Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Exxon Mobil Corporation owned subsidiaries in Cuba that had various oil and gas assets. In 1960, the Cuban government expropriated these assets without compensating Exxon. In 1996, Congress enacted the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which allows U.S. nationals to sue those who traffic in property confiscated by the Cuban government. Exxon sued three state-owned defendants, alleging they trafficked in the confiscated property by participating in the oil industry and operating service stations.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied one defendant's motion to dismiss based on foreign sovereign immunity. The court held that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act does not override the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), and jurisdiction depends on an FSIA exception. The court found that the FSIA’s expropriation exception did not apply but that the commercial-activity exception did. The court allowed limited jurisdictional discovery for the other two defendants and later denied their motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act does not confer jurisdiction and that the FSIA’s expropriation exception is inapplicable. However, the court concluded that the district court needed to undertake additional analysis before determining that jurisdiction exists under the FSIA’s commercial-activity exception. The court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further analysis on the applicability of the FSIA’s commercial-activity exception. View "Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Corporacion CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant had two children together. After the couple separated, the children remained in Mexico with Galaviz. In July 2021, Defendant took the children to El Paso and refused to return them. Plaintiff filed an action in the district court requesting the return of the children to Mexico under the Hague Convention. Defendant raised two affirmative defenses claiming that returning the children would violate their fundamental right to an education and would expose them to a grave risk of harm or an intolerable situation. The district court concluded that Defendant had satisfied his burden and denied Plaintiff’s request for the return of the children. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that in the present case, the district court’s findings regarding the children’s healthcare, including the children’s cognitive decline, the fact that they remained non-verbal, or their regression to using diapers, may be supported by evidence that would be sufficient in a custody dispute. However, this evidence falls short of meeting Defendant’s clear and convincing burden. Finally, Defendant presented no evidence that unsuitable childcare would expose the children to a grave risk of harm. He merely expressed concern that Plaintiff often left the children with her older daughters, and they did not take care of the children. This is not clear and convincing evidence of a grave risk of harm. View "Galaviz v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, several family members of a United States citizen killed in an overseas terrorist attack, appealed from the district court’s judgment dismissing their claims against the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) and the Palestinian Authority (“PA”) for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Government, as intervenor in accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 2403(a) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1(c), also appealed from that judgment. On appeal, both Plaintiffs and the Government argued that the district court erred in finding unconstitutional the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (“PSJVTA”), the statute on which Plaintiffs relied to allege personal jurisdiction over Defendants.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the PSJVTA specifically provides that the PLO and the PA “shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction” in any civil action pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 2333, irrespective of “the date of the occurrence of the act of international terrorism” at issue, upon engaging in certain forms of post-enactment conduct, namely (1) making payments, directly or indirectly, to the designees or families of incarcerated or deceased terrorists, respectively, whose acts of terror injured or killed a United States national, or (2) undertaking any activities within the United States, subject to a handful of exceptions. Thus, the court concluded that the PSJVTA’s “deemed consent” provision is inconsistent with the dictates of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. View "Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of United States citizens injured during terror attacks in Israel and the estates or survivors of United States citizens killed in such attacks, brought an action against the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) and the Palestinian Authority (“PA”) pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”), seeking damages. The Second Circuit concluded on appeal that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA and vacated the judgment entered against Defendants. Plaintiffs later moved to recall the mandate based on a new statute, the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018. The Second Circuit denied that motion. Congress responded with the statute now at issue, the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (“PSJVTA”). The district court concluded that Defendants had engaged in jurisdiction-triggering conduct under the statute but that the PSJVTA violated constitutional due process requirements. Plaintiffs and the Government disputed the latter conclusion, and Plaintiffs argued generally that the PSJVTA justifies recalling the mandate.   The Second Circuit denied Plaintiffs’ motion to call the mandate. The court explained that the PSJVTA provides that the PLO and the PA “shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction” in any civil ATA action if, after a specified time, those entities either (1) make payments, directly or indirectly, to the designees or families of incarcerated or deceased terrorists, respectively, whose acts of terror injured or killed a United States national, or (2) undertake any activities within the United States, subject to limited exceptions. The court concluded that the PSJVTA’s provision for “deemed consent” to personal jurisdiction is inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. View "Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organization" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania, challenged the district court’s denial of his request for a preliminary injunction (the “Injunction Denial”). Petitioner sought— in connection with his petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2241 — to prevent the defendant government officials from carrying out his extradition to Lithuania. The district court denied Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief, deeming him unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claim that his extradition to Lithuania would contravene the extradition treaty between that country and the United States. More specifically, Petitioner maintained that Lithuania’s 2015 extradition request fails to comply with the treaty’s mandate that Lithuania produce what is called “the charging document” (the “charging document contention”). The Injunction Denial ruled, however, that the documents produced by Lithuania comply with the extradition treaty, and that Petitioner is therefore not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief.   The Fourth Circuit reversed. The court explained that it is satisfied that Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that Lithuania’s 2015 extradition request does not satisfy the charging document mandate of the extradition treaty. The court wrote that Petitioner has demonstrated that Lithuania’s 2015 extradition request to return him to that country does not satisfy the Treaty’s requirements. And the public’s interest in the Secretary of State recognizing and fulfilling Treaty obligations outweighs any detrimental impact that the denial of an improper extradition request could have. View "Darius Vitkus v. Antony Blinken" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Syrian national, appealed his conviction after a jury trial for participating in a conspiracy that targeted U.S. military personnel and property in Iraq. The jury delivered a mixed verdict on the six-count indictment. It convicted Defendant for conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction (Count One), conspiring to damage U.S. government property (Count Two), and conspiring to possess a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting the same (Counts Three and Four). The jury acquitted Defendant of conspiring to murder Americans (Count Five) and providing material support to terrorists (Count Six).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the conviction. Reversing in part, the panel agreed with the parties that Defendant’s convictions on Counts Three and Four, for conspiring to possess a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting the same, could not stand after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). On those counts, the panel remanded with direction to the district court to vacate the convictions. The panel affirmed Defendant’s convictions on Counts One and Two for conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction and conspiring to damage U.S. Government property by means of an explosive. As to Count Two, the panel held that 18 U.S.C. Section 844(f) and (n) applied to Defendant’s extraterritorial conduct. The panel held that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to criminal statutes as well as to civil statutes. View "USA V. AHMED ALAHMEDALABDALOKLAH" on Justia Law

Petitioner served as the personal assistant and public-relations secretary to Usama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda and mastermind of the 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States. Members of a military commission convicted Petitioner of conspiracy to commit war crimes, providing material support for terrorism, and solicitation of others to commit war crimes. The members sentenced Petitioner to imprisonment for life, and the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review (“CMCR”) affirmed. On Petitioner’s first appeal to the DC Circuit, the court upheld the conspiracy charge but vacated the other convictions as unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause. The CMCR subsequently reaffirmed Petitioner’s remaining conspiracy conviction and life sentence twice. Petitioner asked the court to vacate his conspiracy conviction or, alternatively, to remand his case for resentencing by military commission members.   The DC Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that Petitioner could have raised the change in law, or other similar objections, in his initial appeal to the CMCR or during the extensive proceedings since then. He did not. On the most recent remand to the CMCR, he questioned the admissibility of the statements in his opening brief but did not argue that Section 948r barred their admission until his reply. Accordingly, the court wrote that it declined to revisit its prior ruling that the convening authority is an inferior officer because the intervening Supreme Court case cited by Petitioner does not clearly dictate a departure from the circuit’s precedent. The court also upheld his sentence of life imprisonment. View "Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. USA" on Justia Law

Appellant and her d her family sued Sudan, seeking compensation for a terrorist attack on their family. The question on appeal is whether we have jurisdiction. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a state sponsor of terrorism may be sued for personal injury arising from acts of terrorism. But in 2020, Congress enacted the Sudan Claims Resolution Act, which stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear most terrorism-related claims against Sudan. Appellants argued that the Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision is unconstitutional and therefore, that their claims against Sudan may be heard in federal court. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Supreme Court has long held that citizens have a constitutional right to access the courts. The court wrote that Appellants challenged Congress’ restoration of Sudan’s sovereign immunity, but these claims simply do not implicate the right to access the courts. Moreover, Appellants’ claims are in tension with the government’s power to establish inferior courts and espouse the claims of its citizens. However, the court modified the district court’s judgment to be a dismissal without prejudice. View "Chava Mark v. Republic of the Sudan" on Justia Law

After Defendant was indicted for various offenses arising out of the export of semiconductors to the People’s Republic of China, a jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. The district court subsequently entered a judgment of acquittal on one count. The government appealed that acquittal, and Defendant appealed his convictions on the other counts.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of acquittal, affirmed Defendant’s other convictions, and remanded. The court explained that The Export Administration Regulations (EARs), administered by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, impose controls on certain exports to “serve the national security, foreign policy, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other interests of the United States.” After the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, the EARs were continued pursuant to Executive Order 13,222, which declared a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The panel rejected Shih’s argument that Executive Order 13,222 was an improper invocation of presidential authority. The panel also rejected Defendant’s argument and argued that IEEPA violates the nondelegation doctrine. The panel held that the district court erred in concluding that this term requires post-manufacture, pre-export testing. The panel therefore ordered the reinstatement of the jury verdict on that count. Defendant argued that the district court erred by failing to give his proposed jury instruction on the fundamental research exemption. The panel rejected this argument because other instructions given in their entirety cover the defense theory. The panel found no error in the district court’s evidentiary rulings because they were well within the district court’s discretion. View "USA V. YI-CHI SHIH" on Justia Law

While living in Japan, Defendant sexually abused a young girl. The government brought charges under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. The government’s theory was that Defendant was employed by the Armed Forces because he worked for a Department of Veterans Affairs subcontractor. Or, the government argued, he was accompanying a member of the Armed Forces because he lived with his wife, who worked at the Kadena Air Base in Japan. Defendant pleaded guilty to two charges in exchange for the government’s dropping the rest. As part of the deal, he also agreed to waive any right to appeal. The district court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Defendant to 420 months imprisonment. But, despite his waiver, Defendant appealed.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court explained that Defendant attempted to get around his appeal waiver by arguing that jurisdiction cannot be waived, and thus he has every right to proceed. The court reasoned that Defendant confuses a crime’s jurisdictional element with federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction. Here, Defendant is not challenging the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. He’s challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on his crimes’ jurisdictional element. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge falls under his appeal waiver, and thus the court dismissed his appeal. View "US v. Emilio Moran" on Justia Law