Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her complaint for failure to effect service of process as required under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1608(a)(3). In view of the resulting prejudice to plaintiff and the absence of any relevant prejudice to the Embassy of Zambia of allowing a further effort at service, the court concluded that that dismissal was too extreme a remedy because plaintiff's attempts at service came so close to strict compliance with the FSIA as to demonstrate a good faith effort at timely compliance amidst the sometimes confusing directions from the district court. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Barot v. Embassy of Zambia" on Justia Law

After Venezuela forcibly seized oil rigs belonging to the Venezuelan subsidiary of an American corporation, both the parent and subsidiary filed suit in the United States asserting jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1604, 1605-1607, expropriation and commercial activity exceptions. The district court granted Venezuela's motion to dismiss as to the subsidiary's expropriation claim, but denied the motion in all other respects. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that the parent corporation had sufficient rights in its subsidiary's property to support its expropriation claim; but the district court should have allowed the claim to proceed because the subsidiary's expropriation claim is neither "wholly substantial" nor "frivolous" under this Circuit's standard for surviving a motion to dismiss in an FSIA case; and the district court should have granted the motion to dismiss with respect the commercial activity exception where the subsidiary's commercial activity had no "direct effect" in the United States, which is required by the FSIA to defeat sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling v. Bolivarian Rep. of Venezuela" on Justia Law

Expander Global conducts no business and is merely a holding company for its wholly owned subsidiary, Expander SystemSweden, another Swedish corporation. Expander Sweden wholly owns Expander Americas. Those companies manufacture industrial pins used in heavy machinery. In 2010, Eagle entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement with Expander Americas to provide consulting services. The Agreement led to a relationship between Global and Bakker, Eagle’s sole owner, who acted as a project manager and as secretary of the Global Board of Directors. In 2011, Global terminated Bakker from his positions and its agreement with Eagle. Eagle sued Expander Americas, alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel; Bakker sued Global for quantum meruit. The district court dismissed the quantum meruit action for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that Global did not have the requisite minimum contacts with Missouri to be subject to its Long-Arm Statute or to satisfy due process. It was not licensed to do business in the state; it did not advertise within the state; it did not send employees to the state; and no money was received or sent to the state. The court granted Expander Americas summary judgment on the remaining claims, based on the statute of frauds. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Eagle Tech. v. Expander Americas, Inc." on Justia Law

The government filed a civil complaint seeking forfeiture of funds held in a brokerage account. The clerk entered a default against Appellants and all other potential claimants. The district court granted the government’s motion for entry of default and, concluding that Appellants could not allege a meritorious defense, refused to grant their motion to set aside the default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). The court did not specifically articulate any “extreme circumstances” justifying entry of default and default judgment. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) courts reviewing a Rule 60(b) motion must apply the factors outlined in Falk v. Allen to ensure that the “extreme circumstances” policy is recognized, but nothing in Rule 60(b) nor the Court’s precedent requires a district court to articulate on the record particular “extreme circumstances” before it denies a motion to set aside a default judgment; and (2) after applying the Falk factors, it is clear that Appellants had no meritorious defense, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’ Rule 60(b)(1) motion. View "United States v. Aguilar" on Justia Law

CCC, an investment fund incorporated in Guernsey, a British Crown dependency in the English Channel, invested in residential mortgage-backed securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Moonmouth purchased CCC shares for $60 million under a 2006 Subscription Agreement, which contained a forum selection clause giving Delaware state courts exclusive jurisdiction over any action and specifying that Delaware law was to govern. In 2008, CCC entered liquidation. A Guernsey court appointed liquidators, who sued Carlyle and others (plaintiffs in this action) in Guernsey for breach of fiduciary duties owed to CCC. Subsequent Transfer Agreements involving the parties released then-existing claims against Carlyle. In 2012, a Dutch law firm representing Moonmouth sent letters alleging that plaintiffs took unacceptable risks in connection with CCC-managed investments and that they would hold plaintiffs liable for damages sustained by investors in connection with CCC. Plaintiffs sought to enforce the Subscription Agreement’s forum selection clause and the Transfer Agreements’ releases. After removal to federal court, the district court remanded to state court. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Subscription Agreement’s forum selection clause pertains to the case, may be enforced against defendants, and may be invoked by plaintiffs; the Transfer Agreement provides an alternative ground supporting remand. View "Carlyle Inv, Mgmt., LLC v. Moonmouth Co., SA" on Justia Law

The Galstians abandoned their properties in Iran in 1978, when the family fled to Los Angeles after the overthrow of the Shah. In 1996, the Iranian government allowed the Galstians to enter Iran and begin reclaiming and selling the properties. By 2003, Minassian and Izadi held powers of attorney for the remaining properties. In 2008, Minassian and Izadi executed a general quitclaim deed transferring all remaining properties to themselves for little or no consideration. Galstian discovered the transfers in 2010, demanded that title be returned, and hired an Iranian attorney, who pressed criminal charges in Iran. The Galstians died in 2012. Their children sued Minassian and Izadi in 2013, asserting breach of fiduciary duty, accounting, and conversion. Minassian argued the Iranian civil court provides a suitable forum for an action brought by Iranian citizens against Iranian citizens and that the California court lacked power to enforce an order directing the transfer of real property in Iran. The trial court stayed the action under Code of Civil Procedure 410.30(a), finding that the interest of substantial justice would be served by having the action heard in another forum. The court of appeal reversed, finding insufficient evidence to show Iran is a suitable alternative forum. View "Aghaian v. Minassian" on Justia Law

Holocaust survivors and the heirs of victims sued the Hungarian national railway, the national bank, and private banks for the roles they played in the World War II genocide against Hungarian Jews. In 2012 appeals, the Seventh Circuit held that the national railway and national bank, instrumentalities of the government, could be sued in a U.S. federal court if the plaintiffs could demonstrate that they had exhausted any available Hungarian remedies or had a legally compelling reason for failure to do so. The court mandated dismissal of claims against two private banks for lack of personal jurisdiction, but denied requests by Erste Bank to review denial of its motion to dismiss. On remand, the district court dismissed the claims against the national defendants for failure to prove exhaustion of Hungarian remedies and dismissed Erste Bank on forum non conveniens grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals, without prejudice. While international law does not require exhaustion of domestic remedies before plaintiffs can say that international law was violated, principles of international comity require that these plaintiffs attempt to exhaust domestic remedies before foreign courts can provide remedies. If plaintiffs find that attempts to pursue remedies in Hungary are frustrated unreasonably or arbitrarily, a U.S. court could hear the claims. View "Albert v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank" on Justia Law

Lee was the CEO of Hyundai Securities from 1996 to 2000. Several shareholders of Hyundai brought, in Korea, a shareholders’ derivative action, alleging securities fraud by Lee. The court entered judgment in favor of Hyundai in the amount of about 24,000,000 U.S. dollars plus interest at the Korean statutory rate. Appeals in Korea were dismissed. Hyundai filed suit under California’s “Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act” (Code Civ. Proc. 1713-1724), seeking recognition of the Korean Judgment. On remand, Hyundai acknowledged it had been compensated for portions of the judgment. Lee asserted that the court could not recognize part of the judgment as it was a penalty or fine and could not award interest at the rate of 20 percent because such a rate was contrary to the law and public policy of California. The trial court granted summary judgment and awarded Hyundai the principal sum of $5,031,231, interest of $3,787,397, daily interest of $2,756 per day from May 27, 2014 until entry of judgment, and post-judgment interest at the Korean rate of 20 percent per annum. Lee appeals. The court of appeal affirmed recognition of the judgment, but reversed the imposition of a 20 percent post-judgment rate of interest. View "Hyundai Sec. Co., Inc. v. Lee" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against the Republic of Cuba and others in Florida state court, alleging that appellees tortured appellant and that appellant continues to suffer the consequences of the torture. Appellant was incarcerated in Cuba in the 1960s and 1970s, and endured unlawful incarceration and torture committed by the Cuban government and its codefendants. Appellant obtained a default judgment in state court and now seeks to execute that judgment on patents and trademarks held or managed by appellees in this action, who are allegedly agents and instrumentalities of Cuba. The court affirmed the district court's denial of appellant's request because the Florida state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the default judgment. View "Jerez v. Republic of Cuba" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ismail Yaman, a Turkish citizen, and respondent Linda Yaman, a United States citizen, were married in Turkey in August 2000, and respondent became a Turkish citizen in October 2000. Their first child, K.Y., was born in March 2002, in the United States. In January 2003, the family moved to Turkey. The couple’s second child, E.Y., was born in Turkey in August 2003. In early to mid-2004, the respondent became suspicious that petitioner was sexually abusing their older child. In December 2004, the parties separated, and early the next year, petitioner initiated divorce proceedings in the Turkish Family Court. On March 13, 2006, after conducting six hearings in which the court considered evidence from both parties and from the independent experts, the Turkish court rejected respondent’s claim that petitioner had abused the children, and issued an order granting sole legal custody of the children to petitioner and granting respondent visitation. Respondent appealed the order to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Turkey on two occasions, and both times the appellate court affirmed the family court’s order. The family court finalized its order in 2007. Within weeks after the family court’s order became final, and without notice to petitioner, respondent fled Turkey with the children by engaging the services of a self-proclaimed “snatch back” specialist. After years of searching, petitioner, who remained in Turkey, was informed in December 2011 that respondent and the children were living in New Hampshire. Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to Article 2 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction2 and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) with the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Following a three-day evidentiary hearing, the court ruled that the return of the children to Turkey would not pose a grave risk of harm to them because respondent had not established that petitioner abused them. The court also found, however, that the respondent had established that the children were “settled” in New Hampshire within the meaning of Article 12 of the Hague Convention; in light of this finding, the court ruled that it lacked the authority to order the children’s return to Turkey. Alternatively, the court ruled that, given the facts of the case, even if it did have the authority to do so, it would not order the return of the children to Turkey. Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which determined that the district court erred in ruling that it lacked authority to order the return of “settled” children, but affirmed the trial court’s alternative ruling denying return of the children on equitable grounds as a sustainable exercise of discretion. After its review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err in granting enforcement of the Turkish custody order. View "In the Matter of Ismail Yaman and Linda Yaman" on Justia Law