Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Air Century, SA relied on diversity jurisdiction when it sued Defendant-Appellee Atlantque Air Assitance and Insured Aircraft Title Services, Inc. (IATS) for breach of contract in district court. Unfortunately, the legal authority Plaintiff used did not provide jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the parties stiputated to the existence of diversity jurisdiction. Instead of challenging diversity, Atlantique sought and was awarded dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Air Century stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of its claims against IATS and then appealed the dismissal of its claims against Atlantique. "Belatedly noticing the diversity issue early in the appeal," Atlantique moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In response, Air Century conceded that the district court had never had subject-matter jurisdiction. It requested that the Tenth Circuit: (1) vacate the district court’s order dismissing Atlantique for lack of personal jurisdiction and (2) dismiss this appeal. Under the circumstances, the district court had no power to rule on any substantive motions or to enter judgment in the case. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit denied the motion to dismiss the appeal, and vacated the district court's orders. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions for the court to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Air Century SA v. Atlantique Air, et al" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a contract between the Indonesian government and the Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon), a United States corporation, and several of its wholly owned subsidiaries where Exxon operated a large natural gas extraction and processing facility in the Aceh province. Plaintiffs were fifteen Indonesian villagers. Eleven villagers filed a complaint in 2001 alleging that Exxon's security forces committed murder, torture, sexual assault, battery, and false imprisonment in violation of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. 1350, and various common law torts. Four villagers alleged that in 2007, Exxon committed various common law torts. All plaintiffs alleged that Exxon took actions both in the United States and at its facility in the Aceh province that resulted in their injuries. Plaintiffs challenged the subsequent dismissal of their claims and Exxon filed a cross-appeal, inter alia, raising corporate immunity for the first time. The court concluded that aiding and abetting liability was well established under the ATS. The court further concluded that neither the text, history, nor purpose of the ATS supported corporate immunity for torts based on heinous conduct allegedly committed by its agents in violation of the law of nations. The court affirmed the dismissal of the TVPA claims in view of recent precedent of the court. The court concluded, however, that Exxon's objections to justiciability were unpersuasive and that the district court erred in ruling that plaintiffs lacked prudential standing to bring their non-federal tort claims and in the choice of law determination. The court finally concluded that Exxon's challenge to the diversity of parties in the complaint at issue was to be resolved initially by the district court. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' TVPA claims, reversed the dismissal of the ATS claims at issue, along with plaintiffs' non-federal tort claims, and remanded the cases to the district court. View "John Doe VIII, et al. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., et al." on Justia Law

In November 2001, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued an anti-dumping duty order on certain hot-rolled carbon steel flat products from Thailand, found that the company was selling the subject merchandise at less than normal value and assigned a dumping margin of 3.86%. In 2006 the order was partially revoked, as to the company, but remained in effect with respect to other exporters and producers. Commerce received a complaint that dumping had resumed and initiated changed circumstances review (CCR), despite the company's assertion that it lacked authority to so. The Court of International Trade (CIT) dismissed the company's suit for an injunction in 2009. Commerce reinstated the order with respect to the company; CIT affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Commerce reasonably interpreted and acted on its revocation and CCR authority under 19 U.S.C. 1675(b, d) as permitting conditional revocation and reconsideration. View "Sahaviriya Steel Ind. Public Co.Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Illinois corporation, filed suit for conversion against a corporation based in South Korea and individuals. Although the defendants were served, there was no formal response. The individual defendants sent a letter asserting that they had no connection to the corporation and requesting dismissal. Several months later the court entered default judgment in the amount of $2,916,332. About a year later the defendants filed appearances and a motion to vacate for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. After noting that jurisdiction can be contested in the original proceeding or in a collateral action, the court concluded that the motion was not untimely. The letter did not constitute an appearance by the individuals and the corporation was not capable of making a pro se appearance. The defendants have submitted affidavits concerning whether they had "minimum contacts" with Illinois that must be considered by the court. View "Philos Technologies, Incorpora v. Philos & D, Incorporated, et al" on Justia Law

The Department of Commerce has employed a technique known as "zeroing" when it investigates a claim that a foreign producer is "dumping" products in the United States at a price below the price in the country of origin. Using zeroing, margins for sales of merchandise sold by a particular exporter at dumped prices are aggregated and margins for sales at non-dumped prices are given a value of zero; the alternative, known as "offsetting," involves aggregating both dumped and non-dumped prices. The statute, 19 U.S.C. 1677(35)(A), refers to calculation of a "dumping margin" equal to "the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price." Domestic producers read the word "exceeds" as requiring zeroing. The Federal Circuit has previously upheld use of zeroing in both investigation and administrative review. Following a World Trade Organization decision disapproving the practice, the Department began using offsetting for investigations and zeroing in administrative review. The Court of International Trade upheld the practice. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the Department had not adequately justified use of two different interpretations of an ambiguous statute.

The company imports components for home storage and organization systems. The U.S. Customs Service liquidated wall panels and locator tabs as "other articles of plastic" rather than as furniture. The company filed protests and requested that the parts be reclassified under duty free provisions. Customs denied the protests. The Court of International Trade ruled in favor of Customs. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. While the lower court examined appropriate authority in defining "unit furniture," it incorrectly determined that a storage panel with hooks was like a wall rack rather than furniture. Noting the various accessories and configurations available with the system, the court stated that the product's versatility is the "very essence of unit furniture."