Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

A domestic importer of paper whitening chemicals, identified as a “domestic interested party” under trade law, challenged the Department of Commerce’s regulatory deadline for submitting a notice of intent to participate in a “sunset review” of antidumping duty orders. Commerce had previously imposed antidumping duties on chemicals from China and Taiwan, and after publishing a notice to initiate a sunset review, required domestic interested parties to file a notice within 15 days and substantive responses within 30 days. The importer filed its notice six days late but submitted its substantive response before the 30-day deadline. Commerce rejected both submissions due to noncompliance with the 15-day notice requirement, revoked the antidumping duty orders, and terminated the review.The United States Court of International Trade reviewed the case after the importer filed suit. The trial court found that Commerce’s 15-day notice requirement conflicted with the governing statute, which was silent on interim deadlines but required revocation if no interested party responded within 90 days. The court reasoned that the statute expects substantive content in response to the notice of initiation, and since the importer met the 30-day substantive deadline, Commerce had no discretion to reject its filing based on the missed 15-day notice. The Trade Court issued a declaratory judgment for the importer, reinstated the antidumping orders, and ordered Commerce to conduct a full sunset review with the importer’s participation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Trade Court’s judgment. The Federal Circuit held that the 15-day requirement was a permissible exercise of Commerce’s delegated authority to “fill up the details” of the statutory scheme. The court found no conflict between the regulation and the statute, determined the regulation was the product of reasoned decisionmaking, and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Commerce and its co-defendants. View "ARCHROMA U.S., INC. v. COMMERCE " on Justia Law

This case concerns the tariff classification of ten models of luxury wristwatches imported from Switzerland by Ildico Inc., the exclusive U.S. distributor of Richard Mille watches. The watches are constructed primarily of 18-karat gold but feature large transparent synthetic sapphire crystal windows on both the front and back. The back crystal allows viewing of the internal components and serves to protect the watch. The central issue is whether the presence of the crystal window on the back means the watch case is not made “wholly of precious metal,” which would affect whether the watches are classified under HTSUS heading 9101 (lower duty rates) or heading 9102 (higher duty rates).Customs and Border Protection conducted an audit in 2016 and determined that the watches should be classified under heading 9102, rather than the heading 9101 under which Ildico had declared them. Customs’ decision resulted in higher duties. After Customs denied Ildico’s protest, Ildico filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade. The Trade Court agreed with Customs, holding that the sapphire crystal backs were part of the watch cases and, since they were not made wholly of precious metal, the watches did not qualify for heading 9101. The court specifically found that the rear crystal was part of the case, even if it could also be described as “watch glass.”On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that, under the relevant HTSUS provisions, the synthetic sapphire crystal back is part of the “watch case.” Because the case is thus not “wholly of precious metal,” the watches cannot be classified under heading 9101 and are properly classified under heading 9102. The court also held that an alternative argument—that the crystal is a “precious stone”—was not preserved for review. View "ILDICO INC. v. US " on Justia Law

Spanish investment companies alleged that Argentina unlawfully expropriated their airline investments, violating a bilateral treaty. After Argentina took over private airlines, the investors initiated arbitration at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The ICSID tribunal awarded over $320 million to the investors, and an internal appellate committee later affirmed the award and added more than $1 million in costs. The investors then assigned their rights to Titan Consortium 1, LLC, which sought enforcement of the award in the United States four years after the initial award.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed Titan’s petition to enforce the arbitral award. Argentina moved to dismiss, arguing the petition was untimely under a three-year statute of limitations. The district court denied the motion, holding that the twelve-year statute of limitations for enforcement of money judgments under D.C. Code § 15-101 applied. It granted summary judgment for Titan, enforcing the award.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed Argentina’s appeal, which challenged only the timeliness ruling. The court considered which statute of limitations applies to enforcement actions under 22 U.S.C. § 1650a, the statute implementing the Washington Convention. The court held that D.C. Code § 15-101’s twelve-year limitations period for enforcement of money judgments is the closest analogue and applies to petitions enforcing ICSID awards under § 1650a. It rejected Argentina’s arguments for a three-year limitations period under federal or D.C. arbitration statutes, noting the differences in statutory text and enforcement procedures. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding Titan’s enforcement action was timely. View "Titan Consortium 1, LLC v. Argentine Republic" on Justia Law

A Korean steel manufacturer faced severe financial challenges beginning in 2013 and underwent four debt-to-equity conversions during a corporate restructuring overseen by a committee of creditor banks, including a government-controlled institution. The first three conversions, between 2014 and 2018, were conducted by this creditors’ committee, while the fourth, in 2019, involved a public bidding process in which a private consortium acquired the company. The equity infusions were scrutinized as possible government subsidies subject to countervailing duties under U.S. trade law.Following a 2016 countervailing duty order by the Department of Commerce on certain Korean steel products, Commerce conducted several administrative reviews. In the fourth review, Commerce reversed its earlier findings and determined that the first three debt-to-equity conversions provided a countervailable benefit because private investor participation was found to be insignificant and the company was not equityworthy at the time. Commerce also found that the benefit of these subsidies was not extinguished by the company’s later acquisition, in part because the company did not contest the presumption of benefit pass-through.The United States Court of International Trade remanded Commerce’s findings, holding that Commerce could not change its practice of not re-examining earlier equity infusions absent new information, and that the agency’s determinations lacked sufficient justification and evidentiary support. On further remand, Commerce, under protest, found no countervailable benefit from the first three conversions, and the trial court sustained this result.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Commerce was permitted to revisit its determinations based on record evidence from later periods, and that its findings of countervailable benefit and benefit pass-through were supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to reinstate Commerce’s original determinations. View "KG DONGBU STEEL CO., LTD. v. US " on Justia Law

Two German nationals, Axel Diegelmann and his son Fritz, operated businesses trading in precious metals. In 2024, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) blocked the property of the Diegelmanns and three companies owned by Axel, finding that Axel, Fritz, and one company operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian economy, and that the other two companies were controlled by or acted on behalf of Axel. OFAC determined that the Diegelmanns had helped Russia-based metals companies buy and sell precious metals, circumventing international sanctions.The Diegelmanns challenged the sanctions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that their activities did not amount to operating in the metals and mining sector as defined by the relevant regulations. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, agreeing with OFAC’s application of the sanctions and denying the Diegelmanns’ motion for summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary-or-capricious standard, which is highly deferential, especially for national security matters. The appellate court held that purchasing finished precious metals, including gold bars, constituted “procuring geological materials” as used in the governing regulations. The court rejected the Diegelmanns’ argument that their conduct did not amount to procurement and found their alternative argument—that refined metals are not “geological materials”—was not preserved for appeal. The court also concluded that substantial evidence supported OFAC’s finding that the Diegelmanns’ activities were sufficiently connected to Russia. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Diegelmann v. Bessent" on Justia Law

A North Carolina software company initiated a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina against its former business partner, a Dutch entity, after their business relationship dissolved. The plaintiff alleged copyright and trademark infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, and various state law violations. Shortly after the complaint, the plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction limiting the defendant’s business activities. Meanwhile, the defendant commenced related litigation in the Netherlands. During those Dutch proceedings, the defendant’s American attorney, Pressly Millen, submitted an affidavit that the plaintiff claimed misrepresented the scope and timing of the U.S. litigation.The Dutch court initially denied the plaintiff’s request to stay the Dutch proceedings, partly relying on representations from the defendant’s counsel. The plaintiff returned to the North Carolina court, seeking an order requiring the defendant to correct these alleged misrepresentations in the Dutch court. The district court ordered the defendant to submit both its order and a corrective statement to the Dutch court. The defendant submitted the order but did not file the separate corrective statement. Later, the Dutch court stayed its proceedings. The plaintiff then moved for contempt sanctions in the North Carolina court against the defendant and its attorneys for failing to comply fully with the correction order. Following a show cause hearing, the district court held the defendant and Millen in civil contempt, sanctioning Millen by suspending his ability to practice in the district, though not holding him jointly liable for monetary sanctions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction to review the contempt order against Millen, a nonparty. The appellate court held that the district court abused its discretion by imposing civil contempt sanctions on Millen without clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff was harmed by Millen’s failure to submit the separate statement. The court vacated the civil contempt adjudication and sanction against Millen. View "Dmarcian, Inc. v. Millen" on Justia Law

During the Salvadoran civil war in March 1982, Mario Adalberto Reyes Mena, then a colonel in the Salvadoran Security Forces, allegedly ordered the ambush and killing of four Dutch journalists, including Jan Kuiper. The journalists were reporting on the conflict and had published material critical of the Salvadoran government. According to findings by a United Nations Truth Commission and a U.S. military investigation, the ambush was premeditated and orchestrated by Reyes Mena, with the intention of silencing unfavorable media coverage. Years later, Reyes Mena was indicted and convicted in absentia in El Salvador for these killings, while residing in Virginia.Gert Kuiper, Jan Kuiper’s brother, subsequently filed a civil action against Reyes Mena in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, pursuant to the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. He sought declaratory and monetary relief for the extrajudicial killing of his brother. Reyes Mena moved to dismiss the case, asserting conduct-based foreign official immunity under international common law. The district court denied the motion, holding that foreign official immunity does not extend to violations of jus cogens norms, such as extrajudicial killings, even if performed in an official capacity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of immunity on interlocutory appeal. The Fourth Circuit held that, under both international and domestic law, foreign officials are not entitled to conduct-based foreign official immunity for violations of jus cogens norms, including extrajudicial killings, regardless of whether such acts were performed in an official capacity. The court affirmed the district court’s order denying Reyes Mena immunity and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kuiper v. Mena" on Justia Law

Several individuals who practice Falun Gong, a religious movement originating in China, asserted that they were persecuted by the Chinese Government due to their beliefs. They alleged that Cisco Systems, Inc. and its executives enabled this persecution by providing surveillance technology that assisted Chinese authorities in identifying and apprehending them. The plaintiffs claimed that Cisco and its executives were liable for aiding and abetting multiple violations of international law, including torture and crimes against humanity, under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). Additionally, one plaintiff sought to hold two Cisco executives liable for aiding and abetting torture under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, addressing whether aiding-and-abetting liability could be imposed under the ATS and TVPA. The Ninth Circuit found that aiding-and-abetting liability was viable under both statutes, concluding that such liability was supported by international norms and that no prudential reasons justified withholding it.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case to determine if courts may recognize aiding-and-abetting liability under the ATS and the TVPA. The Court held that federal courts may not create new causes of action for violations of international norms under the ATS, closing the possibility for such judicially created claims. The Court further held that the TVPA does not provide for aiding-and-abetting liability, as its language does not expressly allow for such claims. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe" on Justia Law

After the Cuban revolution in 1959, the Cuban government seized numerous foreign-owned properties, including Exxon’s oil refinery and related facilities in Cuba. Two Cuban government-controlled companies, CUPET and CIMEX, subsequently operated these assets. Exxon, a U.S. corporation, was unable to pursue legal remedies for decades until Congress enacted the Helms-Burton Act in 1996, which created a private right of action for U.S. nationals whose property was confiscated by the Cuban Government. The Act allows lawsuits against any “person” trafficking in such property, with “person” defined to include agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state.Exxon sued CUPET, CIMEX, and CIMEX’s Panamanian affiliate in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking damages for the use of its expropriated assets under the Helms-Burton Act. The Cuban companies moved to dismiss, arguing that they were immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which provides immunity to foreign states and their agencies unless an exception applies. The District Court agreed and dismissed the case, finding that Exxon had not met any relevant FSIA exception. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that suits under the Helms-Burton Act must also satisfy an FSIA exception.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the Helms-Burton Act itself abrogates the foreign sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities. The Court determined that plaintiffs suing these entities under the Act need not also meet an FSIA exception. The Court found that the statutory text, structure, and the President’s explicit power to suspend claims under the Act all indicate that Congress created a standalone exception to sovereign immunity for suits authorized by the Helms-Burton Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S. A." on Justia Law

A mother removed her eight-year-old son, B.B., from Finland, where he had lived his entire life, to the United States, in violation of a Finnish joint custody agreement with the child’s father. The parents had previously separated amid the mother’s allegations of abuse, though those allegations were disputed and did not involve direct harm to B.B. After the mother settled in Ohio, the father filed a petition in federal court pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, seeking the child’s return to Finland.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio conducted a two-day hearing, including an in-camera interview with the child. The district court found that the father established a wrongful removal under the Convention. The court then examined the mother’s defenses under Article 12 and Article 13, rejecting claims of consent and grave risk of harm. Ultimately, the district court found that the age and maturity exception applied: B.B., though only eight, was found sufficiently mature for his views to be considered, and he clearly objected to returning to Finland for several particularized reasons. The court also found no clear evidence of undue influence by the mother over the child’s testimony.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err in finding B.B. sufficiently mature or in crediting his particularized objections to return. The court further found no clear error in the district court’s assessment of the absence of undue influence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition for return. View "Boa-Bonsu v. Owusu" on Justia Law