Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves multiple plaintiffs who sued Khalifa Hifter under the federal Torture Victim Protection Act for his actions as the commander of the Libyan National Army. The plaintiffs sought to hold Hifter liable for alleged torture and extrajudicial killings of their family members in Libya. The lawsuits were filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia over a 15-month period.In the district court, Hifter moved to dismiss the first two cases, and the court granted those motions in part and denied them in part. Hifter later moved to dismiss the third case, and the court again granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The district court eventually consolidated all three cases for discovery and pretrial matters. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court dismissed all three suits with prejudice, citing lack of personal jurisdiction over Hifter.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Hifter’s cross appeals in Nos. 24-1425, 24-1427, and 24-1429, as they merely sought affirmance of the district court’s judgments on alternative grounds. In Nos. 24-1422 and 24-1426, the court reversed the district court’s judgment, finding that Hifter waived his personal jurisdiction defense by failing to timely assert it in his pre-answer motions. The cases were remanded for further proceedings.In No. 24-1423, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Hifter properly raised a personal jurisdiction defense and that the district court correctly granted summary judgment due to the plaintiffs' failure to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. However, the court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to modify the judgment to state that the dismissal is without prejudice. View "al-Suyid v. Hifter" on Justia Law

Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. entered into a satellite-leasing agreement with Antrix Corporation Ltd., a company owned by the Republic of India. The agreement was terminated by Antrix under a force majeure clause when the Indian Government decided it needed more satellite capacity for itself. Devas initiated arbitration, and the arbitral panel awarded Devas $562.5 million in damages plus interest. Devas sought to confirm the award in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, which confirmed the award and entered a $1.29 billion judgment against Antrix.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, finding that personal jurisdiction was lacking. The Ninth Circuit held that under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), personal jurisdiction over a foreign state requires not only an immunity exception and proper service but also a traditional minimum contacts analysis as set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. The court concluded that Antrix did not have sufficient suit-related contacts with the United States to establish personal jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that personal jurisdiction under the FSIA exists when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. The Court determined that the FSIA does not require proof of minimum contacts beyond the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp." on Justia Law

The Government of Mexico filed a lawsuit against seven American gun manufacturers, alleging that the companies aided and abetted unlawful gun sales that routed firearms to Mexican drug cartels. Mexico claimed that the manufacturers failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent trafficking of their guns into Mexico, resulting in harm from the weapons' misuse. The complaint included allegations that the manufacturers knowingly supplied firearms to retail dealers who sold them illegally to Mexican traffickers, failed to impose controls on their distribution networks, and made design and marketing decisions to stimulate demand among cartel members.The U.S. District Court dismissed the complaint, but the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the decision. The First Circuit found that Mexico had plausibly alleged that the defendants aided and abetted illegal firearms sales, thus satisfying the predicate exception under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA).The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Mexico's complaint did not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers' unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers. The Court concluded that the allegations did not meet the requirements for aiding and abetting liability, as they did not show that the manufacturers took affirmative acts to facilitate the illegal sales or intended to promote the criminal activities. Consequently, PLCAA barred the lawsuit, and the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos" on Justia Law

Amgen Inc., a biotechnology company, holds patents in the U.S. and South Korea for denosumab, a drug used in treating certain bone cancers. Amgen filed patent infringement suits against Celltrion Inc. (Celltrion Korea) in both countries. To support its case, Amgen sought discovery from Celltrion Korea’s subsidiary, Celltrion USA, located in New Jersey. Amgen filed an application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in the District of New Jersey to subpoena Celltrion USA for documents and testimony related to Celltrion Korea’s denosumab products.The Magistrate Judge granted Amgen’s § 1782 application, rejecting Celltrion USA’s argument that § 1782 cannot compel it to produce information held by its foreign parent company. The Judge also found the request not unduly burdensome and ordered the parties to meet and confer to agree on a confidentiality agreement. The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s order, leading Celltrion USA to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case to determine if the order under § 1782 was final and thus appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Court concluded that the order was not final because the scope of permissible discovery had not been conclusively defined. The Court emphasized that without a definite scope of discovery, it could not properly review whether the District Court had abused its discretion. Consequently, the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that an order granting discovery under § 1782 but leaving the scope of discovery unresolved is not a final order under § 1291. View "Amgen Inc v. Celltrion USA Inc" on Justia Law

Two Italian pasta manufacturers, La Molisana S.p.A. and Valdigrano Di Flavio Pagani S.r.L., challenged the United States Department of Commerce's final results from the twenty-third administrative review of an antidumping order on certain pasta from Italy. The dispute centered on Commerce's methodology for determining the protein content of pasta, which affects the classification of pasta as either standard or premium quality. Commerce used the protein content listed on product labels, which is subject to U.S. FDA rounding rules and different nitrogen-to-protein conversion factors in the U.S. and Italy. La Molisana argued that this methodology caused inaccuracies in comparing pasta products.The United States Court of International Trade sustained Commerce's final results, concluding that La Molisana had not demonstrated that the alleged flaws in Commerce's methodology were commercially significant. The court found that Commerce's reliance on packaging labels for protein content fostered transparency and consistency, and that La Molisana's evidence, including a market report and a new definition from the Bologna Grain Exchange, was insufficient to compel a change in the protein breakpoint from 12.5% to 13.5%.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that Commerce's methodology failed to compare products based on identical physical characteristics, as required by statute. The court held that the FDA rounding rules and different nitrogen conversion factors introduced inaccuracies that Commerce could not dismiss as commercially insignificant. However, the court agreed with Commerce and the Trade Court that La Molisana's evidence did not provide a compelling reason to change the protein breakpoint. The Federal Circuit vacated the Trade Court's judgment regarding the rounding rules and nitrogen conversion factors, affirmed the judgment on the protein breakpoint, and remanded for further proceedings. View "La Molisana S.p.A. v. United States" on Justia Law

A mother, Samantha Estefania Francisco Castro, removed her daughter, A.F., from Venezuela, where the father, Jose Leonardo Brito Guevara, had lawful custody. Castro and A.F. illegally immigrated to the United States. Brito petitioned for A.F.'s return under the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied Brito's petition, finding that although Brito had established a prima facie case of wrongful removal, A.F. was now well-settled in Texas. Brito appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in its application of the well-settled exception. The appellate court found that A.F.'s young age, the instability of her residence and her mother's employment, and the uncertain immigration status of both A.F. and her mother weighed against a finding that A.F. was well-settled in the United States. The court emphasized that the Hague Convention's primary objective is to restore the pre-abduction status quo and deter parents from seeking more favorable courts across borders. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to order A.F.'s return to Venezuela. View "Guevara v. Castro" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the widows of five men killed during peaceful rallies in Nigeria, sued Willie Obiano, the former Governor of Anambra State, under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA). They alleged that Obiano ordered Nigerian military forces to shoot and kill their husbands at the rallies. Obiano, who now resides in Texas, served as Governor from March 17, 2014, to March 17, 2022. The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages, claiming the killings were extrajudicial and occurred under Obiano's command.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the suit, citing the common-law principle of foreign official immunity. The court agreed with the magistrate judge's recommendation, concluding that Obiano was entitled to conduct-based immunity for actions taken in his official capacity as a Nigerian official. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument for a ius cogens exception to foreign official immunity, which would have allowed for immunity to be forfeited for heinous acts such as torture or extrajudicial killings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the TVPA does not implicitly abrogate foreign official immunity. The court reasoned that the TVPA's language does not clearly indicate Congress's intent to eliminate existing common-law immunities. The court also noted that the TVPA covers a field previously governed by common law, and thus, it should be interpreted with the presumption that Congress intended to retain the substance of the common law. Consequently, the court concluded that Obiano was protected by conduct-based immunity for his official actions as a Nigerian governor. View "Jane Does 1-5 v. Obiano" on Justia Law

The case involves insurance policies issued by certain surplus lines insurers at Lloyd’s, London, which contain identical arbitration clauses. The insured parties, 3131 Veterans Blvd LLC and Mpire Properties LLC, attempted to sue the insurers in Louisiana state court. The insurers then sued in New York federal court to enforce the arbitration clauses under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The insured parties argued that the arbitration clauses were unenforceable under Louisiana law, which prohibits such clauses in insurance contracts, and that the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA) allows state insurance laws to reverse preempt federal legislation and non-self-executing treaty provisions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in favor of the insured parties, holding that Louisiana law prohibits arbitration clauses in insurance contracts and that the FAA and the New York Convention were reverse-preempted under the MFA, based on the Second Circuit’s previous decision in Stephens v. American International Insurance (Stephens I).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that its reasoning in Stephens I had been undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas, which established a different test for determining whether a treaty provision is self-executing. Applying the Medellín test, the court found that Article II Section 3 of the New York Convention is self-executing. As a result, the court abrogated Stephens I to the extent that it held that Article II Section 3 is not self-executing, reversed the district court decisions, and remanded the matters for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, v. 3131 Veterans Blvd LLC" on Justia Law

A former president of Panama, while residing in the United States, was extradited to Panama under a bilateral treaty. Panama initially charged him with specific crimes, but after his extradition, he was prosecuted for additional money laundering crimes not included in the original extradition request. He claimed these prosecutions violated the treaty's rule of specialty, which restricts prosecution to the crimes listed in the extradition request unless the extradited individual has had the opportunity to return to the extraditing country.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed his lawsuit for lack of standing. The court concluded that he failed to show that his injury was traceable to the defendants' actions or that a favorable ruling would redress his injuries. The court also determined that he lacked standing under the treaty's rule of specialty provision because the United States had waived its right to object to the additional prosecutions, and his rights under the treaty were derivative of the United States' rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to establish Article III standing because his injury was not fairly traceable to the defendants' actions, as the decision to prosecute him was made independently by Panamanian officials. Additionally, the court found that a favorable declaratory judgment would not redress his injury, as it would not bind the Panamanian officials to drop the prosecutions. The court also concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing under the rule of specialty because the United States had consented to the prosecutions, extinguishing his derivative rights under the treaty. View "Berrocal v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

The case involves four affiliated companies, collectively known as the Pangang Companies, which were indicted for economic espionage related to their alleged efforts to steal trade secrets from E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company (DuPont) concerning the production of titanium dioxide. The Pangang Companies argued that they were immune from criminal prosecution in the United States under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) because they are owned and controlled by the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the Pangang Companies' motion to dismiss the indictment, holding that the FSIA did not apply to criminal cases and that even if it did, the commercial activity and implied waiver exceptions to the FSIA would apply. The Pangang Companies appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals initially held that the companies failed to make a prima facie showing that they were covered entities under the FSIA.Upon remand, the district court again denied the motion to dismiss, reiterating that the Pangang Companies did not qualify for immunity under the FSIA and also rejecting their claims to common-law immunity. The court found that the companies did not exercise functions comparable to those of an agency of the PRC and thus were not entitled to immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that under federal common law, the Pangang Companies did not make a prima facie showing that they exercised functions comparable to those of an agency of the PRC. Therefore, they were not eligible for foreign sovereign immunity from criminal prosecution. The court also noted that principles of deference to the political branches on matters touching on foreign relations reinforced this conclusion. View "USA V. PANGANG GROUP COMPANY, LTD." on Justia Law