Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, owner of Fiscal Agency Agreement (FAA) bonds that were not restructured, filed suit against BCRA seeking to recover their unpaid principal and interest. The district court held that the FAA's express waiver of sovereign immunity, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(1), also waived BCRA's immunity because BCRA is Argentina’s “alter ego.” The district court further held that BCRA’s use of its account with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) constituted “commercial activity” in the United States, which waived BCRA’s sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2). The court concluded that it has jurisdiction over the appeal under the collateral-order doctrine; Argentina’s sovereign‐immunity waiver in the FAA may not be imputed to also waive BCRA’s independent sovereign immunity; and BCRA’s use of its FRBNY account is too incidental to the gravamen of plaintiffs’ claim to serve as the basis for waiving BCRA’s sovereign immunity under the commercial‐activity exception to the FSIA. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. View "EM Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Republica Argentina" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, family members or trustees of the estates of victims of state-sponsored terrorism, seek to enforce their 2009 Florida state court judgment obtained against Cuba by attaching the blocked assets of that state under section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), 28 U.S.C. 1610 note. Plaintiffs seek to satisfy the underlying judgment from electronic fund transfers (EFTs) blocked under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515. The court concluded that the EFTs are not attachable under section 201 because no terrorist party or agency or instrumentality thereof has a property interest in the EFTs. In this case, it is undisputed that no Cuban entity transmitted any of the blocked EFTs directly to the blocking bank. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hausler et al., v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, victims of terrorist attacks in Israel by Hamas, filed suit against NatWest, claiming that NatWest provided material support and resources to a terrorist organization in violation of the Antiterrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. 2331(1)(A), 2333(a), and 2339B(a)(1), and collected and provided funds for the financing of terrorism in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2331(1)(A), 2333(a), and 2339C. Plaintiffs alleged that NatWest provided material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organization by maintaining bank accounts and transferring funds for Interpal. The district court granted NatWest's motion for summary judgment. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether NatWest possessed the requisite scienter. The statute's requirement is less exacting, and requires only a showing that NatWest had knowledge that, or exhibited deliberate indifference to whether, Interpal provided material support to a terrorist organization, irrespective of whether Interpal's support aided terrorist activities of the terrorist organization. Because Hamas is an organization designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), plaintiffs can fulfill their burden by demonstrating either that NatWest had actual knowledge that Interpal provided material support to Hamas, or that NatWest exhibited deliberate indifference to whether Interpal provided material support. View "Weiss v. Nat'l Westminster Bank" on Justia Law

This appeal concerns Ex-Im Bank's efforts to execute on a $21 million judgment in its favor against Grenada. Grenada had waived its sovereign immunity from suit in federal court but, nonetheless, Ex-Im Bank has encountered obstacles in attempting to enforce the judgment in the United States under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602-1611. The court concluded that: the question whether the Grynberg Funds may be attached is moot because those funds have already been disbursed; the district court properly vacated the restraining notices against the Restrained Entities because, with one possible exception, the Restrained Funds are not "used for commercial activity in the United States"; and because the record does not provide an adequate basis to determine whether the IATA Funds are used for commercial activity in the United States and whether they belong to Grenada, the court vacated the denial of post-judgment discovery to these funds, and remanded for the district court to reassess whether to permit further discovery. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada" on Justia Law

The Bank filed this interpleader action to determine ownership of funds held on deposit in an account in the name of the Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement (FDSP), an entity organized under the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The account was frozen pursuant to an executive order during the Bosnian War. Yugoimport, a Serbian entity, claimed full ownership of the funds as successor-in-interest to the FDSP. The Republics of Croatia and Slovenia contend that the funds should be divided among the states succeeding the SFRY under a multilateral treaty, the Succession Agreement. The court held that interpretation of the Succession Agreement was governed by the Vienna Convention and that the FSPA was an agency of the SFRY. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Republics. View "Yugoimport v. Republic of Croatia, Republic of Slovenia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, victims and victims' families and estates, filed suit against Iran and others alleging their liability for the attack on the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Plaintiffs obtained a default judgment and attempted to collect. Plaintiffs had writs of attachment issued to Bank of America and Wells Fargo, seeking any asset held by the banks in which Iran had interest. The banks conceded that some accounts were potentially subject to attachment and these "uncontested accounts" were the subject of an interpleader action in the district court. The remaining "contested accounts" are the subject of this appeal. The court affirmed the order of the district court denying plaintiffs' motion for a turnover of the funds because plaintiffs could not attach the contested accounts under either section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322, 2337, or 28 U.S.C. 1610(g) without an Iranian ownership interest in the accounts and because Iran lacked an ownership interest in the accounts. View "Heiser, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al." on Justia Law

Dean and Stacey Norcutt bought a home for cash and satisfied the existing first mortgage held by Zions National Bank. They later discovered the home was also subject to a judgment lien obtained by Sourcecorp, Inc. that far exceeded the property's value. Sourcecorp subsequently initiated a sheriff's sale to foreclose on its judgment lien, and the Norcutts sued to enjoin the sale. The trial court granted relief to the Norcutts, and the court of appeals reversed. On remand, the trial court entered summary judgment for Sourcecorp. The Court of appeals reversed, holding that the Norcutts were equitably subrogated to the position of Zions Bank in priority over Sourcecorp. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Norcutts were equitably subrogated to the mortgage lien's priority for the amount they paid to satisfy the mortgage. Remanded.View "Sourcecorp, Inc. v. Norcutt" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, companies that acquired Floating Rate Accrual Notes (FRANs), commenced numerous separate actions against Argentina seeking damages for the nation's default on the bonds and the claims were subsequently consolidated. At issue, through certified questions, was whether Argentina's obligation to make biannual interest-only payments to a bondholder continued after maturity or acceleration of the indebtedness, and if so, whether the bondholders were entitled to CPLR 5001 prejudgment interest on payments that were not made as a consequence of the nation's default. The court answered the certified questions in the affirmative and held that the FRANs certificate required the issuer to continue to make biannual interest payments post-maturity while the principal remained unpaid; having concluded that the obligation to make biannual interest payments continued after the bonds matured if principal was not promptly repaid, and that nothing in the bond documents indicated that the payments were to stop in the event of acceleration of the debt, it followed that Argentina's duty to make the payments continued after NML Capital accelerated its $32 million of the debt in February 2005; and based on the court's analysis in Spodek v. Park Prop. Dev. Assoc., the bondholders were entitled to prejudgment interest under CPLR 5001 on the unpaid biannual interest payments that were due, but were not paid, after the loads were either accelerated or matured on the due date.View "NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

After the Republic of Argentina defaulted on its external debt, NML, one of its bondholders, prevailed in 11 debt-collection actions filed against Argentina in New York. To execute its judgments, NML sought discovery of Argentina’s property, serving subpoenas on nonparty banks for records relating to global financial transactions. The district court granted motions to compel compliance. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting Argentina’s argument that the order transgressed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602. The Supreme Court affirmed; the FSIA does not immunize a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor from post-judgment discovery of information concerning its extraterritorial assets. The FSIA replaced factor-intensive loosely-common-law-based immunity with “a comprehensive framework for resolving any claim of sovereign immunity” so that any sort of immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in a U.S. court must stand or fall on its text. The FSIA established jurisdictional immunity, section 1604, which was waived here. FSIA execution immunity under sections 1609, 1610, 1611, generally shields “property in the United States of a foreign state” from attachment, arrest, and execution. Nothing forbids or limits discovery in aid of execution of a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor’s assets. Even if Argentina is correct that section 1609 execution immunity implies coextensive discovery-¬in-aid-of-execution immunity, there would be no protection from discovery a foreign sovereign’s extraterritorial assets. Section 1609 immunizes only foreign-state property “in the United States.” The prospect that NML’s general request for information about Argentina’s worldwide assets may turn up information about property that Argentina regards as immune does not mean that NML cannot pursue its discovery. View "Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd." on Justia Law

After the Republic of Argentina defaulted on its external debt, NML, one of its bondholders, prevailed in 11 debt-collection actions filed against Argentina in New York. To execute its judgments, NML sought discovery of Argentina’s property, serving subpoenas on nonparty banks for records relating to global financial transactions. The district court granted motions to compel compliance. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting Argentina’s argument that the order transgressed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602. The Supreme Court affirmed; the FSIA does not immunize a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor from post-judgment discovery of information concerning its extraterritorial assets. The FSIA replaced factor-intensive loosely-common-law-based immunity with “a comprehensive framework for resolving any claim of sovereign immunity” so that any sort of immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in a U.S. court must stand or fall on its text. The FSIA established jurisdictional immunity, section 1604, which was waived here. FSIA execution immunity under sections 1609, 1610, 1611, generally shields “property in the United States of a foreign state” from attachment, arrest, and execution. Nothing forbids or limits discovery in aid of execution of a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor’s assets. Even if Argentina is correct that section 1609 execution immunity implies coextensive discovery-¬in-aid-of-execution immunity, there would be no protection from discovery a foreign sovereign’s extraterritorial assets. Section 1609 immunizes only foreign-state property “in the United States.” The prospect that NML’s general request for information about Argentina’s worldwide assets may turn up information about property that Argentina regards as immune does not mean that NML cannot pursue its discovery. View "Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd." on Justia Law