Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

This was an appeal from the denial of the petition of a detainee at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay for a writ of habeas corpus. At issue was whether the district court erred in determining that the detainee was being lawfully detained on the record as it stood before that court and whether the district court's procedural errors deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to develop a record upon which he could challenge his detention. The court rejected the detainee's contention that the district court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous and because those findings were enough to establish that the detainee was "part of the Taliban or al Qaeda," the court rejected his contention that the record before the court was insufficient to establish the lawfulness of his detention. Given the time the detainee's attorneys had after their receipt of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal record, the district court's grant of leave to file an amended traverse, and the absence of any subsequent request for additional time or discovery, the court held that the detainee had failed to show that he was prejudiced by the denial of the thirty-day continuance. The court also held that, in light of the circumstances, there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to issue further discovery orders without a showing that there was a basis for believing that the requests satisfied the Case Management Order's predicate conditions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of the petition. View "Al Alwi, et al. v. Obama, et al." on Justia Law

The United States detained Nazul Gul and Adel Hamad for several years at the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay and during that time, each filed with the district court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Prior to any hearing on the merits of their petitions, the United States transferred the detainees to the custody of foreign sovereigns and did not then rescind their designation as "enemy combatants." Gul and Hamad wanted to continue litigating their habeas petitions but the district court dismissed their petitions as moot because they were no longer held by the United States. Gul and Hamad subsequently appealed, arguing among other things, that their petitions were not moot because they continued to be burdened by the collateral consequences of their prior detention and continuing designation. The court held that, having determined that Gul and Hamad identified no injury sufficient to bring their cases within the court's jurisdiction under Article III, the court affirmed the order of the district court. View "Gul v. Obama, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican national, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a Texas court. Petitioner sought a stay of execution on the ground that his conviction was obtained in violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention), and relied on Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Avena). The Court held that petitioner's argument was foreclosed by Medellin v. Texas, in which the Court held that neither the Avena decision nor the President's Memorandum purporting to implement that decision constituted directly enforceable federal law. The Court declined to stay the execution so that Congress could consider whether to enact legislation implementing the Avena decision where the Due Process Clause did not prevent a State from carrying out a lawful judgment in light of unenacted legislation that might someday authorize a collateral attack on that judgment. The Court also declined the United State's request that the Court stay the execution until January 2012 in support of "future jurisdiction to review the judgment in a proceeding." Accordingly, the applications for stay of execution was denied and petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "Leal Garcia v. Texas" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a successful forfeiture action brought by the United States government pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1595a, which denied appellant's subsequent motion for attorney's fees. The forfeiture action sought to recover the Pissaro work of art entitled "Le Marche" that was reported stolen from the Musee Faure in Aix-les-Bains, France in 1981. At issue was whether the district court erred by refusing to apply the protections afforded by 18 U.S.C. 983 to the government's section 1595a claim and by denying her motion for attorney's fees after two of the government's three forfeiture claims were dismissed at summary judgment. The court held that a forfeiture action brought pursuant to section 1595a was not governed by section 982 and therefore, appellant was not entitled to raise the innocent-owner defense provided by section 983(d) or to take advantage of the heightened proof requirement of section 983(c). Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of forfeiture and since appellant was not a prevailing party within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2465(b)(1), she was not entitled to attorney's fees under the statute. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued defendants alleging claims under the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c),(d), and under various state laws based on allegations that defendants defrauded individuals throughout the United States by devising an investment scheme through which investors could purchase real estate interests in luxury vacation properties in the Dominican Republic. At issue was whether the district court properly severed the 232 plaintiffs, and their claims, and instructed each plaintiff to file his or her complaint in a separate action. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction because the severance order was not final and the collateral order doctrine did not apply to an interlocutory order severing claims.

The defendant, a dual-citizen of the U.S. and Iran and a chemical engineer, marketed a dynamic software program to Iranian actors and agreed to provide Iranian entities with technology for construction of chemical plants, with a goal of converting Iran into a chemical powerhouse. His efforts included contacting President Ahmadinejad to unveil his plan to help Iran, with respect to the United States' "cruel and tyrannical" treatment of the Iranian people. He was convicted on 10 chargesâfour counts stemming from violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), three counts of making false statements, and three counts of bank fraud and sentenced to a four years imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of the IEEPA and Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control regulations. The law meaningfully constrains the President's discretion and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The government proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's operation does not fall within the informational-materials exemption of the Act. The regulations are not unconstitutionally vague.

Defendants, in consolidated appeals, appealed their convictions for violations of 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(1) for attempting to travel by boat from Saipan in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands ("CNMI") to the Territory of Guam by boat. At issue was whether defendants violated section 1325(a)(1) for being aliens who knowingly and willingly attempted to enter the United States at a time and place other than as designated by immigration officers on or about January 5, 2010, a date within Title VII of the Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008's ("CNRA"), 48 U.S.C. 1806-1808, transition period. The court held that defendants did not violate section 1325(a)(1) by attempting to travel by boat from the CNMI to Guam where the CNMI and Guam were parts of the United States and an alien did not enter or attempt to enter the United States for purposes of section 1325(a)(1) when traveling from one part of the United States to another, even if when doing so they passed through international waters.