Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

by
A Canadian company, J.D. Irving (JDI), challenged the U.S. Department of Commerce's assignment of an antidumping duty cash deposit rate of 11.59% on its softwood lumber products from Canada. This rate was determined in the final results of the second administrative review (AR 2) of an antidumping duty order. JDI argued that its cash deposit rate should remain at 1.57%, the rate assigned in the first administrative review (AR 1). JDI filed a complaint with the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), asserting that the CIT had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the court's residual jurisdiction.The CIT dismissed JDI's case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was not appropriate because jurisdiction could have been available under § 1581(c). The CIT noted that JDI's action was essentially a challenge to the final results of AR 2, which is reviewable under § 1581(c). Additionally, the CIT found that JDI had not demonstrated that the remedy provided by administrative review and binational panel review under the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) would be manifestly inadequate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT's dismissal. The court held that the true nature of JDI's suit was a challenge to the AR 2 final results, making § 1581(c) the proper jurisdiction. The court also determined that JDI had not met its burden to show that the alternative remedies of administrative review and binational panel review would be manifestly inadequate. The court emphasized that binational panels have the authority to review and remand final antidumping determinations, and Commerce must take action consistent with the panel's decision. Therefore, the CIT's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was affirmed. View "J.D. IRVING, LTD. v. US " on Justia Law

by
The case involves the importation of door thresholds by Worldwide Door Components, Inc. and Columbia Aluminum Products, LLC. These companies sought a determination from the Department of Commerce that their imported door thresholds were not subject to existing antidumping and countervailing duty orders on aluminum extrusions from China. The door thresholds in question are assemblies containing both extruded aluminum and non-aluminum components, which the companies argued should be excluded from the orders under the finished merchandise exception.The United States Court of International Trade initially reviewed the case and remanded it to the Department of Commerce for further consideration. The court found that the Department had misinterpreted the scope of the orders and failed to properly consider whether the door thresholds qualified for the finished merchandise exception. On remand, the Department again found the thresholds to be within the scope of the orders, categorizing them as subassemblies. The Court of International Trade disagreed, remanding the case multiple times for further analysis and clarification.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Department of Commerce's determination that the door thresholds were subassemblies was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the Department had provided a thorough analysis of the scope language and relevant record evidence, including statements from the companies themselves. The court also clarified that subassemblies and finished merchandise are mutually exclusive categories under the orders, meaning that the Department was not required to consider the finished merchandise exception once it determined the thresholds were subassemblies.The Federal Circuit reversed the Court of International Trade's second remand order and reinstated the Department of Commerce's first remand redetermination, which found the door thresholds to be subassemblies and therefore within the scope of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders. The court vacated all subsequent opinions and orders by the Court of International Trade. View "WORLDWIDE DOOR COMPONENTS, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

by
The case involves plaintiffs who are individuals and entities harmed by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. They brought claims against the Republic of Sudan under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), specifically invoking the state-sponsored terrorism exception under § 1605A. The plaintiffs allege that Sudan provided material support to al Qaeda, which facilitated the attacks. Sudan moved to dismiss the actions, asserting foreign sovereign immunity under the FSIA.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Sudan’s motion to dismiss. The district court found that Sudan lacked immunity under two terrorism-related exceptions to the FSIA: § 1605A and § 1605B. Sudan then filed a notice of appeal, seeking interlocutory review of the district court’s denial of immunity under § 1605B and the repealed § 1605(a)(7), but not under § 1605A. Sudan argued that the collateral-order doctrine permitted immediate appeals from denials of immunity under the FSIA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The main issue was whether § 1605A(f) of the FSIA, which limits appeals in actions brought under § 1605A, barred Sudan’s appeal. The court held that § 1605A(f) eliminates all interlocutory appeals under the collateral-order doctrine from orders falling within its scope, including Sudan’s proposed appeal. The court concluded that because the district court’s order was nonfinal and the plaintiffs’ actions were brought under § 1605A, the appellate bar applied. Consequently, the court dismissed Sudan’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "In re: Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001" on Justia Law

by
Juan Jose Paramo, the defendant-appellant, is involved in a legal dispute with Banco Mercantil de Norte, S.A. and Arrendadora y Factor Banorte, S.A. de C.V. (the Banorte Parties). The Banorte Parties allege that Paramo committed large-scale fraud in Mexico and fled to the United States. They are pursuing a civil lawsuit in Mexico and sought discovery in the U.S. under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to locate and seize Paramo’s assets. The Banorte Parties filed an ex parte request for discovery assistance, which the district court granted, authorizing subpoenas for Paramo and two other individuals.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted the Banorte Parties' petition and authorized the subpoenas. Paramo filed a motion to quash the subpoenas, arguing that the discovery request was overly broad and that the Intel factors favored him. The district court denied Paramo’s motion in a brief order without waiting for his reply or holding a hearing. Paramo appealed the decision, arguing that the district court failed to provide reasoning for its denial and violated local rules by not allowing him to file a reply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide any reasoning for its decision to deny Paramo’s motion to quash. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that district courts must explain their decisions when granting or denying motions to quash § 1782 subpoenas to allow for effective appellate review. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to provide a reasoned decision. The court did not address the substantive arguments regarding the Intel factors or the scope of the discovery request. View "Banco Mercantil de Norte, S.A. v. Paramo" on Justia Law

by
In the early 1990s, the Republic of Argentina issued collateralized bonds as part of a sovereign-debt-relief plan. Argentina retained reversionary interests in the collateral, which would revert to Argentina if the bonds were fully paid. However, Argentina defaulted on the bonds in 2001. Two decades later, holders of other defaulted Argentine bonds sought to attach these reversionary interests to satisfy judgments from Argentina’s default. They argued that the reversionary interests were used for commercial activity in the U.S., thus falling under an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the attachment of the reversionary interests. During the appeal, the bonds matured, and the district court ordered the turnover of the reversionary interests to the bondholders. Argentina appealed both the attachment and turnover orders, leading to a consolidated appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. The court held that Argentina’s reversionary interests were not protected by the FSIA because Argentina used them in commercial activity in the U.S. The court also found Argentina’s arguments against the turnover under New York law to be meritless. Additionally, the court ordered the parties to resubmit their briefs and appendices with narrow redactions, as the reasons for sealing the case were no longer compelling. The court denied the motion to supplement the record and granted the motion to limit the scope of sealing. View "Attestor Master Value Fund LP v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

by
Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a Pakistani national, was tried in a U.S. district court for his involvement in supporting a terrorist organization responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. He was convicted of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization and conspiring to support a foiled plot in Denmark but was acquitted of conspiring to support the Mumbai attacks. After serving seven years in prison and being granted compassionate release, India requested his extradition to face charges related to the Mumbai attacks.The magistrate judge certified Rana as extraditable, rejecting his arguments that the U.S.-India extradition treaty's Non Bis in Idem (double jeopardy) provision protected him from extradition and that India failed to provide sufficient evidence of probable cause. Rana then filed a habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, which upheld the magistrate judge's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Rana's habeas corpus petition. The court held that the term "offense" in the extradition treaty refers to a charged crime defined by its elements, not the underlying acts. Therefore, the Non Bis in Idem exception did not apply because the Indian charges contained distinct elements from the crimes for which Rana was acquitted in the U.S. The court also found that India provided sufficient competent evidence to support the magistrate judge's finding of probable cause that Rana committed the charged crimes. View "RANA V. JENKINS" on Justia Law

by
Celanese International Corporation, Celanese (Malta) Company 2 Limited, and Celanese Sales U.S. Ltd. (collectively, “Celanese”) filed a petition with the United States International Trade Commission (the “Commission”), alleging that Anhui Jinhe Industrial Co., Ltd., Jinhe USA LLC (collectively, “Jinhe”), and other entities violated 19 U.S.C. § 337 by importing Ace-K (an artificial sweetener) made using a process that infringed Celanese’s patents. The patents in question had an effective filing date of September 21, 2016. It was undisputed that Celanese had sold Ace-K made using the patented process in the United States before the critical date of September 21, 2015.The presiding Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted Jinhe’s motion for a summary determination of no violation of 19 U.S.C. § 337, concluding that Celanese’s prior sales triggered the on-sale bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). The ALJ found that the America Invents Act (AIA) did not overturn settled pre-AIA precedent, which held that sales of products made using a secret process could trigger the on-sale bar, precluding the patentability of that process. The Commission denied Celanese’s petition for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commission.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission’s decision. The court held that the AIA did not alter the pre-AIA rule that a patentee’s sale of an unpatented product made according to a secret method triggers the on-sale bar to patentability. The court concluded that Celanese’s pre-2015 sales of Ace-K made using its secret process triggered the on-sale bar, rendering the later-sought patent claims on that process invalid. View "CELANESE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION v. ITC " on Justia Law

by
In 2001, China and Nigeria signed a bilateral investment treaty to encourage investment between the two countries, agreeing to treat each other's investors fairly and protect their investments. Zhongshan Fucheng Industrial Investment, a Chinese company, invested in Nigeria by participating in a joint venture with Ogun State to develop a free-trade zone. After years of development and significant investment, Ogun State abruptly terminated its relationship with Zhongshan, and Nigerian federal authorities expelled the company's executives. Zhongshan initiated arbitration proceedings, and an arbitrator found that Nigeria had breached its obligations under the treaty, awarding Zhongshan over $55 million in damages.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that it had jurisdiction over the case, finding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s (FSIA) arbitration exception applied because the award was governed by the New York Convention, an international arbitration treaty. Nigeria appealed, arguing that it was immune from suit under the FSIA.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the FSIA’s arbitration exception applied because the arbitration award arose from a legal relationship considered commercial, governed by the New York Convention. The court found that Nigeria had an arbitration agreement with Zhongshan, an arbitration award was issued, and the award was governed by the New York Convention. The court rejected Nigeria's argument that the New York Convention only applies to private acts, holding that the treaty covers arbitral awards arising from sovereign acts when a state consents to arbitration. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's jurisdiction and the enforceability of the arbitration award. View "Zhongshan Fucheng Industrial Investment Co. Ltd v. Federal Republic of Nigeria" on Justia Law

by
The case involves a dispute between Commodities & Minerals Enterprise, Ltd. (CME) and CVG Ferrominera Orinoco, C.A. (FMO). CME sought to confirm a New York Convention arbitration award of $187.9 million against FMO. FMO opposed the confirmation, alleging that CME procured the underlying contract through fraud, bribery, and corruption, arguing that enforcing the award would violate U.S. public policy. The district court confirmed the award, ruling that FMO was barred from challenging the confirmation on public policy grounds because it failed to seek vacatur within the three-month time limit prescribed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially reviewed the case. CME moved to confirm the arbitration award in December 2019. FMO opposed the confirmation nearly two years later, citing public policy concerns. The district court granted CME’s motion, explaining that FMO was barred from opposing confirmation on public policy grounds due to its failure to seek vacatur within the FAA’s three-month time limit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, based on its recent en banc decision in Corporación AIC, SA v. Hidroélectrica Santa Rita S.A., FMO should have been allowed to assert its public policy defense in opposition to confirmation. The court clarified that the grounds for vacating a New York Convention arbitration award are those set forth in U.S. domestic law, specifically Chapter 1 of the FAA, which does not recognize public policy as a ground for vacatur. However, the court affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the award, concluding that FMO’s public policy defense failed on the merits because it attacked the underlying contract, not the award itself. View "Commodities & Minerals Enterprise, Ltd. v. CVG Ferrominera Orinoco C.A." on Justia Law

by
Yanjun Xu, a Chinese citizen and member of China’s Ministry of State Security, was convicted of conspiracy to commit economic espionage and conspiracy to steal trade secrets from multiple aviation companies over a five-year period. Xu was also convicted of attempted economic espionage by theft or fraud and attempted theft of composite fan-blade technology from GE Aviation. He was sentenced to a combined 240 months’ imprisonment. Xu appealed, seeking to vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial, arguing that the district court erred in failing to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 as duplicitous and abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). Alternatively, Xu sought to have his sentence vacated, arguing it was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied Xu’s motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that the conspiracy counts were not duplicitous as they alleged a single overarching conspiracy. The court also admitted expert testimony from James Olson, a retired CIA officer, who testified about espionage techniques and tradecraft, which Xu argued violated Rule 704(b). The court overruled Xu’s objections, finding that Olson’s testimony did not directly opine on Xu’s intent but rather described common practices in espionage.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the indictment was not duplicitous as it charged a single conspiracy with multiple overt acts. The court also found that Olson’s testimony did not violate Rule 704(b) and that any potential error was cured by the district court’s limiting instructions to the jury. Additionally, the appellate court found Xu’s sentence to be procedurally and substantively reasonable, noting that the district court properly calculated the intended loss and considered the § 3553(a) factors. The court concluded that Xu’s sentence was within the Guidelines range and not disparate compared to similarly situated defendants. View "United States v. Yanjun Xu" on Justia Law