Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from an order of the district court denying Argentina's motion to dismiss a petition to confirm an arbitration award filed by Blue Ridge on foreign immunity grounds. The court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the district court's rejection of Argentina's assertion of foreign immunity under the collateral order doctrine; the court declined to exercise appellate jurisdiction to consider whether the district court erred in concluding that Blue Ridge, as an assignee, could state a claim to confirm the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes award because that issue was not "inextricably intertwined" with the district court's foreign sovereign immunity decision; the district court correctly concluded that Argentina waived its foreign sovereign immunity pursuant to two separate and independent exceptions to the immunity from suit provided by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: the implied waiver exception and the arbitral award exception, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(1), (2), and (a)(6). Accordingly, the court affirmed insofar as the district court concluded that Argentina waived its foreign sovereign immunity and remanded for further proceedings. View "Blue Ridge Investments, L.L.C. v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

Xena, a Cayman Islands corporation, filed suit against defendants claiming that defendants improperly and impermissibly secured loans made by MFM, incorporated in the Bahamas with its principal place of business in the Bahamas, to a commercial real estate hedge fund managed by MFM in the British Virgin Islands (BVI), giving them priority over Xena's shares in the funds. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, finding that it had no jurisdiction or authority to determine the priority of foreign parties entitled to, or payments made from, a foreign hedge fund. View "XENA Investments Ltd. v. Magnum Fund Mgmt. Ltd., et al." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was a challenge to the failure of a district court to give preclusive effect to a California federal district court judgment during a proceeding to grant recognition of a subsequent German judgment. Plaintiff Ron Markin executed a promissory note in 1988 agreeing to pay Defendant Thomas Grohmann $551,292.00 with interest at ten percent per annum. The loan was for a business transaction between the parties. In September 1997, Plaintiff sued Defendant in the United States District Court in the Central District of California in order to collect the promissory note. At that time, Defendant resided in Scottsdale, Arizona. The parties entered into a written settlement agreement to resolve the lawsuit. The agreement provided the principal and interest owing; that the lawsuit would be dismissed if that sum plus interest was paid according to the terms of the agreement; that the court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement; that if the amount due under the agreement was not paid in full as provided in the agreement, Plaintiff could obtain a judgment as provided by California law; and that the agreement "shall be governed by and interpreted under the laws of the State of California." Defendant failed to pay according to the agreement, and Plaintiff obtained an ex parte judgment against Defendant. After learning that Defendant owned real property in Germany, Plaintiff commenced a civil action in Germany to enforce the California judgment. The German trial court dismissed the action on the ground that the judgment was not enforceable under German law. Plaintiff appealed and asserted that if the judgment was not enforceable, he could recover on the settlement agreement upon which that judgment was based. The appellate court agreed, and it issued an opinion ordering Defendant to pay Plaintiff. The court held that it could enter a judgment against Defendant based upon the settlement agreement because he had previously been a German citizen. Upon its review of matter, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the German judgment was a final judgment under German law. But because the German judgment did not recognize the effect of a final judgment under California law, it conflicted with the California judgment. The Idaho Court therefore reversed the judgment of the district court that recognized the German judgment.View "Markin v. Grohmann" on Justia Law

In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.View "In re J.L. Gordon, Minor" on Justia Law

In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.View "In re C.I. Morris, Minor" on Justia Law

In an original proceeding, the Supreme Court reviewed a trial court's order that quashed service on Defendant Paulo Rodriguez-Cera. Defendant resided in Mexico but was served by substituted service in Colorado. After previously granting substituted service, the trial court determined that C.R.C.P. 4(d) mandated that service on a defendant located in a foreign country be made according to international agreement, if any. Because Mexico and the United States are parties to the Convention on Service Arboad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters (20 U.S.T. 361), the trial court concluded that Plaintiff Rex Willhite must serve Defendant via the Convention. As a result, the trial court quashed the substituted service. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that C.R.C.P. 4(d) did not establish service according to international agreement as the exclusive means of serving a defendant in a foreign country. The Court held that substituted service under Colorado law provides a valid alternative to service abroad. The Court made the rule absolute and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Willhite v. Rodriguez-Cera" on Justia Law

This action arose out of the sale of Giant Cement Holding, Inc. (Giant) by defendant Cementos Portland Valderrivas (CPV) to defendant Corporacion Uniland S.A. Sagarra Inversiones, S.L. (Sagarra) challenged the transaction on the basis of CPV's self-dealing because of its position as the majority shareholder on both sides of the transaction. Sagarra purported to bring this action individually and derivatively on behalf of nominal defendant Uniland Acquisition Corp. (Uniland Delaware). The court held that to the extent the Complaint asserted a multiple derivative action on behalf of Uniland Delaware, it must be dismissed because Sagarra did not have standing to raise those claims based on the court's review of Spanish law. The court held that for the same reasons, Counts I and II, which assert multiple derivative claims on behalf of Uniland Delaware, were dismissed. The court's determination with respect to Sagarra's lack of standing as to Counts I and II was equally applicable to Count III. The court finally held that because Count IV raised fiduciary duty claims under Spanish law, the better course of action was for the court to exercise its discretion and dismiss Count IV. Therefore, defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint was granted and an implementing order would be entered.View "Sagarra Inversiones, S.L. v. Cementos Portland Valderrivas, S.A., et al." on Justia Law

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,50 U.S.C. 1881a,2008 amendments, permit the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to acquire foreign intelligence information by jointly authorizing surveillance of individuals who are not "United States persons" and are reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S. They normally must first obtain Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court approval; 1881a surveillance is subject to statutory conditions, congressional supervision, and compliance with the Fourth Amendment. United States persons who claim to engage in sensitive international communications with individuals who they believe are likely targets of surveillance sought a declaration that 1881a is facially unconstitutional and a permanent injunction. The district court found that they lacked standing, but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that they showed an "objectively reasonable likelihood" that their communications will be intercepted in the future and that they suffer present injuries from costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of their communications. The Supreme Court reversed. The plaintiffs do not have Article III standing, which require an injury that is "concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling." Allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient. Plaintiffs’ standing theory rests on a speculative chain of possibilities. The Court stated that it is "reluctant to endorse standing theories that require guesswork as to how independent decision-makers will exercise their judgment." Plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending. View "Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican national, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a Texas court. Petitioner sought a stay of execution on the ground that his conviction was obtained in violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention), and relied on Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Avena). The Court held that petitioner's argument was foreclosed by Medellin v. Texas, in which the Court held that neither the Avena decision nor the President's Memorandum purporting to implement that decision constituted directly enforceable federal law. The Court declined to stay the execution so that Congress could consider whether to enact legislation implementing the Avena decision where the Due Process Clause did not prevent a State from carrying out a lawful judgment in light of unenacted legislation that might someday authorize a collateral attack on that judgment. The Court also declined the United State's request that the Court stay the execution until January 2012 in support of "future jurisdiction to review the judgment in a proceeding." Accordingly, the applications for stay of execution was denied and petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "Leal Garcia v. Texas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought civil claims against the sitting president of Sri Lanka under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. 1350. On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the president was not immune from civil suit under the TVPA. Because, as a consequence of the State Department's suggestion of immunity, the president was entitled to head of state immunity under the common law while he remained in office, and because the TVPA did not abrogate that common law immunity, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint. View "Manoharan, et al v. Rajapaksa" on Justia Law