Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

A magistrate judge in the District of Columbia determined that petitioner, a Mexican citizen, was extraditable under the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, U.S. - Mex., May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059. Petitioner owned and operated pharmaceutical businesses in and around Mexico City that illegaly imported psychotropic substances into Mexico. On appeal, petitioner claimed that the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to conduct the extradition proceeding and that the Treaty bars his extradition. The court found no merit in petitioner's claim that the fact that he was moved from Maryland to the District of Columbia against his will precludes the D.C. Magistrate from exercising jurisdiction over him where, under the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, a defendant's involuntary presence in a court is not a bar to personal jurisdiction. Further, when construing other jurisdiction and venue statutes concerning foreign nationals that, like 18 U.S.C. 3184, require a defendant to be "found in" a place, the court has held that this "found in" requirement is satisfied even when the defendant is brought there against his will. The court rejected petitioner's argument that the Treaty's Non Bis In Idem provision in Article 6 bars his extradition where the court declined to follow Sindona v. Grant's "same conduct" framework, and adopted the Blockburger v. United States' "same elements" test as the proper mode of analysis. The court rejected petitioner's remaining claims regarding the Treaty's dual criminality provision in Article 2 and rule of specialty provision in Article 17. The court affirmed the denial of petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. View "Gon v. Holt" on Justia Law

Appellee, a Swiss criminal complainant, sought from appellants the production of documents relating to the examination of Rajiv Jaitly to provide to a Swiss investigating magistrate overseeing a criminal inquiry into a Bernard Madoff feeder fund in Switzerland. At issue was whether 28 U.S.C. 1782, which authorizes federal courts to order document production for use in certain foreign proceedings, permits discovery for use in a foreign criminal investigation conducted by a foreign investigating magistrate. The court held, based on the plain reading of the statute, as well as the statute's legislative history, that the statute applies to a foreign criminal investigation involving an investigating magistrate seeking documents in the United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order. View "Optimal Investment Serv. v. Berlamont" on Justia Law

In 2009, Illinois State Police Officer Zeigler pulled over Mordi’s vehicle. A trained dog discovered drugs in the car. Zeigler arrested Mordi, took him to the station, and left him in an interrogation room. Other officers interviewed Mordi. Mordi is a Nigerian national. Nigeria and the U.S. are parties to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Convention. Mordi told Zeigler that his name was Nigerian, but Mordi does not recall mentioning that he was a Nigerian national. Zeigler listed Mordi’s place of birth as Nigeria, but asserts that he was unaware of Mordi’s citizenship. Mordi did tell the interviewing officers about his citizenship. Immigration and Customs Enforcement filed a detainer notice and federal authorities took over the prosecution. Mordi was represented by a federal public defender, who was aware of his nationality. Mordi pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance and is serving a sentence. At no point during criminal proceedings was he informed about his right under the Convention to have the Nigerian consulate notified about his status. He did not learn about the Convention until a year later, from another inmate. He wrote to the Nigerian consulate, but did not follow through. Mordi instituted, but dismissed, habeas proceedings, arguing ineffective assistance. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied summary judgment motions by Zeigler and the interviewing officers, based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the specific legal principle on which this case turns was not clearly established. View "Mordi v. Zeigler" on Justia Law

In 1998 Kashamu, a dual citizen of Nigeria and Benin, was charged as the leader of a conspiracy to import and distribute heroin. Kashamu never entered the U.S. His location was unknown. The government did not ask that he be tried in absentia. Eleven other defendants pleaded guilty; one was convicted. Months later, Kashamu was arrested in England. There were two unsuccessful extradition proceedings. After the 2003 ruling, Kashamu left England. Six years later, in Chicago district court, he moved to dismiss the indictment based on the English judge's findings, concerning possible confusion between Kashamu and his brother. The Seventh Circuit rejected his arguments. Kashamu remains in Nigeria, a businessman and a ruling party politician. Although there is an extradition treaty, the government has made no effort to extradite him. In 2014 Kashamu sought to dismiss on the grounds that the court has no personal jurisdiction because he has never been in the U.S. and that the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial clause bars prosecution. The Seventh Circuit again disagreed. Even if Kashamu has constitutional rights, they are not violated. The court has no current jurisdiction, but should he come to the U.S., he can be tried. Denial of a motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds is a nonappealable interlocutory order; until proceedings are complete, the causes and duration of the delay, the defendant’s responsibility for it, and the harm from the delay, cannot be determined. At any time “he had only to show up” to obtain resolution of his guilt or innocence. View "Kashamu v. Norgle" on Justia Law

Bokhari is a dual citizen of the U.S. and Pakistan. While living in Wisconsin, Bokhari allegedly conducted a fraudulent scheme with his brothers, bilking a nonprofit entity that administered the E‐Rate Program, a federal project to improve internet and telecommunications services for disadvantaged schools, out of an estimated $1.2 million, by submitting false invoices. In 2001, while the alleged fraud was ongoing, Bokhari moved to Pakistan, where, according to the prosecution, he continued directing the illegal scheme. In 2004, a federal grand jury in Wisconsin indicted the brothers for mail fraud, money laundering, and related charges. The brothers pleaded guilty and were sentenced to more than five years in prison. The government submitted an extradition request to Pakistan in 2005. Bokhari contested the request in Pakistani court, and the Pakistani government sent an attorney to plead the case for extradition. In 2007, following a hearing, a Pakistani magistrate declined to authorize extradition. In 2009, the U.S. secured a “red notice” through Interpol, notifying member states to arrest Bokhari should he enter their jurisdiction. In the U.S., Bokhari’s attorneys moved to dismiss the indictment and quash the arrest warrant. The district court denied Bokhari’s motion pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the appeal as an improper attempt to seek interlocutory review of a non‐final pretrial order. View "United States v. Bokhari" on Justia Law

The European Community filed suit against RJR, alleging that RJR directed, managed, and controlled a global money-laundering scheme with organized crime groups in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., laundered money through New York-based financial institutions and repatriated the profits of the scheme to the United States, and committed various common law torts in violation of New York state law. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the federal and state law claims; the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that RICO cannot apply to a foreign enterprise or to extraterritorial conduct; the court concluded that, with respect to a number of offenses that constitute predicates for RICO liability and were alleged in this case, Congress had clearly manifested an intent that they apply extraterritorially; and, as to the other alleged offenses, the Complaint alleged sufficiently important domestic activity to come within RICO's coverage. The court also concluded that the district court erred in ruling that the European Community's participation as a plaintiff in this lawsuit destroyed complete diversity; the European Community is an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" under 28 U.S.C. 1603(b) and therefore, qualified as a "foreign state" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(4); and its suit against "citizens of a State or of different States" came within the diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc." on Justia Law

Liquidators challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Brazil, concluding that a forfeiture judgment entered by a Brazilian court pursuant to Brazil's successful criminal prosecution of Kesten's former principals and owners took precedence over the Liquidators' Cayman Islands civil default judgment against Kesten. The court concluded that the penal law rule awarding summary judgment in favor of Brazil based on a forfeiture judgment of that sovereign grounded in a violation of Brazil's penal laws; however, the court recognized that 28 U.S.C. 2467 is a statutory exception to the penal rule; while no section 2467 request from Brazil is presently before the Attorney General, that nation's counsel advised the court at oral argument that if the challenged summary judgment decision were vacated based on the penal law rule, Brazil would promptly file a section 2467 petition pursuant to the nations' mutual legal assistance treaty; and therefore, the court remanded with instructions to the district court that it afford Brazil and the Attorney General a reasonable period of time to satisfy the section 2467's exception to that rule before reaching a final decision in this interpleader action. View "Federative Republic of Brazil v. Fu" on Justia Law

Stokes was a public school teacher for more than 10 years. In 2000, he pleaded no contest to a charge of misdemeanor battery for indecently touching two boys who were his students. Stokes was sentenced to probation, with a prohibition on unsupervised contact with minors. Less than a month after sentencing, Stokes obtained permission to complete his probation in Thailand. Within weeks of his arrival in Thailand, he began seeking boys for sex. This continued for several years until someone tipped off the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service, which, with the Royal Thai Police, searched Stokes’s home and recovered a camera, a computer, and compact discs containing thousands of images of Stokes’s sexual activity with Thai boys. Stokes was extradited and convicted of traveling in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in a sex act with a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2423(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims related to a procedural mistake in the extradition process and to the legality of the search. The Thai foreign ministry waived the “Rule of Specialty,” allowing the government to proceed on a substitute charge. The Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and the Warrant Clause have no extraterritorial application, but Stokes was protected by the Amendment’s touchstone requirement of reasonableness. The search was reasonable.View "United States v. Stokes" on Justia Law

The client was the target of a grand jury investigation into alleged violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The grand jury served a subpoena on the client’s former attorney and the government moved to enforce this subpoena and compel testimony, under the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. The client sought to quash the subpoena by asserting the attorney-client privilege and work product protection. After questioning the attorney in camera, the district court found that the crime-fraud exception applied and compelled testimony. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court applied the correct standard in determining whether to conduct an in camera examination of a witness, requiring a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies. The court did not abuse its discretion in applying that standard, in determining procedures for the examination, or in ultimately finding that the crime-fraud exception applied. View "In Re: Grand Jury Subpoena" on Justia Law

Appellees, the Rubins, requested that the district court issue a Writ of Garnishment against the assets of Hamas and HLF after obtaining a judgment against Hamas for damages resulting from a terrorist attack in an outdoor pedestrian mall in Jerusalem. The district court executed the writ but the Rubins could not execute against HLF's assets because those assets had been restrained under 21 U.S.C. 853 to preserve their availability for criminal forfeiture proceedings. The district court subsequently denied the government's motion to dismiss the Rubins' third-party petition under section 853(n) to assert their interests in the restrained assets and vacated the preliminary order of forfeiture. The district court held that the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), Pub. L. No. 107-297, title II, 201, 116 Stat. 2337, allowed the Rubins to execute against HLF's assets not withstanding the government's forfeiture proceedings. The court reversed, holding that section 853(n) did not provide the Rubins with a basis to prevail in the ancillary proceeding; TRIA did not provide the Rubins a basis to assert their interest in the forfeited property; TRIA did not trump the criminal forfeiture statute; and the in custodia legis doctrine did not preclude the district court's in personam jurisdiction over HLF.View "United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief, et al." on Justia Law