Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

A naturalized U.S. citizen originally from Iraq was sought for extradition by the Iraqi government to stand trial for two counts of premeditated murder. Iraq alleged that he served as a local leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), involved in the planning and execution of the murders of two Iraqi police officers in Fallujah in 2006. The extradition request was supported by witness statements, including those from a cooperating witness and eyewitnesses who placed him at the scene and described his participation. The defendant had previously fled Iraq for Syria before coming to the United States.After Iraq’s extradition request, the United States filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, where a magistrate judge certified the defendant’s extradition. The defendant challenged the certification through a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He argued that there was not sufficient probable cause for the charges, that the alleged offenses constituted political acts covered by the political offense exception in the U.S.-Iraq Extradition Treaty, that humanitarian considerations should bar extradition, and that Iraq might prosecute him for offenses beyond those charged. The district court denied the habeas petition, finding the probable cause standard was met, the political offense exception inapplicable, and declining to consider humanitarian grounds or speculative future prosecutions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. The court held that competent evidence supported probable cause for the charged murders, the district court correctly excluded newly submitted contradictory declarations, and the political offense exception did not apply because AQI was not part of the domestic Sunni insurgency but an international terrorist organization. The panel also held that humanitarian objections and speculative concerns about additional charges were not grounds for relief in this context. View "AL-NOURI V. RUBIO" on Justia Law

Devas Multimedia Private Limited, an Indian corporation, along with several related entities, sought to confirm a $562.5 million international arbitral award against Antrix Corporation Limited, a company wholly owned by India. The award stemmed from a 2005 agreement between Devas and Antrix, under which Antrix was to provide satellite capacity to Devas in exchange for fees. In 2011, Antrix terminated the agreement following a policy decision by the Indian government. Devas initiated arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce, which resulted in an award in Devas’s favor. Devas then petitioned to confirm the award under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.The district court confirmed the award, finding it had subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) arbitration exception and the New York Convention, and personal jurisdiction under the FSIA. The court also rejected Antrix’s argument that the case should be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Antrix appealed, and the Ninth Circuit initially ruled in Antrix’s favor on personal jurisdiction grounds. However, the Supreme Court in CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223 (2025), reversed, holding that the FSIA does not require a minimum contacts analysis beyond its statutory provisions, and remanded for consideration of alternative arguments.On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the FSIA’s arbitration exception supplied subject matter jurisdiction, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Antrix was reasonable and comported with the Fifth Amendment, and that forum non conveniens does not apply to actions to confirm foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in part, and reversed and vacated in part on issues related to the standing of certain intervenors, remanding for further proceedings. View "DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD. V. ANTRIX CORP. LTD." on Justia Law

During a review of antidumping duties on multilayered wood flooring imported from China, the U.S. Department of Commerce determined company-specific dumping margins for two mandatory respondents: one received a 0% margin for cooperating, while the other received an 85.13% margin based on adverse facts available due to non-cooperation. Commerce initially calculated a "separate rate" for other eligible companies by averaging these two margins, resulting in a rate of 42.57%. Various plaintiffs, including the appellants, challenged this method, objecting to both the inclusion of the adverse facts available rate and the use of a simple average.The United States Court of International Trade reviewed the case and remanded certain issues to Commerce, including the calculation method for the separate rate. After reconsideration, Commerce adopted a weighted average approach, which reduced the separate rate to 31.63%. This change was more favorable to the appellants. After Commerce filed its final remand results, the appellants submitted comments agreeing that the new calculation method and the resulting rate were lawful and in line with the court’s instructions. They specifically requested the Trade Court to uphold Commerce’s decision. The Trade Court then sustained Commerce’s redetermination, finding it consistent with the statute and administrative guidance, and noted that no parties objected. The court also ruled that issues previously reserved for decision had become moot.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the appellants attempted to challenge the use of the adverse facts available rate and the reasonableness of the 31.63% separate rate. The Federal Circuit held that the appellants forfeited these arguments by not raising them after the new rate was determined and by expressly supporting Commerce’s revised calculation before the Trade Court. The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Trade Court. View "FUSONG JINLONG WOODEN GROUP CO., LTD. v. US " on Justia Law

A domestic importer of refractory bricks used in steelmaking sought a determination that its imported bricks, which contained varying amounts of alumina, were not subject to existing antidumping and countervailing duty orders on magnesia carbon bricks (MCBs) from Mexico and China. The original petitions for these orders, brought by a domestic producer, had expressly limited their scope to MCBs and disclaimed coverage of magnesia alumina carbon (MAC) bricks, which incorporate alumina and are considered distinct in industry terminology.After the orders were issued, the importer requested a scope ruling that its MAC bricks were excluded from the orders due to their alumina content. The United States Department of Commerce initially ruled in favor of exclusion only for bricks with at least five percent alumina, applying this threshold in subsequent scope rulings. However, when the Magnesia Carbon Bricks Fair Trade Committee alleged that the importer was evading duties by misclassifying its products, United States Customs and Border Protection could not conclusively determine coverage and referred the matter to Commerce. The United States Court of International Trade reviewed Commerce’s application of the five percent threshold, found it inconsistent with a prior decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and remanded for reconsideration. On remand, Commerce, under protest, determined that any brick with added alumina, regardless of amount, was not covered by the orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Trade Court’s decision and affirmed. The court held that, under its prior precedent, the antidumping and countervailing duty orders do not cover MCBs containing any amount of added alumina, as industry usage and the original petition’s representations excluded all MAC bricks “by name.” Thus, Commerce could not lawfully impose a minimum alumina content threshold for exclusion, and the Trade Court’s interpretation was correct. View "FEDMET RESOURCES CORPORATION v. US " on Justia Law

A domestic importer of paper whitening chemicals, identified as a “domestic interested party” under trade law, challenged the Department of Commerce’s regulatory deadline for submitting a notice of intent to participate in a “sunset review” of antidumping duty orders. Commerce had previously imposed antidumping duties on chemicals from China and Taiwan, and after publishing a notice to initiate a sunset review, required domestic interested parties to file a notice within 15 days and substantive responses within 30 days. The importer filed its notice six days late but submitted its substantive response before the 30-day deadline. Commerce rejected both submissions due to noncompliance with the 15-day notice requirement, revoked the antidumping duty orders, and terminated the review.The United States Court of International Trade reviewed the case after the importer filed suit. The trial court found that Commerce’s 15-day notice requirement conflicted with the governing statute, which was silent on interim deadlines but required revocation if no interested party responded within 90 days. The court reasoned that the statute expects substantive content in response to the notice of initiation, and since the importer met the 30-day substantive deadline, Commerce had no discretion to reject its filing based on the missed 15-day notice. The Trade Court issued a declaratory judgment for the importer, reinstated the antidumping orders, and ordered Commerce to conduct a full sunset review with the importer’s participation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Trade Court’s judgment. The Federal Circuit held that the 15-day requirement was a permissible exercise of Commerce’s delegated authority to “fill up the details” of the statutory scheme. The court found no conflict between the regulation and the statute, determined the regulation was the product of reasoned decisionmaking, and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Commerce and its co-defendants. View "ARCHROMA U.S., INC. v. COMMERCE " on Justia Law

This case concerns the tariff classification of ten models of luxury wristwatches imported from Switzerland by Ildico Inc., the exclusive U.S. distributor of Richard Mille watches. The watches are constructed primarily of 18-karat gold but feature large transparent synthetic sapphire crystal windows on both the front and back. The back crystal allows viewing of the internal components and serves to protect the watch. The central issue is whether the presence of the crystal window on the back means the watch case is not made “wholly of precious metal,” which would affect whether the watches are classified under HTSUS heading 9101 (lower duty rates) or heading 9102 (higher duty rates).Customs and Border Protection conducted an audit in 2016 and determined that the watches should be classified under heading 9102, rather than the heading 9101 under which Ildico had declared them. Customs’ decision resulted in higher duties. After Customs denied Ildico’s protest, Ildico filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade. The Trade Court agreed with Customs, holding that the sapphire crystal backs were part of the watch cases and, since they were not made wholly of precious metal, the watches did not qualify for heading 9101. The court specifically found that the rear crystal was part of the case, even if it could also be described as “watch glass.”On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that, under the relevant HTSUS provisions, the synthetic sapphire crystal back is part of the “watch case.” Because the case is thus not “wholly of precious metal,” the watches cannot be classified under heading 9101 and are properly classified under heading 9102. The court also held that an alternative argument—that the crystal is a “precious stone”—was not preserved for review. View "ILDICO INC. v. US " on Justia Law

Spanish investment companies alleged that Argentina unlawfully expropriated their airline investments, violating a bilateral treaty. After Argentina took over private airlines, the investors initiated arbitration at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The ICSID tribunal awarded over $320 million to the investors, and an internal appellate committee later affirmed the award and added more than $1 million in costs. The investors then assigned their rights to Titan Consortium 1, LLC, which sought enforcement of the award in the United States four years after the initial award.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed Titan’s petition to enforce the arbitral award. Argentina moved to dismiss, arguing the petition was untimely under a three-year statute of limitations. The district court denied the motion, holding that the twelve-year statute of limitations for enforcement of money judgments under D.C. Code § 15-101 applied. It granted summary judgment for Titan, enforcing the award.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed Argentina’s appeal, which challenged only the timeliness ruling. The court considered which statute of limitations applies to enforcement actions under 22 U.S.C. § 1650a, the statute implementing the Washington Convention. The court held that D.C. Code § 15-101’s twelve-year limitations period for enforcement of money judgments is the closest analogue and applies to petitions enforcing ICSID awards under § 1650a. It rejected Argentina’s arguments for a three-year limitations period under federal or D.C. arbitration statutes, noting the differences in statutory text and enforcement procedures. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding Titan’s enforcement action was timely. View "Titan Consortium 1, LLC v. Argentine Republic" on Justia Law

A Korean steel manufacturer faced severe financial challenges beginning in 2013 and underwent four debt-to-equity conversions during a corporate restructuring overseen by a committee of creditor banks, including a government-controlled institution. The first three conversions, between 2014 and 2018, were conducted by this creditors’ committee, while the fourth, in 2019, involved a public bidding process in which a private consortium acquired the company. The equity infusions were scrutinized as possible government subsidies subject to countervailing duties under U.S. trade law.Following a 2016 countervailing duty order by the Department of Commerce on certain Korean steel products, Commerce conducted several administrative reviews. In the fourth review, Commerce reversed its earlier findings and determined that the first three debt-to-equity conversions provided a countervailable benefit because private investor participation was found to be insignificant and the company was not equityworthy at the time. Commerce also found that the benefit of these subsidies was not extinguished by the company’s later acquisition, in part because the company did not contest the presumption of benefit pass-through.The United States Court of International Trade remanded Commerce’s findings, holding that Commerce could not change its practice of not re-examining earlier equity infusions absent new information, and that the agency’s determinations lacked sufficient justification and evidentiary support. On further remand, Commerce, under protest, found no countervailable benefit from the first three conversions, and the trial court sustained this result.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Commerce was permitted to revisit its determinations based on record evidence from later periods, and that its findings of countervailable benefit and benefit pass-through were supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to reinstate Commerce’s original determinations. View "KG DONGBU STEEL CO., LTD. v. US " on Justia Law

Two German nationals, Axel Diegelmann and his son Fritz, operated businesses trading in precious metals. In 2024, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) blocked the property of the Diegelmanns and three companies owned by Axel, finding that Axel, Fritz, and one company operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian economy, and that the other two companies were controlled by or acted on behalf of Axel. OFAC determined that the Diegelmanns had helped Russia-based metals companies buy and sell precious metals, circumventing international sanctions.The Diegelmanns challenged the sanctions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that their activities did not amount to operating in the metals and mining sector as defined by the relevant regulations. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, agreeing with OFAC’s application of the sanctions and denying the Diegelmanns’ motion for summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary-or-capricious standard, which is highly deferential, especially for national security matters. The appellate court held that purchasing finished precious metals, including gold bars, constituted “procuring geological materials” as used in the governing regulations. The court rejected the Diegelmanns’ argument that their conduct did not amount to procurement and found their alternative argument—that refined metals are not “geological materials”—was not preserved for appeal. The court also concluded that substantial evidence supported OFAC’s finding that the Diegelmanns’ activities were sufficiently connected to Russia. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Diegelmann v. Bessent" on Justia Law

A North Carolina software company initiated a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina against its former business partner, a Dutch entity, after their business relationship dissolved. The plaintiff alleged copyright and trademark infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, and various state law violations. Shortly after the complaint, the plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction limiting the defendant’s business activities. Meanwhile, the defendant commenced related litigation in the Netherlands. During those Dutch proceedings, the defendant’s American attorney, Pressly Millen, submitted an affidavit that the plaintiff claimed misrepresented the scope and timing of the U.S. litigation.The Dutch court initially denied the plaintiff’s request to stay the Dutch proceedings, partly relying on representations from the defendant’s counsel. The plaintiff returned to the North Carolina court, seeking an order requiring the defendant to correct these alleged misrepresentations in the Dutch court. The district court ordered the defendant to submit both its order and a corrective statement to the Dutch court. The defendant submitted the order but did not file the separate corrective statement. Later, the Dutch court stayed its proceedings. The plaintiff then moved for contempt sanctions in the North Carolina court against the defendant and its attorneys for failing to comply fully with the correction order. Following a show cause hearing, the district court held the defendant and Millen in civil contempt, sanctioning Millen by suspending his ability to practice in the district, though not holding him jointly liable for monetary sanctions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction to review the contempt order against Millen, a nonparty. The appellate court held that the district court abused its discretion by imposing civil contempt sanctions on Millen without clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff was harmed by Millen’s failure to submit the separate statement. The court vacated the civil contempt adjudication and sanction against Millen. View "Dmarcian, Inc. v. Millen" on Justia Law