Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a noncitizen "enemy combatant" undergoing proceedings before a military commission at Guatanamo Bay, sought a declaratory judgment that the commission lacked jurisdiction to hear the charges against him because the alleged acts occurred in Yemen, where he argued no war or hostilities existed in 2000 or 2002. The court held, pursuant to Hamad v. Gates, that Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act, 28 U.S.C. 2241(e), deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit. The court rejected plaintiff’s claims challenging the constitutionality of the Act. View "Al-Nashiri v. MacDonald" on Justia Law

The FBI investigated Alwan, an Iraqi living in Bowling Green, after his fingerprints appeared on an improvised explosive device in Iraq, and introduced Alwan to a confidential source (CHS), who recorded their conversations. CHS convinced Alwan that he was part of a group supporting Jihad. Alwan assisted in sending what he believed to be money and weapons to the Mujahidin several times and eventually asked to lead the fictional terrorist cell. CHS instructed Alwan to recruit others. Hammadi agreed to join, stating that he had participated in IED attacks on American troops and had been arrested, but bribed his way free and fled to Syria. In Syria, he applied for refugee status to immigrate to the U.S. and answered “no” when asked if he had engaged in terrorist activity. Hammadi had moved to Bowling Green on the recommendation of Alwan, whose family he knew from Iraq and whom he had met in Syria. The two transported $100,000 from CHS to a truck, believing that it would find its way to Iraq, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339A. They hid rocket-propelled grenade launchers, machine guns, plastic explosives, and sniper rifles in another truck, for transport to terrorists, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B. They loaded Stinger missiles into another truck and plotted to murder a U.S. Army Captain. Hammadi pleaded guilty to 10 terrorism and two immigration offenses. Rejecting claims of entrapment and sentencing manipulation, the district court imposed a life sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Hammadi would not qualify for a departure under either theory.View "United States v. Hammadi" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for conspiring to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana knowing that it would be unlawfully imported into the United States and conspiring to import 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana. The court held that ongoing, formalized collaboration between an American law enforcement agency and its foreign counterpart did not, by itself, give rise to an "agency" relationship between the two entities sufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment abroad; the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule did not impose a duty upon American law enforcement officials to review the legality, under foreign law, of applications for surveillance authority considered by foreign courts; defendant was not entitled to discovery of the wiretap application materials, submitted by Jamaican law enforcement to courts in that nation, underlying the electronic surveillance abroad; the district court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of the foreign wiretaps and his motion to compel the documentation underlying the foreign wiretap orders; defendant's amended judgment of conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and the district court properly admitted expert testimony at defendant's trial regarding the values and quantities of marijuana generally used by drug traffickers in the course of distribution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Guantanamo detainee, appealed from a judgment of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, appellant argued that the district court erred in not affording him protection due "medical personnel" under the First Geneva Convention. Because appellant had not established that he was "medical personnel" as defined by the Geneva Conventions, and because all other issues have been determined in the previous proceedings, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus.View "Al-Warafi v. Obama" on Justia Law

Phillips was indicted in 2004 on charged that he had travelled to Thailand and knowingly engaged in illicit sexual conduct (18 U.S.C. 2423(f), 2246) with a minor male, not yet 16 years of age, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2423(c), the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act). Phillips pleaded guilty to the single count and was sentenced to 37 months in prison, followed by lifetime supervised release. Phillips was released from prison in 2007, violated several terms of his supervised release, and was sentenced to an additional 30 months. Released from his second incarceration in 2010, he unsuccessfully moved to vacate judgment under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that PROTECT, which punishes “[e]ngaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places,” applied only to individuals who both traveled in foreign commerce and engaged in illicit sexual conduct after its enactment and that his conviction violated the Ex Post Facto clause. The district court found the motion time-barred and procedurally defaulted, noting that the illicit sexual conduct (not the travel) occurred after the enactment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the “actual innocence exception,” to the limitations period should be applied only in case of a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The exception cannot be so broadly defined as to be premised upon changes in statutory interpretation of the term “travels.” View "Phillips v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant, a reputed international arms trafficker was convicted of conspiracy to kill United States nationals; conspiracy to kill United States officers and employees; conspiracy to acquire and export a missile system designed to destroy aircraft; and conspiracy to provide material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization. Defendant raised numerous issues on appeal. The court concluded that, in the absence of actual animus or shocking conduct akin to coercion or a violation of defendant's person, an international sting operation of the kind undertaken in this case did not constitute either vindictive prosecution or outrageous government conduct; government application of "coercive political pressure" on a foreign government to secure a defendant's extradition did not render that defendant's prosecution improper; the district court correctly rejected defendant's claim that his prosecution violated the doctrine of specialty; and the indictment sufficiently charged defendant with conspiracy to murder United States nationals and conspiracy to murder United States officers and employees, notwithstanding that the indictment did not refer explicitly to "murder." Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's conviction and remanded for the limited purpose of correcting a clerical error. View "United States v. Bout" on Justia Law

Wilson Lucom was an American expatriate who wished to bequeath assets worth more than $200 million to a foundation established for impoverished children in Panama. Plaintiff, Lucom's attorney, filed suit against the Arias Group/Arias Family, Lucom's wife and step-children, under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, alleging that the Arias Group participated in a criminal conspiracy to thwart plaintiff through acts of intimidation, extortion, corruption, theft, money laundering, and bribery of foreign officials, so that the Arias Group could steal the Estate assets for themselves. At issue on appeal was RICO's four-year statute of limitations on civil actions and the "separate accrual" rule. Under the rule, the commission of a separable, new predicate act within a 4-year limitations period permitted a plaintiff to recover for the additional damages caused by that act. The court concluded that none of the injuries in plaintiff's complaint were new and independent because all of his alleged injuries were continuations of injuries that have been accumulating since before September 2007. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff had done little more than repackage his 2007 abuse of process complaint. Therefore, plaintiff's civil RICO complaint was untimely, and the district court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of the Arias Group. View "Lehman, et al. v. Lucom, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their conviction for conspiracy to possess illicit substances aboard an aircraft with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. 963. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their participation in a plan to transport cocaine from South America to the United Kingdom on board commercial airplanes. The court concluded that Congress intended that the substantive crime underlying the conspiracy charge - possession with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. 959(b) - applied extraterritorially; section 963 could be applied extraterritorially; under Blackmer v. United States, application of section 959(b) to Defendant Parker, a U.S. citizen, did not violate the Due Process Clause; extraterritorial application of section 959(b)(2) in this case was permissible as implementing Congress' treaty-making power under the Necessary and Proper Clause; and the recital of facts and the elements of conspiracy to commit the relevant offense was sufficient to enable defendants to prepare their defenses. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Lawrence, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican national, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a Texas court. Petitioner sought a stay of execution on the ground that his conviction was obtained in violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention), and relied on Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Avena). The Court held that petitioner's argument was foreclosed by Medellin v. Texas, in which the Court held that neither the Avena decision nor the President's Memorandum purporting to implement that decision constituted directly enforceable federal law. The Court declined to stay the execution so that Congress could consider whether to enact legislation implementing the Avena decision where the Due Process Clause did not prevent a State from carrying out a lawful judgment in light of unenacted legislation that might someday authorize a collateral attack on that judgment. The Court also declined the United State's request that the Court stay the execution until January 2012 in support of "future jurisdiction to review the judgment in a proceeding." Accordingly, the applications for stay of execution was denied and petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "Leal Garcia v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2009, Lumbard was arrested by Michigan authorities on warrants charging breaking and entering, destruction of a building, and larceny. He was released on a $100,000 bond. Other outstanding warrants charged aggravated battery, obstruction of justice, receiving stolen property, and more. Eluding capture on the other warrants, Lumbard paid Cheesebrew $500 for his birth date, social security number, and information about his place of birth and his parents. Lumbard used the information to obtain a driver’s license, a copy of Cheesebrew’s birth certificate, and a passport. He traveled to Tokyo, Thailand, and Burma after attempting to stage a “suicide.” Lumbard was eventually located and, during transport, attempted to stab a Burmese officer in order to be charged in Burma, which would have prevented extradition. He entered a conditional guilty plea to falsely representing information in an application for a passport and knowingly providing false identifying documents, 18 U.S.C. 1542 and using the name, social security number, date of birth, and driver’s license of another person to obtain a passport, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) and (c)(7), (aggravated identity theft). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that a purchase of identification can constitute aggravated identity theft. View "United States v. Lumbard" on Justia Law