violate co-Defendant’s due process rights. Moreover, the court wrote the district court’s conclusion that Section 3292 failed to toll the statute of limitations is erroneous. The court explained that the totality of the circumstances indicates that a reasonable person in co-Defendant’s position would not have equated the restraint on his freedom of movement with formal arrest. View "USA v. Murta" on Justia Law

This appeal concerns an alleged international bribery scheme between U.S.-based businesses and Venezuelan officials. On Defendants’ motions, the district court dismissed all counts charged against them and suppressed statements made during an interview. The government timely appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. First, the court held that because extraterritoriality concerns the merits of the case, not the court’s power to hear it, the district court erred in concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over these counts. Further, Defendants’ contention that the indictment does not sufficiently allege that they are agents of a domestic concern does not lend itself to the conclusion that the indictment is inherently insufficient. Moreover, the term “agent” is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendants. Additionally, the court wrote that the allegations that Defendants engaged in conduct that occurred in part in the Southern District of Texas satisfy the money-laundering statute’s extraterritorial provision. The district court erred in concluding otherwise. Finally, the environment in which the agents questioned Defendant, wherein his attorney could safeguard against police coercion, does not present the same inherently coercive pressures as the station-house questioning at issue in Miranda. The district court’s order suppressing the statements, then, was erroneous. View "USA v. Murta" on Justia Law