Justia International Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs, a group of American service members and their families affected by the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, sought to enforce multi-billion-dollar judgments against Iran. They aimed to obtain $1.68 billion held in an account with Clearstream Banking, a Luxembourg-based financial institution, representing bond investments made in New York on behalf of Bank Markazi, Iran’s central bank. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Clearstream and Bank Markazi to turn over the account contents. Clearstream and Bank Markazi appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ turnover claim against Bank Markazi. However, it determined that the district court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Clearstream. The court also found that Clearstream’s challenge to the constitutionality of 22 U.S.C. § 8772, which makes certain assets available to satisfy judgments against Iran, failed. Despite this, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs without applying state law to determine the ownership of the assets.The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's order and judgment. It remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to determine whether Bank Markazi is an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and to apply state law to ascertain the parties' interests in the assets before applying 22 U.S.C. § 8772. View "Peterson v. Bank Markazi" on Justia Law

In 2010, four individuals sued the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) under the Anti-Terrorism Act, resulting in a default judgment of $318 million against FARC. Unable to collect from FARC, the plaintiffs sought to garnish assets of Samark José López Bello and his companies, alleging they were agents or instrumentalities of FARC. The district court initially ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, mandating a jury trial to determine the agency status of López and his companies.On remand, the district court scheduled a jury trial and allowed discovery. The plaintiffs sought to depose López and requested documents. López and his companies filed motions for protective orders to avoid discovery, which the district court denied, warning of sanctions for non-compliance. López failed to appear for his deposition and did not comply with document requests. Consequently, the district court entered default judgments against López and his companies, citing willful disobedience and the inability to compel compliance due to López's fugitive status.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's entry of default judgments, finding no abuse of discretion. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court correctly interpreted its scheduling order to allow discovery and found that López's failure to comply with discovery orders was willful. The court also determined that less severe sanctions would not ensure compliance, given López's fugitive status. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction due to an appeal of the protective order denials, as those orders were not final or immediately appealable. View "Stansell v. Lopez Bello" on Justia Law

Yi-Chi Shih, a UCLA electrical engineering professor, was convicted of violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by exporting monolithic microwave integrated circuits (MMICs) to China without a license. These MMICs, which amplify microwave signals, were used in collaboration with Chinese engineers for a military weapons development project. Shih misrepresented the export status of the MMICs to the U.S.-based foundry, Cree, to facilitate their manufacture and export.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially entered a judgment of acquittal on the IEEPA violation counts but later reinstated the conspiracy count upon reconsideration. At sentencing, the court applied a base offense level of 14, resulting in a 63-month sentence. Both parties appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reinstated the substantive IEEPA violation conviction and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court applied a base offense level of 26, concluding that Shih's conduct evaded national security controls, resulting in an 85-month sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the export controls Shih evaded were implemented for national security reasons, as the relevant Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) listed national security as a reason for control. The court rejected Shih's argument that the controls were solely for foreign policy reasons and his attempt to characterize his conduct as a mere recordkeeping offense. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the higher base offense level of 26 was appropriate and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "USA V. SHIH" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two companies over the enforcement of standard-essential patents (SEPs) related to the 5G wireless-communication standard. The plaintiff, a telecommunications company, had made a commitment to license its SEPs on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The defendant, another technology company, sought an antisuit injunction to prevent the plaintiff from enforcing injunctions it had obtained in Colombia and Brazil based on these SEPs.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied the defendant's request for an antisuit injunction. The district court applied a three-part framework to analyze the request, focusing on whether the domestic suit would be dispositive of the foreign actions. The court concluded that the domestic suit would not necessarily result in a global cross-license between the parties and therefore did not meet the threshold requirement for issuing an antisuit injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court vacated the district court's denial and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court concluded that the district court had erred in its interpretation of the "dispositive" requirement. Specifically, the appellate court held that the FRAND commitment precludes the plaintiff from pursuing SEP-based injunctive relief unless it has first complied with its obligation to negotiate in good faith over a license to those SEPs. Since whether the plaintiff had complied with this obligation was an issue before the district court, the appellate court determined that the "dispositive" requirement was met.The appellate court did not decide whether the defendant was ultimately entitled to the antisuit injunction, leaving that determination to the district court's discretion upon further analysis. The case was remanded for the district court to consider the remaining parts of the foreign-antisuit-injunction framework. View "TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON v. LENOVO (UNITED STATES), INC. " on Justia Law

Shamrock Building Materials, Inc. imported steel tubing from Mexico, which had a thin interior coating primarily composed of epoxy, melamine, and silicone additives. The United States Customs and Border Protection classified the tubing under heading 7306 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), which pertains to other tubes and pipes of iron or nonalloy steel. Shamrock contested this classification, arguing that the tubing should be classified under heading 8547 of the HTSUS, which covers electrical conduit tubing of base metal lined with insulating material. Customs rejected Shamrock's protests.The United States Court of International Trade reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the United States, upholding Customs' classification under heading 7306. The court found that the interior coating of the tubing did not provide significant electrical insulation, which is a requirement for classification under heading 8547. The court noted that the coating's primary function was to facilitate the installation of electrical wires by reducing friction, rather than providing electrical insulation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the decision of the Court of International Trade. The Federal Circuit agreed with the lower court's interpretation that heading 8547 requires a commercially significant level of electrical insulation. The court found that Shamrock did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the interior coating of the tubing provided such insulation. Consequently, the court held that the tubing was correctly classified under heading 7306 of the HTSUS. View "SHAMROCK BUILDING MATERIALS, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

The case involves Havana Docks Corporation, which held a 99-year usufructuary concession at the Port of Havana, Cuba. This concession, granted in 1905, allowed Havana Docks to build and operate piers at the port. The Cuban Government expropriated this concession in 1960, and Havana Docks has not received compensation for this expropriation. The concession was set to expire in 2004. Havana Docks filed a claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, which certified its loss at $9.179 million.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled in favor of Havana Docks, awarding over $100 million in judgments against four cruise lines—Royal Caribbean Cruises, Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Carnival Corporation, and MSC Cruises—for trafficking in the confiscated property from 2016 to 2019. The court found that the cruise lines had engaged in trafficking by docking their ships at the terminal, using the property to embark and disembark passengers, and using it as a starting and ending point for shore excursions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Havana Docks' limited property interest had expired in 2004, and therefore, the cruise lines did not traffic in the confiscated property from 2016 to 2019. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that Havana Docks is a U.S. national under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act but reversed the judgments against the cruise lines for the 2016-2019 period. The case was remanded for further proceedings regarding Havana Docks' claims against Carnival for alleged trafficking from 1996 to 2001. View "Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd." on Justia Law

A Canadian company, J.D. Irving (JDI), challenged the U.S. Department of Commerce's assignment of an antidumping duty cash deposit rate of 11.59% on its softwood lumber products from Canada. This rate was determined in the final results of the second administrative review (AR 2) of an antidumping duty order. JDI argued that its cash deposit rate should remain at 1.57%, the rate assigned in the first administrative review (AR 1). JDI filed a complaint with the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), asserting that the CIT had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the court's residual jurisdiction.The CIT dismissed JDI's case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was not appropriate because jurisdiction could have been available under § 1581(c). The CIT noted that JDI's action was essentially a challenge to the final results of AR 2, which is reviewable under § 1581(c). Additionally, the CIT found that JDI had not demonstrated that the remedy provided by administrative review and binational panel review under the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) would be manifestly inadequate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT's dismissal. The court held that the true nature of JDI's suit was a challenge to the AR 2 final results, making § 1581(c) the proper jurisdiction. The court also determined that JDI had not met its burden to show that the alternative remedies of administrative review and binational panel review would be manifestly inadequate. The court emphasized that binational panels have the authority to review and remand final antidumping determinations, and Commerce must take action consistent with the panel's decision. Therefore, the CIT's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was affirmed. View "J.D. IRVING, LTD. v. US " on Justia Law

The case involves the importation of door thresholds by Worldwide Door Components, Inc. and Columbia Aluminum Products, LLC. These companies sought a determination from the Department of Commerce that their imported door thresholds were not subject to existing antidumping and countervailing duty orders on aluminum extrusions from China. The door thresholds in question are assemblies containing both extruded aluminum and non-aluminum components, which the companies argued should be excluded from the orders under the finished merchandise exception.The United States Court of International Trade initially reviewed the case and remanded it to the Department of Commerce for further consideration. The court found that the Department had misinterpreted the scope of the orders and failed to properly consider whether the door thresholds qualified for the finished merchandise exception. On remand, the Department again found the thresholds to be within the scope of the orders, categorizing them as subassemblies. The Court of International Trade disagreed, remanding the case multiple times for further analysis and clarification.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Department of Commerce's determination that the door thresholds were subassemblies was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the Department had provided a thorough analysis of the scope language and relevant record evidence, including statements from the companies themselves. The court also clarified that subassemblies and finished merchandise are mutually exclusive categories under the orders, meaning that the Department was not required to consider the finished merchandise exception once it determined the thresholds were subassemblies.The Federal Circuit reversed the Court of International Trade's second remand order and reinstated the Department of Commerce's first remand redetermination, which found the door thresholds to be subassemblies and therefore within the scope of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders. The court vacated all subsequent opinions and orders by the Court of International Trade. View "WORLDWIDE DOOR COMPONENTS, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

The case involves plaintiffs who are individuals and entities harmed by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. They brought claims against the Republic of Sudan under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), specifically invoking the state-sponsored terrorism exception under § 1605A. The plaintiffs allege that Sudan provided material support to al Qaeda, which facilitated the attacks. Sudan moved to dismiss the actions, asserting foreign sovereign immunity under the FSIA.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Sudan’s motion to dismiss. The district court found that Sudan lacked immunity under two terrorism-related exceptions to the FSIA: § 1605A and § 1605B. Sudan then filed a notice of appeal, seeking interlocutory review of the district court’s denial of immunity under § 1605B and the repealed § 1605(a)(7), but not under § 1605A. Sudan argued that the collateral-order doctrine permitted immediate appeals from denials of immunity under the FSIA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The main issue was whether § 1605A(f) of the FSIA, which limits appeals in actions brought under § 1605A, barred Sudan’s appeal. The court held that § 1605A(f) eliminates all interlocutory appeals under the collateral-order doctrine from orders falling within its scope, including Sudan’s proposed appeal. The court concluded that because the district court’s order was nonfinal and the plaintiffs’ actions were brought under § 1605A, the appellate bar applied. Consequently, the court dismissed Sudan’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "In re: Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001" on Justia Law

Juan Jose Paramo, the defendant-appellant, is involved in a legal dispute with Banco Mercantil de Norte, S.A. and Arrendadora y Factor Banorte, S.A. de C.V. (the Banorte Parties). The Banorte Parties allege that Paramo committed large-scale fraud in Mexico and fled to the United States. They are pursuing a civil lawsuit in Mexico and sought discovery in the U.S. under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to locate and seize Paramo’s assets. The Banorte Parties filed an ex parte request for discovery assistance, which the district court granted, authorizing subpoenas for Paramo and two other individuals.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted the Banorte Parties' petition and authorized the subpoenas. Paramo filed a motion to quash the subpoenas, arguing that the discovery request was overly broad and that the Intel factors favored him. The district court denied Paramo’s motion in a brief order without waiting for his reply or holding a hearing. Paramo appealed the decision, arguing that the district court failed to provide reasoning for its denial and violated local rules by not allowing him to file a reply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide any reasoning for its decision to deny Paramo’s motion to quash. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that district courts must explain their decisions when granting or denying motions to quash § 1782 subpoenas to allow for effective appellate review. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to provide a reasoned decision. The court did not address the substantive arguments regarding the Intel factors or the scope of the discovery request. View "Banco Mercantil de Norte, S.A. v. Paramo" on Justia Law