Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants, the Donziger Firm and others, appealed the district court's grant of certain relief against them in favor of Chevron, in connection with an $8.646 billion judgment obtained against Chevron in Ecuador by the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs represented by the Donziger Firm. The judgment award was for environmental damage in connection with the Texaco oil exploration activities in Ecuador from the 1960s-1990s. On appeal, defendants challenge the district court's judgment, arguing principally that the action should have been dismissed on the ground that Chevron lacks Article III standing, and/or that the judgment should be reversed on the grounds, inter alia, that it violates principles of international comity and judicial estoppel, exceeds any legal authorization for equitable relief, and was entered without personal jurisdiction over defendants other than Donziger and his Firm. The court found no basis for dismissal or reversal in the absence of challenges to the district court's factual findings; considering the express disclaimers by the Ecuadorian appellate courts of their own jurisdiction to "hear and resolve" the above charges of corruption, "preserving the parties' rights" to pursue those charges in actions in the United States; and considering the district court's confinement of its injunction to a grant of in personam relief against the three defendants-appellants without disturbing the Ecuadorian judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chevron Corp. v. Donziger" on Justia Law

American nationals may seek damages from state sponsors of terrorism in U.S. courts, 28 U.S.C. 1605A, but face difficulties enforcing their judgments. Concerned with specific terrorism cases, Congress enacted the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, making designated assets available to satisfy judgments underlying a consolidated enforcement proceeding (identified by docket number), 22 U.S.C. 8772. Section 8772(a)(2) requires a court to determine,“whether Iran holds equitable title to, or the beneficial interest in, the assets.” Plaintiffs obtained default judgments and sought turnover of about $1.75 billion in bonds held in a New York bank account, allegedly owned by Bank Markazi, the Central Bank of Iran. Bank Markazi maintained that Section 8772 violated the separation-of-powers doctrine, contending that Congress had usurped the judicial role by directing a particular result in a pending enforcement proceeding. The district court, Second Circuit, and Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that Section 8772 permissibly changed the law applicable in a pending litigation. Although Article III bars Congress from telling a court how to apply pre-existing law to particular circumstances, Congress may amend a law and make the amended prescription retroactively applicable in pending cases. Nor is Section 8772 invalid because it prescribes a rule for a single, pending case identified by caption and docket number. Measures taken by the political branches to control the disposition of foreign-state property, including blocking specific foreign-state assets or making them available for attachment, have never been rejected as invasions upon the Article III judicial power. View "Bank Markazi v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Two men died in a 2005 shooting in Oaxaca, Mexico. Petitioner, a legal permanent resident of the U.S., where he had lived for more than 15 years was the shooter. Petitioner frequently traveled to Mexico, where his wife and children lived.The town clerk held a meeting. Petitioner’s family and a victim's family signed an agreement, drafted by the court, identifying Petitioner as the person “who committed the homicide” and providing that his family would pay 50,000 pesos to the victim's family. Petitioner’s wife understood “the agreement resolved the case," because the family of the other victim, “never claimed that Avelino committed any crime.” Unbeknownst to Petitioner, a cousin who was not a party to the agreement reported the homicide to the attorney general. Oaxacan authorities issued a warrant on charges of homicide with “unfair advantage." Meanwhile, Petitioner returned to the U.S., and lived openly under his own name. The Mexican government made no effort to locate him or to obtain extradition. In 2012, Mexico cited the “urgency” clause of the extradition treaty to request his arrest. Petitioner, who had obtained citizenship in 2010, was working to obtain permanent resident status for his family. He made several trips to Mexico to meet consular officials. Neither Mexican nor U.S. authorities detained him or informed him of the warrant. Petitioner was arrested in 2013, and certified as extraditable. He unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus, challenging certification of extraditability. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the treaty incorporates the Speedy Trial Clause. View "Martinez v. United States" on Justia Law

Zivotofsky was born to U.S. citizens living in Jerusalem. Under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2003, 116 Stat. 1350, his mother asked Embassy officials to list his place of birth as “Israel” on his passport. Section 214(d) of the Act states for “purposes of the registration of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon the request … record the place of birth as Israel.” Embassy officials refused to list Zivotofsky’s place of birth as “Israel,” citing the Executive Branch’s position that the U.S. does not recognize any country as having sovereignty over Jerusalem. The D. C. Circuit held the statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed. The President has the exclusive power to grant formal recognition to a foreign sovereign. The Court cited the Reception Clause, which directs that the President “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” and the President’s additional Article II powers, to negotiate treaties and to nominate the Nation’s ambassadors and dispatch other diplomatic agents. The Constitution assigns the President, not Congress, means to effect recognition on his own initiative. The Nation must “speak . . . with one voice” regarding which governments are legitimate in the eyes of the United States and which are not, and only the Executive has the characteristic of unity at all times. If Congress may not pass a law, speaking in its own voice, effecting formal recognition, then it may not force the President, through section 214(d), to contradict his prior recognition determination in an official document issued by the Secretary of State. View "Zivotofsky v. Kerry" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, family members of union leaders killed in Colombia by members of the Colombian National Army's 18th Brigade, filed suit against Occidental, alleging several causes of action, including three under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 1350, contending that Occidental should be liable for the 18th Brigade's war crimes, crimes against humanity, and assorted torts arising out of the murder of the union leaders. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) because it raised nonjusticiable political questions. The court affirmed, concluding that the facts of this case cannot be framed in such a way that severs the tie between the United States' and Occidental's funding of the CNA and the 18th Brigade. Plaintiffs' allegations are manifestly irreconcilable with the State Department's human rights certifications to Congress and the court remains bound by the Supreme Court's holding in Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co. and Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc. View "Saldana v. Occidental Petroleum" on Justia Law

USAID entered a contract with a private consulting firm, DAI, to provide humanitarian support to groups within Cuba pursuant to the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. 6021 et seq. DAI contracted with Alan Gross to train the Jewish community in Cuba to use and maintain information and communication technologies. Gross was subsequently convicted in Cuba of participating in a subversive project of the U.S. government and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. Gross and his wife subsequently field suit against DAI and the United States, alleging, among other things, negligence, gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium in connection with Gross's work in Cuba. Gross settled with DAI and the district court granted the United States's motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The court concluded that the foreign country exception deprived the district court of jurisdiction to address Gross's Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(k), claims, all of which are based on or derivative of injuries suffered in Cuba. Further, the court rejected Gross's Equal Protection Clause argument under rational basis review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal. View "Gross v. United States" on Justia Law

After victims of a terrorist kidnapping in Colombia (plaintiffs) received a nine-figure default judgment against their captor (FARC), they attempted to collect through a series of ex parte garnishments and executions against third parties with purported illicit ties to the captor. Third-party claimants appealed the various orders granting plaintiffs' motions seeking to collect on their judgment using claimants' assets and denying the motions filed by claimants seeking relief. The court concluded that plaintiffs should have provided formal notice of the garnishment and execution proceedings to the owners of the property, as Florida law provides; the district court incorrectly concluded that no process was due to the owners of the property here; ultimately, claimants bear their share of the blame for either sitting on their rights to challenge the allegations against them or simply failing to rebut the changes; and, therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court with the exception of the turnover judgment against Brunello Ltd.'s account. View "Stansell, et al. v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, (FARC), et al." on Justia Law

This petition involves Bermuda's efforts to secure rights from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to operate a satellite at the 96.2 degree W.L. orbital location. Bermuda partnered with EchoStar to deploy and maintain its satellite at this orbital location. Meanwhile, the Netherlands also sought rights from the ITU to operate a satellite at a nearby orbital location. Petitioner, Spectrum Five, a developer and operator of satellites working in partnership with the Netherlands, filed an objection to the FCC to EchoStar's request to move its satellite from 76.8 degrees W.L. to 96.2 degrees W.L. The FCC granted EchoStar's request and determined that Bermuda secured rights to the 96.2 degree W.L. orbital location. Spectrum Five petitioned for review of the Commission's order, claiming principally that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The court dismissed the petition for lack of Article III standing because Spectrum Five failed to demonstrate a significant likelihood that a decision of this court would redress its alleged injury. View "Spectrum Five LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law

After the Company prevailed in a 2000 arbitration in France against the Congo, the Company sought to collect the arbitral award with little success. The Company obtained a judgment in 2009 from a court in England enforcing the arbitral award. The Company then sued in the United States to enforce the foreign judgment under state law. The court held that the limitations period in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 207, does not preempt the longer limitations period in the D.C. Recognition Act, D.C. 15-639, and the court reversed the dismissal of the complaint. The court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the English Judgment is enforceable under the D.C. Recognition Act. View "Commissions Import Export S.A. v. Republic of the Congo, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, foreign nationals, alleged that they were tortured and otherwise mistreated by American civilian and military personnel while detained at Abu Ghraib. CACI, a corporation domiciled in the United States, contracted with the United States to provide private interrogators to interrogate detainees at Abu Ghraib. Plaintiffs alleged that CACI employees instigated, directed, participated in, encouraged, and aided and abetted conduct towards detainees that clearly violated federal and international law. The court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. does not foreclose plaintiffs' claims under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, and that the district court erred in reaching a contrary conclusion. In light of Kiobel, the court held that plaintiffs' claims "touch and concern" the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute. Because the court was unable to determine whether the claims presented nonjusticiable political questions, the court did not reach the additional issue of the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' common law claims. The court vacated the district court's judgment with respect to all plaintiffs' claims and remanded. View "Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc." on Justia Law