Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs are 21 U.S. citizens who were harmed, and the estate and family members of a U.S. citizen who was killed in rocket attacks carried out in Israel in 2006 by the terrorist organization Hizbollah. Plaintiffs alleged that the Lebanese Canadian Bank (“LCB”) provided extensive financial assistance to Hizbollah in the years leading up to the attacks. In 2011, Defendant Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL (“SGBL”) acquired all of LCB’s assets and liabilities in a transaction conducted under the laws of Lebanon. Plaintiffs sued for damages under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990 and sought to hold SGBL liable as LCB’s successor. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that SGBL did not inherit LCB’s status for purposes of personal jurisdiction when it acquired LCB’s assets and liabilities.   The Second Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs’ successor-jurisdiction theory raises an important and unresolved issue under New York law. Accordingly, the court certified the following two questions to the New York Court of Appeals:1. Under New York law, does an entity that acquires all of another entity’s liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, inherit the acquired entity’s status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction? 2. In what circumstances will the acquiring entity be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York? View "Lelchook v. Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL" on Justia Law

In 2008, Intervenors-Appellees Caterpillar Financial Services Asia Pte Ltd (“Caterpillar”) and Eksportfinans ASA (“Eksportfinans”) provided a loan to Marfield Limited Incorporated (“Marfield”) for the construction of an offshore construction vessel. To secure payment of this loan, Marfield executed and delivered a First Preferred Naval Mortgage to Eksportfinans and a Second Preferred Naval Mortgage to Caterpillar on December 19, 2008. As further security for outstanding sums owed to Caterpillar, Marfield executed a Third Preferred Naval Mortgage on April 17, 2014, encumbering the vessel. The vessel was flagged in Panama, so all three of those mortgages were submitted to the Panama government.In 2012, Caterpillar and Intervenor-Appellee the Norwegian Government (“Norway”) provided a loan to Shanara Maritime International S.A. (“Shanara”) for the construction of another offshore construction vessel. Once both vessels were complete, there were chartered until early 2014, when the Mexican government seized them. On February 28, 2014, Marfield and Shanara terminated their bareboat charters of the vessels, and the vessels remained in the Mexican government’s custody. Shanara and Marfield could not generate revenue on the vessels and began to fall behind on their loan payments to IntervenorsAppellees Caterpillar, Norway, KFW, and Eksportfinans (collectively, the “Lenders”). Shortly after that, the Mexican government separately seized the vessels in connection with the bankruptcy.Subsequently, the district court entered findings, including that (1) Marfield and Shanara are in default under the loan agreements; and (2) the Lenders’ preferred ship mortgages related to said default outrank Plaintiff's state-created liens arising from PLaintiff's attachment of the vessells under Texas state law. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding no clear error. View "Corporativo Grupo v. Marfield Ltd" on Justia Law

This is an international child custody dispute between Respondent and Petitioner over their minor children. While the family was residing in Germany, Respondent took the children to the United States and refused to return them. The Hague Convention generally requires children to be returned to the state of habitual residence so that the country’s courts may adjudicate the merits of any custody disputes. The Ninth Circuit previously vacated and remanded the district court’s first order to return the children to Germany. Because the Supreme Court issued its decision in Golan while the court was considering Respondent’s appeal of the second return order, the court also remanded that order for the district court’s reconsideration. The district court then granted the petition a third time.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting, on a second remand, Petitioner’s petition against Respondent for the return, pursuant to the Hague Convention, of the parties’ two children to Germany. Agreeing with other circuits, the panel held that, in cases governed by the Hague Convention, the district court has discretion as to whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing following remand and must exercise that discretion consistent with the Convention. The panel held that, on the second remand, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold a third evidentiary hearing when the factual record was fully developed. The panel held that, in making determinations about German procedural issues, the district court neither abused its discretion nor violated Respondent’s due process rights by communicating with the State Department and, through it, the German Central Authority View "BOGDAN RADU V. PERSEPHONE JOHNSON SHON" on Justia Law

This appeal involves a nonjusticiable political question: who has the authority to litigate in the name of the Venezuelan state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. The underlying action, brought by a litigation trust on behalf of Petróleos de Venezuela, alleged conspiracy, antitrust, cybercrime, and fraud claims against various individuals and entities. After the district court dismissed the action for lack of standing and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, an entity purporting to speak for Petróleos de Venezuela sought to substitute itself as the real party in interest. The entity’s board was appointed by Nicolás Maduro, who claims to be the president of Venezuela. But the United States Department of State has concluded that Maduro is not Venezuela’s legitimate political leader.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed because the district court could not grant the motion without addressing a nonjusticiable political question. The district court cannot question the validity of then-President Guaidó’s appointment of an alternative board of directors. So, under the political-question doctrine, it was powerless to grant the Maduro entity’s motion to substitute the entity as the real party in interest in contravention of the position taken by the United States Department of State.   Further, the court wrote that the district court would not have jurisdiction to conduct the requested inquiry on remand. And even if the Department of State declared today that the Maduro entity is authorized to bring suit in Petróleos de Venezuela’s name, the court would still affirm because, under Article III, a justiciable case or controversy must exist “through all stages of the litigation,” including “at the time the complaint is filed.” View "PDVSA US Litigation Trust v. Lukoil Pan Americas LLC, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal concerns a discovery dispute over certain documents in an ongoing case before the district court. Defendants are non-mission third parties hired by Qatar as “contractors to support its foreign policy objective of maintaining U.S. Government support.” Plaintiffs brought this case against Defendants for allegedly helping Qatar hack Plaintiffs’ computer systems and disseminate the hacked materials. The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendants to produce documents related to their work on Qatar’s behalf. On appeal, Qatar contends that the disputed documents are inviolable under the Vienna Conventions and protected from disclosure.   The DC Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court explained that Qatar is not a party to the suit, having chosen to only file statements of interest in the underlying district court proceedings as amicus curiae. The court explained that an appellant not named in the underlying suit must be bound by an underlying order and avail itself of applicable procedural rules in the related trial court proceedings to be recognized as a party that can properly bring an appeal. Otherwise, the appeal must be dismissed under the well-established rule that only parties can appeal an adverse judgment.   However, the court wrote that it recognizes that both the parties and the District Court were operating in uncharted territory regarding how a foreign sovereign may invoke its treaty rights under the Vienna Conventions. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to the District Court to afford Qatar the opportunity to intervene or take some other action to become a party in accordance with this opinion before enforcing the underlying discovery order. View "Broidy Capital Management LLC v. Nicolas Muzin" on Justia Law

The Republic of Turkey appealed the September 7, 2021, district court judgment. The court concluded that Turkey failed to prove its ownership of a six-thousand-year-old marble idol. The district court determined that Turkey’s claims of replevin and conversion failed and entered a declaratory judgment that all rights, title, and interest to the idol vested in Defendant. In addition, the district court held that Defendants were entitled to judgment because they established the equitable defense of laches. On appeal, Turkey argued the district court misconstrued fundamental principles of New York law in each of these holdings.   The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that Turkey prejudiced Defendants by unreasonably delaying this action. The court explained that because Turkey had reason to know the Stargazer was its cultural patrimony in the 1990s, it had reason to investigate the artifact and assert its claim to ownership. This is not to say that sovereign nations have a standing obligation to investigate the potential theft of their dispersed artifacts. But Turkey sat on its hands despite signals from its own Ministry of Culture that the Stargazer was in New York City. Turkey’s failure to bring its claim (or even investigate it) until 2017 was unreasonable. View "Republic of Turkey v. Christie's Inc., et al." on Justia Law

At issue is whether the Commonwealth of Virginia would recognize a divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens when neither spouse was domiciled in that nation at the time of the divorce. The question arises from Petitioner’s marriage to a woman after the woman and another man — both Ghanaian citizens — divorced pursuant to Ghanaian customary law. At the time of the divorce, the woman and man were lawful permanent residents of the United States, and neither was present or domiciled in Ghana. Based on his marriage to the woman, Petitioner became a lawful permanent resident of the United States. But when Petitioner applied to become a naturalized citizen, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) determined that he and the woman were not validly married. USCIS reasoned that under controlling Virginia law, the Commonwealth would not recognize a divorce granted by a nation where neither spouse was domiciled at the time of the divorce. Petitioner sought a review of the decision in the district court, which granted summary judgment to USCIS. Petitioner then brought this appeal.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant Petitioner’s naturalization application. The court concluded as a matter of comity, Virginia would recognize this otherwise valid divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens, regardless of the citizens’ domicile at the time. The court explained it rejected only USCIS’s argument that pursuant to present Virginia law, the Commonwealth would refuse to recognize a divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens simply because neither was domiciled in the foreign nation at the time of the divorce. View "Michael Adjei v. Alejandro Mayorkas" on Justia Law

The Partnership filed a contract claim in a Chinese court against Wan, his company, and his brother. The Chinese court entered a default judgment against Wan after he failed to appear. A year later, the Partnership filed a complaint in the Central District of Illinois, seeking enforcement of the Chinese judgment under the Illinois foreign judgment recognition law, predicating subject matter jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. The district court, determining that the Chinese judgment was enforceable under Illinois law, granted the Partnership summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding the factual predicates for the district court’s jurisdiction not established firmly in the existing record. The Partnership, which had the burden on the issue, failed to present “competent proof” of its citizenship; it did not present any evidence establishing its citizenship or the citizenship of its several partners. The Partnership submitted a declaration by its employee who stated simply that it “is and was domiciled in Yancheng City, Jiangsu Province, People’s Republic of China.” However, a partnership does not have a “domicile” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Rather, to establish subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, the citizenship of each partner must be established. There is no evidence to support a finding of complete diversity. View "Yancheng Shanda Yuanfeng Equity Investment Partnership v. Wan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a U.S. citizen and a U.S. national, as that term is defined in 22 U.S.C. Section 6023(15). He claims to be the “rightful owner of an 82.5% interest in certain commercial waterfront real property in the Port of Santiago de Cuba,” identified by the Cuban government as La Marítima and Terminal Naviera. According to the complaints, the knowing and intentional conduct of Carnival and Royal Caribbean constitutes trafficking under Section 6023(13)(A). As a result, Plaintiff—who provided the cruise lines with written notice by certified mail of his intent to commence an action under Title III—claims that he is entitled to damages under Section 6082.   The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for panel rehearing and vacated our prior opinion. The court held that Plaintiff has standing to assert his Title III claims, but that those claims fail on the merits. The court explained that the Cuban government confiscated La Marítima prior to March 12, 1996, and because Plaintiff acquired his interest in the property through inheritance after that date, his claims failed. The court, therefore, affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of Carnival and Royal Caribbean. View "Javier Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

A Bolivian arbitration tribunal awarded $36 million in damages to Compania de Inversiones Mercantiles S.A. (“CIMSA”) against Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua S.A.B. de C.V. (“GCC”). GCC fought the award in the Bolivian courts, losing before a chamber of Bolivia’s highest constitutional court in 2016. In 2019, CIMSA obtained an order from the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado confirming the award. In 2020, GCC convinced a different chamber of Bolivia’s highest constitutional court to invalidate its prior decision, and a Bolivian trial judge subsequently annulled the award. GCC then moved the U.S. district court to vacate the confirmation order. The district court: (1) denied GCC’s motion; and (2) ordered GCC to turn over assets located in Mexico to satisfy the award. GCC brought separate appeals from these two rulings. GCC argued that the district court erred by refusing to vacate the Confirmation Judgment, contending the 2020 Bolivian court orders annulling the Damages Award required vacatur. The Tenth Circuit found when a court has been asked to vacate an order confirming an arbitral award that has later been annulled, it may balance against comity considerations (1) whether the annulment is repugnant to U.S. public policy or (2) whether giving effect to the annulment would undermine U.S. public policy. "Although the district court here may have found the 2020 Bolivian orders were not repugnant, it did not legally err by considering whether giving effect to those orders through vacatur of its Confirmation Judgment would offend U.S. public policy." Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to vacate its Confirmation Judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Compania De Inversiones v. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua, et al." on Justia Law